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ABSTRACT 
The Biotech dispute at WTO received a great deal of attention, and reopened a wide-
ranging debate over the benefits of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and 
their effects on human health and the environment. The dispute was complex and 
involved a high level of political sensitivity. It brought attention to procedural and 
substantive issues in which the roles of science and precaution, and the 
interrelationship between trade law and international law took centre stage. It raised 
questions as to the degree of risk acceptable to society, as well as questions 
regarding the regulation of GMOs in the face of continuing uncertainty about the 
risks they may pose to human health and the environment.  
This thesis explores both the conceptual foundations and the legal aspects of this 
debate. It argues that extending the scope of the SPS Agreement in the manner the 
Biotech decision did is problematic, and overburdens the EU with demonstrating 
that its GMO authorisation framework is based on scientific risk assessments and 
not otherwise disguised restrictions on trade.  
This thesis also highlights that the conflict surrounding GMOs is not limited to the 
World Trade Organization. By leaving little room for the application of 
precautionary approaches and non-scientific factors, the Panel largely failed to 
recognise the institutional and discursive complexity in which the conflict about 
GMOs is embedded. The thesis concludes that increased sensitivity of WTO law to 
environmental and non-scientific factors will reduce the existing tension allowing 
it to coexist with other international treaties. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are organisms, such as plants and animals, 
whose genetic characteristics are being modified artificially in order to give them a new 
property.1 The commercial adoption of GMOs has been growing rapidly, making them 
increasingly important; genetically modified crops (GM crops) are fast joining 
agriculture throughout the world.2  
In this century, more and more of the foods we eat will be produced by organisms that 
have been genetically altered through modern biotechnology. Food and feed which 
contain or consist of such GMOs, or are produced from GMOs, are called genetically 
modified food or feed (GM food or feed).3  They offer significant potential benefits to 
society, including increase in crop production, resistance to pests and weeds, and added 
nutritional value. However, the safety of GMOs is still unknown. Concerns stem from 
a lack of scientific certainty regarding GMOs and their impact on human health and 
surrounding environment.4  
The European Union (EU)5 and the United States of America (‘United States’ or ‘US’) 
strongly disagree over the EU's regulation of GM food and feed.6 The disagreement 
                                                 
1 GMO technology is an application of modern biotechnology, which is also used for biological and 
medical research, production of pharmaceutical drugs and experimental medicine. For more on the 
definition of GMOs, see Chapter 2, section 2.1 
2 Clive James, ‘Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops’ (ISAAA Brief 43, ISAAA 2011) 
http://www.isaaa.org, accessed June 2012.  See also Chapter 2,  section 2.6.2  
3 As defined under Art 2(2) of Directive 2001/18/EC on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms’, and Art 2(2) of its predecessor, Directive 90/220/EC, and, under Art. 
1(2) (a), 1(2) (b) of EC Regulation (EC) 258/97 concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients; 
Chapter 2, section 2.1- 2.4 addresses the definitional problem of GMOs.  
4 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology (Biotechnology 
Regulation Series, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008) 
5 On 1 December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (done at Lisbon, 13 December 2007) entered into force.  On 29 
November 2009, the WTO received a Verbal Note (WT/L/779) from the Council of the European Union 
and the Commission of the European Communities stating that, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon, as of 
1 December 2009, the European Union replaces and succeeds the European Community. 
6 Chapter 3 covers the diverging policies of the EU and the US; Jonathan B Wiener and Michael D 
Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and Europe’ (2002) 5(4) Journal of risk Research, 
317; Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues 
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involves biotechnology companies, governmental regulators, non-governmental 
organizations and scientists. The debate is most intense in Europe, where public 
concern about GM foods is higher than in other parts of the world, such as the United 
States, Argentina, Canada, and Brazil. GM crops are more widely grown in these 
countries, and the introduction of such products has been less controversial.7 
The United States has chosen to regulate both GM foods and seeds under existing laws, 
assuming that GMOs are substantially equivalent to conventional crops, which can be 
described as reactive legislation.8 Conversely, the European Union has adopted a 
distinctive, complex, and specific legislation within which genetically modified foods 
and crops may be developed, introduced into the environment, and worked into the 
food supply. This regulatory framework can be described as precautionary.9 
In the past decade, political tension arose between the leading producers of GMOs, 
such as the US, Canada, Argentina, and the EU, because the latter put in place a 
deliberate suspension of its own GMO approval process until it adopt further legislation 
on labelling and traceability of GMOs, which negatively affected their exports to the 
EU’s market.10  
This tension has led the GMO issue directly into the World Trade Organizations’ 
(WTO)11 Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). In August 2003, multiple formal complaints 
                                                 
Surrounding Genetically Modified Food’  (DECEMBER 2005) 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Biotech
_USEU1205.pdf. Accessed 03 Feb 2009; David Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and 
the United States’, manuscript for publication in (2003) 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law. 
7 Clive James, (n 2); See also Chapter 2 section 2.6 
8 A reactive regulation, in which safety or other studies or regulatory restrictions are mandated only on 
evidence of the substantiality of a health or environmental risk or actual harm. On the US regulations 
see Maria R Lee Muramoto, ‘Reforming the ‘uncoordinated’ Framework for Regulation of 
Biotechnology’(2012) 17(2) Drake J Agri L 311; Margaret Rosso Grossman ‘Genetically Modified 
Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability 
in Tort’ in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell (eds), the Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Organisms: Comparative approaches (OUP, 2010) 
9 On the EU’s regulatory framework, see Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs Law (no 4)  
10 See David Vogel, ‘The New Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe’  (2001) CARR Discussion paper 
no 3, LSE London, p 3-4 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35984/1/Disspaper3.pdf  Accessed 4 March 2006; See 
also Chapter 3 section 2.4  
11 The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 by the Final Act Embodying the results of the 
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (15 April 1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125. The WTO 
Agreement establishes the WTO, and all other Agreements are annexed to this agreement. See 
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were filed by the US, Argentina, and Canada12 to the WTO against the EU’s alleged 
moratorium on the approval of GMOs during the period of October 1998 to August 
2003, as well as against some of the EU Member States’ national bans on GMOs and 
GM foods. The US, Canada, and Argentina argued that the de facto EU moratorium (a 
period of six years in which the EU authorised no genetically modified organisms) was 
not scientifically justified and amounted to an unfair trade barrier. The complainants 
also argued that the EU approval system for GM products was not working properly, 
even though the de facto moratorium had been lifted. This complaint became known 
as the European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products (hereinafter ‘EC-Biotech’, or ‘Biotech’ dispute).13 
It wasn’t until September 2006 that the final ruling became public.14 In its Report, the 
WTOs’ DSU Panel (‘the Panel’) addressed the various categories of European Union 
and EU Member State measures that were challenged, and found inconsistencies with 
the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).15 
Nevertheless, the Panel emphasised that its Report did not examine the safety of 
GMOs, and that it did not examine the legitimacy of current EU legislation. Violations 
found in connection with the approval process relate solely to the procedural 
requirement not to cause ‘undue delay’.16 The Panel did not find other violations of the 
SPS Agreement in this context. Thus, the WTO findings were neither a verdict in 
favour of GMOs, nor a prohibition to regulate the use of GMOs based on precaution. 
Moreover, the Panel avoided addressing a number of legal issues that many expected 
                                                 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (15 April 1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994), entered into force Jan. 1, 1995. [Hereinafter ‘WTO Agreements’]. 
12 Request for Consultations by the United States, EC-Biotech (WT/DS291), Request for Consultations 
by Canada EC-Biotech (WT/DS292), and Request for Consultations by Argentina EC-Biotech 
(WT/DS293). 
13 See European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, AND WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006). [hereinafter ‘Biotech’] 
14 This ruling was later adopted without appeal by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on 21 November 
2006.  
15 Phytosanitary refers to the health of plants, Agreement on the application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, (15 April 1994) 1867 UNTS 493.  
16 Panel Reports, Biotech, (n 13) pp1081-1087. This high-profile case brought attention to several 
procedural issues pertaining to the dispute settlement system, such as the role of advisory experts and of 
amicus curiae briefs, as well as the extended time taken in resolving these special cases, which are 
marked with a high level of complexity and political sensitivity. 
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would be addressed in this case, such as the role of science, the precaution principle, 
and the inter-relationship between trade law and public international law.17 In fact, the 
Panel explicitly stated that it did not address the question whether EU product-by 
product approval procedures were consistent with EU obligations under the WTO 
agreements. If the approval procedures as such were to be challenged, it should be done 
by filing a new complaint.  
The complainants timed the filing of the complaint to fall after their ratification and 
before the entry into force of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety the (Cartagena 
Protocol).18 With large base of 164 parties, the Cartagena Protocol is widely considered 
a multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), and aims to ensure the safe handling, 
transport, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) resulting from modern 
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, while also taking 
into account risks to human health. Of great importance to the EU position and this 
thesis is that the Cartagena Protocol allows a precautionary approach in risk 
assessment.19 
The WTO Biotech dispute reflects a deep disagreement over wide ranging issues 
concerning the regulation of GMOs affecting the trade of GM crops and GM products. 
In particular, the Biotech case demonstrates great resistance in the EU to allowing 
unrestricted marketing of GMO products, in contrast with the relaxed approval and 
marketing of GMOs in the US, Canada, and Argentina. Therefore, the ruling is of key 
importance not only to the parties of the dispute, but also to a long list of countries 
registered as third parties to the dispute, as well as to many developing countries 
considering introducing laws to regulate GM crops and products.  
                                                 
17 Such as the definition of ‘undue delay’, the role of science and precaution, and the inter-relationship 
between trade law and public international law. There remain, however, several questions on which the 
panel commented either inconclusively or not at all. 
18Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 29 January 2000, 
1760 UNTS 9, reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000) UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3, Article 42. 
[hereinafter ‘Cartagena Protocol’] The reference here is to Canada and Argentina; the USA did not sign 
the Cartagena Protocol. See also Chapter 4 section 3.1.2. 
19 For detailed analysis of the Cartagena Protocol see Christoph Bail, et al (eds), The Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development?( Earthscan 
Publications 2002) 
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The debate surrounding the dispute and GM foods and food products, in general, 
involves moral, environmental, human health, and consumer fears raised by food safety 
related concerns, the ethical challenges of gene research, unease about corporate 
control of intellectual property rights in seed varieties, and worry over agriculture.20 
Considering that environmental issues have become increasingly important, this thesis 
will be limited to human health and environmental aspects (i.e. biosafety aspects)21 of 
genetic modification in particular.  
The US has embraced biotechnology, and is the biggest producer of GMOs.22 The US 
was the main driving force behind Biotech dispute due to its clash in regulatory and 
cultural attitudes with the EU over authorisation and access of GMOs.23 It is therefore 
not surprising that the United States is also the most frequent complainant, defendant 
and third party intervener in WTO dispute settlement proceedings.24  This thesis will 
focus on the EU and US, which collectively, account for almost half of world trade, 
because they exhibit striking variations in regulatory outcomes, and because their 
polices strongly effect what other countries do. It does not explore the Argentina and 
Canadian arguments or regulatory systems, except where it is part of the general 
arguments.25 
                                                 
20 There is no attempt to cover matters of intellectual property law, except in Chapter 2 where it was 
used as an example of unease about corporate control of intellectual property rights. Similarly, consumer 
fears raised by food safety related concerns, and the ethical challenges of gene research are used to prove 
the extent of uncertainty and disagreement surrounding the science behind GMOs. 
21 ‘Biosafety’ is the prevention of large-scale loss of biological integrity, focusing both 
on ecology and human health. Biosafety and the environment: An introduction to the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety GE.03-01836/E. UNEP. (undated) p.8 http://www.unep.org/dgef/Portals/43/cpbs-unep-
cbd-en.pdf accessed January 2013 
22  See Chapter 2, section 2.6; and Clive James, (n 2)  
23 US government representatives confirmed that the main issue at stake was the EU’s GMO regulation, 
see USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ (March 2013) USTR 
3-4 http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20SPS.pdf. Accessed 2 April 13; Petros C Mavroidis, 
‘The trade disputes Concerning Health Policy Between the EC and the US’ in Ernest-Ulrich Petersmann 
& Mark A Pollack, (eds) Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US, and the WTO (International 
Economic Law, OUP, 2003) p 243; Thomas Bernauer; Genes Trade and Regulations: The Seeds of 
Conflict in Biotechnology (Princeton University Press 2003) p 120.  
24 See WTO ‘Disputes by country/territory’ 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm. Accessed 12 December 2012.   
25 Similar to the US, Canada and Argentina applied the conventional scientific risk assessment approach. 
See Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral Legal 
Frameworks, (UNCTD, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No.29, UN– 
New York and Geneva, 2005) p.4. 
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The focus 
Acknowledging that the WTO’s central objective is to promote ‘trade liberalisation’, 
the Biotech dispute challenged the ability of WTO to balance free trade in GMOs with 
measures that are designed to protect the environment and public health which is 
protected under the Cartagena Protocol.26 Tensions between the two regimes are 
explored, specifically the significant impact that trade has on the environment. Many 
describe the ruling as a missed opportunity for the WTO to protect the environment 
and public health.27  
Bearing this in mind, the conflict about GMOs is not limited to the WTO. The thesis 
also offers an insight into a variety of legal interactions between the WTO, and the 
Cartagena Protocol, the EU and the US. This institutional diversity reflects the complex 
structure of the global economic system, which is governed by multiple legal systems. 
This expanding network of economic laws is not based on a coherent set of normative 
or institutional hierarchies. It is an emerging ‘disorder of orders’ with horizontal and 
vertical connections between legal systems and other non-legal normative systems.28   
This thesis will assess whether, in the after math of Biotech dispute, the EU will be able 
to maintain and develop its regulatory system for GMOs that allows for the use of 
precautionary measures to protect the environment and public health. Whilst the 
regulation of GMOs over a variety of topics including labelling and traceability, this 
thesis is primarily concerned with the authorisation framework. This focus is justified 
because the complaining countries in Biotech only challenged EU’s authorisation 
framework, namely the 'suspension' and 'failure' by the EU to consider applications for 
approval of GM products. 
                                                 
26 Biosafety and the environment: An introduction to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  GE.03-
01836/E. UNEP. (undated) p. 8 
27 For example, Joseph McMahon, ‘The EC- Biotech Decision: Another Missed opportunity?’ in Luc 
Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell (eds), The Regulation Of Geneitically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative Approaches (OUP, 2010)  
28 Robert Cryer et al., Research Methodologies in the EU and International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 
p. 22. 
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It is necessary to identify the implications of this ruling for the potential means 
available to the EU or other WTO members in regulating or taking decisions with effect 
on the cross-border movement of GMOs. Whether the EU’s regulations on GMOs 
remain ongoing source of trade tension with the US? How wide is the regulatory 
discretion of WTO members? How should MS balance their obligations, particularly 
if competing under different treaties? How might WTO Members respond to those 
uncertain risks?  
In answering the above question, the thesis investigates the nexus between institutions 
and discourse from a legal perspective. It starts by focusing on the WTO, critically 
analysing the reports of the WTO Panel. This thesis, in particular, analyses the 
application and scope of the SPS, the lack of consensus in scientific knowledge, and 
the contentious application of the precautionary principle. In carrying out the analysis, 
this thesis offers insight into the basics of the science relating to GMOs, benefits versus 
risks, corporations versus civil society, including their interaction with the WTO, and 
international environmental agreements and Member States.  
Questions of risks to human health and the environment, traditionally a matter over 
which national governments enjoyed virtually unlimited regulatory control have now 
become subject to substantial constraint dictated by international legal rules. It is 
important to clarify that it is not the intention of this thesis to provide full analysis of 
risk regulation; rather there is a modest analysis of risk regulation in chapter two which 
explains the competing paradigms of ‘sound science’ and ‘precautionary principle’ 
which have been used throughout the thesis. 
 
Methodology 
This thesis will provide an analytical account of the free trade of GMOs under the WTO 
as they relate to both other obligations under national law and to international treaties. 
The author approaches the subject in an interdisciplinary perspective approach that 
allow a more comprehensive understanding in international law. This methodology has 
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been employed throughout chapters. The analysis will be pitched at a conceptual level, 
and will draw from, for illustrative purposes, both legal material and social sciences 
explaining the way the legal systems work and interact with international law.  
The methodology used is largely based on a review of relevant primary and secondary 
sources in the field of trade and environment. The primary and secondary sources 
includes:  a selection of legal texts, Reports of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body 
and it’s Appellate Body, international treaties, international documents, policy 
documents academic articles, comments of various authors, NGOs newspapers, and the 
web.  
Value of the research 
GMO technology (Agricultural biotechnology) is the fastest growing technology the 
world has seen. The outcome of the Biotech dispute has the potential to shape and steer 
the direction of the further development of GMO technology, particularly given the 
fact that once GM crops are released into the environment for cultivation they are hard 
to contain, borders cannot control their movement, and they may cross-pollinate with 
relative species.   
Concerns about the effects of GMOs are continuously being considered at the national 
and international levels in a variety of forums. Outcomes of such deliberations include 
the recent adoption of Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability 
and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,29 and the EU Commission’s 
announcement allowing EU Member States more discretion over where GM crops are 
grown, reflecting major reversal of opinion.30 The rules included in different legal 
instruments remain inconsistent with each other, and may give rise to further conflicts 
between GMO exporting countries and potential importers.   
                                                 
29 Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (The Nagoya – Kuala 
Lumpur Supplementary Protocol) Nagoya, 16.10.2010.  http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/ 
accessed 10 Nov 2012 
30 ‘GMOs: Member States to be given full responsibility on cultivation in their territories’, Commission 
Press Release, IP/10/921 (Brussels, 13 Jul 2010). 
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This first GMO case before the WTO's tribunal is of historic importance due to its 
manifold legal, political, and economic aspects, not to mention its social, 
developmental, and cultural ramifications and implications. Whether the law can 
evolve fast enough to provide the right balance to better serve all the parties at stake, 
we need to, at a minimum, think hard about approaches that can work not just in the 
US or just in the EU, but rather that make GMOs useful and safer on a global scale. 
Therefore, this is a timely research with the growing recognition of the need for 
international cooperation and regulation, as part of the rule of law, being a vital aspect 
for the future. The thesis will therefore be of practical use to stakeholders and policy 
makers alike. It pools the findings of a cross section of studies to look at the 
implications therein, and examine the arising biosafety and trade issues with special 
reference to developing countries. 
 
This thesis is organized along the following lines: 
Chapter 1 focuses on the way the dispute was settled under the WTO regime. It starts 
with a general overview of the WTO and a critical analysis of the main issues of the 
WTO’s GMO dispute (EC-Biotech - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products). This is done by reference to relevant previous disputes brought 
before the WTO, such as the EC- Hormones, and Australia-Salmon cases. This chapter 
highlights the dispute’s most important current and prospective legal issues in order to 
determine to what extent the findings or reasoning of the Biotech Dispute might 
influence the ongoing trade and ‘biosafety’ debate. 
In Biotech, the parties used the uncertainty associated with science to justify their 
positions. At the heart of the dispute was disagreement about the definition and nature 
of GMOs. Chapter 2) addresses this problem, it explores how the determination of risks 
to health and the environment has come to be heavily reliant on science, provides a 
background to the development and science of biotechnology, and explains the 
complex nature of GMOs. It provides context by way of outlining historical 
background, current developments, different applications of GMOs, and current 
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statistics on their use. It also explores arguments for and against cultivation and use of 
GMOs. It also addresses the difficulty facing regulators conducting risk assessments 
before authorization and release in the market.  It further explains the importance of 
these new products for the complainants, corporations, civil society, third parties, and 
how the Ruling of the trade dispute will affect the choices of developing countries with 
regard to the regulation and adoption of GMOs.  
Chapter 3 lays out regulation of GMOs in the EU and the US, outlining attitudes that 
underpin the differences in regulation. This chapter analyses the conceptual framework 
with respect to national regulation and its justification. It begins by examining the EU’s 
regulations of GMOs, and underlines its recent legislative changes that led to the 
dispute. It also briefly illustrates how the attitude of the United States towards GMOs 
diverges from that of the EU. Additionally, Chapter 3 highlights and contrasts the 
motives behind the disparate approaches towards GMOs of the EU and the US. It 
concludes by identifying future layers of complexity related to this debate, as well as 
crucial issues that require attention such as safety of GMOs, labelling, and coexistence. 
Chapter 4 situates the GMO debate within international law. First, it explains the choice 
of law in the WTO, and the controversial science-based requirements of the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in contrast and comparison to the 
GATT and TBT Agreement. It then provides a critical analysis of the Biotech Panel’s 
findings and interpretations on the scope of the SPS Agreement. The chapter also 
evaluates the Panel’s understanding of key concepts and basic definitions on science, 
such as ‘risk assessment’, ‘uncertainty’, and ‘precaution’, in light of broader 
institutional questions when the WTO dispute settlement system rules on legal 
complaints over EU regulatory framework on GMOs. Additionally, the chapter 
outlines the relevant system of governance applying to GMOs, which involves 
overlapping and sometimes conflicting regulations promulgated at the national, EU, 
and international levels. It will focus on controversial science-based requirements of 
the SPS Agreement, in contrast to the Cartagena protocol and CBD. A broader 
understanding is an essential tool for scrutinizing EU GMO regulations under current 
international trade law. Finally, the chapter concludes that increased sensitivity of 
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WTO law to environmental and non-scientific factors will allow it to coexist with other 
international treaties. 
The final chapter contains summary of the findings of the thesis, as well as the 
conclusions and highlights drawn therefrom. In general, regards the possible influences 
that the GMO dispute may have on the trade and environment debate, and in particular, 
concerning the significant implications of the Panel’s ruling on the EU or any other 
WTO Member’s ability to develop and maintain a regulatory system that allows 
precautionary measure. 
 
 
 
 
The law and cases are current as of 30th November 2012. For the integrity of the 
discussion, a few materials dated later than 30th February 2013 are included. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE GMOs AT THE WTO: WHERE DO WE STAND AFTER  
THE BIOTECH DIPUTE? 
  
‘In a world dominated by trade, it is the WTO that dominates trade.’1 
 
1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the GMO dispute before the World Trade Organization.   The 
European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products2 addresses various EU and EU Member State measures 
challenged by the US, Canada, and Argentina. The dispute raises a wide range of 
complex factual, scientific, and legal issues concerning the regulation of GMOs, 
affecting the international trade of GM crops and GM products. 
Over the three year course of the dispute, the parties submitted hundreds of pages 
of briefs and dozens of factual exhibits. The panel also called upon six independent 
scientific experts, who submitted hundreds of pages of materials and spent two days 
with the panel and the parties to opine on scientific issues related to the dispute. 
The result was a comprehensive Panel Report more than 1,000 pages in length, with 
hundreds of additional pages of Annexes.3 
The decision is significant because it affects whether countries have the ability to 
determine their own approaches on GM crops and food, and whether citizens are 
                                                 
1 John Madeley, Hungry for Trade: How the Poor Pay Free Trade, (Zed Books, 2000), p. 60. 
2 European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, AND WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) [hereinafter EC- Biotech or 
Biotech]. 
3 The Report and all Annexes are publicly available on the WTO website, http://www.wto.org.   
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able to engage fully in these processes without pressure from large economic 
interests. This may not affect only European Union countries, but also many other 
countries, especially developing countries considering how to manage GM crops 
and foods. In particular, the outcome of the ruling is very important because it could 
affect whether a precautionary approach to new technological developments is 
allowable under WTO’s ‘free trade’ rules4.  
Bearing in mind that the aim of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is to ‘secure 
a positive solution to a dispute’,5 this chapter outlines the contours of the EC-
Biotech dispute. It will explain the main arguments made by the disputants, as well 
as explain the outcome of this dispute. The analysis will provide an overview of the 
main findings in relation to the challenged measures, the alleged ‘general de facto 
moratorium’ on the approval of biotech products, the related ‘product specific 
measures’, and the EU Member States’ measures related to the import and/or 
marketing of specific biotech products.  
The objective of the analysis is to highlight the different aspects of issues arising 
from this GMO dispute. Crosscutting issues such as transparency, public 
participation, and the relevance of multilateral environmental agreements in the 
interpretation of WTO agreements will also be considered. The dispute’s most 
important legal issues will be scrutinized in order to see to what extent the dispute 
might influence the ongoing GMO debate, in general, and its effect of international 
trade law on domestic health and environmental risk regulatory choices, in 
particular. Such legal issues include the Panel’s finding on the legal nature of the 
                                                 
4 The WTO has recognised that regulators commonly adopt a precautionary perspective where risks 
of irreversible damage to the environment and to human health are concerned. Other international 
laws, such as the Cartagena Protocol, state that a lack of evidence of harm to human health or the 
environment shall not prevent governments from taking precautionary measures to avoid harm. 
5Thus finding a mutually acceptable solution to a problem between members consistent with WTO 
provisions is encouraged. This may be possible through bilateral consultations between the 
governments concerned. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, The Legal 
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 354(1999), 1869 UNTS 
401, 33ILM 1226 (1994) [hereafter DSU] Article 3(7),  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm. Accessed 12 June 2009.  
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precautionary principle, and on its relevance for the interpretation of WTO 
provisions.  
The analysis does not cover the entirety of the arguments of the parties or the 
findings of the panel. Instead, it focuses on the points most relevant for the 
challenged measures. The plaintiffs’ main allegation of EU violations of its 
commitments as WTO Members under the SPS agreement, and serves as the focus 
of this analysis.6 
2 GMOs at the World Trade Organization  
2.1 The parties of the dispute 
This dispute involves more than the formal parties to the Biotech dispute. It also 
concerns a long list of countries registered as third parties to the dispute, and public 
interest groups which submitted amici curiae, including academics, civil society 
groups, and NGOs. 
On 13 and 14 May 2003 the United States7, Canada,8 Argentina,9 (hereinafter ‘the 
Complainants’) requested separate consultations before the World Trade 
Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body10 with the European Union in regards to 
measures affecting the approval and marketing of products that contain or consist 
of, or are produced from, genetically modified organisms. In brief, the complainants 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 4 on the applicable law. Several WTO agreements could apply to the topic, including 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures [herein after ‘SPS 
agreement’], the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter ‘TBT Agreement’], Article 
19 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and of the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade 1994 
[ hereinafter ‘GATT’ or ‘GATT 1994’]. 
7 Request for Consultations by the United States, Biotech, WT/DS291 (13 May 2003).  
8 Request for Consultations by Canada, Biotech, WT/DS292/1 (13 May 2003).  
9 Request for Consultations by Argentina, Biotech, WT/DS/293 (13 May 2003).  
10 Pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (‘DSU’), Article 11 SPS agreement, Article 14 TBT Agreement, Article 19 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture and Article XXII of GATT. 
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claimed that the EU and individual Member State actions regarding GMOs were 
inconsistent with WTO trade agreements. 
The US announced that Egypt would also request consultations with the EU on this 
issue. The US was counting on support from Egypt in order to back up its claim 
that EU policies on GMOs have harmed the developing world.11 In the end, Egypt 
decided not to request consultation and withdrew from the complaint on May 30, 
2003, stating its ‘desire to reduce further distortions and impediments to 
international trade that may result due to the further pursuit of this matter’, while 
also recognizing ‘the need to preserve adequate and effective consumer and 
environmental protection.’12 A trade source noted that Egypt had no reason to join 
in as it did not have a significant export interest in GMOs, and had itself banned 
Thai canned tuna due to concerns that the fish might be canned in GM soy oil.13 As 
a result of Egypt’s withdrawal from the claim, the US cancelled talks towards a 
planned free trade agreement (FTA) with Egypt. In a letter to Egypt’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, US Senator Chuck Grassley stated that one criterion that ought to 
be used in determining with whom the United States negotiates future FTAs is 
whether that country shares the US’s vision of the global trading system.14  
The consultations between the disputants were held in Geneva on 19 June 2003 but 
they were unable to settle the dispute. Therefore, on 7 August 2003, the United 
                                                 
11  For discussion of the ‘developing world’ argument see Chapter 2, section 3.2.and 3.3. 
12 ‘The GMO Dispute: Bush Administration Attack on European Food Safety Policy Latest 
Challenge to WTO’s Legitimacy’ Public Citizen- Washington DC, June 2003, 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/agriculture/ Accessed 13 May 2008; Letter by the Egyptian 
Ambassador to the EU, Suleiman Awaad, Cited in Al Amrani I.: ‘Egypt follows EU line on GM’, 
Middle East Times, 6 June 2003. 
13 Request for consultation, Egypt — Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil 
WT/DS205/1(2000) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds205_e.htm  Accessed 
4 June 2008. 
14 See ‘GMO Update: EU-Egypt; EU; China’ 3(10) Bridges Trade BioRes, 2 June 2003. 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/biores/biores3-10.pdf Accessed 3 July 2008  
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States15, Canada16, and Argentina17 requested the establishment of a panel to 
examine the matter.  
The three Complaining Parties in this dispute have filed legally separate complaints, 
but each of the complaints related to the same matter. The DSB, pursuant to the 
request of the three countries, decided to have them examined by a single Panel in 
August 2003.18 However, due to disagreement over the Panel’s composition 
amongst the disputants, it was not constituted until March 2004, when they finally 
recognised the appointed Panel (consisting of Mr Christian Haeberli (Switzerland) 
as the chairman, and members Mohan Kumar (India) and Akio Shimizo (Japan)) as 
being qualified to address disputes involving science.19 
The European Commission expressed its surprise at the initiation of the dispute as 
it was in the process of revising its own GMO legislation. The Commission 
described it as ‘legally unwarranted, economically unfounded and politically 
unhelpful’.20 
Several WTO Members, including Australia, Brazil, China, Chinese Taipei, Chile, 
Colombia, El-Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, 
Thailand, and Uruguay, reserved their right to participate as third parties before the 
Panel.21 Many of these third parties took active part in the dispute in order to express 
their views and interests in relation to GMOs. The arguments of Australia, Chile, 
China, New Zealand, and Norway were clearly set in written submissions and oral 
statements.22   
                                                 
15 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Biotech, WT/DS291/23 (7 August 
8, 2003). 
16 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Canada, Biotech, WT/DS292/17 (7 August 2003) 
17 Request the Establishment of a Panel by Argentina, Biotech, WT/DS293/17 (8 August 2003)  
18 In accordance with Articles 6 and 9 of the DSU. See Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 1.10. 
19 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras 1.11-1.12. 
20 Commission ‘European Commission Regrets U.S. Decision to File WTO Case on GMOs as 
Misguided and Unnecessary’, Commission Presss Release IP/03/681(13 May 2003). 
21 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 1.13. 
22 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 1.15, and pp. 228-247. 
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In addition, the Panel accepted three unsolicited amicus curiae briefs, one from a 
‘group of academics’23 based at universities in the US and the UK, a second from a 
‘public interests coalition’,24 and a third  from ‘a group of  five NGOs’.25 The 
authors of these amici briefs include the major international NGOs aiming largely 
to protect the environment, wild life, food safety, sustainable development, and 
organic farming. 26   
This wide interest the dispute generated demonstrates the importance of GMOs as 
emerging agricultural products. Hence, the outcome of this dispute will have 
impacts on the development of GMOs worldwide, and affect regulatory choices.27  
2.2 The challenged measures 
According to the Panel, this dispute concerns two distinct matters: 
1. The operation and application by the EU of its regime for approval of 
‘biotech products’; and 
                                                 
23 Amicus Curiae Brief, Biotech, WT/DS/291,292, and 293 (30 April 2004) authored by Lawrence. 
Busch (Michigan State University), Robin Grove-White (Lancaster University), Sheila. Jasanoff 
(Harvard University, David Winickoff (Harvard University), and Brian Wynne (Lancaster 
University). [hereinafter ‘Group of Academics’]. 
24 Amicus Coalition, EC- Biotech, WT/DS/291,292, and293 ( 27 May2004) authored by 
transnational coalition of 15 NGOs (Gene watch, Foundation for international Environmental Law 
and Development (FIELD), Five Year Freeze, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB)(UK), The Centre for Food Safety (USA), Council of Canadians, Polaris Institute (Canada), 
Group de Reflection Rural Argentina, Centre for Human rights and the Environment 
(CEDHA)(Argentina), Gene Campaign, Forum for Biotechnology and Food Security (India), 
Fundacion Sociedades Sustentables (Chile), Green Peace International (Netherlands), Californians 
for GE Free Agriculture, International Forum on Globalisation); submitted by the FIELD (London). 
[hereinafter ‘Public Interest Coalition’].  
25 Amicus Curiae Brief,  Biotech, WT/DS/291,292, and293 (1 June 2004) authored by Centre for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL),  Friends of Earth –United Stated (FOE-US), Defenders of 
wild life, The Institute for Agriculture and trade Policy (IATP), and Organic Consumers 
Associations- United States (OCA-US) [hereinafter Group of five NGOs]. 
26 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.10-7.11. 
27 Steve Suppan, ‘US Vs EC Biotech Products Case: WTO Dispute Backgrounder’, (2005) ITAP, 
p.1  http://www.bite-back.org/background/IATPbriefing.pdf, accessed 23 October 2010. See 
Chapter 3, section 3 for elaboration on the US regulatory position.  
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2. Certain measures adopted and maintained by the EU Member States 
prohibiting or restricting the marketing of ‘biotech products’. 28  
 The panel clarified that ‘“biotech products” in this dispute refers to plant cultivars 
that have been developed through recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid 
(‘recombinant DNA’) technology’.29 
The Complainants challenged two EU directives and an EU regulation establishing 
a pre-marketing approval process for GMOs in the EU.  The directives, Directive 
2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council30 and its predecessor, 
Directive 90/220/EEC31 of 17 October 2002, governing the ‘deliberate release into 
the environment of genetically modified organisms’, and provided a multi-step 
process involving Member State and European officials for approval of GMOs 
before they could be imported or marketed in the EU.  Regulation 258/97/EC32 
provided approval procedures relating to ‘novel foods and novel food ingredients.’ 
The EU legislation aimed to protect human health and the environment. It outlined 
the procedure to be conducted in the event a company seeks to obtain approval to 
place a biotech product (GM product) on the market, and set the standards by which 
an application for approval is evaluated. The legislation required a case by case 
evaluation of potential risks the GM product may pose to human health or the 
environment.33  
Directive 2001/18 (and its predecessor, Directive 90/220) and Regulation 258/97, 
under certain conditions, permit EU Member States to adopt ‘safeguard’ measures 
in respect of GM products that have obtained approval for EU wide marketing. The 
                                                 
28 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 2.19. 
29. See Panel Reports, Biotech, para 2.20.  See Chapter 2, section 2 which provides definition of 
GMOs under EU law, US law, and Cartagena Protocol.  
30 OJ 17.04.2001 L1006/1 [hereinafter ‘Directive 2001/18’ or Deliberate Release Directive’]. 
31 OJ 08.05.1990 L117/15, preamble, as amended by Directive 94/15/EC, OJ 22.041994 L103, and 
Directive 97/35/EC, OJ 27.061997 L169. 
32  OJ 14.02.1997 L043/1. [hereinafter ‘Novel Food Regulation’ or Regulation (EC) No 258/97 ] 
33 The Panel reviewed this process in detail in its Report at paras. 7.103-7.146. See Chapter 3 for 
analysis of the relevant EU legislation. 
19 
 
Member States may provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of an 
approved GM product in their own territory if they have detailed grounds for 
considering, based on new or additional information or scientific knowledge, that 
the particular product poses a risk to human health or the environment.34    
2.2.1 The allegations 
The complaining parties alleged that the operation of the EU legislation amounted 
to a general moratorium on the approval of GMOs and biotech products. The 
Complainants further alleged that the moratorium posed an unjustified trade barrier 
in violation of various WTO Agreements.35 They also complained about failures to 
approve specific GMOs and biotech products. Finally, they asserted that safeguard 
measures taken by individual EU Member States to prohibit or restrict GMOs and 
biotech products in their territory were inconsistent with WTO rules.  
The Complainants focused on the benefits and safety of modern biotechnology. 
Both the US and Canada also emphasised that there was no inherent difference 
between GMOs and their conventional counterparts in terms of health and 
environmental risk. Moreover, Argentina looked to the impact on developing 
countries to support the moral argument, claiming that the European Union 
measures hindered developing countries’ agricultural and economic development 
by blocking exports of biotech products, and by discouraging imports and 
cultivation of biotech seeds.36 
The US argued that EU’s position on GMOs violated WTO rules and was a barrier 
to trade. It also contended that American export markets had been significantly 
                                                 
34 The Panel reviewed this process in detail in its Report at paras. 7.103-7.146. See Chapter 3 for 
analysis of the relevant EU legislation. 
35 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 4.160-4.359 (part 1 – arguments of the parties) violations mainly 
under GATT, TBT, and SPS Agreement. 
36 See US Request for Consultations,(n 7). See also Canada Request for Consultations, (n 8); and 
Argentina Request for Consultations, (n 9) 
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harmed by the moratorium as US farmers grow crops that are not approved in the 
EU. 
The Complainants based their claims on numerous provisions of four WTO covered 
agreements: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement); the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT agreement), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and the Agreement on 
Agriculture in an alternative to the SPS Agreement. 37 
The US maintained that the objective of the challenged measures was the protection 
of human health, hence the applicable law must be found in the Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.38 The Complainants declared that the EU 
general moratoria, the product specific moratoria, and the national bans breached 
several SPS provisions. These provisions can be divided into two groups: those 
containing procedural requirements (Article 8 and Annex C, Article 7 and Annex 
C), and those entailing substantive obligations (Article 5.1 and Article 2.2).  
According to the Complainants, the EU measures (the general moratorium, product 
specific moratorium, and the national bans) did not comply with the obligation to 
undertake approval procedures without ‘undue delay’39 (Art 8 and annex C of the 
SPS Agreement), and that they did not comply with the obligation to promptly 
publish sanitary measures (Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement).40 They 
also argued that the EU measures did not comply with substantive obligations of 
the SPS Agreement.  Specifically, the measures did not comply with the obligation 
                                                 
37 For detailed discussion of the applicable WTO law see Chapter 4, section 2.1. 
38 The first US submission to the dispute panel largely compromises a statement of facts followed 
by legal discussion that focuses on the SPS agreement. However, it reserved the right to also make 
claims under TBT Agreement. See First Written submission of the United States, Biotech, paras. 71-
80.  
39 Article 8  requiring Members to observe the requirements of Annex C in the operation of control, 
inspection and approval procedures; Annex C(1)(a) – requiring that Members undertake procedures 
related to SPS measures ‘without undue delay’; Annex C(1)(B) – requiring that Members publish 
SPS procedures and communicate with applicants promptly and openly based on certain guidelines. 
40 Article 7 requiring Members provide notification of changes in SPS measures in accordance with 
Annex B; Annex B(1) – requiring publication of SPS measures. 
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to carry out a risk assessment (Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement) and with the 
obligation to base measures on scientific principles (Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement).41 Furthermore, the Complainants asserted that the EU measures were 
a disguised restriction on international trade because, on the one hand, they violated 
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, which obliges members to be consistent in the 
application of sanitary measures, and, on the other hand, because they also violated 
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, which obliges members not to discriminate in 
the application of sanitary measures.42 
While the US only presented claims under the SPS Agreement, Canada and 
Argentina further challenged the EU measures as being inconsistent with Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement, which obliges Members, in relation to technical 
regulation, not to discriminate imported like products, and Article 2.2, which allows 
members to establish technical regulations for the protection of human health or the 
environment, but to do so without creating ‘unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade’. Both countries maintained that the objective of the EU measures was neither 
human health, nor environmental protection, and that their application was 
unnecessarily restrictive to trade.43 Both countries also considered the moratoria 
and the national bans to violate Article III.4 of the GATT. This provision enshrines 
the national treatment principle, according to which a country cannot accord an 
imported product different treatment than a domestic like product.  
Additionally, Argentina claimed that the EU moratorium negatively affected 
exports to the EU from developing countries that have adopted GMOs techniques 
in their agriculture practices. Argentina held that the moratorium violated Article 
                                                 
41 First written submission of the US, Biotech, pp. 109-111; First written submission of Canada, 
Biotech, pp. 177-179. 
42 Article 2.2 – permitting SPS measures only based on ‘sufficient scientific evidence’; Article 2.3 
– prohibiting discrimination between WTO members through SPS measures; Article 5.1 – requiring 
that SPS measures be based on risk assessments; Article 5.5 – prohibiting ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions in the levels’ of SPS measures in different situations; Article 5.6 – requiring Members 
to employ the least restrictive means to achieve the desired SPS protections. 
43 See First Written Submission of Canada, Biotech, paras. 486-499; First Written Submission of 
Argentina, Biotech, paras. 571-583. 
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10.1 of the SPS Agreement and Article 12.3 of the TBT agreement, which embody 
the special and deferential treatment principle.44    
The Panel, in its ruling, assessed three main issues for their compliance with WTO 
rules: 
 The alleged general EU moratorium on approvals of biotech products 
(referred to as ‘general EU moratorium’); 
 The EU's failure to approve a number of specific biotech products (referred 
to as 'product-specific EC measures'); 
 Failure to take action to stop EU Member States banning GM products 
(national-level bans in several EU Member States on the marketing and 
import of specific biotech products after the products had been approved at 
the EU level).45 
It is important to stress that the Complainants did not challenge the right of a WTO 
Member to regulate or maintain pre-marketing approval procedures for agricultural 
products. Rather, the complaint is based on the EU’s failure to implement those 
regulations and procedures in a manner consistent with WTO rules, which in turn 
resulted in a violation of the EU’s WTO commitments. 
2.2.2 EU’s defence 
The EU countered the Complainants’ allegations by highlighting the potential and 
proven risks of biotech products, as well as drawing attention to the widespread 
                                                 
44 Article 10.1 – requiring that Members ‘take account of the special needs of developing country 
Members’ in establishment of SPS measures. See First Written Submission of Argentina, Biotech, 
para. 5. 
45 Interim Panel Reports, Biotech, WT/DS291-293/Interim (7 February 2006) p.1032. 
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recognition among the international community regarding the differing risks of 
genetically modified and conventional organisms.46  
 It also pointed to trade statistics in order to show that their policies did not restrict 
exports of developing countries to the EU.47 In its defence, the EU further argued 
that determination of the applicable law must be made by reference to the objective 
of its GMO related legislation, which was protection of the environment.48 
In response to claims against it, the EU asserted that the general moratorium did not 
exist, and argued that the lack of approvals did not qualify as a formal or informal 
measure under the SPS Agreement regulations on how measures can be applied.49 
It stated that ‘the alleged delay in completing the approval procedures for certain 
applications does not, itself, constitute a sanitary or phytosanitary measure’50, But 
even if delays in regulatory review of applications of the commercialization of 
GMOs were considered to be measures, the EU argued that they are not ‘undue’ but 
that the delays are due to legitimate requests for information from applicants and 
due to the implementation process for Directive 2001/18.51 Most of the delays, the 
EU contends, resulted from lack of applicant response or incomplete response to 
provide further information regards GMOs, therefore failure to complete product-
specific applications did not qualify as measures SPS Agreement either.52 
As to the EU’s Member State bans, the EU argued that because they were 
temporary, they did not violate WTO obligations.53 Firstly, as provisional measures 
                                                 
46 First Written Submission of the European Communities, Biotech, pp. 15-24. 
47 Ibid, p. 64. 
48 Ibid, para. 416. 
49 Ibid, p. 64. 
50 Ibid, para. 469.  
51 Ibid.  
52Ibid para.48; see also Second Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, para. 
172, for example, regarding an application to commercialize genetically modified oilseed rape 
(canola), the EC points to delays in receiving information requested of the applicant, including 
information related to ‘the impact of herbicide regimes associated with the cultivation of GM 
herbicide tolerant oilseed rape, on farmland biodiversity, and population dynamics and life cycles 
in the farming ecosystem.’ 
53 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, p.595-599.  
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based on the ‘precautionary principle’ they were justified under Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement. Secondly, as provisional measures, they could not be challenged 
under the TBT Agreement because there were not technical regulations.54 Thirdly, 
they did not violate Article III.4 of the GATT because they do not treat domestic 
like products differently.   
Additionally, the EU claimed that the contested moratoria and bans primarily 
addressed environmental, not health concerns, and consequently fell outside of the 
SPS Agreement.55 While the SPS Agreement does not deal with environmental 
concerns, the TBT and the GATT do have environmental related provisions. 
Therefore, the EU concluded that the SPS Agreement was applicable only to the 
extent that it protected human health. As the EU’s main interest was environmental 
protection, the applicable law must be found in the other two WTO agreements.  
The EU stressed that it strongly disagreed with the complainants and considered its 
measures to not breach the different WTO Agreements. However, it maintained 
that, if the Panel should decide otherwise, the challenged measures (the general 
moratoria, the product specific moratoria, and the national bans) were justified 
under Article XX (b), (d), or (g) of the GATT, and that they did not constitute an 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination resulting in disguised  restriction on 
international trade.56 
The EU emphasised the issue of regulatory autonomy in the face of uncertain risks 
and differences in levels of ‘acceptable risks’ between countries.57 It argued that its 
regulatory approach was not unique, and was supported by international 
instruments including the Cartagena Protocol. Furthermore, according to the EU, 
                                                 
54 Ibid, paras. 649-650. 
55 Ibid, para 433. 
56 Ibid, paras. 673-674. 
57 Ibid, paras. 71-75. 
25 
 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety applied instead.58 It further contended that 
even if WTO agreements were applicable, they should be interpreted in conjunction 
with, rather than separate from, other sources of international law.  
 Finally, the EU argued that determination of the applicable law must be made on 
the basis of the objective of its GMO related legislation, which was to protect the 
environment.59 Therefore, the appropriate WTO agreement was the TBT 
Agreement, not the SPS Agreement.60 
2.2.3 The institutional and legal context:  
The majority of international trade is now subject to the rule-based system of the 
World Trade Organisation,61 of which almost all major trading nations can be found 
among its 153 Members.62 The WTO’s adjudication system for the dispute 
settlement process ‘serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under 
the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements 
in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.’63 
To date, the only other GMO dispute to come before the WTO is Egypt — Import 
Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soy Bean Oil64 on 22 September 2000, in which 
Thailand put forth a request for consultation with Egypt regarding prohibitions that 
                                                 
58 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 453-459. See also 
Chapter 4, section 3 for the applicability of The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 9 (2000) [herinafter ‘Cartagena Protocol’].   
59 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, para. 416. 
60 Panel Reports, Biotech dispute, pp. 140-142. 
61 The World Trade Organization was established in 1995 by the founding act – Final Act 
Embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, (15 April 1994) 
33 I.L.M. 1125. The WTO Agreement establishes the WTO, and all other Agreements are annexed 
to this agreement. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, (15 April 
1994) 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), entered into force Jan. 1, 1995. [Hereinafter ‘WTO Agreement’]. 
62 153 members on 10 February 2011, Members and Observers, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm accessed 10 February 2011. 
63 DSU, Article 3.2. 
64 Request for Consultation, Egypt — Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil 
WT/DS205/1 (2000).  
26 
 
the latter imposed on the import of canned tuna with soybean oil from Thailand.65 
In this case Thailand claimed that Egypt had failed to carry out its obligations under 
Articles I and XI of the Marrakech Agreement, Article XII of the GATT, and 
Articles 2, 3, 5 and Annex B, paragraphs 2 and 5, of the SPS Agreement.  Thailand 
argued that tuna exported to Egypt did not contain soybean oil produced from 
genetically modified plants. Moreover, Thailand claimed it was not possible to 
identify the origin of soybean oil because the final processing stages destroyed 
genetic material. Thailand therefore found restrictions on its canned tuna 
discriminatory, and asked the Egyptian government to lift them. Egypt’s argument 
was based on the claim that Thailand’s export of tuna contained genetically 
modified soybeans, and thus could represent a potential risk to Egyptian consumers. 
During the framework of the consultations, Egypt had to withdraw its violating 
measures. 
Egypt — Import Prohibition on Canned Tuna with Soy Bean Oil is considered to be 
a straight forward trade dispute which was quickly resolved. In comparison, the 
challenged measures in the EC- Biotech dispute are considered to be non-tariff 
barriers to trade.66 The EC-Biotech dispute has proved a big challenge to the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism, placing very complex issues, mostly non trade 
issues, in the spotlight. It was the first indication of the tension surrounding 
international trade of GMOs. 
 
                                                 
65 In this case Thailand claimed that Egypt had failed to carry out its obligations under articles I, XI 
of the Marrakech Agreement, and XII of the GATT, and Articles 2, and 3 and 5, and annex B, 
Paragraph 2 and paragraph 5, of the SPS Agreement. 
66 Francesco Sindico, ‘The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade and 
Environment Debate’ (January 2005), FEEM Working Paper No. 11.05.  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=655061. Accessed 9 November 2010.  
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3 Reports of the Panel 
The Panel was unsuccessful in concluding its task within the usual six month period 
for WTO procedures. It repeatedly postponed the circulation of the Reports67 until 
7 February 2006, when the Panel issued a confidential preliminary ruling, released 
only to the parties to the dispute.68  In May 2006, a WTO dispute panel issued its 
final ruling ‘Reports’ of the Panel on the complaint brought by the US, Canada and 
Argentina against the alleged EU ‘moratorium’ on the approval of new biotech 
products. At that stage, the substance of the Report was confidential, and was only 
released to the parties to the dispute. 
Three years after the Panel was established, on 29 September 2006, the Reports of 
the Panel were finally circulated to the parties of the dispute. 69 Subsequently, at its 
meeting on 21 November 2006, the DSB adopted the official ‘Reports’ of the 
Panel.70 The findings in the final Panel Report unsurprisingly correspond, to a large 
extent, to the February Interim Report, except for a critical change in the Panel’s 
position on remedies (recommendations), which will be discussed in section 4.2 
below. The reasoning of the Panel is long and complex. Its Reports comprise more 
than 1,000 pages and several annexes. 
                                                 
67 For example, Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, Biotech, WT/DS291/30, (21 Dec 
2005).  
68 Interim Panel Reports, (n 45). 
69 Biotech, Panel Reports circulated on 29 September 2006. The WTO Secretariat divided the Panel 
Report into eight parts: Part I (pp. 1-108, covering I. Introduction, II. Factual Aspects, III. 
Complaining Parties’ Requests for Findings and Recommendations, and IV. Arguments of Parties); 
Part II (pp. 109-247, covering IV. Arguments of Parties and V. Arguments of Third Parties); Part 
III (pp. 248-342, covering VI. Interim Review and VII. Findings [A. Procedural Issues and General 
Matters]); Part IV (pp. 343-423, covering VII. Findings [B. Overview of Measures at Issue and C. 
Relevant EC Approval Procedures]); Part V (pp. 424-691, covering VII. Findings [D. General EC 
Moratorium]); Part VI (pp. 692-866, covering VII. Findings [D. General EC Moratorium and E. 
Product-Specific Measures]); Part VII (pp. 867-1066, covering VII. Findings [E. Product-Specific 
Measures and F. EC Member State Safeguard Measures]); Part VIII (pp. 1067-1087, covering VIII. 
Conclusions and Recommendations). 
70 Reports of the WTO Panel, Biotech, p. 1.  
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3.1 The main findings   
After three years of consideration, the Panel concluded that the EU acted 
inconsistently with its obligations under specific articles of the SPS Agreement, and 
dismissed the charges under other WTO trade agreements.71 
In its Report, the Panel recognised the existence of a general moratorium, as well 
as ‘product-specific ones’, which created unnecessary delays inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement. It focused on three issues.72 First, it noted ‘undue delay’ in the 
EU’s GMO approval procedure resulting from the moratoria, in violation of Article 
8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement. Second, the Panel struck down national bans 
(safeguards) established by some EU Member States on certain EU-approved 
GMOs on ground specifying that these Member States failed to conduct risk 
assessments, and thus violated SPS Article 5.1 and Annex A. Third, the Panel found 
that the sufficiency of available scientific evidence, such as earlier conclusions 
rendered by relevant EU scientific committees, precluded these Member States 
from invoking provisional measures (national bans or safeguards) under SPS 
Article 5.7 without having conducted a risk assessment under Article 5.1. The Panel 
requested that the EU correct the inconsistencies with the WTO in relation to the 
implementation of its pre-market approval system for GM products.73 
The next section provides critical overview of the main findings of the ‘Reports of 
the Panel’ in relation to the challenged measures. The analysis does not cover the 
entirety of the parties’ arguments or the findings of the Panel. Instead, it focuses on 
the points most relevant for the challenged measures.   
                                                 
71 The Panel considered only one of the GATT claims by Canada and Argentina None of the TBT 
claims was successful. See Panel Reports, Biotech, p. 866. 
72 Interim Panel Reports, Biotech, (n 45) paras. 8.4-8.64. 
73 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 8.16, 8.20, and 8.32 (US); 8.36, 8.40, and 8.48 (Canada); 8.55 and 
8.64 (Argentina). 
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3.2 The applicability of SPS Agreement 74 
With the launch of the EC-Biotech dispute, the EU and many academics reviewed 
the measures presented by the Complainants, and hotly contested the applicability 
of WTO law to it.75 As a preliminary matter, the Panel had to consider whether the 
EU approval procedures themselves constituted SPS measures, thus triggering the 
application of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.76    
The underlying objective of the SPS Agreement is to ensure that Members do not 
use food safety, animal and plant health regulations as unjustified trade restrictive 
measures or barriers to protect their domestic agricultural industries from 
competitive imports.77  The SPS Agreement and disputes under it are of relatively 
recent origin. To date 41 cases were brought in a request for consultation to the 
Dispute Settlement system, and which cite the SPS Agreement, domestic food 
safety laws, and quarantine requirements that affect international trade.78 Key 
                                                 
74 The SPS Committee has not discussed GMOs in any detail. However, the United States circulated 
a paper in June 2000 which pointed out the lack of consistency in notifications. Some countries 
notified GMO-related regulations under SPS, others under TBT, and sometimes under both. WTO, 
see ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (Current issues in SPS Agreement Training Module) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm accessed 3 April 
2012. 
75 See, Francessco Sindico, ‘The GMO Dispute before the WTO: Legal Implications for the Trade 
and Environment Debate’ (January 2005), FEEM Working Paper No. 11.05.  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=655061. Accessed 9 November 2010, see Chapter 4, section 2.1.  
76 If a measure falls within the SPS Agreement, the measure is already presumed to be a trade barrier. 
See, SPS Agreement, preamble and Article 1.1. 
77 SPS Agreement, preamble, Article 1.  
78 World Trade Organisation - Disputes by Agreements: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A19 
accessed 12 April 2014. Those cases show that there are a number of legal problems in relation to 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of the SPS Agreement, and that the 
jurisprudence still at a very early stage. See Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 2007). 
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disputes are EC-Hormones79 ; Australia — Salmon80; Japan — Agricultural 
Products81; Japan — Apples, 82 United States-Poultry (China)83.  
According to Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement two requirements need to be 
fulfilled for it to apply: first, the measure in dispute is a sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure; and second, ‘the measure in dispute may, directly or indirectly, affect 
international trade.’84 
To start with, the scope of the SPS agreement is set in Annex A, which defines an 
SPS measure as: 
Any measure applied: 
(a) to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member 
from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, 
disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; 
(b) to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs; 
(c) to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or 
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, or 
                                                 
79 Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998. [hereinafter ‘Hormones’] In this case 
the EU banned the import of meat and meat products from cattle which had been treated with certain 
hormones for growth production purposes. 
80 Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, 
adopted 6 November 1998. [hereinafter ‘Australia- Salmon’] 
81 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 
adopted 19 March 1999. [hereinafter’ Japan — Agricultural Products’] 
82 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R, 
adopted 10 December 2003. [hereinafter’ Japan — Apples’] 
83 Panel Report, United States –Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China 
WT/DS392/R adopted 25 October 2010 [hereinafter United States-Poultry (China)] 
84 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.254. 
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(d) to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from 
the entry, establishment or spread of pests. 
These measures can be laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and 
procedures applied to achieve protection against specific risk.85  
 
The Complainants argued that the EUs regulatory framework is an SPS measure, 
and that the acts in question, as components of this structure, are by extension SPS 
measures. The US, in particular claimed that the EUs regulatory framework was an 
SPS measure because it aimed to address the SPS objectives of protecting animal 
or plant life or health, or the environment, from risks arising from disease-causing 
organisms, contaminants, toxins, or the spread of pests.86 
In defence, the EU argued its approval procedures were SPS measures only in part, 
which also partly fell outside the scope of the SPS Agreement. The reasoning was 
that some measures could incorporate both SPS and other measures simultaneously 
because they were aimed at protecting the environment in general, rather than in 
preventing the spread of disease amongst plants, animals, and humans.87 For 
example, the EU argued that GM seeds intended to be planted in the ground were 
not ‘foods, beverages or feedstuffs’ under Annex A (1) (b), and that GMOs were 
not ‘diseases’ or ‘pests’ as defined by Annex A (1). The EU also argued that one of 
the express purposes of Directives 90/229 and 2001/18 was protection of ‘the 
environment’, which it argued was distinct from protection of human, animal and 
plant life as defined by the SPS.88    
The Panel rejected these arguments, giving a broad reading to the definition of an 
SPS measure, and thus a broad applicability to the scientific justification 
                                                 
85 SPS Agreement, Annex A, Article 1. 
86 First submission of the US, Biotech, paras. 82-3; First submission of Canada, Biotech, para 155. 
87 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.150-7.173. 
88 Ibid, para 7.198. 
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requirements of the SPS agreement. The Panel adopted an expansive understanding 
of the concept of an SPS measure, seeming to bring an unexpectedly wide range of 
EU’s regulations (approval procedure) that may be considered environmental 
within the ambit of the SPS Agreement.  It did so by looking at the ordinary 
meaning of every word used in Annex A in their broader context, frequently 
referring the ‘Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ and other dictionaries.89   
First, the Panel identified the types of risks covered by Directives 90/220 and 
2001/18. The Panel noted that the central objective of the EU’s legislation was to 
protect human health and the environment when placing GMOs on the market, by 
themselves or in products, and to avoid adverse effects on human health and the 
environment which may arise from the deliberate release of GMOs.  
The Panel then analysed whether the aim of protecting ‘human health and the 
environment’ in the relevant EU Directives fell within the scope of the SPS 
Agreement.90 The Panel understood environmental protection as being the 
protection of animal and plant health, and held that ‘to the extent directives 90/22091 
and 2001/1892 are applied to protect animals and plants  as a part of their purpose 
of protecting the environment, they are not a priori excluded from the scope of 
application of the [SPS Agreement].’93  
The Panel recalled in this regard that the purpose of directive 2001/18/EC is to avoid 
adverse effects arising from ‘deliberate release’ into the environment of GMOs. The 
term deliberate release is defined as ‘any international introduction into the 
environment of a GMO’.94 Annex II.C.2.1 to Directive 2001/18/EC specifies that 
potential adverse effects of GMOs may include disease to animals and plants. It 
                                                 
89 Many examples available, Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.212-7.437. On the scope of SPS see, 
Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (OUP, 
2007) p 21. 
90 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.196. 
91 For discussion of the Directive. See Chapter 3, section 2 
92 Ibid. 
93 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.207.  
94 Deliberate Release Directive, Article 2(3). 
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was clear to the Panel that the purpose of avoiding disease in general includes the 
purpose of avoiding, more specifically, the ‘entry, establishment or spread’ of 
‘disease’. Furthermore, Annex C.2.1 designates effects to the dynamics of 
populations of species and genetic diversity of populations as relevant adverse 
effects. These effects relate to potential ‘pest effects’ of GMOs, which could occur, 
inter alia, through the spread of pollen from genetically modified plants to other 
plants ‘out crossing’, or through the development of persistence or ‘invasiveness’ 
of the GMO or GM plant due to selective advantage. The purpose of avoiding ‘pest 
effects’ of GMOs includes the purpose of avoiding the ‘entry, establishment or 
spread’ of GMOs as ‘pests’.95 
The panel, then, went on to analyse whether the Directives to protect the 
environment fell within the definition in Annex A(1)(a)-(d) of the SPS 
Agreement.96 The most noticeable interpretation of the Annex was the broad 
interpretation of ‘pests’, which was understood to cover plants in addition to 
animals. The Panel analysed whether the specific threats posed by GMOs to the 
environment could be characterized as ‘pests’ under Annex A(1)(a). The first threat 
was that GMO plants could grow where they are undesired (i.e. the issue of invasive 
alien species).97 The next issue was whether a cross-bred plant could be considered 
as a pest within Annex A(1)(a).98 The third issue was whether ‘pesticide-producing 
GM plants increase the potential for the development of pesticide-resistance in 
target and non-target organism…could be considered a “pest” within the meaning 
of Annex A(1)(a).’99 In these three situations the Panel gave broad interpretations 
as to what could be considered a pest within the meaning of the Annex A(1)(a).100 
Therefore, the Panel ‘consider[ed] that the directives can be viewed as measures 
                                                 
95 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.231 (footnotes omitted).  
96 Ibid, para. 7.212.  
97 Ibid, para. 7.243-7. 
98 Ibid, paras. 7.248- 7.258.    
99 Ibid, paras. 7.259- 7.263.  
100 Ibid, para. 7.263.  
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applied to protect the life or health of animals or plants from risks arising indirectly 
from the entry, establishment or spread of weeds as “pests”.’101 
The Panel then went on to assess whether Directives 90/220 and 2001/18 fell within 
the scope of Annex A(1)(b) of the SPS Agreement, where covers measures ‘to 
protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from additives, contaminates, toxins or disease- causing organisms in foods, 
beverages or feedstuffs.’ The Panel adopted a similarly broad interpretation while 
analysing the specific terms and phrases used in the Annex, for example, those 
relating to pollen of the GM crop consumed by insects, and GM plants consumed 
by non-target insects, deer, rabbits or other wild fauna.    
The Panel also took a very broad view of what was included in Annex A(1)(c), 
which covers measures to ‘protect human life  or health within the territory of the 
Member From risks arising from disease carried by animal, plants or products 
thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.’ 102  
Finally, as regards Annex A(1)(d), which covers measures to prevent or limit other 
damage within the territory of a Member from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests, the Panel noted that the damage to biodiversity implied damage to living 
organisms that would more likely qualify as the type of risks referred to in 
Annex(1)(a) and (b).103  
Afterwards, the Panel turned to examine the application of the SPS Agreement to 
Regulation 258/97, concerning novel foods and food ingredients. It first, had to 
identify the purpose of the Regulation. To do so, it pointed to Article 3(1) of the 
Regulation, which states that foods and food ingredients falling within the scope of 
the Regulation must not present a danger for the consumer, mislead the consumer, 
and differ from foods or food ingredients which they are intended to replace to such 
                                                 
101 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.275 (emphasis added). 
102 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.361-7.362. 
103 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.379-7.380. 
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an extent that their normal consumption would be nutritionally disadvantageous for 
the consumers.104  
The Panel concluded that, to the extent the Regulation seeks to achieve the first 
purpose, it could be considered as a measure which is applied for the purpose 
identified in Annex A(1)(b), thus qualifying as an SPS measure. 105  It also added, 
that to the extent where the Regulation is applied to achieve the second and third 
purposes, the Regulation was not a measure applied for one of the purposes 
mentioned in Annex A(1), and thus did not qualify as an SPS measure. 106  
Following the detailed analysis of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, the Panel held 
that many of the potential effects at which the EU measures were aimed fell within 
the scope of the SPS Agreement. The Panel held that Directives 90/220 and 2001/18 
as well as Regulation 258/97 were, for the most part, SPS measures which may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade within the meaning of the SPS 
Agreement.107   
The applicability of the SPS Agreement was also analysed in relation to the 
national bans (safeguard measures). The Panel examined the purpose, form and 
nature, as well as the effect on international trade, of each of the nine challenged 
measures individually to determine if they were SPS measures as described in the 
SPS Agreement.  To a large degree, the legal reasoning described above in relation 
to the EU approval regulations was applied in the analysis of the safeguard 
measures.  In each instance, safeguard measures were found to constitute SPS 
measures. While the Panel’s decision that the EU’s approval procedures are SPS 
measures required that the Panel analyse the complaints under the SPS Agreement, 
the complaining parties did not challenge the EU approval procedures themselves, 
                                                 
104 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.394-7.414. 
105 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.415. 
106 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.416. 
107 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.432-7.437.  The panel noted that Regulation (No) 258/97 was 
not an SPS measure to the extent it applied  to ensure either that novel foods do not mislead the 
consumer or that they are not nutritionally disadvantageous.  
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but rather the EU moratorium on approval of applications and the Member State 
safeguard measures.  
The Panel widely interpreted key terms of the SPS measure definition of the SPS 
Agreement, and concluded that the EU approval procedures were, in fact, SPS 
measures. It found that a broad range of measures to protect biodiversity fell within 
its scope, including cross contamination plants by GM plants, reduction of the 
economic value of crop, and effects of non-target insects and plants.108  
The Panel’s interpretations of key terms of EU’s approval system, and of the 
national bans, qualified as purposes covered by the SPS Agreement. Some believe  
this will broaden the scope of the scientifically strict SPS Agreement,109 which is 
used to cover environmentally related measures rather than the TBT and/or the 
GATT agreements, unless the Panel or Appellate Body choose to overturn these 
holdings in the future.110 The issue of the applicability and its effect on trade and 
cultivation of GMOs of remains highly debated. Chapter 4 examines this issue 
further, and situates it in the context of international law.  
The Panel also had to decide whether, consequently the general and specific product 
moratoria constituted SPS measure, and whether, consequently, the obligations of 
the SPS Agreement requiring scientific justification applied to them.  The next 
sections closely examine the findings of the Panel on the nature of the moratorium.  
3.3 The delay in concluding the ruling  
The WTO provides a strict timeframe for the completion of a dispute. A case should 
not take more than a year before the Panel; the Biotech dispute took three times 
                                                 
108 The Panel’s findings suggests that one measure incorporating different purposes could fall within 
the scope of application of more than one WTO agreement, but what should apply when there is 
overlap remains open question. See Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.147- 437. 
109 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech dispute and the Applicability of SPS Agreement’ 
(2007) 6(2) World Trade Review. 243. 
110 This also means that very few measures will fall under the TBT Agreement. See discussion in 
section 3.2 below. 
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longer. There were a number of reasons. The parties requested several 
postponements and extensions in relation to the submissions and responses. There 
were a huge number of documents submitted to the Panel, which is reflected in the 
large number of Annexes to the case. The Panel sought additional scientific and 
technical expert advice. There were also a large number of issues addressed by the 
parties. Some understood this long delay as reflecting ‘the acute awareness of the 
panel of the repercussions of its ruling on this controversial and high-profile case’, 
and not only as just a product of the inherit complexity of the case itself, and the 
various uncertainties surrounding several of the issues of the dispute.111      
3.4 The legal nature of the ‘moratorium’.  
The complaining parties alleged that from October 1998 until the establishment of 
the Panel in August 2003, the EU applied an effective, ‘general de facto 
moratorium’ on all GMOs/Biotech products so that applications for such products 
were not allowed to obtain final approval. This constituted a sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure that failed to observe several requirements for SPS measures 
under the SPS Agreement.112 
The parties did not dispute that during this period the EU did not approve any 
biotech product applications.  The Complainants pointed to statements by several 
EU officials declaring a ‘moratorium’ on the approval of applications until the EU 
had updated its labelling and traceability regulations. The Complainants alleged that 
the moratorium posed an unjustified trade barrier in violation of various WTO 
Agreements. 113 
                                                 
111 Archana Negi ‘World Trade Organization and the EC Biotech Case: Procedural and Substantive 
Issues’ (2007) 44(1) International Studies. p15. 
112 In relation to the general de facto moratorium the parties alleged the following violations under 
the SPS Agreement: Annex C(1)(a)-(b), and consequently, Article 8; Annex B(1) and, consequently 
Articles 7, 5.1, and 5.6; and consequently Articles 2.2; Article 5.5 and, consequently Articles 2.3 
and 10.1.  
113 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras 4.31-4.66 Part 1 – arguments of the parties- claim mainly under 
GATT, TBT, and SPS agreement. 
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EU denied of the existence of a moratorium. The EU claimed that even if there was 
a moratorium between June 1999 to August 2003, this case was ‘moot’ if the 
moratorium ‘ceased to exist’ after the establishment of the Panel. The EU submitted 
that under these circumstances the Panel should not rule on the moratorium.114  
Relying on previous cases, the Panel rejected the EU’s claim. The Panel noted that 
two biotech products were approved in 2004, after it was established.115 These new 
developments might have terminated the ‘across-the-board’ moratorium which the 
Complainants claimed to have existed between the relevant dates.116 The Panel 
ruled that it ‘had the authority’ to rule on measures within the terms of reference, 
even if the measure subsequently ceased to exist. 117 
The Panel did not address the legality of the EU’s approval legislation itself since 
this issue was not raised by complainants, although it construed the EU’s 
suspension of its approval procedure on GMOs from June 1999 to August 2003 as 
a general ‘de facto’ moratorium.118 
The EU also argued that Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement presupposed the 
existence of an act. The complaining parties’ allegations about the general 
moratorium were in reality complaints about delay in the completion of the 
approval procedure. The EU asserted that a delay of this kind is not an SPS measure 
since it only concerned the application of an SPS measure within the meaning of 
Annex A(1), and therefore was not subject to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
The Panel began its analysis of the general moratorium with an examination of 
whether the EU acted inconsistently with Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, which 
requires SPS measures to be based on risk assessment. Although Directives 90/220 
and 2001/18, as well as Regulation 258/97, were found to be SPS measures, the 
                                                 
114 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras.7.1286 and 7.1297. 
115 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1303 and 7.1305. 
116 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1304. 
117 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1306-8. 
118 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.3. 
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Panel in the Biotech dispute did not find the EU moratorium on GMO products to 
be an SPS measure according to the definition contained in Annex A(1) of the SPS 
Agreement; rather it amounted to a procedural decision to delay the final positive 
approval until certain conditions were met.  This affected the operation and 
application of the EU’s approval procedures.119 The Panel held that the moratorium 
was not a ‘requirement’ or ‘procedure’, as identified by Article 5.1 and Annex A(1), 
because they were procedural decisions that neither approved nor rejected 
applications.120 Alleged violations under Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.5, 5.6, 7, and Annex 
B(1) were also dismissed on similar grounds. 
The Panel next examined the allegation by the Complainants that the general 
moratorium had led to failure by the EU to comply with the requirements of Article 
8 and Annex C(1)(a), which require that the EU’s approval procedure for GMOs 
had to be undertaken and completed ‘without undue delay’.121  The US considers 
undue delay to be ‘the unjustifiable’ and ‘excessive’ and ‘hindrance’ in undertaking 
or completing an approval procedure.122 
The Panel found the meaning of ‘undertake and complete’ to cover ‘all stages of 
approval procedures and should be taken as meaning that, once an application has 
been received, approval procedures must be started and then carried out from 
beginning to end.’123 It also found the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘without 
undue delay’ to be completed with no unjustifiable loss of time.124  
                                                 
119 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 8.6 - 8.8. 
120 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1382. As a result, the requirements of risk assessment and 
scientific basis for SPS measures did not apply to the moratorium. 
121 Art. 8 of the SPS Agreement: Members shall observe the provisions in Annex C in the operation 
of control, inspection and approval procedures, including national system for approving the use of 
additives or for establishing tolerances for contaminants in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and 
otherwise ensure that their procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement; 
Annex C(1)(a) Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check and ensure the 
fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, that: such measures are undertaken and completed 
without undue delay..     
122 First Written Submission by the United States, Biotech. para. 89. And Report of the Panel paras. 
7.1469-7.1471. 
123 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1491-7.1492. 
124 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.1494. 
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The determination of whether there was ‘undue delay’ had to be made on case by 
case basis. The Panel found that both the reason for a delay and its duration were 
relevant factors. The Panel noted that a ‘lengthy delay for which no adequate 
explanation is provided might in some circumstances permit the inference that the 
delay is “undue”.’125 
The Panel proceeded with its analysis to determine the reason behind the 
application of the general de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech products 
between October 1998 and August 2003.  The Panel found especially persuasive a 
June 1999 declaration of the ‘Group of Five countries’ – Denmark, Italy, France, 
Greece, and Luxembourg – according to which they would take steps to suspend 
new approvals, pending the adoption of EU legislation on labelling and traceability 
of GMOs.  The Panel held that the Commission, while not necessarily in favour of 
the Group of Five countries’ declaration, did in fact fail to take steps necessary to 
move applications through the approval process, perhaps due to an awareness of the 
lack of political support for such approvals.126 The Panel concluded, that the lack 
of EU legislation ensuring labelling and traceability of GMOs and GMO-derived 
products did not provide a justification for delays in the completion of approval 
procedures.127  
The Panel also examined the perceived inadequacy of then-existing EU approval 
legislation. The Panel held that the moratoria affecting the ‘operation and 
applications of the EU approval procedures’ constituted ‘procedures to check and 
ensure the fulfilment of SPS measures’, resulting in ‘undue delay’ under the 
procedures, and therefore violated Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement.128 
Additionally, the Panel held that neither the perceived inadequacies of the EU 
regulatory system on GMOs, nor the evolving science and application of a 
                                                 
125 Panel Reports Biotech, paras. 7.1497-7.1498. 
126 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1508, 7.1564-5, 7.1569. 
127 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1518. 
128 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.6. 
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precautionary approach justified the lengthy delay in approval of applications in the 
EU from June 1999 to August 2003.   
According to the Panel, Annex C(1)(a), together with Article 8, were intended to 
prevent Members from using procedural delays to avoid establishing or revising 
substantive SPS rules indefinitely.129  The Panel also held that a Member could take 
a precautionary approach in compliance with Annex C(1)(a) by adopting 
substantive rules that provided for provisional approvals or approvals subject to 
other conditions. 130  
The Panel observed that not all moratoria would necessarily violate the ‘undue 
delay’ standard of Annex C(1)(A).  For instance, a general delay might be justifiable 
if new scientific evidence were brought to light that conflicted with available 
scientific evidence and affected the approval of all application.131  The Panel held:  
[I]f new scientific evidence comes to light which conflicts with available 
scientific evidence and which directly relevant to all biotech products subject 
to a pre-marketing approval requirement, we think it might, depending on the 
circumstances, be justifiable to suspend all final approvals pending an 
appropriate assessment of the new evidence.132  
All other claims by the complainants that the de facto moratorium resulted in 
various inconsistencies with obligations under the SPS Agreement were 
dismissed.133  
In its recommendation, the Panel stated that the EU should bring the general 
moratorium into conformity with relevant WTO obligations ‘if, and to the extent 
                                                 
129 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1518. 
130 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1527. 
131 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1532. 
132 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1530-7.1532. 
133 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.14 
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that’ it still exists.134 The Panel found that it did not have to determine whether the 
general moratorium had ceased any time after the establishment of the Panel.135 
In sum, the Panel characterised the general moratorium as a procedural decision not 
to make the final decision which did not constitute an SPS measure. In doing so, 
the panel avoided ruling on its consistency with the substantive requirements of risk 
assessment according to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The moratorium was 
only in breach of procedural requirements under Article 8 and Annex C(1)(a) of the 
SPS Agreement. 
3.5 Product-specific EU Measure 
The complaining parties argued that the EU had failed to consider for final approval 
applications concerning certain specified biotech products for which the EU had 
commenced approval procedures (‘product–specific measures’). They alleged that 
these so called ‘product specific measures’ resulted in various breaches of the EU’s 
WTO obligations.136 The Complainants also alleged that ‘product–specific 
measures’, which is the moratorium as applied to specific product approval 
applications of GMOs/biotechnology products, failed to observe several 
requirements of WTO rules137 
Following the same reasoning outlined in the previous section, the Panel 
determined that, like the ‘general moratorium’, the ‘product-specific delays’ were 
                                                 
134 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.1317. In comparison, the Interim Report refrained from making 
recommendations to the EU to bring this into conformity with its obligations as the general de facto 
moratorium had ended, and given that the EU had approved a relevant biotech product subsequent 
to the constitution of the Panel. See, Interim Panel Reports, Biotech, (n 45) Conclusions, paras. 8.15-
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135 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1318-19. 
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not themselves SPS measures within the meaning of the SPS Agreement, but rather 
affected  the operation and application of the EU approval legislation for the 
approval of GM products, which the panel found to be an SPS measure.138 The 
Panel found the product-specific measures would not, themselves, have been 
measures applied for achieving the EU’s appropriate level of SPS protection, and 
thus could not be considered SPS measures within the meaning of Article 5.1.139 In 
other words, it declined to make any finding as to the consistency of the 
moratorium, or product specific measures, with the provisions of Articles 2.2 and 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel found that the EU breached its obligations in 
only one matter.140 It established that there was ‘undue delay’ in the completion of 
the approval procedures with respect to 24 of 27 specified biotech products, and 
therefore the EU had breached its obligations to ensure that procedures were 
undertaken and completed without ‘undue delay’, as required under Article 8 of the 
SPS Agreement.141 All other claims by the Complainants that the relevant product 
specific measures were inconsistent with the SPS Agreement were dismissed. 
With respect to Directives 90/220 and 2001/18, the Panel concluded that the general 
de facto moratorium resulted in a failure to complete individual approval 
procedures without undue delay, and hence inconsistent with Article 8 and Annex 
C of the SPS Agreement. With respect to Regulation 258/97, the Panel provided 
similar a finding, noting that to the extent the approval procedure addressed safety 
aspects within the scope of the SPS agreement, the general de facto moratorium 
resulted in a failure to complete individual approval procedures without undue 
delay, also giving rise to an inconsistency with Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS 
Agreement. 
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139 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1713. 
140 All other claims by the Complainants that the de facto moratorium resulted in various 
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In sum, the Panel found that the EU’s failure to complete its approval procedures 
without ‘undue delay’ was inconsistent with the Agreement’s provisions on control, 
inspection and approval procedure (Article 8 and Annex C). These articles do not 
refer to SPS measures, instead referring to procedures to fulfil SPS measures. The 
Panel recommended that the EU bring the relevant product specific measures into 
conformity with its obligations under the SPS Agreement, effectively 
recommending that the EU ensure approval procedures for any pending application 
are undertaken and completed without undue delay.142  
The next section analyses the Panel’s ruling on ‘safeguard measures’ against the 
importation, marketing, or sale of a number of GMOs and Biotech products which 
had already been approved at a community level by a number of EU Member States. 
3.6 National bans are not ‘based’ on ‘risk assessment’ 
The Complainant’s third allegation concerned ‘certain Measures adopted and 
maintained by EU Member States prohibiting or restricting the marketing of biotech 
products.’143 Under the ‘Deliberate Release Directive’ and the ‘Novel Food 
Regulation’ some EU Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and 
Luxembourg) continued to maintain safeguard measures in respect of Biotech 
products or GMOs that had obtained approval for EU wide marketing under the EU 
law because they considered them too risky. In their view, GMO risks should be 
scientifically determined and assessed, such that an absence of sound science 
supporting regulation is fatal to its legitimacy.144   
The complaining parties alleged that the safeguard measures violated Article 5.1 
of the SPS Agreement,145 which provides: 
                                                 
142 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 8.20. 
143 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.2529. 
144 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.2530- 7.2533; US First Submission, Biotech, p. 109-111, 
Canadian Submission, Biotech, p. 192-94;  
145 It should be read with Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement states 
that ‘any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
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Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary  measures are based 
on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, 
animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques 
developed by the relevant international organization.   
The Panel determined, step by step, whether the SPS Agreement applied, whether 
the safeguard measures were SPS measures for the purpose of the SPS Agreement. 
First, the Panel had to establish that the SPS Agreement was applicable to the 
measures. The Panel analysed the documents submitted by these Member States to 
justify their adoption of safeguard measures, as well as text and structural features 
of the measures, in order to ascertain their purposes.146 Taking into account the 
evidence pertinent to each individual safeguard measure, the Panel held that the 
Member State safeguard measures (the national bans) were SPS measures in their 
purpose, form and nature, and in their effect on international trade.147  
The Panel concluded that they were all SPS measures, so they were subject to the 
substantive requirements of the SPS Agreement. The SPS measure should have 
been ‘based on scientific principles and ... not maintained without sufficient 
evidence’, and ‘based on’ an acceptable form of risk assessment.148   
Risk assessment is defined in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement. The definition 
differentiates two types of risks. The first is risk assessment made on ‘the evaluation 
of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of pest or disease within the 
territory of an importing Member’. The second is related to measures adopted to 
limit or avoid the ‘presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
                                                 
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence.’   
146 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.2546. 
147 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.2610, 7.2662, and 7.2702 (Austria), 7.2749 and 7.2774 (France), 
7.2813 (Germany), 7.2854 (Greece), 7.2891 (Italy), and 7.2922 (Luxembourg). 
148 Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. 
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organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs’. In this case the risk assessment should 
focus on the potential adverse effect on human or animal health.   
In defence, the EU argued that the extent of scientific uncertainty surrounding 
GMOs triggers the SPS provision, allowing precautionary ‘provisional measures’ 
which render risk assessment unnecessary as a basis for national safeguard 
provisions. Additionally the EU argued that the safeguard measures were based on 
other risk assessments.149 The EU’s view of the role of risk assessment was 
supported by amicus curiae submission from a group of academics. 150 
The Panel did not question the right of EU Member States to ban GMOs, which 
was recognised in its main Directive 2001/18, and under Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement, which permits Members to adopt temporary SPS measures ‘where 
relevant scientific evidence is insufficient’. 
The Panel detailed that for each of the products in question, the EU’s relevant 
scientific committee conducted risk assessment, evaluated the potential risks to 
human health and/or the environment and the supporting arguments presented by 
the relevant Member States. The Panel also noted that some EU Member States did 
provide additional reports and scientific studies to support their national product-
specific bans. The Panel asserted that a risk assessment must determine the 
likelihood or the probability of a risk. In contrast, scientific studies demonstrating 
a mere possibility of risk were not sufficient to justify the imposition of SPS 
measures. The Panel argued that many of the studies on which the national 
governments based their measures did not contain all of the elements it considered 
necessary to qualify as proper risk assessment. The Panel identified that most 
studies were missing the likelihood element, i.e. ‘the probability of entry, 
establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and economic 
consequences’. The Panel considered that this was not a risk assessment that meets 
                                                 
149 EU First Written Submission. Biotech, paras. 574, 590-1, 610. 
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the requirements of the SPS Agreement.151 In the case of all safeguard measures, 
the Panel therefore found that the failure to base the safeguard measures (national 
bans) on risk assessment violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. By implication, 
the Panel also found a violation of Article 2.2, which requires SPS measures to be 
based on scientific principles.152  
While Article 5.7 permits Members to adopt SPS measures ‘where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient’, the Panel held that the safeguard measures fell 
outside the scope of Article 5.7, which would, according to the Panel, only apply in 
cases where there was insufficient evidence to conduct such risk assessment. The 
Panel found that the EU Member States imposing the safeguard measures had not 
conducted separate risk assessments, and the risk assessments conducted by the EU 
did not support the imposition of SPS measures.153 
In order to provide a scientific justification, Members must follow the principle laid 
down in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. The general rule is that full risk assessment 
must be presented, with the only exception being if it is a provisional application 
for precautionary measures as specified in Article 5(7).  In order to invoke Article 
5(7) there has to be not only ‘insufficient’ scientific evidence, but also has to be 
some kind of qualified risk present. The phrase ‘on the basis of available pertinent 
information’ clarifies that the risk present cannot merely be a hypothetical risk. The 
measure has to be temporary. The Panel in Biotech dispute explained: 154 
a Member may provisionally adopt an SPS measure on the basis of available 
pertinent information in situations where the scientific evidence is 
insufficient for an adequate risk assessment, as required by Article 5(1) and 
as defined in Annex A(4), it makes sense to require, as the second sentence 
of Article 5(7) does, that that Member seek to obtain ‘the additional 
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information necessary’ for such a risk assessment. Once a Member has 
obtained the additional information necessary for risk assessment which 
meets definition of Annex A(4), it will be in a position to comply with its 
obligation in Article 5(1) to base its SPS measure on a risk assessment which 
satisfies the definition of Annex A(4). 
 
With regard to risk assessment, the Panel admitted that it may include diverse and 
divergent scientific opinions. Moreover, the Panel asserted that this did not prevent 
states from adopting a precautionary approach where there were scientific 
uncertainties. However, in these cases, the individual Member States of the EU had 
not carried out risk assessments which supported a precautionary approach.155 
When a measure has a higher level of protection than laid down in international 
standards, this higher level needs to be scientifically justified, and if no international 
standard exists, an SPS measure equally needs to be scientifically justified.156  
A risk assessment is described in Article 5.2 as: 
In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available 
scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of specific diseases or 
pests; existence of pest or disease free areas; relevant ecological and 
environmental conditions; and quarantine or other treatment  
In Hormones, the Appellate Body (AB) has interpreted Article 5.2 with a view to 
real life situations: 
…there is nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken 
into account in a risk assessment of Article 5.2 was intended to be a closed 
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156 See SPS Agreement, Article 3.3. 
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list. It is essential to bear in mind that the risk is to be evaluated in risk 
assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in science 
laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in 
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential 
for adverse effects on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die.157 
In EC-Hormones the Appellate Body declared that what constitutes a sufficient risk 
assessment is not defined in the SPS Agreement, either substantially or 
procedurally. A Member, therefore, is free to consider both Article 5(2) (‘available 
scientific evidence’) and Article 5(3) (‘relevant economic factors’), but there must 
be a ‘rational relationship between the trade measure and the risk assessment’.158 
Notably, the Panel in Biotech held that the decision in the EC – Hormones case, 
which permitted the imposition of SPS measures based on divergent scientific 
views, applied only to cases where the divergent views were expressed within the 
same risk assessment.159 
Furthermore, based on Japan – Apples case160, the Panel stated that SPS measures 
may be imposed when there is insufficient scientific evidence to perform an 
‘adequate’ assessment of risks. The Panel instead held that a risk assessment is 
‘adequate’ if it meets the definition of a risk assessment in Annex A(4), which only 
requires an ‘evaluation’ of likelihood of entry of a pest or disease and its potential 
adverse effects without reference to any qualitative standard determined by the 
Member.161  
In the Biotech case, the Panel recommended that the DSB request the EU bring the 
relevant Member States’ safeguard measures into conformity with its obligation 
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158 See Hormones, (n 79) para.193. 
159  Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.3024. 
160 The Panel found that the risk assessment report submitted by Japan was not ‘sufficiently specific’ 
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under the SPS Agreement, either by revoking or justifying them based on an SPS-
compliant risk assessment.162  
The Panel found most of the challenged measures fell under the scope of the SPS 
Agreement, whose assessment is more risk and science-based relative to the GATT 
or TBT Agreement, which could also have been found applicable.  
This restrictive interpretation raises concerns as to the leeway for WTO Members 
to protect their environment and public health. The Panel ruling ignores the 
relevance of the precautionary principle in determining the scope of risk 
assessments by not addressing the issue of insufficiency of scientific evidence. It 
reveals the real issue, which is the broader division on the international level over 
the use of science-based and precaution-based models for risk regulation in 
conditions of uncertainty.  Chapter 4 expands on this issue.  
 
4 Procedural issues 
This Biotech dispute brought attention to several procedural issues pertaining to the 
dispute settlement system, such as the extended delays and time taken in resolving 
this special case marked by a high level of complexity and political sensitivity.163 
4.1 Leaked Interim Reports, and Transparency of WTO,   
In the WTO, the dispute settlement procedures still maintain restrictions on 
documents until the circulation of the final report. The arguments of the parties 
                                                 
162 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.64. 
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be considered below in section 4.2. and 4.3. Chapter 3 tackles the causes of disagreement over 
GMOs and the different regulatory attitude.   
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submitted to the Panels are restricted, in effect closing the process to public scrutiny 
until a decision is rendered.164 
On 7 February 2006, the WTO dispute Panel issued its Interim Report to the parties. 
Such reports are not made public. They are considered preliminary until parties 
have a chance to review or challenge the findings, after which a final report is 
issued, adopted by the WTO Panel and made public.165 In the Biotech dispute, 
Friends of the Earth published most of the Report after receiving a leaked copy. On 
legal advice, it deleted limited company-specific information from the interim 
report to avoid legal action.166    
The legal reasoning in the final Report mirrored to large extent the Interim 
Reports,167 but surprisingly the findings on the moratorium were changed in the 
Panel ‘Reports’  from the original finding in the ‘Interim’  ruling.168 
In the Interim Reports, the EU had, notwithstanding its own rules and regulations, 
applied a general de facto moratorium on approvals of biotech products between 
June 1999 and August 2003. The general de facto moratorium resulted in a failure 
by the EU to 'complete individual approval procedures without undue delay', 
thereby violating Article 8 and Annex C of the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which state, amongst other things, that a 
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WTO Member should ensure that its approval procedures 'are undertaken and 
completed without undue delay'. 
The Panel’s Interim Ruling originally rendered no recommendation as to the EU’s 
general moratorium as it ended in 2004 with the first GMO approval since 1998.169 
This was in accordance with WTO jurisprudence according to which a Panel 
refrains from making a recommendation regarding a WTO-inconsistent measure if 
such measure is no longer in force after the establishment of the Panel.170 
Effectively, the Panel ruled that the EU had already remedied the inconsistency of 
its de facto moratorium, and needed to take no further action on this front. 
Nevertheless, in the final Report the Panel accepted the Complainants’ request,171 
and rendered a ‘qualified’ recommendation that the EU should bring the general 
moratorium into conformity with relevant WTO obligations ‘if and to the extent 
that’ it still exists.172 
The Panel justified such a conditional remedy in its recommendation by observing 
that due to its ‘murky and complex’ nature the moratorium might be re-imposed in 
the future; thus, deciding this issue here and now would ‘secure a positive solution’ 
to the dispute.173 This reasoning did not sit well with some commentators. For 
example, Cho wrote ‘one might speculate that under this logic, decisions could 
always be rendered measures no longer in force, since all violations could 
potentially be reintroduced.’174 
The Panel’s final Ruling changed from the Interim Ruling, exposing the EU to 
possible further litigation over EU’s authorisation regulatory regime for agricultural 
biotechnology.175 In other words, the Panel left open the possibility that parts of the 
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EU’s authorisation regulatory system for agricultural biotechnology might violate 
WTO rules. For example, doubt as to whether the Directive and Regulation are in 
compliance with SPS Agreement? Or whether there is breach of the national 
treatment principle, will require assessment of whether GMOs are like products ?176 
The Interim Ruling also raised concerns in relation to the transparency and 
institutional integrity of the WTO. It is important to note that the Interim ruling was 
made public on non-governmental organisations websites, including Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy, and Friends of Earth Europe.177 Hence, the Interim 
ruling raised concerns in relation to the transparency and institutional integrity of 
the WTO. Advocates for transparency in WTO Dispute Settlement system call not 
just for public release of documentation but also for public access to WTO hearings 
before Panels and Appellate Body.178 
In Appendix (k) to the final ruling, the Panel expressed ‘grave concern’ that the 
publication of the confidential Interim ruling had led to misinterpretation of its 
findings, particularly concerning the right of WTO Members to take a precautionary 
approach.179 The Panel warned that such a leak ‘could damage the integrity of the 
WTO dispute settlement system as a whole.’180 While the parties concerned denied 
any involvement in the breaches of confidentiality, and condemned these breaches, 
the Panel emphasized that ‘these statements cannot easily be reconciled with the 
fact that these leaks did occur.’181 The Panel also found it ‘surprising and disturbing’ 
that two non-governmental organizations (the Institute for Agriculture and Trade 
Policy and Friends of the Earth), whose amicus curiae briefs the Panel accepted, 
disclosed the confidential Report on their websites.182 In response, the Friends of 
                                                 
176 For discussion, see chapter 3, section 5.1.2 
177 For example, see http://www.foeeurope.org/biteback/WTO _report_descriptive.pdf and 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid=78475 accessed 11July 2008 
178 See Lothar Ehring, ‘Public Access to Dispute Settlement Hearings in the World Trade 
Organisation’ (2008) 11(4) Journal of International Economic Law 
179 Panel Reports Biotech, Appendix k. 
180 Panel Reports Biotech, para. 6.185. 
181 Panel Reports Biotech, para. 6.195. 
182 Panel Reports Biotech, para. 6.196. 
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the Earth reportedly stated that it ‘acted in the public interest.’ 183 The Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade explained that it tried to prevent a disinformation campaign 
by US diplomats and industry officials for using purported content of the Interim 
Report. It has used the result to warn parties to the Biosafety protocol, and 
threatening possible WTO litigation.184  
This leak highlighted the lack of transparency in the WTO, which can lead to 
manipulation of information in matters that are of direct concern to all WTO 
Members, as well as to the public. This matter is clearly reflected in the rushed 
responses to the Reports of Panel with the release of the Interim Report. (See section 
6 below)   
4.1.1 Public participation  
 Not only had the GMO disputes attracted significant attention and huge media 
coverage, but they also drew the interest of some interest groups, NGOs, and 
academics who have discussed the safety of GMOs; these actors submitted their 
own amicus curiae brief to the WTO.185 They requested the Panel in Biotech to 
accept and consider the amici briefs as ‘information and technical advice’ essential 
to the Panel’s deliberations under Article 13 of the (DSU).186 In Biotech, the Panel 
noted that the briefs were submitted prior to the first substantive meeting of the 
Panel with the parties. The parties and third parties were given an opportunity to 
comment on these briefs.187 
                                                 
183 ‘WTO: Biotech Panel Largely Confirms Interim Findings against EU’, 10(32) Bridges Weekly 
Trade News Digest (Oct. 4, 2006). 
184 A letter from Jim Harkness, Presedent, Institute for Agriculture and trade policy to Pascal Lamy, 
Director General, World Trade law (5 October 2006),  http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_89189.pdf. 
Accessed 5 June 2008. 
185 Amicus curiae- (plural amici curiae) is a legal Latin phrase, literally translated as "friend of the 
court", that refers to someone, not a party to a case, who volunteers to offer information on a point 
of law or some other aspect of the case to assist the court in deciding a matter before it. 
186 The Panel has authority to accept and consider amicus briefs under Article 13(1) of the WTO 
DSU, which ensures access to information and technical advice relevant to Panel deliberations.  
187 Panel Reports Biotech, paras. 7.10-7.11.  
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The AB in Shrimp-Turtle ruled that accepting non-requested information is 
compatible with the provisions of the DSU, based on Article 13 of the DSU, which 
gave comprehensive authority to a panel to ‘seek’ information and technical advice 
from any relevant source. The AB also added that it is up to the Panel to decide 
what weight to ascribe to such information or advice.188 In line with previous 
disputes, the Panel in Biotech restated its discretionary authority to accept and 
consider, or reject any information submitted to it. Although the Panel accepted 
amici curiae submissions discussed below, the Panel did not find it necessary to 
take them into account. No further explanation was offered regarding the reasons 
behind its decision.189 
Group of Academics190 of science, technology, and social science from the US and 
UK presented amicus curiae, which focused largely on issues related to science, 
risk assessment, and precaution.191 The briefs highlighted the complexities in risk 
assessment, and the low levels of certainty and consensus over the technical aspects 
of GM technologies. They called on the Panel to recognise that risk assessment is 
not a singular concept, but rather varies with context and decision-making cultures. 
In light of the developing status of risk assessment, they added that the moratorium 
should be seen as a reasonable time for the EU to collect additional information.192  
This amicus curia demonstrates, where there is high degree of scientific 
uncertainty, ‘post-normal science can offer valuable means of framing the dispute 
                                                 
188 Subsequently, the compliance panel in Australia -Salmon relied on non-solicited information 
while the adoption of the additional procedures on Amicus Curiae briefs by the Asbestos AB 
generated big controversy. Since then few panels have accepted unsolicited briefs submitted by non-
parties to the dispute. 
189 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.11. 
190 Group of Academics (n 23). Their opinion was also published as David Winickoff and others, 
‘Adjudicating the GM Food War: Science, Risk, and Democracy in World Trade Law’, 30 Yale 
Journal of International Law, 81.  
191 See Chapter 2, section 2.8. 
192 Group of Academics, (n 23) p. 5-8. 
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in the broader social context than the sound science approach’, which is used to 
assess health safety, and environmental risks under the SPS agreement.193 
The Group of five NGOs,194 composed of CIEL, FOE-US, Defenders of Wildlife, 
ITAP, and OCA-USA, presented a brief in favour of precautionary decision 
making, basing its arguments on what they saw as prevailing scientific uncertainty 
surrounding the risks of GMOs. This uncertainty, they argued, ‘is, in fact so 
substantial that it impedes an adequate consideration of those risks’, thus allowing 
for the application of precautionary decision-making pursuant to Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, as well as relevant rules and principles of international law. 
Finally, the ‘Public Interest Coalition’,195 comprised of 15 public interest groups 
submitted an amicus curiae brief that explained the relevance of critical science to 
the dispute. It supported the EU’s argument that the de facto moratorium was not a 
measure subject to WTO rules, but rather an ‘expression of political intent’. The 
Group continued, arguing that even if the Panel did find the moratoria and national 
measures to fall within the scope of the WTO agreements, it refuted the 
Complainants’ arguments because the measures were consistent with the 
precautionary principle, and consequently with international standards, and thus 
necessary to achieve their objectives, based on non-discriminatory, transparent, and 
fair risk assessment.   
The overwhelming evidence of the amicus briefs supported the EU position; 
reference to arguments in amici curiae will be made where necessary. 
This disregard of these submissions was heavily criticized by NGOs. For example, 
CIEL responded: 
The deficits of democracy in the WTO are augmented by the secrecy of 
interim rulings and the failure of dispute settlement panels or the Appellate 
                                                 
193 Group of Academics (n 23) p. 4-5. 
194 Group of five NGOs. (n 25) 
195Public Interest Coalition (n 24). 
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Body to consider amicus curiae briefs.  In that regard, accepting amicus 
curiae briefs only to neglect them afterwards further underscores the closed 
door characteristics of dispute settlement in the trade arena, which 
ultimately leads to reasoning and decisions of lesser quality.  Cases 
involving public health and the environment cannot afford poorly reasoned 
decisions.196 
Providing more openness at the DSU is vital in order to provide easy and full access 
to information for all those affected, and to ensure public participation in the 
decision making process. Failure to do so may impair the public’s ability to 
meaningfully contribute to the debate at the international level. The role of public 
participation and NGOs in the dispute settlement procedure remains unresolved. 
Disregard of amicus curiae can be damaging to the credibility of the WTO as an 
inter-governmental organisation, therefore weakening the legitimacy of its 
decisions. This is discussed in more depth in Chapter 4.   
4.2 The need for scientific experts  
Initially, the appointed Panel recognised that it was qualified to address disputes 
about science. However, in August 2004, the Panel stated that certain aspects of the 
dispute raised scientific and/or technical issues, and decided to consult individual 
experts and seek information from certain international organizations that might 
help it in its work by providing conceptual clarity.197 A search began for scientific 
and technical experts to serve as advisors to the Panel. The experts were appointed 
in November 2004.198  
                                                 
196 ‘EC-Biotech: Overview and Analysis of the Panel’s Interim Report’ CIEL (March 2006), p.9, 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/EC_Biotech_Mar06.pdf.  Accessed November 2006.  
197 Article 13(2) DSU. 
Article 13(2) DSU permits the Panel to ‘seek information and technical advice from any individual 
or body which it deems appropriate,’ including sources other than the parties to the dispute, at its 
discretion. It also empowers the Panel to ’seek information from any relevant source and … consult 
experts to obtain their opinion.’ 
198 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 1.17. 
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During the proceedings, the Panel sought information from individual experts on 
issues of scientific or technical complexity in accordance with the relevant WTO 
agreements. Six independent experts were selected who provided evidence on 114 
questions from the Panel. Further information was also solicited from international 
organizations in the field of biotechnology.199 The Panel invited these organisations 
to ‘identify appropriate standard references (scientific or technical dictionaries, 
documents adopted or circulated by the relevant international organization, etc.) 
that would assist the Panel in ascertaining the meaning of certain terms and 
concepts.’ 200 Other than that, the Panel did not seek out the views or specific 
expertise of any of these organizations. Since the Panel requested expert opinions, 
it is vital to the credibility of the ruling that the experts’ opinions, the documentary 
basis for the opinion, and questions put to the experts be appended to the ruling. 
It was not clear why the Panel chose to do so, the Panel also showed similar attitude 
with interpreting the applicable law.201 Suppan commented, ‘[s]ince the panel has 
requested expert opinion, it is vital to the credibility of the ruling that the experts’ 
opinions, the documentary basis for the opinion and questions put to the experts be 
appended to the ruling’.202 Chapter 4, section 2.3 and 4.3 explains how expert 
opinion could have had impact on the scope and applicability of the SPS 
Agreement. 
5 Unresolved issues  
The Biotech dispute raises a wide range of complex factual, scientific, and legal 
issues. Apart from the Panel’s findings on the applicability of the SPS Agreement, 
it should be noted that the Report itself is a narrow and specific ruling. 
                                                 
199 The Panel sought information from the secretariats of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Codex Alimentarius, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plant Protection Convention, 
Office of the Epizotics, United Nations Environment Programme and World Health Organization. 
200 Many examples available, Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.212-7.437. 
201 See Chapter 4, sections 2.3, and 3.2 
202 Steve Suppan, ‘US Vs EC Biotech Products Case: WTO Dispute Backgrounder’, (2005) ITAP 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid=76644%20 accessed 4 September 2009  
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Subsequently, the Reports of Panel left many questions about important substantive 
issues with respect to GMOs without answers. Specifically and admittedly the Panel 
it did not examine the following points:203 
1) Whether GMOs/’biotech products in general are safe or not’. Chapter 2 
addresses complexity of the science of GMOs, the debate surrounding it, 
and extent of disagreement over the regulation of GMO in relation to the 
WTO regime.204  
2) Whether the ‘biotech products at issue in the dispute are "like" their 
conventional counterparts’. Moreover, the Panel avoided addressing a 
number of legal issues that many expected would be addressed in this case. 
For example, it explicitly did not find it necessary to address the challenges 
under the GATT or TBT Agreements.  
3) Whether the EU had the ‘right to require the pre-marketing approval of 
biotech products’. This issue was not raised by the Complainants. 
4) Whether the EU’s ‘approval procedure under its biosafety regulation was 
consistent with its obligations under the WTO agreements’. This issue was 
not raised by the Complainants therefore the Panel did not actually consider 
the merits of the EU regulatory framework. 
5) The EU’s relevant scientific committees’ conclusions regarding the ‘safety 
evaluation of specific biotech product’. 
The Panel was keen to stress that the challenge did not address the WTO-
consistency of the EU biotech regulations or the safety of GMOs, but rather the 
failure of the EU to properly apply its own procedures. Thus, the WTO findings 
                                                 
203 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.3. The Panel stressed that it did not find it necessary to rule on 
those issues. 
204 Many NGOs do not regard this point as implicit recognition the WTO as the appropriate venue 
to rule over the safety of GMOs, see for example, FoE International, ‘Looking behind the US spin’ 
(n 166); See Chapter 2 on the contested risks and benefits. 
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were neither a verdict in favour of biotech products, nor a prohibition to regulate 
the use of biotech products based on precaution. One may argue that this was a 
procedural decision, and therefore does not impose a substantive requirement in 
relation to biotech products with pending or future applications. The WTO’s ruling 
does not question the right of its Members to adopt strict biosafety legislation, or 
even bans, in order to protect the public and the environment from GMOs. All in 
all, the Panel Report raises many interesting legal questions which were not fully 
addressed, and thus remain controversial. Chapter 3 explains EU’s authorisation 
framework. It also addresses the question of its compatibility with WTO 
obligations. The following sections will identify the unresolved substantive issues. 
5.1 Implementation of the Reports205 
The implementation of the adopted Reports proves that this dispute is far from easy 
to resolve.  
At its meeting on 21 November 2006, the DSB adopted the Panel’s Reports. None 
of the parties appealed against the ruling.206 Despite civil society efforts to appeal 
the ruling, the European Commission did not appeal the Panel’s Ruling against the 
EU’s application of its approval procedures. It considered that much of the Panel 
Report had become theoretical because its approvals regime had been functioning 
normally and some 10 GM products had been authorized since the Panel’s 
establishment.207 
In general, the illegal measure must, in all cases, be removed within 15 months of 
the decision. If the losing party does not act in compliance with the decision of the 
dispute resolution process, other countries may withdraw trade concessions and 
                                                 
205 Agreement under Article 21.3(b) DSU. 
206  See Arts 16(1), 16(4), and 17(4) DSU. Appeal on the ruling should be filed within 60 days of 
receiving the final Report of the Panel. The appeal has to be based on points of law only. See also, 
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e 
/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. accessed 4October 2008. 
207 Minutes of the meeting of the WTO dispute Settlement body of 21 November 2006, 
WT/DSB/M/222 (12 January 2007). 
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impose retaliatory tariffs under the authorization of a DSB. The possibility of 
retaliation may also be arbitrated through the DSB. If there is a disagreement on the 
implementation of the conclusion, the parties may resort to the original DSB Panel, 
which will examine the consistency of the implementation of the measures. If the 
Panel finds the losing party has indeed conformed to its decision then the process 
is completed. If they find that the losing party has not implemented the measure in 
full, retaliatory tariffs and withdrawal trade concession may take place as described 
above.208 
At the DSB meeting on 19 December 2006, the EU announced its intention to 
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB in a manner consistent 
with its WTO obligations. However, due to the complexity and sensitivity of the 
issues involved, the EU would need a reasonable period of time for implementation. 
Pursuant to Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, the EU was ready to discuss an appropriate 
timeframe with Argentina, Canada and the United States.209  
On 21 June 2007, the US, the EU, Canada and Argentina respectively notified the 
DSB that they had agreed that the reasonable period of time for the EU to implement 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB shall be twelve months from the date 
of the adoption of the Panel’s Reports. Accordingly, the reasonable period of time 
should have expired on 21 November 2007. All the parties agreed to modify the 
reasonable period of time so as to expire on 14 January 2008. 
At the same time, the European Commission took action against Member States. 
For example, it referred France to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
because of its failure to adopt an EU law governing laboratory and research use 
                                                 
208 Implementation Report by loosing party should be submitted within reasonable period of time 
(Art. 21.3 DSU). In case of non-implementation, parties negotiate compensation pending full 
implementation (Art. 22.2 DSU). If no agreement on compensation. DSB authorises retaliation 
pending full implementation (Art 22 DSU). See also, WTO-Understanding the WTO: Settling 
Disputes.  available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm. 
209 Biotech, Summary of the dispute to date, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ds291_e.htm. 
Accessed November 2010.     
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of genetically modified microorganisms. The EU is particularly concerned about 
the country's failure to design emergency plans to deal with an inadvertent release 
of such organisms, and asked the Court to impose a fine of 168,800 Euros (US 
$204,200) per day until such legislation is enacted.210 The referral was the second 
time the EU had taken action against France for not updating its biotechnology 
regulations to conform to EU requirements.211 
This deadline for implementation was never met. The EU, Canada, and Argentina 
agreed on another extension for a ‘reasonable period of time’ to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB. This date was extended a few more times.  
Eventually, the EU and Canada reached a settlement to implement the 
recommendations and rulings of the DSB in July 2009. The settlement set a 
framework for annual bilateral dialogue on ‘Biotech Market Access Issues of 
mutual interests’.212 A similar settlement was reached with Argentina. This 
settlement established bilateral dialogue on ‘issues related to the application of 
biotechnology to agriculture’. The dialogue has EU authorities meet with their 
Argentinean counterparts to discuss agricultural biotechnology and trade issues of 
mutual interest, such as the authorization processes of GM products of mutual 
interest, measures related to biotechnology which may affect trade, evaluation of 
the economic and trade outlook of future GM product approvals, and the renewal 
of GM product authorizations. 213 The EU insists that the dialogue will not influence 
any decisions made on biotech policy in Brussels. Rather, it says the dialogue is 
expected to act as an exchange of information on contentious biotech issues in an 
attempt to avoid any unnecessary trade obstacles. 214 
                                                 
210 ‘France chided for Tardiness in GM Legislation’, (2006), 25 Biotechnology L. Report, 292. 
211 See chapter 3 for more on the difficulties facing the EU in balancing the complex internal 
multilevel decision making with their external obligations under WTO. 
212 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Biotech WT/DS292/40 (17 July 2009). 
213 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Biotech, WT/DS293/41 (23 March 2010). 
214 ‘EU, Argentina End Seven-Year WTO Biotech Row’, 10(5) Bridges Trade BioRes 19 March 
2010  http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/72588/. Accessed 12 March 2011. 
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Canada, Argentina, and the US have been meeting regularly with the European 
Commission to discuss biotech-related issues since the adoption of the WTO Panel 
Report in 2006. While discussions with Canada and Argentina have been fruitful, 
the US remains a hold out.215 On 14 January 2008, the EU and the US informed the 
DSB that they had reached an agreement on procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of 
the DSU with respect to dispute WT/DS291. On 17 January 2008, the United States 
requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions and other obligations 
with respect to dispute WT/DS291. On 6 February 2008, the EU objected to the 
United States' request for authorization to suspend concessions and other 
obligations and referred the matter to arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU. At 
its meeting on 8 February 2008, the DSB agreed that the matter had been referred 
to arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU. On 15 February 2008, the EU and the 
United States requested the Arbitrator to suspend its work pursuant to their agreed 
procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU. In accordance with the parties' 
joint request, the Arbitrator suspended the arbitration.  
To conclude, the EU is still showing resistance to implementing the full 
recommendations of the Panel. It is very similar to its resistance to implement the 
recommendations in EC Hormones. The ruling of EC Hormones did not force the 
EU to remove its prohibition on meat from Canada and the US containing 
hormones. Instead it adopted a new directive reaffirming the prohibition and issued 
a new request at the WTO to end the retaliatory measures by Canada and the US.216 
In spite of this, the EU keeps expressing its will to engage in constructive 
discussions with the US.217 
                                                 
215 Document WT/DS293/41; EU; Argentina End Seven-Year WTO Biotech Row, 10(5) Bridges 
Trade BioRes19 March 2010, available http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/72588/. Accessed March 2011. 
216 US Continued Suspension of Obligation of Obligations in Hormones (n 79 ). See 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds320_e.htm. accessed 23 September 2010 
217 Status Reports by the European Communities- Addendum, WT/DS291/37/Add.21, 
WT/DS293/31/Add.21, 13 October 2009. Status Reports by the European Communities- 
Addendum, WT/DS291/37/Add.59, 7 December 2012. 
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5.2 Like product 
The Complainants accused the EU of discriminating between ‘like products’, 
reflecting their view that genetic modification should not be a reason per se to treat 
products differently. Specifically, they argued that as a result of the specific product 
bans and the national measures, biotech products were treated less favourably than 
their imported and domestically grown non-biotech counterparts. They based their 
argument on four commonly used criteria for establishing likeness, noting that the 
product did not differ in terms of properties, end use, consumers’ tastes and habits, 
and tariff classification. Argentina, argued that the bans were in violation of Annex 
c1(a), second sentence, and Article III:4 of GATT.   In its response, the EU noted 
that a product was only like if it was similarly subject to the approval procedure; 
this was clearly not the case for conventional products. Moreover, the EU stated 
that the international community, through the Biosafety Protocol, recognised that 
GM products require their own, distinct authorisation process.218   
The panel stated that Members are authorised in their approval procedures to treat 
differently imported products and domestic products. Where that distinction can be 
justified based on the difference in safety features of the products, unless that 
differential treatment was based on the origin of the products. The complainants did 
not provide evidence to show that the differential treatment was based on the origin 
of products.219 Therefore, the Panel did not rule on whether or not GMOs are ‘like’ 
their counterparts. This was closely related to the complicated issue of ‘substantial 
equivalence’, one of the central pillars of the American regulatory approach to 
GMOs. The Panel, as did previous panels in previous situation such as Hormones, 
found no need to examine the safeguard measures under Article III:4 of the GATT, 
                                                 
218 See discussion in Chapter 4, section 3.1.2. 
219 Reports of the Panel, Biotech, para 7.2415, 7.2514 
65 
 
since they were already in breach with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.220 
(Chapter 3 section 5.1.2 addresses question of like product) 
5.3 Risk assessment and scientific uncertainty 
The Complainants argued that EU Member State safeguards ‘were not based on risk 
assessment’ in violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, and were not 
otherwise ‘consistent with the requirements of Article 5.7’.  They argued that both 
articles need to be reviewed by the Panel because Article 5.7 is an ‘exception’ to 
the requirements ‘based on risk assessment’ under Article 5.1.221 
The EU argued for the independent application of Article 5.7, which allows WTO 
Members to establish a provisional SPS measure without a risk assessment 
precisely because of the insufficiency of scientific evidence and uncertainty about 
risks that makes it impossible to carry out a full risk assessment.222 Regulatory 
review delays resulting from requests by regulators to obtain sufficient relevant 
scientific evidence to perform a risk assessment and to design risk management 
measures (e.g. traceability systems) and risk communication measures (e.g. 
labelling of GMOs) should therefore not be characterized as ‘undue delays’ in 
violation of the SPS agreement.223 The EU noted Canada’s three-year delay in 
approving Monsanto’s application to commercialize genetically engineered wheat 
as an example of the delay required by thorough regulatory review.224 
The Panel’s analysis started with claims under Article 5.1 because the critical issue, 
in its view, was ‘whether the relevant safeguard measures meet the requirements 
set out in the text of Article 5.1, not whether they are consistent with Article 5.7.’ 
225  For the definition of ‘risk assessment’ as set forth in Annex A, the Panel made 
                                                 
220 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.3421-7.3423, 8.29 This issue will be discussed further in Chapter 
3, section 5.1.2 
221 The EU argued that only article 5.7 applied. See Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.3000-7.3004. 
222 Second Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 80-103. 
223 Second Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 281-282. 
224 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 486-489. 
225 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.3006. 
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reference to analysis of the Appellate Body in the Australia- Salmon case, in which 
the AB noted that ‘risk assessment’ must evaluate ‘the probability’ of entry and 
establishment or spread of disease or pest. On that basis, the Panel dismissed 
scientific studies in support of the safeguard measures because they did not address 
the issue of probability. Therefore, The Panel found that none of the EU Member 
States’ safeguards were based on risk assessment.226   
The Panel agreed with the Complainants assertion that ‘the body of scientific 
evidence permitted the performance of risk assessment as required under Article 
5.1’, and that, consequently, Article 5.7 did not apply. The Panel focused on risk 
assessment, concluding that the EU level was sufficient for a risk assessment in 
each case. Consequently, the Panel found that each Member State safeguard was 
inconsistent with the obligations under Article 5.1, and ‘by implication,’ was also 
inconsistent with requirements of Article 2.2 that an SPS measure be ‘based on 
scientific principles’ and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.227      
In the Panel’s view, ‘evolving science’ and the application of a ‘prudent and 
precautionary approach’ could not justify a delay in the operation of procedures 
because regulators have the option of adopting temporary measures, or placing 
conditions on final approvals, where scientific evidence is ‘insufficient’.228 The 
Panel said delays caused by new information coming to light, or caused by extreme 
events beyond the EU’s control, such as natural disasters, civil war or an unexpected 
administrative overload, might be considered justified. Moreover, delays attributed 
to the applicant for an approval could not, in the view of the Panel, amount to 
‘undue’ delays by the EU.229 
                                                 
226 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.3040. 
227 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.3399. 
228 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1525. 
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In Biotech, the Panel acknowledged that there may be uncertainties in science. It 
held that the state of scientific information can be taken into account in the risk 
assessment process, but it cannot be invoked as ground for delay.230 
5.4 The relationship between the WTO rules and other rules of 
international law 
As part of its defence, the EU argued that the WTO agreements must not be read in 
clinical isolation; rather they should be interpreted in light of other international 
rules and principles relevant to the dispute. It alleged that the complaining parties 
treated the legal issues concerning the authorisation and the international trade of 
biotech products as though they are regulated exclusively by WTO rules. In 
particular, the EU suggested that the Panel should take into account the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, which was ratified by the EU, Argentina, and Canada, and 
signed by the US, and its supplement, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which 
was ratified by the EU, and signed by Argentina and Canada. 231  
The EU asserted that the Cartagena Protocol is the most advanced and specific 
international legal text in the field of trade in GMOs. The EU considered the 
Protocol was appropriate to assist the WTO in the interpretation of specific 
issues.232 The Cartagena protocol is of particular relevance since its objective is to 
‘contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe 
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health, and specifically 
focusing on transboundary movements.’233 The Protocol provides inter alia for a 
                                                 
230 For full analysis see Chapter 4, section 4. 
231 First Written Submission by the European Communities, paras. 453-459. 
232 First Written Submission by the European Communities, paras. 453-459. 
233 Protocol on Biosafety, Article 1. The Protocol provides inter alia for a prior approval procedure 
for the importation of living modified organisms as well as handling, transport, packaging and 
identification obligations. It also requires risk assessment to be carried out. Several references to the 
precautionary approach are found in the preamble and the text of the Protocol. Its preamble also 
notes that trade and environment agreements should be ‘mutually supportive’.    
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prior approval procedure for the importation of living modified organisms as well 
as handling, transport, packaging, and identification obligations. It also requires risk 
assessment to be carried out. Several references to the precautionary approach are 
found in the preamble and text of the Protocol. In other words, because the 
Biosafety Protocol is a specific international legal text in the field of trade in GMOs 
concluded latter than the WTO agreements, it can be used to clarify provisions 
present in the WTO agreement.  
Although the Protocol was binding on more than 110 states at the time of the 
dispute, the United States rejected any application of non-WTO agreements to this 
WTO dispute.234 The US argued that the Protocol was not binding on the US (since 
it is not a party to the protocol), or on any other complaining parties.235 In addition, 
it noted that the EU had not identified how the ‘Biosafety Protocol’ or the 
‘precautionary principle’ would be of relevance to interpreting any particular 
provision of the WTO agreements at issue. The complaining parties further argued 
that even if the Biosafety Protocol was applicable, it did not affect rights arising 
from other international treaties. 
The Panel treated this link as a treaty interpretation issue. The Panel held that 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 236, 
which governs the force to be given to other international agreements, did indicate 
that any relevant rules of international law should be taken into account in WTO 
rulings only if these rules are ‘applicable in the relations between the parties.’237 
Because the CBD and the Biosafety Protocol did not have the force of law in all 
Member States to the dispute,238 the Panel held that it could, but was not ‘required’ 
                                                 
234 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.56. 
235 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.58. 
236 UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969). 
237 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.69-7.71. 
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to, take those treaties into account.  With little explanation, the Panel held it was 
not necessary or appropriate to rely on these treaties in the present case.239 
Given that the US was not a party to the CBD, the Panel ruled that it was not 
required to take the CBD into account in interpreting the WTO agreements at issue 
in the dispute. Similarly, the Panel considered that it was not required to take the 
Protocol into account since Argentina, Canada and the US were not parties to it.240 
Moreover, the Panel noted that the Protocol had entered into force after the Panel 
was established. In the Panel’s words, ‘we do not consider that in interpreting the 
relevant WTO agreement we are required to take into account other rules of 
international law which are not applicable to one of the parties to this dispute.’241 
Despite this restrictive interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of VCLT, the Panel noted 
that, like dictionaries, other rules of international law may be useful in aiding an 
interpretation of WTO agreements. The Panel requested other international 
organizations to identify other materials that might aid in identifying the ordinary 
meaning of the WTO agreements. These instruments would be taken into account 
where appropriate.242 
A United Nation Environment Programme recent publication suggests that 
adequate classification of trade related measures should be developed in a manner 
that takes into account the context of the Cartagena Protocol, and recommends a 
framework for considering trade-related measures in reference to the functions they 
perform.243  
                                                 
239 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.89. 
240 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.75. 
241 Panel Reports, Biotech, see reasoning in paras. 7.92-7.94. 
242 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.95-7.96. 
243 ‘Trade-related Measures and Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ prepared by CIEL for 
UNEP (UNIP 2007). 
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The Reports of Panel fail to address this matter. This was a crucial issue that needed 
to be addressed. Therefore, Chapter 4 provides wider analysis of international law 
applicable to GMOs, the linkage between trade and other concerns, and the role of 
the Cartagena Protocol’s trade related measures in responding to this relationship. 
To do so, the chapter will provide a review of the overall objectives and main 
provisions, and also assess the status of the precautionary principle in light of the 
Protocol. 
5.5 The precautionary principle as defence  
The EU argued in defence that the precautionary principle should be taken into 
account because it was a general principle of customary international law. The EU 
attempted to justify some Members States’ national bans on GMOs with reference 
to the precautionary principle as general principle of customary international law 
and as provided in the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.244 
The Panel construed this to mean that the principle was either a rule of customary 
international law or a general principle of law recognized by States.  Noting that it 
was unclear whether the Members had widely accepted the precautionary principle, 
the Panel followed the Appellate Body’s lead in the earlier Hormones case, and 
declined to ‘take a position on whether or not or not the precautionary principle is 
recognised principle of general customary international law.’ It instead noted that 
there has ‘been no authoritative decision by international court or tribunal’ which 
so recognizes the precautionary principle, and that legal commentators remain 
divided as to whether the precautionary principle has attained such status. 245 The 
Panel ruled the precautionary principle to be too ‘complex’ and ‘unsettled’ an issue 
                                                 
244 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 79- 86 and 105-110; See 
also, Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.73-7.75 (Cartagena Protocol) and 7.76-7.89 (precautionary 
principle). 
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in international law to serve as a basis for the Panel’s Ruling. In any case, the Panel 
found it unnecessary to take a position in order to dispose of this specific dispute.246 
Citing the Appellate Body Report of the EC-Hormones ruling as its authority, the 
Panel stated that ‘even if a Member follows a precautionary approach’, its SPS 
measure needs to be ‘based on’ (i.e. ‘sufficiently warranted’ or ‘reasonably 
supported’) by a ‘risk assessment’. Further, the Panel disallowed the risk 
management option of taking a precautionary approach to regulating GMOs if a 
risk management decision is not based on a risk assessment as defined by the SPS 
Agreement.247   
Indeed, in applying the SPS agreement, the Panel did address the precautionary 
approach. In the Panel’s view, Annex C(1)(a) was not inconsistent with the 
precautionary approach. It held: 
Annex (c)(1), first clause, allows a Member to take time that is reasonably 
needed to determine with adequate confidence whether its relevant SPS 
requirements are fulfilled. Consistent with this, we consider that a Member 
which finds it appropriate to follow a prudent and precautionary approach in 
assessing and approving applications concerning GMOs and GMO derived 
products, might, for instance, be justified in requesting further information or 
clarification of an applicant in a situation where another Member considers 
that the information available is sufficient to carry out its assessment and 
reach a decision on an application.248 
The role of the precautionary principle in the application of EU legislation is one of 
the dispute’s main issues. The gaps and lack of consensus in scientific knowledge 
and the application of the precautionary principle are fundamental issues in 
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ensuring biosafety. See Chapter 3, section 4 for critical analysis of the status of the 
precautionary principle. 
The Panel ruling also included several decisions favourable to the complaining 
parties and future GMO exporters. First, the Panel held that it was not required to 
(and did not) consider the international environmental norms embodied in the CBD 
or the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol. Second, the Panel held that a Member could 
not unduly delay a substantive decision on pre-marketing approval applications of 
GMOs by means of procedural roadblocks. Third, the Panel somewhat restricted 
the ability of Members to impose SPS measures based on a perceived inadequacy 
of the scientific evidence available, thus limiting the precautionary principle to 
cases where the scientific evidence in a particular risk assessment is internally 
inconsistent, or where there is insufficient evidence to even conduct a risk 
assessment as defined in Annex A(4).249    
5.6 The needs of developing countries  
Argentina argued that the moratoria related to Argentine product applications 
violated Article 10.1of the SPS Agreement on special and deferential treatment, 
which requires Members to ‘take account of the special needs of developing country 
Members.’250 The Panel rejected this argument, relying on the Oxford dictionary’s 
definition of the expression ‘take account of’. It found that Article 10.1 does not 
prescribe a specific result to be achieved. More specifically, nothing in Article 10.1 
suggests that in weighing and balancing the various interests at stake, the EU had 
to necessarily give priority to those needs of Argentina (export levels) as a 
developing country over other domestic concerns, such as protection of its own 
consumers or the environment. 251 The Panel also added that burden of proof in 
relation to Article 10.1 of the SPS Agreement was incumbent on Argentina, and as 
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the complaining party it had to prove that the EU did not take account of developing 
countries’ needs. The fact that the EU did not accord special and differential 
treatment in comparison with other developed country exporters did not 
demonstrate, by itself, an inconsistency with Article 10.1.252 Numerous articles 
address this matter, and show that, as a consequence, it has become difficult for 
developing countries to establish their policies on GMOs without interference from 
the main parties of the Biotech dispute.253  
The significance of Argentina’s argument lays in the fact that it draws attention to 
the questions of the needs of developing countries and how they should approach 
GMOs. Chapter 2 identifies the main concerns of developing countries as regards 
GMOs. Chapter 4 demonstrates their strong interest in international regulation of 
GMOs, and considers the effect the Biotech dispute will have on their choices and 
needs. 
6 Response to the ‘Reports’ of the Panel 
With the issuance of the Panel’s Interim Reports, the United States and the 
European Union rushed statements about their views on the implication of the 
Reports on both parties and the rest of the world.  They both gave the impression 
that the ruling was in their favour. It can be seen as an attempt by both sides of the 
dispute to influence other countries to favour their policies. At this point one may 
wonder whether both parties are trying to use the WTO dispute mechanism to 
promote their domestic policies on GMOs.  
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6.1 US’s response 
US trade officials quickly announced the result as a win for farmers around the 
globe, pointing to the removal of barriers to the further development and 
dissemination of a ‘safe and beneficial technology that is improving food security 
and helping reduce poverty worldwide.’254 The US Trade Representative (USTR) 
issued a statement, noting that the WTO ruled the EU’s moratorium on GMOs 
illegal. It also added that this ruling ‘brings the United States one step closer to 
clearing barriers...and expanding global use of promising advances in food 
production.’255    
Mike Johanns, the US Agriculture Secretary, as quoted by the Office of the USTR 
said, ‘today’s decision affirms what the world farmers have known about 
biotechnology for many years.’ He added, ‘since the first biotechnology crops were 
commercialized in 1996, we’ve seen double digit increase in their adoption every 
single year. Biotechnology crops not only are helping to meet the world’s food 
needs, they also are having a positive environmental impact on our soil and water 
resources. Farmers, who grew biotechnology crops in 21 countries around the 
world, including 5 in the EU, stand to benefit from today’s decision.’256    
The US explained that the WTO ruling would require GMO regulations to be based 
on scientific evidence. It acknowledged that the EU approved a ‘handful’ of biotech 
product applications, but the broad ban remained in effect.257 Ambassador Schwab, 
quoted by Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), said, ‘the 
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WTO has ruled in favour of science-based policymaking over the unjustified, anti-
biotech policies adopted by in the EU.’258 Schwab urged the EU to ‘fully comply 
with its WTO obligations and consider all outstanding biotech product applications, 
and evaluate their scientific merits in accordance with EU’s own laws, without 
undue delay.’259 
Despite these statements declaring victory, the USTR spokeswoman commented at 
a later time that ‘the United States remains very concerned with EU treatment of 
agricultural biotech products.’ At the same time, the ‘US’s goal is to normalise trade 
in biotech products, not to impose trade sanctions on EU goods.’ She also added 
that American seed companies, farmers, and exporters continue to experience 
significant commercial losses as a result of EU’s actions. 260   
These statements show that the US government is still trying to dissuade the EU, 
and other governments around the world, from to restricting the cultivation or the 
entry of GMOs into their countries. 
6.2 EU’s response  
The EU’s initial response to filing the complaint at the WTO was immediate and 
brief. ‘We regret this more to an unnecessary litigation’, said Pascal Lamy, EU trade 
commissioner at the time. He also claimed that the case would confuse already 
sceptical European consumers.261   
In a press release issued same day of Interim Report, the EU stressed the need for 
strong regulatory oversight of GMOs, and noted that the approvals process it has in 
place had led to the authorisation of more than 30 biotech products. It argued that 
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it does not have a ban in place, suggesting that the implications of the biotech case 
for current EU processes are likely to be minimal because the ruling does not apply 
to regulatory framework that came into effect in 2004.262 Therefore, The EU 
observed that since it resumed the approval of GMOs in 2004, the Panel’s 
recommendations based on the old situation have had no practical impact on the 
EU.263  
As regards the national safeguard bans, efforts to remove them by the European 
Commission have been met with sustained resistance amongst Member States and 
in the Council of Ministers.264 EU Member States remained largely hostile to 
GMOs.  In her statement, Austria’s Health Minister, Maria Rauch-Kallat, asserted 
that ‘the protection of people and environment have absolute priority…we will 
exhaust all possibilities to keep Austria’s agriculture GM free and ensure consumers 
safety.’265 France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Poland, and 
Romania also imposed different bans on the cultivation of GMOs.266  
The EU continues to defend its regulatory system. For example, in a speech to the 
European Biotechnology Open day in Brussels, EU Trade Commissioner, Peter 
Mandelson strongly defended the EU’s approach to biotechnology and GM food, 
one that prioritises strict science-based health and safety testing, but which also 
recognises that safe biotechnology has a crucial role to play in agriculture and 
agricultural trade both in Europe and the developing world.267 
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6.3 Identifying Civil Society Concerns  
Civil society was also quick to attack the decision, accusing the US of trying to 
force biotech foods on European consumers. They stressed the right of European 
governments to protect their farm land, environment and consumers from the risks 
posed by GMOs.268 The following extracts demonstrate the anger not only with 
GMOs, but also with the WTO as a legitimate forum with effect on domestic 
regulations.269  
For many civil society groups and NGOs, the WTO is seen as the enforcer of the 
interests of global corporations at the expense of people and the environment. Eric 
Gail of Greenpeace said ‘all this verdict proves is that the WTO is unqualified to 
deal with complex scientific and environmental issues, as it puts trade interests 
above all others.’ 270  Their stand is not surprising since most of the anti-GMO 
pressure came from environmentalists and consumer groups.271  
Adrian Bebb, GM food campaigner at Friends of Earth Europe said, ‘Whatever the 
World Trade Organisation says, the dispute over genetically modified foods has 
created no clear winners but many losers. The public faces contaminated foods 
resulting from weak regulations in the United States and farmers see their 
livelihoods threatened by contamination. This trade dispute has been pointless 
exercise that will change absolutely nothing. Europeans will continue to reject 
genetically modified foods.’272   
                                                 
268 Some NGO groups have sent their own legal submissions to the WTO. Group of Academics brief 
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Sonja Meister, Trade Campaigner at Friends of Earth Europe declared, ‘This ruling 
shows that the WTO is the wrong forum to deal with environmental trade disputes 
and the international community must find an alternative before another case 
occurs. The WTO ignored international environmental laws, met in secret behind 
closed doors and barred any public involvement, even though we have a strong 
public resistance against GMOs in Europe.’273  
Director of Friends of Earth, Martin Rocholl asserted that, ‘the Bush Administration 
is using the undemocratic and secretive WTO to force feed GM food on the World. 
Decisions about the food we eat should be made in Europe, not the White House or 
the WTO.’274 
In a very sharp statement Lorry Wallach, director of Public Citizen, added ‘The 
United States may have won this battle, but it is rapidly losing the GMO war’. This 
WTO ruling will only increase consumer suspicion of GMOs and of a global trading 
system that subsumes the public interest to the interests Monsanto and other 
agribusiness giants eager to force feed consumers products about which consumers 
have deep concerns.275 Public Citizen added, ‘[f]orcing unwanted GMOs on 
unwilling nations is not just stupid politics: It is a violation of international law. The 
Biosafety Protocol protects the right of nations to regulate these products in the 
public interest. The best way for nations to greet this news from the WTO is to stand 
their ground and implement much-needed pre-market approval, safety testing, 
traceability and labelling programs.’276 
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Over 740 organisations with combined membership of 60 million people have 
supported the campaign of ‘Bite back: Hands off our food’. This campaign 
demands that the WTO does not force GM foods onto people against their wishes, 
and asserts that the WTO is an illegitimate forum to deal with GMOs.277 The Panel 
ruling might have adverse effects, and prompt more and more consumers around 
the globe, through their representatives, to lobby and enact policies declaring their 
regional and national governments GMO-free and to campaign against the WTO. 
278 
Many NGOs also viewed the ruling as an attack, or an attempt to undermine other 
international agreements, in particular, the Biosafety Protocol. They believed that 
this ruling was a warning to members of the Biosafety Protocol to regulate biotech 
products according to their protocol commitments. A Protocol-based defence of 
those regulations cannot prevail at the WTO if the plaintiffs are not Protocol 
members279 
The Panel’s decision was seen by some as an attempt to force ‘Frankenfoods’ on 
the rest of the world, regardless of what consumers and their elected representatives 
say.280 According to Friend of the Earth Europe, public opinion remains hostile 
towards GM food, and this WTO ruling did not persuade Europeans them to change. 
The number of bans from national governments has increased since the beginning 
of the dispute, and over 170 EU regions have declared themselves GM Free 
zones.281 
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NGOs view the WTO as a trade body incapable of reconciling the growing conflict 
between ‘free’ trade and what citizens require of their governments in relation to 
complex scientific matters (e.g. those surrounding GMOs). They also stressed that 
Biotech did not rule on the safety of GMOs, or on other EU legislation, such as 
labelling. 282 
6.4 Identifying Industries 
A number of industry and farmer groups in the US, which is the world leader in the 
adoption of GM crops, expressed their support for the preliminary report, and the 
subsequent Panel ruling. The American Soybean Association welcomed the WTO 
ruling against the EU, announcing victory against ‘Europe’s flawed and non-
science based approval processes. The American Soybean Association also called 
on the US government to promptly mount a WTO challenge against Europe’s 
discriminatory traceability and labelling laws that apply to biotech crops.283 The 
American National Corn Growers Association made similar threats, noting that ‘we 
do not expect Europe to become big importers of US corn but the moratorium cast 
a big shadow across other nations. This is a message to the world that we won’t put 
up with the EU violating the rules.’284 The GM industry in the US continues to back 
the science-based regulatory system. 
The European Association for Bio-industries stated that the biotech dispute was not 
‘about safety, the crops being grown around the world have passed stringent food, 
feed and environment safety standards and are as safe as, or safer than, conventional 
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crops.’285 Industries try to prove their view by highlighting the increasing use and 
cultivation of biotech crops around the world.  
It is interesting to note that corporations, producers, and patent owners of GM seed, 
such as Monsanto, preferred not to draw attention, and did not make big 
announcements about the result of the dispute.   
7 Conclusion 
The EC-Biotech dispute highlights the regulatory divide between WTO Members, 
and reveals a deepening crisis over issues of science and governance. It has proven 
to be a big challenge for the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It placed very 
complex issues in the spotlight, while also bringing into focus the role of the World 
Trade Organization in protecting values other than trade, such as human health and 
the environment. 
The Panel’s Report did not rule on the general safety of GMOs, or on the general 
legality of the EU approval procedure. Yet, the Panel spent three years and 
produced a 1000-page report, plus yet another 1,000 pages of Annexes. The 
politically charged nature of the debate was clearly reflected in this dispute. The 
Panel was very careful and hesitant in its Reports. The Biotech dispute brought 
attention to several procedural issues pertaining to the WTO dispute settlement 
system, such as the role of advisory experts and of amicus curiae briefs, as well as 
the extended time taken to resolve these special cases marked with a high level of 
complexity and political sensitivity. Although the Panel report retained a narrow 
frame of reference, the case also drew attention to significant substantive issues, 
such as the definition of ‘undue delay’, the role of science and precaution, and the 
inter-relationship between trade law and public international law. There remain, 
                                                 
285 EuropaBio statement on WTO ruling on biotech crops, EuropaBio, Brussels, 8 February 2006. 
http://www.europabio.org/  accessed 19 February 2006.  
82 
 
however, several questions on which the Panel commented either inconclusively or 
not at all.  
The immediate result of the Panel’s Reports has been to further inflame and 
politicize an already sensitive issue in transatlantic relations. In order to understand 
the full implications of this dispute and to assess the best solution, we need a better 
contextual understating of the issues at stake. The next chapter takes the crucial step 
of unfolding the complexity of this dispute by providing an explanation of the 
science related to GMOs, and considering the aspects that make GMOs highly 
contentious. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 GNETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS EXPLAINED 
 
 ‘Mixing genetic material from species that cannot breed naturally takes into areas 
that should be left to God.’ 
Prince Charles1 
1 Introduction  
 
Although the transfer of genetic material has long occurred through selective 
breeding and other techniques, new technologies permit more controlled transfers, 
and transfers of genes from completely unrelated species. Hence, ‘GMOs are 
created by transferring genetic material from one organism to another. This process 
is called genetic engineering or biotechnology.’2 On the one hand, GMOs offer 
significant potential benefits to society in areas like agriculture, environmental 
management, and human health protection. On the other hand, much of the concern 
stems from a lack of scientific certainty associated with GMOs and their impact on 
human health and surrounding environment.  
 
While GMOs are fast joining agriculture throughout many parts of the world, the 
world remains split; countries do not agree on the best way to protect against these 
potential threats, and they have different regulations regarding the testing and 
approval procedures necessary to place GMOs and their products on the market.3 
                                                 
1 ‘Prince Charles Speaks Out Against GM Food’ BBC News, 09 April 1999 
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Module) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm. 
Accessed 3 April 2012. 
3  Also, when they disagree about labelling and identification requirements. See WTO, ‘Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (Current issues in SPS Agreement Training Module) 
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Some countries like the US, Canada, and Argentina endorse GMOs, allowing 
cultivation and commercialisation of GMOs. Others, such as the Member States of 
the European Union, embrace more cautious approach towards GMOs. Still other 
countries ban imports and sales of GMOs and their products altogether.   
These differences create trade problems, such as the Biotech dispute. The dispute is 
the product of great resistance to allowing unrestricted marketing of GMO products 
in the European Union. It also placed GMOs in the spotlight, bringing wider 
attention to GMOs. The parties’ submissions show conflicting understanding and 
approaches to GMOs, with their arguments making a case for and against GMOs. 
The Panel sought expert advice to on issues of ‘scientific or technical complexity’ 
in order to help it decide which factual issues were relevant to the allegations of 
violations charged by the plaintiffs under four WTO agreements.4 Finally, the Biotech 
ruling has the potential to shape the relationship between the SPS Agreement (WTO 
law) and the Cartagena Protocol regimes, both domestic and international. 
Therefore, it will have important implications for both developed and developing 
countries, as well as the import and export of GMOs. It may also influence 
developing countries considering what laws to introduce to regulate GM crops and 
products.   
The concept of ‘risk’ has emerged as a central concern of regulation in the world 
‘risk society’.5 This chapter explores how the determination of risks to health and 
the environment has come to be heavily reliant on scientific evidence and expertise 
based procedures. Hence, understanding global legislative efforts at regulation 
requires a basic knowledge of the science behind GMOs. Such knowledge is 
essential since it is the starting point for conducting risk assessment. This has led to 
the development of different procedures for conducting risk assessment at national, 
and international level.  
                                                 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm. Accessed 3 April 
2012. 
4 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 4.160-4.359. The complainants challenged the lack of scientific 
justification for the de facto moratorium and national bans.  They also added that the EU delays 
hindered development of GM technology, which is of proven safety and brings great benefits. 
5 Brian Wynne, ‘Uncertainty and environmental learning: reconceiving science and policy in the 
preventive paradigm’ (1992) 2(2) Global Environmental Change, 144; For more on risk society 
see Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity (London; SAGE Publication, 1992) 
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This chapter introduces background information on plant breeding and genetic 
modification of plants, placing modern biotechnology techniques in their historical 
and scientific context. It also explains the main uses of genetically modified crops 
and food. It then presents data about crops that are currently grown commercially 
around the world and the future varieties that are currently being developed.  
While genetically modified crop varieties promise benefits to the corporations, 
farmers, food producers, consumers, and the environment, they may also pose 
unknown risks to the human health and many other environmental issues. To 
contrast the contested benefits with the potential risks resulting from GMOs, this 
chapter will assess arguments set forth for and against the use of GMOs.  
Finally, this chapter draws attention to the argument raised by the United to States 
in its allegations that GMOs can feed the worlds, the last section examines the 
impact of the Biotech’s Ruling on developing country choices with regard to the 
role that genetically modified organisms might play in their food security. 
 
 
2 Genetically modified organisms  
There is no universally accepted definition of genetically modified organisms 
(GMO), even though many attempts have been made to find an exhaustive 
definition. The references and definitions vary across countries and regulatory 
agencies. In the following, the terms, ’Genetic Modification’ (GM),‘genetically 
engineered’, ‘GE organisms’, ‘genetically engineered organisms’, ‘genetically 
modified’, ‘genetic modified organisms’ (GMOs), ‘living modified organism’ 
(LMO), ‘transgenic crops’, and ‘transgenic organisms’ will be used 
synonymously.6  
The World Health Organisation provides that: 7  
                                                 
6Please note that some terms are wider than the others. The Biotech Panel adopted a similar 
approach, using the terms, ‘biotech products’, ‘GMOs’, ‘GM plants’, ‘GM crops’, or ‘GM products’ 
interchangeably, Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1-7.2.                                                                                           
7 WHO, ’20 Questions on Genetically Modified (GM) Foods’ 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/biotech/en/20questions_en.pdf.  Accessed 5 March 
2008. 
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Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) can be defined as organisms 
in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does 
not occur naturally. The technology is often called “modern 
biotechnology” or “gene technology”, sometimes also “recombinant 
DNA technology” or “genetic engineering”. It allows selected 
individual genes to be transferred from one organism into another, also 
between non-related species. 
Such methods are used to create GM plants- which are then used to grow 
GM food crops.    
Although citizens and governments in different countries all want to ensure that 
these GMOs do not pose a threat to human health or the environment, they do not 
agree on the best way to protect against these potential threats.8 The Biotech dispute 
clearly demonstrates how deeply this division is based on how they define GMOs. 
The next section illustrates the extent of this division. 
2.1 The definitional problem of GMOs    
Responses to the challenges raised by agricultural biotechnology seem to have 
diverged. In the regulatory arena, the differences in approach are significant. At the 
heart of the divergence is the fact that the definition of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) is far from clear. The differences are clearly reflected in the 
Biotech dispute.  
The US and Canada consider ‘Genetic modification’ a broad term, covering a 
variety of scientific methods designed to improve the productivity and functionality 
of plants, animals, and micro-organisms. They provide historical and scientific 
development of traditional techniques of plant breeding and present ‘modern 
biotechnology’ or ‘recombinant technology’ (rDNA) as simply the latest and most 
                                                 
8 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 2). 
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advanced technique in genetic modification of crop plants.  In other words, genetic 
modification is basically an extension of traditional breeding techniques. 9    
The US denies any potential hazards arising from GMOs.10 The US chose to use 
the expression ‘biotech products’ which refers to ‘plant cultivars that have been 
developed through recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (“recombinant DNA) 
technology.’11 The US government use the term ‘genetic modification’ to cover 
both modern (recombinant DNA) techniques and traditional breeding techniques.12 
Argentina uses the phrase ‘biotech agriculture products’ to describe ‘genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs)’ or ‘novel foods’ as they are designated in EU 
legislation.13 
The EU considered that the terms used by the Complainants were misleading since 
biotechnology covers techniques and practices other than genetic modification, 
referring to a press release concerning the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations’ (FAO) annual report, ‘The State of Food and Agriculture 2003-
04’,14 which pointed out that ‘…biotechnology, one of the tools of the gene 
revolution, is much more than genetically modified organisms (GMOs), [and] 
sometimes also called transgenic organisms.’ These were at issue in the Biotech 
case. Consequently, some of the potential benefits described in paragraphs 17-26 
of the first written submission of the USA might not derive from GMOs, but other 
forms of modern biotechnology.  
The EU’s legislation relevant to the dispute refers to ‘genetically modified 
organisms’ (GMOs) as contained in Article 2(2) of EC Directive 2001/18 ‘on the 
                                                 
9 First Written Submission of Canada, Biotech, paras. 3-6. Traditional breeding methods include, 
selective breeding, crossbreeding (hybridization) and grafting. See also First Submission of the 
United States, Biotech, paras.  7-15. 
10 First Submission of the United States, Biotech, para. 27. 
11 First Submission of the United States, Biotech, para 10. The US in their submission used the 
phrase “ modern technology” to refer to “recombinant DNA”  
12 7 Code of Federal Regulation, Section 340.1, see ‘Statement on Biotechnology Issues’, by James 
H. Maryanski, FDA Biotechnology Coordinator, before the senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry, 7 October 1999, available at 
www.hhs.gov/progorg/asl/testify/t991007a.htm. Accessed 13 April 2010. 
13 Directive 2001/18/EC and its predecessor Directive 90/220/EEC and Regulation (EC) No. 258/97. 
14 ‘The Gene Revolution: Great Potential for The Poor, But No Panacea’ FAO Press Release 17 
May 2004, http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2004/41714/index.html  Accessed 13 April 
2010. 
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deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms’15 ( and 
Article 2(2) of its predecessor, EC Directive 90/22016), and under Articles 1(2)(a) 
and 1(2)(b) of EC Regulation 258/97, concerning ‘novel foods and novel food 
ingredients’.17 Naturally, ‘genetically modified organisms’ (GMOs) is the EUs term 
of reference in the dispute.18 The EU defined GMO as ‘an organism, with the 
exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way 
that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination.’19  The 
European Communities argues that none of the current biotech gene transfer 
methods are able to precisely control where a foreign gene will be inserted into the 
recipient cell's genome, or whether that insertion will be stable, and further 
describes the screening for the desired traits.20 The EU highlights main difference 
between genetic modification and conventional breeding practices as being that the 
latter does not allow for the crossing of natural species barriers or for the transfer 
of a single or few genes instead of whole genomes.21 Similarly, Norway, a third 
party to the dispute, defined GMOs as one of the results of modern biotechnology, 
which are created by a particular set of techniques used to genetically modify (or 
‘genetically engineer’) organisms.22 
The amicus curiae brief submitted by NGOs to the WTO Panel provided that 
‘Genetic Modification’, the process through which an organism is modified by the 
application of recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology, can involve either the 
transfer of genes from one (or more) species to another or the manipulation of 
genetic material within species.23 The amicus curiae brief submitted by a trans-
Atlantic group of expert academics defined ‘genetic modification’ or ‘genetic 
engineering’ as involving the manipulation of an organism’s genetic endowment by 
introducing or eliminating specific genes through modern molecular biology 
                                                 
15 OJ 17.4.2001 L106/1  
16 OJ 8.5.1990 L117/15, preamble as amended by Directive 94/15/EC, OJ 22.4.1994 L 103 and 
Directive 97/35/EC, OJ 27. 6.1997 L169.  
17 OJ 14.2.1997 L043/1. 
18 See Chapter 3 sections 2.1-3 for discussion of EU legislation. 
19 Article 2(2) of Directive 2001/18/EC See also, First Written Submission by the European 
Communities, Biotech, at para. 17.  
20 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 26-28. 
21 First Written Submission by the European Communities, Biotech, paras. 19-20. 
22 Third Party Submission by Norway, Biotech, May 24, 2004. 
23 Amicus curiae Brief submitted by CIEL, FOE-US, Defenders of Wildlife, IATP and OCA-USA. 
European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
(WT/DS/291, 292 and 293), para. 5. 
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techniques. The production process of genetically modified crops involves 
transgenesis, or the transfer of genes from one plant, animal, or virus into another 
organism.24     
At the international level, the EU made reference to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which defines the revolutionary technology of ‘biotechnology’ as ‘any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.’25 The 
use of biotechnology in agriculture has produced a growing number of ‘genetically 
modified organisms’ (GMOs) and products derived from them.26 
Article 3(g-i) to the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on biological diversity 
refers to GMOs as ‘living modified organisms’.27 According to the Protocol, a 
‘living modified organism’ is defined as ‘any living organism that processes a novel 
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern 
biotechnology.’28 In everyday usage, LMOs are usually considered to be the same 
as GMOs, but their definition and interpretation vary widely. 
Article 3(h) of the Cartagena protocol on Biosafety defines ‘living organisms’ as 
‘any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic material, 
including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids.’ 
Under Article 3(i), "modern biotechnology" means the application of:  
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or  
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family,  
                                                 
24 Amicus Curiae Brief, Biotech, WT/DS/291,292, and293 (1 June 2004) authored by CIEL, FOE-
US, Defenders of wild life, IATP, and OCA-US [hereinafter Group of five NGOs] p. 9. 
25 The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79. 31 ILM (1992) 818; B&B Docs, 390. 
Adopted on June 1992 at Rio de Janero Earth Summit, entered into force 29 December 1993. 
[hereinafter ‘CBD’]  
26 The biotechnology industry provides products for human health care, industrial processing, 
environmental bioremediation, and food and agriculture. See section 2.6 below 
27 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted 29 January 
2000, 1760 UNTS 9 [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol’] Article 3(g).    
28 Cartagena Protocol, Article 3(g). 
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that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers 
and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection.29  
The Biotech panel  in its Reports briefly noted these differences, choosing to use 
interchangeably the terms ‘biotech products’, ‘GMOs’, ‘GM plants’, ‘GM crops’ 
or ‘GM products’, ‘without prejudice to the views of the Parties to the dispute’.30  
Of these terms, the Panels’ preferred choice throughout the reports is ‘Biotech 
products’, as used by the United States to refer to ‘plant cultivars that have been 
developed through recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (“recombinant DNA”) 
technology.’31 It did not use ‘GMOs’ as reference, or as used by the EU. This thesis 
tends to more frequently use the term ‘GMOs’, which is the term used in EU 
legislation at heart of this dispute.32 For the purpose of this thesis, a broad definition 
is used, in which genetically modified organism is an organism that has been 
modified through the use of modern biotechnology, such as recombinant DNA 
techniques.  
This wide terminology used to describe GMOs only adds to the confusion. The next 
three sections take a back step in order to explain biotechnology (the science of 
GMOs).  It begins with background information on plant breeding, clarifying what 
‘plant biotechnology’ is. It then explains techniques used to genetically modify 
plants. These sections will place modern biotechnology techniques in their 
historical and scientific context. 
2.2 History of plant breeding 
All plants, fungi, and bacteria contain DNA, and they pass a copy of their DNA to 
their offspring. Genetic change is a natural and desirable process. ‘It results in 
variation in shape, form and behaviour of the individuals within a species, allowing 
for evolution and adaptation. It is crucial for the survival of any new species in 
response to environmental change.’ As a result, the evolution of life on earth was 
dependent on the extraordinary nature of DNA.33  
                                                 
29Cartagena Protocol, Article 3(i) 
30 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.1- 7.2. 
31 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 2.20. 
32 See Chapter 3, sections 2.1-3 for more details on EU regulations. 
33 Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (Imperial College Press, London, 2003) pp. 4, 9. 
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Historically, it is possible that crop improvement has been practiced since humans 
started to plant and harvest crops, rather than forage for food from wild plants, 
perhaps as long ago as 10,000 years. At first, improvement may have occurred 
unconsciously but then became more systematic:34  
 
Types of crop plants with different characteristics would be grown in 
adjacent plots and some of the seed produced would result from crossing of 
the two types. Farmers would then select the best seed for the next 
generation. This relatively primitive but effective form of plant breeding is 
still used in many parts of the world today and through the ages has changed 
crop plants greatly from their wild ancestors and relatives. 
        
These ancient techniques were developed further by the Chinese, Greeks, Romans, 
Babylonians, and Egyptians among many others.  Farmers were able to select the 
best suited crops with the highest yields in order to produce enough food to support 
a growing population.  They used ‘selective breeding’ to improve production of, 
not only crops, but also livestock to use them for food. They also developed the 
process of fermentation, bread making, cheese making, and brewing beer.  The 
latter is still done by the same basic method of using malted grains to convert starch 
into sugar and then adding specific yeasts. 35  
 
Agriculture and conventional plant breeding was a necessary drive for development 
of civilizations. Most plants were domesticated in different regions. For example, 
wheat was domesticated in the Near East; rice was domesticated in eastern Asia and 
western Africa; and maize and beans were domesticated in the Americas. These 
centres of domestication usually showed high levels of crop genetic diversity, 
which was maintained by farmers who planted and exchanged them on a regular 
basis. In other words, for centuries, farmers have improved crop plants by selective 
breeding, mostly at a trial and error level. They selected plants with desired traits 
                                                 
34 Ibid, p.  10. 
35 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (2nd edn Pearson: 
Benjamin Cummings, San Francisco, 2009), p.2-3. They also took advantage of microorganisms 
and used fermentation to make breads, chesses, yogurts, and alcoholic beverages such as beer and 
wine. 
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then, used cross breeding to improve the plants through the millennia, giving us the 
modern wheat, large corn cobs, and juicy apples. It takes many generations of crop 
cycles to improve the productivity or resilience of a crop. This method has been 
described by some scientists as slow and uncertain because isolating desired traits 
in this fashion can take many years.36 
 
The ‘Green Revolution’ of the 1960s and 1970s aimed to aid ‘world food security’. 
‘Green revolution’ crops were traditionally bred to yield larger grains per plant 
volume high yielding varieties, mostly developed by international public research 
centres, gave farmers, especially in Asia, new crop varieties with substantially 
higher yields.37 However, this growth hit a plateau by mid 1980s. This selective 
breeding can only duplicate reproductive events that might occur in nature. By 
managing these productive events towards a particular end, the randomness that 
ordinarily drives natural selection used to achieve human goals.38 Unfortunately 
several major parts of the world, particularly Africa gained little, due to the choice 
of crops that were developed and the high costs of input, ‘leaving many goals of 
increasing world food security unachieved.39 
Many scientists and farmers still use traditional breeding techniques to enhance 
crop yields, increase resistance to various pests or diseases, or increase to the 
tolerance of a particular crop to heat, drought, or wet conditions, even though the 
process is long. In addition, the possibility of finding improved traits is limited by 
the amount of genetic diversity already present in the plant.40 Yet, a major limitation 
to plant breeding lies in the extent of variation in the parental lines. Farmers and 
plant breeders cannot select for variation that is not present in their breeding 
population.41     
                                                 
36 Ibid, p.2-3. 
37  Robert L Paarlberg et al, ‘Regulation of GM Crops: Shaping an International Regime’ in Robert 
E. Evenson and Vittorio Santaniello (eds), The Regulation of Agricultural biotechnology (CABI 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 2-8.  
38 Rebecca Bratspies, ‘The Illusion of Care: Regulation, uncertainty, and Genetically Modified Food 
Crop’ (2002) 10 NYU Environmental Law Journal .p 302. 
39 Robert L Paarlberg et al, ‘Regulation of GM Crops (n 37) p. 2. 
40 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (Elsevier 2009) 398. 
41 For information about wide and forced crossing see Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops 
(n 33), p. 14. Another way of increasing the variation within the breeding population is to introduce 
mutations artificially, using radiation or chemical mutant. It involves the mixing of tens of thousands 
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In the late 1970s, a number of scientists and firms also started to investigate the 
possibilities of ‘agricultural biotechnology’. A new technique was developed, 
allowing the artificial insertion of specific genes into the genome of a plant. The 
new technique was first called ‘genetic engineering’, and subsequently ‘genetic 
modification’, which is related both to genetically modified foods and food 
products, and to non-food plants (like tobacco and cotton).42 This rapid 
development in new technologies led to ‘gene cloning’, the ability to identify and 
reproduce, and to ‘genetic engineering’, manipulating the DNA of organisms. 
Through genetic engineering, scientists are able to combine DNA from different 
sources into a specific plant, resulting in ‘transgenic plant’.43  
Hence, the major difference between ‘genetic engineering’ and traditional breeding 
is that genetic engineering allows the transfer of genetic material between 
organisms that would never be able to breed in any natural or laboratory setting. A 
plant can be transformed with a gene from any source, including animals, bacteria, 
or viruses as well as other plants, whereas traditional crossbreeding techniques 
move genes between members of the same species of plants. Example include 
plants that produce their own pesticides, plants that are resistant to herbicides, and 
plant vaccine.44  
The next section offers a brief explanation of the wide discipline of ‘biotechnology’, 
then focuses on ‘plant biotechnology’, which is the science of genetic engineering.   
2.3 Plant biotechnology  
Biotechnology is an umbrella term. The United Nation Convention on Biological 
Diversity defines ‘biotechnology’ as:  
 
                                                 
of genes, sometimes with unpredictable results (it can introduce unwanted as well as desirable 
genetic change).    
42 Ibid, (n 33) 17. 
43 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40) p. 398. 
44 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p.157. 
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‘any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, 
or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific 
use’. 45  
 
Scientists like to broadly define biotechnology as using living organisms, or the 
products of living organisms, for human benefit (or benefit for human 
surroundings) to make a product or solve a problem.46 They also explain that 
biotechnology is not a single, narrow discipline of study. Instead, it is an expansive 
field that absolutely relies on contributions of many areas of biology, chemistry, 
mathematics, computer science, and engineering in addition to other disciplines 
such as philosophy and economics.47 This science affects our everyday lives, and 
‘will become even more important during this century’, which some have called the 
‘century of biotechnology’.48  
 
There are many different applications and types of biotechnology, mainly, 
microbial biotechnology,49 animal biotechnology,50 DNA fingerprinting and 
forensic analysis,51 bioremediation,52 aquatic biotechnology,53 medical 
                                                 
45 CBD, Article 2. A Hungarian scientist, Karl Ereky, coined the term Biotechnology in 1919 to refer 
to the science and methods that permit products to be produced from new materials with the aid of 
living organisms, see Brian Sheridan, EU Biotechnology: law and practice: regulating Genetically 
Modified &novel Food Products (Palladian Law Publishing 2001).  
46 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 5. 
47 Ibid, p. 5. 
48 Ibid, pp.1-3. 
49 ‘Microbial biotechnology’ manipulates microorganisms such as bacteria and yeast, microbial 
biotechnology has created better enzymes and organisms for making many foods such as beer and 
wine. 
50 ‘Animal biotechnology’ is where animal can be used as ‘bioreactors’ to produce valuable products 
such as ‘antibodies’, transgenic animal containing genes from another source (for instance, human 
genes for clotting proteins can be introduced into cows for the production of these proteins in their 
milk. Because many genes found in animals are also present in humans, animal are also important 
in basic research to learn about gene function, animal cloning has the potential of producing animals 
with genetically engineered organs that can be transplanted into humans. 
51 ‘Forensic biotechnology’ applies DNA fingerprinting is a tool used for law enforcement that can 
lead to inclusion or exclusion of a person from suspicion, based on DNA evidence DNA 
fingerprinting can be accomplished using trace amounts of tissue, hair, blood, or body fluids left 
behind in crime science. DNA fingerprinting can be used in paternity cases. 
52 ‘Bioremediation’ is used to clean up environmental hazards that have been caused by industrial 
progress, where the use of biotechnology to process and degrade a variety of natural and manmade 
substances, particularly those that contribute to environmental pollution, 
53 ‘Aquatic biotechnology’ one important application is ‘aquaculture’ raising fish and shellfish in 
controlled conditions for use as food sources. It has also introduced disease resistant strains of 
oysters and vaccines against viruses that infect salmon and other fish. Also transgenic salmon have 
been created that overproduce growth hormone leading to higher growth rates over short growing 
periods, decreasing time and expense required to grow salmon for market sale, 
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biotechnology,54 and plant biotechnology. It is important to notice that the different 
areas of biotechnology are interrelated.55 Biotechnology is a multi- disciplinary 
science with many pros and cons, and controversial issues are associated with 
almost every application. This paper is limited to the latter kind of genetic 
modification, known as ‘plant biotechnology’, which is the focus of the Biotech 
dispute. This technology is used for the production of GM seeds, and used to 
cultivate the GM crops to be sold as GM food, GM animal feed, and in food 
products. 
 
‘Plant biotechnology’, or as others refer to it ‘agricultural biotechnology’, is an 
already large business that is rapidly expanding.  In 2010, the global market value 
of biotech crops was estimated at US$11.2 billion, up from US$10.6 billion in 2009. 
This represented 22% of the US$51.8 billion global crop protection market in 2010, 
and 33% of the US$34 billion commercial seed market.56 Agricultural 
biotechnology is the term generally used to describe the use of biotechnology to 
alter plants in order to improve their characteristics, such as by giving them 
resistance to a new, safer, and more effective herbicide, resistance to insects, or to 
fungal or bacterial diseases. These plants are usually termed transgenic, meaning 
they contain genes from another organism (which may also be a plant). This new 
technology allows innovations that are impossible to achieve with conventional 
hybridization methods.57 It is important to stress that some scientists view this 
technology as an extension of traditional breeding, while others emphasis that 
breaking the species barrier is so novel that the GM crops pose uncertain risks to 
human health and the environment. 58 
 
The next section will give a brief explanation of the main techniques used in the 
modern plant biotechnology.  
                                                 
54 ‘Medical biotechnology’ is involved in the whole spectrum of human medicine. From preventative 
medicine to diagnosis of health and illness to the treatment of human disease conditions, medical 
biotechnology has resulted wide array of applications designed to improve the human health. 
55 For further information about biotechnology see William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, 
Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) pp.8-13. 
56 See Clive James, ‘Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops (ISAAA Brief No 42, 
ISAAA, 2010), Executive Summary. http://www.isaaa.org. Accessed June 2012. 
57 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 137. 
58 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40) p. 398.  Scientists 
tend to describe biotechnology to include old and new techniques. 
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2.4 Genetic engineering of plants 
The process of ‘genetic engineering’ is also referred to as ‘genetic modification’, 
‘gene technology’ or ‘recombinant DNA technology’.59 It allows selected 
individual genes to be taken from one organism and inserted into another to enhance 
desirable characteristics, or to suppress undesirable ones, in order to produce a plant 
that contains a gene or genes that have been introduced artificially from related or 
unrelated species.60 It began when DNA cloning techniques were developed (by 
cutting and pasting DNA from different sources).61 
 
The first step is to identify a gene that will confer a specific desirable trait on the 
plant. Then, scientists cut DNA molecules at specific points, gluing them back 
together in different combinations to make new molecules. This process is called 
‘recombinant DNA technology ‘.62 The development of this technology meant that, 
technically, there was no limit to the source of new genes, and enabled plant 
breeders to bring specific genes into breeding programme without unwanted genetic 
baggage.63  
Through recombinant DNA technology, certain desired traits can be conferred on 
living organisms. It is used for number of purposes, including the production of 
proteins of medical importance such as insulin, human growth hormone, and blood 
clotting factors. Recombinant technology has led to hundreds of applications, 
including the development of disease resistant crops and plants that produce greater 
yields of fruit and vegetables, genetically engineered bacteria capable of degrading 
                                                 
59 Jules Pretty, ‘The rapid emergence of genetic modification in world agriculture: contested risks 
and benefits’ (2002) 28(3) Environmental Conservation 248-262.  
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0376892901000261. Accessed June 2011. 
Biotechnology or modern biotechnology is also known as genetic modification or engineering. 
60 This section excludes other modern techniques of ‘agricultural technology’, such as ‘marker aided 
selection’, in which DNA segments are used to mark the presence of useful genes, which can then 
be transferred to future generations through traditional plant breeding using the markers to follow 
inheritance. 
61 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology (n 35) p. 58. 
62 Ibid, pp. 2-4. The first commercial use of recombinant DNA technology in the pharmaceutical 
industry, recombinant human insulin approved by the FDA of the USA in 1981. 
63 Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 18. 
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environmental pollutants, and staple crop engineered to be more nutritious such as 
the famous ‘golden rice’ with pro-vitamin A in the rice grain.64   
 
The terms ‘gene cloning’, ‘recombinant DNA technology’, and genetic 
engineering’ are used to describe the same process when, in fact, these techniques 
are slightly different methodologies, albeit interrelated.65 In addition, there are 
another layer of different techniques used to insert genetic information into plant 
cells, such as ‘protoplast fusion’, ‘leaf fragment technique’, ‘gene guns’, 
‘chloroplast engineering’, and ‘antisense technology’.66 
 
One of the most reliable and widely used techniques is tumour-inducing plasmid or 
‘Ti Plasmid’, where transgenic plants are created by placing the foreign gene into 
the Ti Plasmid of Agrobacterium tumefaciens (a bacterium that infects wounded 
plant tissue and causes the disease known as crown gall), allowing the bacteria to 
transfer its T-DNA into plant genome.67 The Agrobacterium tumefaciens is also 
used in ‘transformation of protoplast’ (protoplast is plant cell without a cell wall) 
by infecting protoplast and transforming it to produce GM plants, and in ‘protoplast 
fusion’ which creates cells that can grow into a hybrid plant.  It has been used to 
create ‘brocoflower’, a fusion of broccoli and cauliflower.68 
 
Another method for getting a specific gene into plant tissue is to blast DNA through 
the plant cell wall with a ‘particle gun’. Unlike the use of Ti plasmid, this technique 
works with all types of plants. The desired DNA is carried on microscopic metal 
particles. These are fired by a gun into plant tissue, and penetrate the plant cell 
                                                 
64 See next section. Also See William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to 
Biotechnology, (n 35), Chapter 1. 
65 Ibid, p.58; First Written Submission of Canada, Biotech, paras. 7-12. Attempts to provide 
background information on plant breeding and genetic modification, it provides modern 
biotechnology to include induced mutation (“mutagenesis”) and recombinant DNA technology 
(rDNA). 
66 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35), p. 157. 
67 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40)  p. 403; Nigel G 
Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 18. 
68 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35), p. 157. 
99 
 
walls. It has been very successful in the production of genetically modified cereals, 
including maize, wheat, barley, rice, and oats.69  
 
To check whether the transgene is in the plant, scientists use selectable 
marker/reporter genes on the same segment of DNA as the transgene.  In practice, 
selectable marker genes make the transformed cells and the GM plant resistant to 
an antibiotic, or tolerant of a herbicide.  However, genetic techniques are available 
that allow the removal of the reporter or resistance gene, after the integration of the 
incoming DNA has been checked.70 Removal is due to the fear that reporter genes 
could find their way to bacterial population in gut or soil. 
 
The final stage of making a transgenic plant is evaluating and testing the 
transformed plants for harmful side effects on human health and the ecosystem.71 
If no harmful effects found, and then the transgene must be transferred from the 
experimental plant is back into the original high yielding parent. The seeds are 
grown, plants with the transgene are selected, and the whole process is repeated 
about four or five times. Finally, field tests are performed to determine how the 
transgene affects the growth, yield, disease resistance, and other traits of the plants. 
Only plants that consistently have the highest yield with the best disease resistance 
will be selected to be grown again.72 
 
Plant biotechnology or agricultural biotechnology has ‘truly opened up a whole 
range of genetic exchanges that could never be possible without human 
interference.’73 Genes can now be transferred across species, class, or order, and 
introduce entirely new traits into organisms that were never before expressed.74  
                                                 
69 There are other direct gene transfer methods including the use of electroporation, silicon carbide 
fibre vortexing. For more information see, Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 
24. 
70 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40) p. 406; Nigel G 
Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 22. 
71 ‘Biosafety’ is a term used to describe efforts to reduce and eliminate the potential risks resulting 
from biotechnology and its products. 
72 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40), p. 405. 
73 Sarah Lively, ‘The ABCs and NTBs of GMOs: The Great European Union-United 
States Trade Debate—Do European Restrictions on the Trade of Genetically Modified Organisms 
Violate International Trade Law?’ (2002) 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 239, p. 243. 
74 Rebecca Bratspies, ‘The Illusion of Care’ (n 38), 303. 
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The first GM plants were planted for commercial purposes in the mid-1990s. Since 
then, Genetic engineering techniques and their applications have developed very 
rapidly. International production and trade in GMO products has increased rapidly 
too. The next section provides the main different traits of GMOs available today. 
 
2.5 The main applications of GMOs   
 
The main traits in GM crops are intended to provide:  
1. Herbicide resistance Researchers have introduced a gene from bacterium 
conveying resistance to some herbicides, and created transgenic crops that 
produce an alternative enzyme that is not affected by chemical herbicides 
(weed killers).75 By making the crop plants resistant to the herbicide by 
genetic engineering, both weeds and crops and weeds may be sprayed 
together. The weeds are killed but the crop survives. Most soybeans grown 
today contain herbicide resistant genes. The same is true of cotton, oilseed 
rape, maze, canola, and more.76 (Herbicide tolerance was one of the first 
GM traits to be tested in the field, and subsequently for commercial 
production) 
2. Insect/Pest resistance Insects can be very damaging to plants. Farmers 
spraying crops with insecticides find it a very costly and dangerous 
procedure.  Therefore, plants engineered to contain Bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt) toxin have a built in defence against certain insects. Then Bt toxin is 
sprayed on crops to prevent insects such as the cotton bollworm and 
European corn borer from destroying cotton and maize.77 In fact, most 
cotton seeds planted today contain the gene for Bt toxin, which effectively 
                                                 
75 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 163.  
76 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40), p. 410; Nigel G 
Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 43. 
77 This enhanced pesticide was introduced into wide range of plants, including tobacco, tomato, corn, 
and cotton. See also David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40)  
p. 412; Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33) p. 47. 
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kills cotton infesting insects by damaging their digestive system when they 
eat leaves.78  
3. Disease resistance79 This is achieved through the introduction of a gene 
form certain viruses which cause disease in plants.80 It provides vaccines for 
plants by having the vaccine encoded in a plant’s DNA, which turns on the 
plant immune system to certain virus. It helped revive the papaya industry 
in Hawaii.81 It is also being introduced to coffee, bananas, cassava, papaya, 
and others.  
4. Improvement of crop yield and quality The above strategies all contribute 
to an improvement in crop yield by allowing the plant to better withstand 
external factors that reduce the amount and quality of harvestable plant 
material. In addition, GM crops can increase the amount, or improve the 
quality, of material produced by the crop. For example, FlavrSavr tomatoes 
delay softening on the vine, and golden rice produces pro-vitamin A in the 
rice grain, leading to improved nutrition.82 
5. Environmental stress tolerance It increases the ability of the plant to 
survive adverse growing conditions such as drought, oxidative, soil salinity, 
cold, and heat stress. These abilities are normally associated with specific 
groups of genes which can be isolated and introduced into crops. 
International production and trade in GMO products has increased rapidly. The next 
section provides crucial statistical information that demonstrates the scale and size 
of the commercial cultivation of GM crops. 
2.6 Commercialisation of GMOs. 
GM crops are fast joining agriculture throughout the world, and will play an 
increasingly important role in global food production.  The introduction of these 
GM products into the food supply has been one of the most rapid adoptions of 
                                                 
78 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 162. 
79 It is possible to engineer plants for resistance not only for viral diseases but also roundworms, 
fungal diseases (moulds, blights, rusts, and rots) 
80 WHO, ’20 Questions on Genetically Modified (GM) Foods’ (n 7).  
81 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 161. 
82 Acceleration of growth time, reduction in the maturation time of trees.  
102 
 
technology in history.83 The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications (ISAAA)84 confirms this. It notes that the year 2010 was the 
fifteen anniversary of the commercialisation of biotech crops, first planted in 1996. 
During the sixteen intervening years, planting Agri-biotech/ GMOs, the 
accumulated hectarage planted exceeded one million hectares.  
After over a decade and a half of commercialisation, the global adoption of biotech 
crops continues to rise. According to ISAAA Brief No. 43 for 2011, 16.7 million 
farmers planted 160 million hectares of biotech crops in 29 countries, a sustained 
increase of 8% or 12 million hectares over 2010,85 when 15.4 million farmers 
planted 148 million hectares.86 The number has increased consistently from only 6 
countries in the year 1996, the first year of commercialisation. 
This growth from 1.7 million hectares of biotech crops in 1996 to 160 million 
hectares in 2011 is a record ninety four-fold increase between 1996 and 2011, 
making biotech crops the fastest adopted crop technology in the history of modern 
agriculture.87    
Leading countries planting biotech crops are the US, Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Canada, China, Paraguay and South Africa. 88 American farmers have embraced the 
technology, and most American corn and soybeans are genetically altered.  The US 
has by far the largest area of planted genetically altered crops. According to the 
ISAAA, American farmers planted 69 million hectares with biotech crops in 2011 
Brazil with 30.3 million hectares, and Argentina with 23.7 million hectares trailed 
far behind.89 USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service estimates that in 
2012, 93 % of soybean acreage, 88 % of corn acreage, and 94 percent of cotton 
acreage in the United States were planted with biotech varieties. New GM crops 
                                                 
83 Tim Josling, et al, Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System (Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, DC, March 2004) p. 153. 
84 The ISAAA is not-for-profit organisation with centres based in the Philippines, Kenya and United 
States. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA) report 
provides detailed biotech crop adoption statistics around the world. ISAAA has been tracking the 
global biotech crop adoption since the technology’s inception in 1996. The report is prepared and 
presented by Dr. Clive James, Chair of the ISAAA Board of Directors.  See Clive James, (n 56) 
85 Clive James, (n 56) 
86 Clive James, (n 56) 
87 Clive James, (n 56)  
88 Clive James, (n 56) 
89 U.S. plantings were up 3 percent from 2010. See Clive James, (n 56) 
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will continue to be brought to market, leading to more acceptance of biotech crops 
on the one hand, and potentially more trade challenges on the other. 90 
According to James, the technology is becoming increasingly popular in Brazil and 
Argentina, China, India and South Africa.91 19 of the 29 countries that have adopted 
biotech crops are developing nations, where usage grew at a rate of 17 percent to 
10.2 million hectares in 2009, compared to only 5 percent growth or 3.8 million 
hectares in industrialized countries. The Brief also adds that more than 90 percent 
of biotech crop growers are small-scale farmers. Of the 15.4 million farmers using 
the technology in 2010, 14.4 million were small-scale, resource-poor farmers in 
developing countries.92 
The Complainants are in the top five countries cultivating GMOs/agri-biotech 
products. They are considered mega-countries in terms of cultivation and 
production. Number one is the USA, which cultivates the largest volume of GM 
crops, leading the way in 2011 with 69 million hectares. Argentina, with 23.7 
million hectares, became the second biggest grower in 2011. Canada grew 10.4 
million hectares of biotech crops. This data confirms that the Complainants are the 
biggest producers of GMOs, together they account for about 65% of the global area 
of GM crops, and therefore have significant interest in promoting trade in GMOs. 
Commercial expansion of this scale cannot be ignored.  It signals that ‘GMOs are 
here to stay’,93 making this thesis of crucial importance.  
2.6.1 Industry 
Research and development of GMOs is lead mainly by large corporations. The big 
players in seed productions are American corporations Monsanto 23% and Dupont 
15%, and Swiss Syngenta 9%.; Together they account for $10,282 million, or 47% 
of the worldwide proprietary seed market.94  
                                                 
90 USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ USTR (March 2013) 
p. 21 http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20SPS.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2013. 
91 Clive James, (n 56). 
92 Clive James, (n 56). 
93 Dianna Boweles and Harry Klee, ‘Introduction to the Special Issues on Plant Technology’ (2001) 
GM special issue 27(6) The Plant Journal, pp. 481-2. 
94 The proprietary seed market (that is, brand- name seed that is subject to exclusive monopoly – 
i.e., intellectual property). See, ETC ‘Who owns nature’ (Miércoles, 12 November 2008) 
http://www.etcgroup.org/es/node/706 Accessed 20 September 2009. 
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This biotech industry appeared in the mid-1970s, mainly in the US, and shortly 
afterwards in Europe and Asia. The companies or corporations are ‘set up 
specifically to turn the science of biotechnology into a commercial product and sell 
the result.’95 The US Supreme Court was the first to allow GMOs to be patented, 
following the Diamond v Chakrabaty case in 1980 (Dutfield, 2003a, 154ff). This 
fuelled further interest and expansion in the biotech industry. It can be summed as 
‘opportunity created by intellectual resource and inherent entrepreneurial spirit 
allied to a powerful capitalist environment.’96  
GM seeds produced by large corporations are subject to Intellectual property rights 
law [hereinafter IPRs], and patenting obligations of the WTO’s TRIPs agreement.97 
These corporations work on the principle that, first, they are protected by IP law, 
which enables them to capture the benefits by excluding others from using such 
organisms.98 Second, the corporation sell their seeds with a licence agreement, 
allowing use for one year and forbidding farmers from saving seeds. Charging extra 
(technology fee) recovers the cost of developing GM seeds. Farmers pay more for 
the seed because they have to spend less on herbicides,99 although farmers are 
locked into buying the herbicides produced by the same company marketing the 
GM seeds.100 For example, Bollgard cotton verities are sold under a licence 
agreement in which the growers pay a fee and agree to abide by the terms, which 
include a 1 year licence to use the technology and an agreement to participate in an 
insect resistance management programme.101 Pretty notes that, the technology fee 
appears to capture most of the entire margin in certain systems. 102 For example, 
insect tolerant crops have been developed and commercialized by agrochemical 
companies. It flowed from the advantage to agrochemical corporations of producing 
                                                 
95 Jason Rushton & Chris Evans, ‘The Business of Biotechnology’ in Colin Ratledge and Bjorn 
Kristiansen, Basic Biotechnology (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 313. 
96 Ibid, 313. 
97 ‘Intellectual property’ is a generic term used to refer to a group of legal regimes such as patents, 
trade-marks and copyright. For more on IPRs and GMOs debate see Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte 
eds, The Future Control of Food: A guide to International Negotiations and Rules on Intellectual 
Property, Biodiversity and Food Security (Earthscan 2008). 
98 Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte (eds) The Future Control of Food (n  97) p. 21. 
99 Jason Rushton & Chris Evans, ‘The business of biotechnology’ (n 95) p. 312. 
100 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59), p. 250.  
101 Frederick J Perlak et al., ‘Development and commercial use of Bollgard cotton in the USA- early 
promises versus today’s reality’ GM Special Issue (2001) 27(6) The Plant Journal, p. 489.  
102 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 257. 
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crops tolerant to specific insecticide, particularly when manufactured by the same 
company.  
A few corporations, including Dow, DuPont, Syngenta, Aventis and Monsanto, 
own 3 out of 4 GM crop patents in the United States. The situation is much worse 
internationally, where Monsanto, the world’s biggest seed company, is by far the 
GM crop leader, owning 90% of the GM seeds and associated licenses. ETC Group 
estimates that Monsanto's biotech seeds and traits (including those licensed to other 
companies) accounted for 87% of the total world area devoted to genetically 
engineered seeds in 2007.103  
Monsanto has crafted crops that tolerate dousing in herbicides, and crops that are 
designed to resist pests, effectively creating their own insecticide.104 A typical 
bailment license forbids saving these seeds, and also requires that farmers sign a 
separate patent license agreement, which typically include language such as:105 
The purchase of these seeds/bailment/transfer of these seeds conveys no 
license under said patents to use these seeds or perform any of the methods 
covered by these patents. A license must first be obtained before these seeds 
can be used in any way... Progeny of these seeds cannot be cleaned or used 
as planting seed or transferred to others for planting. This seed may only be 
offered for sale and distribution by authorized seed companies or their 
dealers. 
IPRs are outside the scope of this thesis, however they are useful to illustrate the 
effect on the debate surrounding GMOs, which is limited to international trade 
implications.106 There is intense interest in how power relation and IPRs will play 
out. The critical issue relating to the GM debate is who owns the benefits of the 
new technology? Add to it that in agriculture there is greater concentration of power 
                                                 
103ETC ‘Who owns nature’ (Miércoles, 12 November 2008), http://www.etcgroup.org/es/node/706 
accessed 11 June 2010. 
104 See Clive James, (n 56). 
105 Eagle seed is company selling Monsanto Roundup ready soybeans, 
http://www.eagleseed.com/roundup.html accessed 11 June 2010.  
106 For more on the subject see, Geoff Tansey & Tasmin Rajotte eds, The Future Control of Food (n 
97). At this stage the issue of genetic resource ownership has not been settled. There is a need to 
find the right balance between the use of genetic resources and at the same time reward the players 
involved.   
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at every stage of the food chain, especially the vertical integration of 
corporations.107 Therefore, IPR may pose potential problems with regards to 
monopoly and availability of a diversity of crops.    
Many commentators and NGOs worry that GMOs may be another technological fix 
to patch up the problems of modern agriculture caused by previous agrochemical 
technologies, such as pesticide resistance and pollution which were promoted by 
the same companies now leading the biotechnology revolution. Additionally, they 
consider this as undesirable level of control of seed markets by few chemical 
companies.108 For example, ETC Group released a 48-page report (industry 
statistics), warning of corporate concentration and commoditisation of nature, as 
well as highlighting global resistance grounded in "Food Sovereignty".109 The 
Council for Responsible genetics fears that ‘through their monopoly and patents, 
and technologies that promote increased monoculture, agribusiness is leading us 
into a perilous future where they will control a basic human resource – food’.110 An 
example of this control is that exclusive use of herbicide-tolerant GM crops would 
make farmers dependent on industry for these chemicals.111  
Friends of Earth issues a series of heavily footnoted, yearly reports on the impact 
of Genetically Modified Crops (GM) in agriculture titled ‘Who benefits from GM 
Crops?’. This series of reports is a counterweight to the ISAAA annual reports on 
genetically modified (GM) crops. FOE claims that the ISAAA is biased to industry, 
and issues exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims about the successes of GM 
crops. According to FOE, ISAAA does so because it is partly funded by big 
corporations and pro-GM US government bodies.112  
The next section counts the current commercial applications of GMOs. It also sheds 
light on future promises of the technology. 
                                                 
107 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) 256-257. 
108 WHO, ’20 Questions on Genetically Modified (GM) Foods’ (n 7).  
109ETC ‘Who owns nature’ (Miércoles, 12 November 2008) http://www.etcgroup.org/es/node/706. 
110 Such as, Council for Responsible Genetics, ‘”Coalition of the Willing” Files Complaint Against 
EU GM Food Restrictions’ (Press release, Council for Responsible Genetics 14 May 2003 
http://www.gene-watch.org/press/us-eu-wto_051403.html Accessed 11 September 2009  
111 WHO, ’20 Questions on Genetically Modified (GM) Foods’ (n 7).  
112 See the main statement by Friends of Earth, ‘Who benefits from GM Crops?’ FoE 2006-2011, 
http://www.foei.org/en/resources/publications/pdfs/2011/who-benefits-from-gm-crops.   
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2.6.2 Commercial adoption of the different applications of GMOs   
The first food on the market derived from GM plants was the Flavr-savr slow-
ripening tomatoes with supposedly improved flavour.113 Slow ripening fruit can be 
beneficial for growers and retailers since the fruit will have a longer shelf life. 
Commercially, Flavr-savr was largely unsuccessful in the market due in part to a 
decline in quality related to the modification.114      
Current GM food comes primarily from four crops that dominate GM agriculture: 
soybeans, maize, cotton and canola. It adds up to almost 99% of global biotech 
area.115 Biotech soybean continued to be the principal biotech crop in 2011, 
occupying 75.4 million hectares, or 47% of global biotech area, followed by biotech 
maize (51.00 million hectares at 32% of the global biotech crop area), biotech 
cotton (24.7 million hectares at 15% of the global biotech crop area) and biotech 
canola (8.2 million hectares at 5% of the global biotech crop area).116 Other crops 
also cultivated on smaller scale include squash, papaya, alfalfa, and sugarbeet.117  
Initially, the biotech industry wanted their products to be accepted by farmers and 
food produces. Research has focused primarily on developing GM plants to 
improve crop protection, such as improving resistance to pests, reducing the need 
for pesticides resulting in agronomic traits. Herbicide tolerance was one of the first 
GM traits to be tested in the field, and subsequently for commercial production.118  
Within commercial GM crops, in 2011, the predominant genetic modification was 
herbicide resistance (deployed in soybean, maize, canola, cotton, sugar beet and 
alfalfa), which accounting for 59% of global biotech products, and insect resistance 
which occupying 15%.119 There is notable increasing growth in stacked double and 
triple traits (varieties combining two different traits) accounting for 26%. Such 
varieties have been introduced in cotton and corn. The addition of new traits, such 
                                                 
113 Nigel G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), p. 39. 
114 Laylah Zurek ‘The European Communities Biotech Dispute: how the WTO Fails to Consider 
Cultural Factors in the Genetically Modified Food Debate’ (2007) 42 Tex Int’l LJ 345.  
115 Clive James, (n 56) ‘Biotech soybean continued to be the principal biotech crop in 2011, 
occupying 75.4 million hectares or 47% of global biotech area, followed by biotech maize (51.00 
million hectares at 32%), biotech cotton (24.7 million hectares at 15%) and biotech canola (8.2 
million hectares at 5%) of the global biotech crop area.’ 
116 Clive James, (n 56). 
117 Clive James, (n 56). 
118 World Health Organization ‘20 Questions on Genetically Modified (GM) Foods’ (n 7). 
119 Clive James, (n 56). 
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as resistance to root-worm in maize, and the combinations of traits with similar 
functions, such as two genes for resistance to lepidopteran pests in maize, is also 
increasing. 120 
While the improvement of agronomic characteristics in major crops has been highly 
successful, few products genetically engineered to meet the specific needs of either 
food processors or consumers have yet been commercialized. Recently, however, a 
renewed emphasis on developing agricultural biotechnology applications more 
beneficial to consumers has accompanied continuing efforts to develop crops with 
improved agronomic traits. Although genetically engineered crops with enhanced 
health, nutrition, functional, and consumer benefits have lagged behind agronomic 
applications, research on many such products is in the advanced stages of 
development. These applications could improve human and livestock nutrition and 
health, the nutritional quality of food animals for human consumption, and create 
ingredients with superior properties for food manufacturing and processing.121  
 
This expansion beyond food and feed crops can be achieved via increases in 
molecular farming. Molecular farming describes the application of molecular-
biological techniques to the synthesis of commercial products that are already 
extracted from plants through to the manufacture of compounds that are completely 
novel to plants such as novel or modified carbohydrates, oils, fats, and proteins. 
Potential future applications might include an edible source of vaccines and 
antibodies, plant based petroleum for fuel, alternatives to rubber, nicotine-free 
tobacco, caffeine-free coffee, biodegradable plastics, stress tolerant plants for 
agricultural and forest production, and industrial fibres.122 Some of these GM Plants 
are expected to reach the market in the next 10 years.123 
 
Pretty categorizes the different applications into three main generations depending 
on their commercial availability.124 The first GM generation was modified in ways 
                                                 
120 Tim Josling, et al, Food Regulation and Trade (n 83) p. 153. 
121 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) 255. 
122 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 165. See 
also David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 40), p. 413. Nigel 
G Halford, Genetically Modified Crops (n 33), pp. 50-56. 
123 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 156. 
124 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 249-250. 
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beneficial to the agri-chemical companies, the seed suppliers, or the farmers, but 
not for the consumers. The second generation comprises those GMOs already 
developed and tested, but not commercially released, either because of uncertainties 
of the technology itself, or over concerns for potential environmental concern. An 
example is the so called ‘Terminator’ technology protection system, this involves 
the insertion of gene switching mechanisms to prevent any seed saved after harvest 
from being replanted. The second generation is likely to bring more public and 
consumer benefits. Second generation biotech crops, such as alfalfa, wheat, and 
potatoes, will come to the market within 10 years, as well as high oleic acid soybean 
and vitamin A-enriched rice (golden rice).125 The third generation of GMOs are 
those that are still far from the market, but generally require the better understanding 
of whole gene complexes that control such traits as drought, salt, or metal tolerance. 
They will allow farmers to cultivate on problem soil, and produce faster growth in 
rice, wheat, and more. The third generation has the potential to bring more public 
and consumer benefits. Though, these are still under research, they will have their 
own risks.126    
Finally, the ISAAA expects the number of biotech farmers globally to reach 20 
million or more in 40 countries on 200 million hectares in 2015. ISAAA predicts 
further adoption increases will also come from: 
 significant expansion of biotech soybean, maize, and cotton in Brazil. 
 commercialisation of Bt cotton in 2010 by Pakistan, the fourth-largest 
cotton growing country. 
 expansion of Bt cotton in Burkina Faso with potential adoption of biotech 
cotton and or maize in other African countries including Malawi, Kenya, 
Uganda, and Mali. 
 adoption of golden rice by the Philippines in 2012, and by Bangladesh and 
India before 2015.127 
The use of GMOs per se does not necessarily raise alarm. But there is considerable 
concern about the unknown effects of the modified organisms on the environment, 
                                                 
125 William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 35) p. 156. 
126 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 250. 
127 Ibid.  
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and on human health when GM plants and their products are consumed as food. 
Alarm is also being raised by the ethics of industrial involvement in development 
and sale of GMOs.128   
It is clear that cultivation, production, and consumption of GMOs are increasing in 
many parts of the world. Combined with the fact that techniques used in creating 
GMOs are relatively new and very complex, each application brings different 
potential benefits and risks for different stakeholders, which triggered wide debate 
on the matter.129 Commercialisation of GMOs only intensifies the debate, 
prompting wide media coverage.130 The commercialisation of GMOs may now be 
inevitable, but its benefits, in terms of size, nature and distribution, are not. The 
next section will highlight the main arguments from both sides, reflecting sharp 
divisions of opinions on benefits and risks. 
2.7 Contested risks and benefits 
The creation of GMOs or so called ‘Frankenstein’ foods has generated much debate 
and controversy. Current debates reveal substantial differences in perceptions of the 
associated risks and benefits. Some strongly argue that GMOs are safe and essential 
for world progress. Others state they are not needed, and involve too many risks.131 
Potential benefits and potential risks of GMOs presented so far raise highly 
interdisciplinary and complex issues. There is no clear division as the 
environmental and health concerns raise ethical and political questions around the 
distribution of risks and benefits.132 However, this chapter focuses on concerns over 
human health and protection of the environment take centre stage in this debate, 
and have driven both sides of the argument. 
It must be borne in mind that GMOs have been developed and commercialized over 
short period of time. The technology is very new, and still in its infancy. It is 
impossible to accurately predict its full effect on human health and the 
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129 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) 259. 
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environment.133 There are unknown factors in the new science behind 
biotechnology, and until it is thoroughly understood the risks cannot be completely 
characterized.134  
 
2.7.1 Potential benefits  
 
Proponents claim that GMOs improve efficiency of agricultural production and 
overall safety of food, increase the economic vibrancy and vitality of the 
communities, and foster sustainable development. They also advocate that GM 
crops can grow faster, produce more, yield better quality, and use fewer 
chemicals.135 The ISAAA Brief claims that agri-biotechnology is able to deliver 
healthier crops that produce more food, often in areas with less than perfect growing 
conditions. 136 The 2011 ISAAA Brief illustrates that biotechnology is a key 
component contributing to a sustainable agriculture. It also adds that more and more 
farmers around the world are turning to biotechnology so they can grow plants that 
yield more per acre and reduce production costs, while being resistant to disease 
and insect pests.137   
2.7.1.1 Agriculture economic (agronomic) benefits 
 
Biotechnology traits developed and commercialized to date have largely focused 
on herbicide resistance and pest control (primarily Bt crops).138 GMOs commonly 
found on the market include Roundup ready soybeans and Bt corn and cotton.139 
Many plant pests have proven either difficult or uneconomical to control with 
chemical treatment, traditional breeding, or other agricultural technologies, and in 
these instances, in particular, biotechnology has proven to be an effective 
agronomic tool. Herbicide resistance allows farmers to control weeds with 
chemicals that would otherwise damage the crop itself. This can lead to economic 
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advantage from reduction in weed and insect control cost. For example, tomatoes 
with improved shelf life can result in energy and water savings as consequence of 
the tomatoes being easier to process. 140 With regard to pesticide reduction, the 
ISAAA explains that biotech crop varieties require less cultivation and fewer 
pesticide applications, thereby saving fuel and reducing carbon dioxide emissions 
into the air. Reduction in input leads to improved agronomic practice.141 
GM herbicide tolerance will provide not only more efficient, but also more flexible 
weed control for growers of these crops. Weed control is an important aspect of 
growing each of these crops, and herbicides will continue to be the major method 
of control when used with either conventional or GM crops. GM crops are likely to 
be cheaper for the grower than the current methods, and involve fewer sprays and 
use relatively benign herbicides.142 These crops can be expected to sustain less weed 
and insect damage, and therefore to produce higher yield per acre, leading to 
another agronomic advantage.143 Many look hopefully towards this new technology 
for help in increasing global food security in the future.144 So far there is no clear 
evidence to support this claim.145  
Finally, GM crops have also a wide range of non-food applications that provide 
agronomic benefits, such as stronger fibres in cotton, where gene insertion 
technology has increased the strength of one major upland cotton variety by 60% 
and provided softer, more durable clothes for consumers and greater profits for 
farmers.146 Gene insertion has also provided vaccines for plants by encoding the 
vaccine in a plant’s DNA to turn on the plant immune system when certain viruses 
are present. This technology helped revive the papaya industry in Hawaii.147 Future 
application may include improved varieties that allow safer transport storage. 
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Studies show, for example, that transgenic corn that expresses ‘avidin’, which is a 
protein found in egg whites, is highly resistant to pests during storage.148  
2.7.1.2 Environmental protection  
 
Proponents also argue that GM plants are environmentally friendly since they 
reduce the amount of pesticides and herbicides sprayed on the plants, thus 
conserving the soil health, improving water retention, and increasing energy 
conservation.149 Insecticide use appears generally to be down with GMOs (by 
reduction on the numbers of sprays per hectare per year), particularly in cotton and 
maize. On the other hand, herbicide use appears to have increased. 150   
ISAAA officials have maintained that there is substantial evidence that crops 
genetically modified to withstand drought, salt, insects, and diseases are safe for 
human consumption. According to them, biotechnology delivers food that is as safe 
as those produced through conventional agriculture.151  
GM crops such as cotton and maize are modified to express protein known as Bt 
toxins. Bt crops contain genes introduced from Bacillus thuringiensis Bt, a soil 
bacteria commonly found in the environment that kills certain classes of insects, 
making the GM plants more insect resistant.152  
Using fewer insecticides, GM crops can have many advantages for the environment, 
the farmer, and especially the farm workers who currently deal with constant or 
repeated exposure to subtoxic levels of chemicals. Bollgard cotton is the trade mark 
given to a number of verities of cotton with built in Bt protein, providing insect 
control against mainly budworm, and bollworm.153 Cultivation of Bollgard cotton 
should lead to reduced use of chemical insecticides, reduced trips across the field, 
reduced worker exposure, and reduced chemical load on the environment.154 
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2.7.1.3 Consumer benefits 
GM crops can produce foods with a variety of advantages to the consumer. This 
can be done by introducing new plant genes that enhance existing gene action to 
improve starch or oil yield, modified oils or starches, and enhance fruit flavour, 
colour or nutrition. For example, genetic modification of potatoes can improve 
flavour and mash texture through modification of starch and sugar content. It can 
also produce high starch potatoes by reducing water content in potatoes, and alter 
cell-wall composition so they absorb less fat when fried.155 This type of 
modification may have dietary benefits for consumers. 
Moreover, GMOs are hopeful products aimed at ending malnutrition in the 
developing world. ‘Golden rice’ is an example of genetically engineered rice that 
produces large amounts of beta carotene which the body converts into vitamin A. 
Researchers are developing rice that provides extra iron and protein. However, this 
rice would not work alone. It will need to be paired with a balanced diet, which 
includes fat necessary for it to be absorbed.156  Additionally, new plant products 
with a range of gene- inactivating techniques can reduce the activity of, or switch 
off, specific unwanted genes. These genes might affect fruit softening, toxin or 
allergen genes.157  
 
Plants could also be genetically modified to produce vaccines or other medicines. 
Potatoes have been modified to produce edible vaccines against E. Coli bacteria, 
which causes diarrhoea. This would allow cheap and easy distribution of the 
vaccine, but research is still at a very early stage.158 
 
Future GM crops should be able to conform more closely to consumer wishes. 
Theoretically, it is possible that genetic modification could improve the flavour, 
texture, appearance, price, and nutritional content of plants. However, it is very 
difficult to predict exactly when these new developments will become 
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commercially available.159 Some believe that when these become available, it will 
be easier to convince consumers to accept them.160 
While genetically modified crop varieties promise benefits to the corporations, 
farmers, food producers, and consumers, and the environment, they may also pose 
a range of risks. The next section explores these risks and the associated concerns 
2.7.2 Potential risks   
Opponents might have nothing against genes per se, instead they fear the effects of 
foreign genes not naturally found in the plant.161 They are not only sceptic about 
the alleged benefits, but also warn against a number of risks, which in their opinion, 
are posed by GM crops and food products. Generally opponents have two types of 
worries. The first relates to food safety and risk to human health; the second 
concerns risk to the environment. Such fears should not be underestimated; they 
might have the power to shake up the industry. We will dwell on these two issues 
in turn. 
2.7.2.1 Concerns about food safety and risks to human health  
The concerns about food safety and risks to human health focus on two main areas: 
allergenic and immune system reactions to new substances, and antibiotic marker 
genes.162 New GM crops may contain new proteins transferred together with the 
desired trait. A risk to humans arises if these products provoke an additional 
allergenic reaction. For example, a 1996 report in the New England Journal of 
Medicine seemed to confirm at least some of those fears. The study found that 
soybeans containing a gene from Brazil nut could trigger an allergic reaction in 
people who were sensitive to Brazil nuts.163 The work on these soybeans was 
discontinued, and none of the plants were ever released to the public.164 In spite of 
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this risk, scientists believe that the odds of an unknown allergen being found in GM 
foods sold to consumers are very small.165 As a matter of principle, the transfer of 
genes from commonly allergenic foods is discouraged unless it can be demonstrated 
that the protein product of the transferred gene is not allergenic.166  
Another example is the StarLink corn, which was found to have a higher 
concentration of protein than expected after processing and cooking. The protein 
can cause an allergic reaction if consumed by the public. Companies pushed for 
approval. The EPA gave split approval for StarLink corn to be grown as long it was 
only used to feed livestock.167 The lack of labelling and segregation in the US 
allowed the StarLink corn to mix with all other corn from the region, which was 
then shipped together to processing centres.168 In 2000, an unapproved transgenic 
corn called StarLink was detected in taco shells found in American grocery stores. 
This led The EPA to revoke its approval, and withdraw the product from the market. 
The company offered to buy back all the remaining StarLink corn so that no more 
food would became contaminated. In addition, all StarLink seed was pulled from 
the market to prevent its future growth. StarLink is no longer grown anywhere in 
the world. 169 The lack of segregation can led to worse situations, where GM crops 
intended for industrial or pharmaceutical processes, becomes commercially 
widespread, the risks from unwanted material in the human food chain are 
intensified.170  
 
Another concern regards antibiotic resistance marker genes. It is feared that these 
genes may be transferred to bacteria, which would then acquire the antibiotic 
resistance themselves, rendering many antibiotics useless. There is worry that 
overuse of antibiotics may render some human drugs ineffective, and/or make some 
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strains of bacteria untreatable.171 Alternatives to antibiotic marker genes now exist, 
and many believe antibiotics should not be used in commercial GMOs.172 
 
Similarly, gene transfer from GM foods to cells of the body, or to bacteria in the 
gastrointestinal tract, could cause concern if the transferred genetic material 
adversely affects human health. 173 This would be particularly relevant if antibiotic 
resistance genes used in creating GMOs were to be transferred.  Arpad Pusztai first 
suggested this following a study on the effects of consumption of genetically 
modified potatoes on rats, in which subjects fed the altered potatoes suffered stunted 
internal organ growth and weakened immune systems.174 The research, however, 
has been criticized.175 
2.7.2.2 Concerns about the environment 
Environmental concerns mainly relate to the plants themselves, and the effect on 
the non-target species, such as insects in their environment.176 Many fear gene flow 
and cross pollination, where transgenes could transfer from GMO to conventional 
crop, related species in the wild, and/or to bacteria in soil or human guts.  It is 
difficult to predict the effects on native plant ecology.177 At first, this concern was 
raised in relation to open-air crop trials, with possibility of cross pollination, and 
on-the-ground and in-the-soil contamination of non-GMO crops.178 It was then a 
problem for farmers growing conventional crops near GM farms. Cross pollination 
is a complex risk to assess as it varies from country to country. If a crop has native 
wild relatives the risk is higher than it would be in another country where there are 
few or no relative wild relatives.179 Cross pollination within species can be limited 
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by management practice, and appropriate further studies are needed to clarify the 
extent of this threat.180 Such a gene flow may lead to a chance of recombining 
viruses and bacteria to produce new pathogens leading to novel and non-desirable 
traits.181 The concern is whether different viruses subsequently infecting the plant 
might incorporate some of the original viral DNA, giving rise to a new hybrid 
virus.182 
 
Herbicide tolerant crops raises concerns regarding new forms of resistance. The 
main fear is that GM plants may confer their genetically modified traits on weedy 
relatives that live nearby, leading to resistant weeds, sometimes referred to as ‘super 
weeds’.183 Just as genes for antibiotic resistance could theoretically spread from 
plants to bacteria, genes for pest or herbicide resistance could potentially spread to 
weeds. Many plants including squash, sunflower, and canola are close relatives to 
weeds. Cross breading occasionally occurs, allowing the genes from the plant to 
mix with the genes from the other plant. Herbicide tolerant crops themselves may 
also become problem weeds in the rotation. New secondary pest and weed problems 
can also arise. 184 Gene Watch cites an example from Canada, where GM oilseed 
rape pollinated other oilseed rape. The other oilseed rape developed resistance to a 
few herbicides, and farmers had to use alternative herbicides to control them.185  
 
There are concerns on three fronts with regard to the introduction of Bt crops.  First, 
there is the possibility of insects building up resistance against the Bt toxin.186 The 
fear is that some insects will survive the toxins, developing resistance and then 
mating with other resistant insects, likely producing offspring also resistant to the 
pesticide. The Bt toxin in the plants act as selection pressure on the variations 
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inherent within a pest population, driving them toward resistance. In a short period 
of time, much shorter than the evolutionary timeline, the entire population will be 
resistant, and the pesticide will no longer be effective.187 These crops would exert 
strong selection pressure on any resistant insects, potentially making that pest 
resistant and forcing farmers to go back to spraying. 
Second, there is concern as regards the effect of GM plants on ‘non-target 
organisms’, that is, any plants or animals inadvertently exposed to it.188 An article 
in the journal ‘Nature’ suggested that Monarch butterflies were killed by eating 
pollen from corn carrying the Bt gene. This article alarmed the science community 
as well as environmental advocacy groups, and spurred public debate.189  Much 
controversy surrounded this study, and led to further studies examining the effect 
on butterflies and other non-target organisms. Some showed adverse effects of 
transgenic corn pollen on the Monarch butterfly. However, the studies were 
conducted in the laboratory where caterpillars had no choice but to eat milkweed 
contaminated with pollen, a much different setting from a corn field. Clark argues 
that more studies in the actual environment are necessary to allow reliable 
conclusions to be reached.190 The monarch butterfly became the symbol of the anti-
GMO movement in the early 2001.191  
Third, there is fear of changes to farm practices, which would lead to loss of 
biodiversity.192 Bt trait in the crops is very effective, more thoroughly killing pests 
than spraying, and resulting in less food for birds and other animals further up the 
food chain. This is also of concern to biodiversity because it reduces the number of 
different varieties available.193 Proponents argue that any potential environmental 
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hazard from agricultural biotechnology must be weighed against the clearly 
established benefits.194 
2.7.3 Other issues and concerns 
A wide range of ethical, legal, political, economic, and social implications of 
biotechnology are a source of great debate and discussion by scientists, the general 
public, clergy, politicians, lawyers, and many others around the world.195 This brief 
section only draws attention to some of the many issues to highlight the intensity 
and complexity of the debated.  
People’s right to eat GM free food: Many NGOs took this argument forwards, 
particularly with the launch of the Biotech dispute. For example, Friends of the 
Earth strongly demanded that the WTO not deny people the right to know and 
choose what they eat and farm.196 It was also argued that it must not undermine the 
right of the European Union and others to take appropriate steps to protect their 
citizens and the environment from GMO food and farming.197 In this respect, 
labelling requirements for GM foods can be effective tools that allow consumers to 
make an informed choice about the food they eat. Additionally, GM crops and foods 
can be treated differently in terms of sales and imports.198 
Ethical and cultural issues: Potential risks of GMOs raise ethical issues, such as the 
ethical acceptability of risk to the environment or the health of producers, or 
responsibilities to future generations. Assessing the ethical implications of GMOs 
is very difficult. It requires dwelling on the ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’, and is beyond 
the scope of this thesis.199 Another specific ethical concern is that GM crops are 
‘unnatural’ food because they are the result of human manipulation of living 
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matter.200 Moreover, ‘[d]epending on the region of the world, people often have 
strong and clear attitudes to food. In addition to nutritional value, food often has 
societal and historic connections, and in some instances may even have religious 
importance.’201  In line with this, vegetarians and persons of the Islamic and Jewish 
faiths may be averse to eating food containing pig genes.202 
Coexistence between GMOs, and organic and conventional farming: Cross 
pollination presents risks, such as genetic contamination, which occurs if a GMO 
cross pollinates with neighbouring non-GM fields, or when they cross pollinate 
with wild relatives.203  GM crops make it difficult for organic and conventional 
farming to distinguish themselves on the market. This also relates to consumer 
choice, and the visibility of options for consumers wanting to avoid GM food. 204 
GMOs may damage the environment and human health. Farmers whose crops are 
contaminated by GMOs may experience economic loss. Who should take 
responsibility for the harm? Should the industry be liable for damage caused to the 
environment?205 
Other concerns regard the socio-economic impact of the new technology on the 
survival of traditional and biological agricultural models, as well as the impact on 
indigenous and local communities. However, the socio-economic impacts of GMOs 
are hard to predict.206  
Issues relating to commercialisation of GMOs and corporate power:207 Private 
corporations claim IP rights for most GMOs. This ‘private ownership of seed 
patents raised ethical concerns about future fairness of availability of these crops to 
the world’s farmers.’208 The GM seed market is big, and expanding steadily. In 
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2009, it was worth US$10.5 billion, and yielded crops that were worth US$130 
billion.209  
There is distrust of the large multinational corporations that control both the GM 
seed and herbicide markets. This distrust contributes to suspicions of the entire 
technology. ‘Terminator’ seeds, for example, transfer power from farmers to 
companies. It prevents farmers from saving and reusing seeds, which is a 
widespread practice both in developing and developed countries.210 This type of 
application intensifies concerns about the increase of corporate power, the 
dependency of farmers on corporations for seeds, and the limitations imposed by 
the licence agreement. 
 
The success of GMOs, arguably, will rely on public acceptance, particularly in 
Europe where it has proven to be a major stumbling block in the development of 
GM crops.211 The challenge for biotechnology industry is to convince the public 
that GMOs offer real advantages which cannot be achieved realistically any other 
way, and that the technology is safe. The industry will need to demonstrate that it 
is not only concerned with shareholders profit, but also willing to engage with 
farmers and consumer’s needs.212 
People’s distrust of large companies stems from the fear of these corporations 
putting financial gain ahead of public welfare. Many commentators have argued 
that GM technology represents ‘no more than a further technological fix on the 
intense agriculture mill.’213 If research is conducted by public interest bodies, such 
as universities or non-governmental organizations, whose concern is to produce 
public goods, then biotechnology could result in the spread of technologies that 
have immense benefits.214 
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This distrust in corporations led some to believe in conspiracy theory that assumes 
some people have plans to control world population growth over the coming 
decades.215 For example, William Engdahl’s critique ‘seeds of destruction’ goes far 
beyond the familiar controversies surrounding the practice of genetic modification 
as a scientific technique. He describes a world driven by profit and government 
corruption, where GMOs are used to gain worldwide control over food production. 
216 He believes that ‘genetic manipulation’ unleashes great potential, as ‘control of 
food supply of entire nations is too much power to give to any single corporation 
or government.’217 
For many people, tabloid newspapers are the only source of information about 
GMOs. At the same time, there is plenty of conflicting information provided by 
governments, the big corporations that control agriculture, and interest groups with 
anti-biotechnology views. Yet, the GMO debate is most intense in Europe, where 
public concern about GM foods is higher than in other parts of the world such as 
the United States, where GM crops are more widely grown and the introduction of 
these products has been less controversial. EU citizens’ strong views on the matter 
have influenced the evolution of the regulatory system. See Chapter 3, sections 2.4 
and 4.7 on public distrust of GMOs. 
 
2.8 Risk regulation and assessment of GMOs   
 
The Biotech dispute raises concerns regarding the role of science in shaping 
regulatory choices and measures that address possible risks and related 
uncertainties posed by GMOs.218 This section considers the interaction of science 
and society in risk assessment and its effect on regulatory choices regarding the 
control of risks arising from GMOs.  
                                                 
215 Some NGOs such as Greenpeace accused the US government and the GM industry of imposing 
GM crops on the South. See Greenpeace, ‘The US War on Biosafety: Renewed Aggression by 
Rouge State’ (June 2003), www.greenpeace.org/.../Global/...2/.../the-us-war-on-biosafety-rene.p. 
accessed 18 May 2010 
216 William Engdall ‘Seeds of Destruction: The Geopolitics of GM Food’ (2004) 5 Current Concerns, 
http://www.currentconcerns.ch/archive/2004/05/20040505.php. Accessed June 2008. 
217 Ibid, p.14.  
218 See chapter 1, sections 5.3 and 5.5. 
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Risk is generally defined as probability of particular event occurring and the 
consequent severity of the impact of that event.219 There seems to be a 
contemporary obsession with anticipating risks, acting to prevent them and having 
in place plans to manage risk events should they occur. 220 According to Beck we 
live in the age of ‘risk society’ where risk has been regarded as one of the key 
unifying themes that shape the contemporary social sciences. He notes that ‘Risks 
are always events that are threatening’ and he makes a distinction between risk as 
an anticipated event and catastrophe as an actual event.221  
 
Regulation can be seen to be centrally concerned with the control of risks, 
identifying and assessing risk is not a simple matter. A host of different approaches 
to deﬁning and assessing risks can be taken.222 Risk analysis for new technologies 
can take a number of forms, and choices of appropriate methods depend on the 
scientific and regulatory context.223 Advocates of GMOs focus on cost benefit 
approaches to risk, weighing the scale of harm against potential benefits, while 
opponents of GMOs argue over the applicability of the key concepts of ‘risks’ and 
‘uncertainty’.224  The role of the precautionary principle can be used as a risk 
assessment tool to be employed in the absence of scientific literature, precautionary 
principle can also be used as risk management tool.225  
                                                 
219 For more on the definition of risk and the different types of risks see Robert Baldwin, Martin 
Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd edn, 
OUP, 2011) 86-87. 
220 For wider discussion see Bridgget M Hutter, ed, Anticipating Risks and Organising Risk 
Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
221 Ulrich Beck, ‘Living in the world of risk society’, (2006) 35(3) Economy and Society, 332 
222 For more on the different perspectives to calculate risk ranging from technical, economic, 
psychological, to cultural approaches see. Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, 
Understanding Regulation (n 219) 86-92.  
223 The basis for regulating new technology products is ‘Risk Analysis Framework’ which has three 
components: (1) risk assessment, is designed to provide an objective and neutral product risk profile 
identifying the actual risk; (2) risk management, is designed to make regulatory decision based upon 
product risk profile established by the risk assessors; and (3) risk communication is designed to 
ensure transparency; a two way flow of information between both the risk assessors and the risk 
managers but also between the Risk Analysis Framework and stakeholders. See Grant E Isaac and 
William A Kerr, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms at the World Trade Organisation: A Harvest of 
Trouble’ (2003) 37(6) Journal of World Trade 1083, 1086. 
224 Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and 
Politics of Genetically Modified Foods. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 9. 
225 See Grant E Isaac and William A Kerr, ‘A Harvest of Trouble’ (n 223) p. 1088. 
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Managing and regulating risk in an effective manner is a key regulatory challenge: 
to potentially avoid the under regulation of risk, or potentially be biased to the over 
regulation of risk.226 Regulators must chose a method to assess risk that will unleash 
the benefits of GM crops whilst avoiding its pitfalls. ‘Regulators walk fine line, if 
they are too stringent, billions of dollars of unnecessary costs will be imposed. If 
standards are too lenient, the scope of health or environmental harm maybe too 
high.’227 In making regulatory choices under these circumstances, the root question 
becomes how to account for scientific uncertainties in the regulatory process, and 
how to balance risks and benefits in the absence of critical scientific information. 
 
The main focus of theoretical attention has been on the ‘new risk environments’ 
created by science and technology and particularly on ‘technologies of the 
future’.228 Lezaun- believes that there is a volatility attached to risks in modern 
society, where new scientific developments are highly volatile with new 
developments being herald as success one day and hazardous shortly afterwards.229 
Thus, in a relatively short period of time many issues traditionally, which national 
governments enjoyed full regulatory control, have come to be viewed of global 
importance requiring systems of international regulation.230   
 
It is true in the case of GMOs that advances in biotechnology intensified the debate 
about the proper balance between engagement with the wider public and the 
precautionary principle and its relationship to risk, scientific evidence and 
uncertainty.231 Pretty explains that GMOs are not a single, homogenous technology. 
Each application and product brings different benefits for different stakeholders, 
and each poses different environmental and health risks. It is important, therefore, 
to distinguish between the major types of applications and the different generations 
                                                 
226 for more on the different challenges that face regulators see Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and 
Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (n 219) 92-97 
227 Rebecca Bratspies, ‘The Illusion of Care’(n 38) p 299 
228 There are many areas of science, particularly in the field of environment, see Bridgget M 
Hutter, ed, Anticipating Risks and Organising Risk Regulation (n 220), p. 5 
229 See Javier Lezaun, ‘Bioethics and Risk Regulation of ‘Frontier Research’: the Case of Gene 
Therapy’ in Bridgget M Hutter, ed, Anticipating Risks and Organising Risk Regulation (n 220) 
230 For more see Jacqueline Peel, Science and Risk regulation in International Law (e-book, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) chapter 2 
231 see Bridgget M Hutter, ed, Anticipating Risks and Organising Risk Regulation (n 220) 
, p.7 The development of biotechnology with global reach focus concerns on permanent 
widespread changes which may occur to DNA through these interventions 
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of GM technologies.232 Different GM organisms include different genes inserted in 
different ways. This means that individual GMOs and their safety should be 
assessed on a case by case basis and that it is not possible to make general 
statements on the safety of all GMOs.233 
 
In such area, some would consider that there are significant unknowns, ‘we do not 
know what we don’t know’.234 Like any new technology, biotechnology carries 
risks, and those risks must be properly assessed and managed. GMOs may pose 
risks to human health and the environment which are presently beyond the ability 
of science to predict, and have the potential to trigger social and political 
tensions.235 It is hard to do so when ‘everything we know about GMOs lies in the 
shadow of ignorance, the prospect of harm that we have not even thought of.’ 236  
Further, the acceptability of risk depends not simply on ‘how likely any particular 
bad outcome is, but also of the type of world in which we want to live’, which 
hugely complicates decision making on the regulation. So cultural and social 
background to risk affect which risks are selected for concern, and which are 
dismissed as unimportant.237  
 
Particular concerns in the control of risks relate to divergences in lay and expert 
approaches; to the use of information in regulating uncertainties; and the 
susceptibility of risk control regimes to democratic and participatory 
mechanisms.238 Consequently, regulatory solutions are fundamentally shaped by 
                                                 
232 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 248-262. Pretty contends that neither side of 
the GMO debate is entirely correct. 
233William Kerr, ‘International Trade in Transgenic Food Products: A new Focus for Agricultural 
Trade Disputes’ (1999) 22(2) World Economy, p. 245;  WHO, ’20 Questions on Genetically 
Modified (GM) Foods’(n 7). 
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preventive paradigm’ (1992) 2(2) Global Environmental Change, 144 
235 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 132) p. 12. 
236 The science is compounded by banal errors, data gaps, and necessary assumptions. ‘The most 
intractable issue around new technology is the nature of scientific uncertainty. Maria Lee, EU 
Regulation of GMOs (n 132) p. 29-30; see also Alexia Herwig, ‘Whither Science in WTO Dispute 
Settlement?’ (2008) 21(8) LJIL 824 
237 Maria Lee, EU Environmental law: Challenges, Change and Decision Making (Hart Publishing 
2005), p. 80;   Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 132) p. 30, 39-41. 
238 See Keven E Jones and Alan Irwin, ‘Creating Space for engagement? Lay Membership in 
Contemporary Risk Governance’ in Bridgget M Hutter, ed, Anticipating Risks and Organising 
Risk Regulation (n 220) 
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worldviews and ‘approaches’ towards risk regulation. They emphasize that risk 
regulation is about choices that reﬂect fundamental assumptions about the 
vulnerability of particular social systems.239 Many actors are involved in 
influencing and shaping regulatory choices regards GMOs at the national and 
international levels. It involves biotechnology companies, governmental regulators, 
non-governmental organizations, scientists, consumers and farmers; their views and 
interests are shaped by a variety of economic, moral and scientific considerations.  
Bernauner regards EU and US policies on GMOs as outcome of interaction between 
the above actors, shaped by differences in public perception of agricultural 
biotechnology, consumer trust in regulatory authorities, and institutional settings.240 
The EU and the US do not just disagree on the appropriate role of ‘agricultural 
technology’, but also disagree on what counts as science for legitimate 
regulation.241  Due to lack of public trust in the regulatory agencies and negative 
public perception of GMOs, the collective action civil society, farmers and 
consumers groups have reduced the collective action capacity of pro biotech 
interests in the EU pushing for stricter regulation. In contrast, a well organised 
biotech producer coalition has prevailed in the US due to lower public outrage and 
weaker campaigns by civil society. 242 Such events have shaken confidence in 
experts and governments and led to fundamental questioning of new scientific and 
technological development.243 
 
The debate over the regulation of GMOs has been dominated by two models.  The 
US adopted a ‘product approach’, and the EU adopted a ‘process approach’.244 
Assessment of the risks and benefits related to GMOs varies substantially between 
countries and regions, as do regulatory approaches. On the one hand, ‘substantial 
                                                 
239 See Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation (n 219) 92, 
98-102. 
240 Thomas Bernauer, The Seeds of Conflict (n 131) pp. 66-101. 
241 Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘From the USA with love: Sharing Home Grown Hormones, GMOs, and 
Clones with reluctant Europe’ (30 April 2007) 37(2) Environmental Law, 301; Maria Lee, EU 
Regulation of GMOs (n 132) p. 211. Chapter 3 focus on how and why the EU and the US have taken 
starkly different approaches to the regulation of GMOs. 
242 For elaboration on this interaction see Chapter 3, section 2.4 and section 4.4. 
243 See also Brian Wynne, ‘Creating public alienation: expert cultures of risk and ethics on 
GMOs’, (2001) 10(4) Science as Culture, 445-81; see also chapter 3, section 2.4 & 4.4 on how 
scares such BSC affected the choices of the public in Europe. 
244 See generally Thomas Bernauer, The Seeds of Conflict  (n 131) p44-66; Grant E Isaac and William 
A Kerr, ‘A Harvest of Trouble’ (n 223) p. 1083.  
128 
 
equivalence’ is a starting point for the safety assessment of GM foods. It is used by 
some national and international agencies, including the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Japan's Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, the United 
Nations World Health Organization (WHO), and the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). For example, the FAO supports a ‘science 
based evaluation system’ that would objectively determine the benefits and risks of 
each individual GMO. This has called for a cautious case by case approach to 
address legitimate concerns for the biosafety of each product or process prior to its 
release.245 On the other hand, the EU, CBD, and Cartagena Protocol endorse 
precautionary attitude when assessing the benefits and risks of introducing a 
specific GM crop, which allows the socio-economic and agricultural context of 
individual countries to be considered.246  
The above analysis highlights that different governments want to ensure that these 
GMOs do not pose a threat to human health or the environment, yet they do not 
agree on the best way to protect against these potential threats.247 Most developed 
counties like the US, the EU, Canada, and Japan already have regulatory 
frameworks to deal with different aspects of GMOs, ‘focusing primarily on 
domestic priorities and strategies.’248 Many developing countries are increasingly 
expected to set up their trade national regulatory schemes based on the requests and 
expectations of their main trade partners. They are caught in the middle of the 
dispute, and are expected to choose whether to line up behind the United States or 
the European Union on the question of GMOs.249 
In the Biotech dispute, the parties differ in their interpretation of the commitment 
to market access for GMOs pertaining to the use of science in the decisions. This 
                                                 
245 FAO ‘FAO Statement on Biotechnology’ Agricultural Biotechnologies (March 2000), 
http://www.fao.org/biotech/fao-statement-on-biotechnology/en/. Accessed 20 September 2010. 
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247 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 2). 
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clash is clear in the parties’ submissions. The US adopted a ‘sound science’ 
approach, and mainly applied a conventional risk assessment approach, and widely 
authorised most GM products for production and consumption. It stressed the need 
for ‘basis in science’ and argued, inter alia that the EU’s actions were not supported 
by ‘sufficient scientific evidence’, and rigorous risk assessment, and therefore the 
measures violated Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.  This was particularly 
submitted in respect to EU Member State bans on products for which risk 
assessment found the products in question were adequately safe to be approved in 
the EU. 250   
 
In its defence, the EU considered GM crops and products profoundly different from 
other conventional foods and food products, being particularly concerned with the 
unknowns associated with GMOs. The EU presented ‘prudent and precautionary 
approach’ because the science on GMOs is constantly evolving, and that ‘new risk 
considerations sometimes arise spontaneously and change the scope of the risk 
assessment.’ It relied particularly on the precautionary principle as provided under 
the Cartagena Protocol.251  
 
The Panel in Biotech dispute appointed several experts to provide expert opinion 
and to review the scientific justification for the measures. The Panel in Biotech 
rejected the EUs defence, instead provided a broad interpretation of ‘SPS measure’ 
which will continue to place the onus on the EU to demonstrate that its authorisation  
framework pertaining to GMOs is based on scientific risk assessments and not 
otherwise disguised restrictions on trade.252 In turn, this has placed increased 
importance on scientific knowledge and expertise in national and international legal 
processes dealing with highly technical and complex matters of health and 
environmental risk. Acceptance of science as sound foundation for international 
risk regulation is underpinned by perceptions that scientific knowledge offers an 
‘objective’ and ‘universally applicable’ basis for rational decision making, as well 
                                                 
250First Written Submission of the US, Biotech, pp.86, 109–111; see also, First Written Submission 
of Canada Biotech (First Written Submission of Canada), pp. 177-179. 
251 First Submission of the EU, Biotech, p12. EU also argued that GMOs cannot be treated as ‘like’ 
or ‘equivalent to’ their non-GMO counterparts because they raise the potential for new types of 
harm p. 51-63 
252 The Panel also ruled against applying sources external to the WTO covered agreements. see 
chapter 4 for full discussion on the implications of extending the scope of SPS Agreement.   
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as the close association between the notions of risk, and the scientific understanding 
of them, that has developed over time.253 
 
Some social scientists question the authority of scientific knowledge and the 
objectivity of risk assessment by exposing the uncertainties in various areas dealing 
with health and environment. They argue that emphasis on sound science in 
international regulation of risks may often downplay the role of non-scientific 
consideration in producing social and scientific consensus on the importance of 
risks posed by a given activity, especially in the face of the unknowns.254  
 
Winickoff and others (the authors of the Academic brief) provide useful criteria for 
distinguishing different types of risk based on associated levels of uncertainty and 
social consensus. ‘Using these criteria, the authors argue that risk situations can be 
conceptualised on a “continuum”, running from “low certainty and low consensus” 
at one end, to high certainty and high consensus” at the other’.255 They argue that, 
in cases of low certainty and low consensus situations should invite a ‘more 
differential approach to the science based decision making of members’ giving 
national regulators greater room to take public input into the risk decision-making 
process.256 On the other hand, they acknowledge that in cases where consensus and 
certainty are high, ‘the range of rational measures to address the risk situation 
should be more limited.257 Accordingly, they contend that in situations of high 
consensus and high certainty, a heavier burden should be placed on countries to 
establish that their measures stem from non-protectionist values.258 
  
The Panel in the Biotech dispute did not comment on the general debate of safety 
of GMOs despite the fact that the parties provided the Panel with extensive 
information regarding their views on the matter.259 The Panel avoided on ruling 
whether GMOs should be treated with the same or more stringent regulation than 
                                                 
253 For more see Jacqueline Peel, Science and Risk regulation in International Law (n 230) 61-92. 
254 Jacqueline Peel, Science and Risk regulation in International Law (n 230), 93-107. 
255 David Winickoff and others, ‘Adjudicating the GM Food War: Science, Risk, and Democracy 
in World Trade Law’, 30 Yale Journal of International Law, 104 
256 Ibid, 105-6 
257 Ibid, 118 
258 Ibid, 123 
259 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.3421-7.3423.  
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that of traditional varieties, leaving the choices as regards the regulation of risk an 
ongoing contested matter.  
 
 
3 Trade dispute or trade war? 
In the past 16 years, the global production of genetically modified crops has 
increased dramatically. Yet more than 43 percent of the global area devoted GM 
crops is located in the US. Another 47 percent of the global area devoted GM crops 
is located is only in four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and India.260 At the 
same time there are countries, led by the EU and Japan, which have implemented 
cautious policies regulating import approval of GM crops, and the marketing of GM 
food.261 This leaves many developing countries with few alternatives: they may 
allow the cultivation of GM crops, but risk the loss of potential exports; they may 
reject the commercialization of any cultivation of GM crops; or they may allow the 
cultivation of GM and non-GM crops, a costly alternative. In the context of 
international trade in GM crops, the Biotech dispute represents the war over the 
expansion of GM technology into more countries, the fear of export loss is a major 
driver for developing countries choice making.          
The US justified its complaint by contending that biotech products were necessary 
to feed developing countries.262 After the filing the complaint, President Bush 
brought the dispute to wider public attention by charging that EU’s moratorium was 
impeding efforts to feed the world. He stated that ‘European governments should 
join, not hinder, the great cause of ending hunger in Africa.’263 
                                                 
260 See section 2.6 above. 
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Egypt’s participation as complainant was crucial to the American claim that the 
EU’s ban was hurting developing countries as well as US biotechnology companies. 
Some suggest that Egypt pulled out of the case due to domestic backlash, and 
instead decided to pursue its complaint against the EU separately.264 Despite 
Egypt’s withdrawal, the US maintained its argument about feeding the world. In its 
submission to the Panel, the US claimed that the EU’s effective ban on GM imports 
was denying the claimed benefits of GM technology to developing countries fearful 
of EU bans on their own exports if they were to accept GM imports and grow GM 
crops.265 The US did not specify which WTO provisions had been violated by the 
EU measures in relation to developing countries exports, but it did, however, 
underline strongly their negative impact. The US submitted that countries whose 
population is starving denied American aid consisting of GM food, and continues 
to do so, for fear that their meat exports to the EU would be hindered.266  
This next section aims to examine the impact of the ruling on developing countries’ 
choices with regard to the role that genetically modified organisms (GMOs) might 
play in their food security, and in tackling related problems like, hunger and 
malnutrition, while keeping in mind that, the task of reconciling national trade 
interests, environmental preservation and food security (starvation and 
malnutrition) is a very difficult task. 
3.1 Can GMOs ‘feed the world’? 
Developing countries are facing continuously rising food demand due to growth in 
population. However, many face low crop yields related to several factors, like 
droughts, extreme humidity, pests, cost of fertilizers, and transport. Add to that 
political instability, war and HIV/AIDS which have adversely impacted 
agriculture.267 Most commentators agree that food production will have to increase, 
and that the increase will have to come from existing farmland.268 
 
                                                 
264 Edward Alan, ‘US Retaliation against Egypt hits Trade Plans’, Financial Times, 29 June 2003,  
http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=ft.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=stor  
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Advocates of GM crops believe that they can be of particular benefit in improving 
agricultural production in the developing world. The US, in particular, continues to 
be vocal proponent, noting that: 
Agricultural biotechnology promotes economic development, and has 
delivered on its promise to feed a hungry world, increase product yields, 
reduce pesticide use, improve nutrition and disease prevention, enhance 
food security, and increase incomes of farmers- most of whom are in the 
developing world.269 
Claiming that genetically modified crops can feed the whole world is disingenuous 
because food security is a complex issue.270 Some recognize that food security is 
less about food availability, than a lack of access to food.271 Even if GMOs leads to 
increased crop yields, the problem is not that there is not enough food on the planet 
but how wealth is distributed; the argument is that people go hungry because they 
cannot afford food or the land to grow it.272  Pretty contends that ‘in most cases, 
people are hungry because they are poor.’ They don’t have the money to buy the 
food they need. Poor farmers cannot afford expensive modern technologies that 
could theoretically increase their yields. ‘What they need are readily available and 
cheap means to improve their farm productivity.’273  
Another factor contributing to poverty is agricultural subsidies worth about US$300 
billion in developed countries to protect their farmers and agribusinesses. These 
                                                 
269 ‘US Trade Representative Susan Schwab and US Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns Announce 
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about 790 million people in serious food insecurity. 
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subsidies, found in the US, the EU, and Japan amongst others, negatively affect 
developing countries, and contribute to keeping the poor mired in poverty.274   
 
GMOs of interest and relevance to the needs of developing countries, such as crops 
that can survive in dry or could climates, crops with improved nutritional quality, 
crops that produce higher yields, or crops with  increasing salt or acid soil tolerance 
(environmental stress), are still being refined in laboratories.275 ‘Commercially 
available GM crops are largely dominated by herbicide or insecticide tolerant crops. 
These varieties can be useful for big farmer in developing countries, but they are 
not likely to improve the situation of smaller farmers.’276  
 
Many factors affect a country’s position on agricultural biotechnology (GMOs), 
such as policy awareness of the country, the level of risk they are willing to accept, 
their capacity to carry out risk assessment and implement adequate legislation, their 
perception of the benefits they could gain, their dependence on agriculture exports, 
their reliance on food aid, and the investment they have already made in the 
sector.277 There is not one solution to fit all; the term developing country, covers 
many countries in different continents and different climates, with different needs, 
and a variety of local conditions and problems.  
 
According to figures from ISAAA, of the 29 countries planting biotech crops in 
2011, 19 were developing and 10 were industrial. The five lead developing 
countries in biotech crops are India, China, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa, 
which collectively represent 40% of the global population. The major GM crop 
approved for commercial release in developing countries is Bt cotton, which is 
grown commercially in China, India, and Indonesia and is the fastest expanding 
GM crop.278  
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Many NGOs, scientists, and academics remain sceptical of the benefits, 
highlighting a wide range of potential risks. Some maintain that ‘[m]ost benefits are 
noble in nature and cause, yet these benefits are only the could bes of the future.’ 
Therefore, since most of these benefits are just, ‘sweeping predictions seem quite 
idealistic considering the relative novelty of agricultural genetic engineering.’ Most 
developing countries lack capacity to assess and manage potential risks of 
GMOs.279  
Another fear relates to poor farmers depending on big corporations for seeds rather 
being self-sufficient. Seed saving is an ongoing practice in developing countries. 
However, since IPRs of GMOs are held by private corporations, GM farmers are 
not allowed to save seeds from their harvests for replanting in subsequent years; 
rather, they must buy new seed annually.280 This results in adverse consequences, 
and those poor farmers most susceptible to hunger would unable to afford to use 
GM seeds, even if they were proved to be safe.281  
 
Finally, there are also unknown health effects for the poor who consume GMOs. 
Corn and other grains comprise 70 percent of the average African’s caloric intake 
as opposed to just 3 to 4 percent of the average American’s caloric intake, exposing 
them to greater risk as regards the potential negative health impacts.282 
 
3.2 The challenge facing developing countries   
Many developing countries are exporters of conventional agricultural products. 
They are concerned with export opportunities, especially towards markets like the 
EU where a GM free label is important. These countries maintain this GM status 
by refraining from planting any type of GM crop in order to avoid cumbersome 
documentation and traceability requirements, as well to meet consumers’ 
expectations. 
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http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1464. Accessed 18 August 2009. 
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The EU’s strict import measures have implications for developing countries. 
Developing countries relying on exports of conventional agricultural products to 
the EU find it difficult to adopt GMOs for domestic consumption in fear of losing 
their export opportunities. Maintaining ‘GM-free’ status allows them to avoid 
cumbersome documentation and traceability requirements, as well to meet 
consumers’ expectations.283        
This perception has contributed to some African countries refusing food aid that 
includes GMOs. In 2002, Zambia declined an American food aid offer of GM 
maize. In particular, the ‘[m]ain Zambian concerns relate to uncertainty and 
regarding the safety of GM maize for human consumption, as well as the possible 
contamination of local varieties which could allegedly imply rejection by EU 
Countries of Zambian food exports.’284   
In May 2004, the South African Development Community (SADAC) approved 
guidelines on handling GM food aid. These guidelines fully endorsed the 
recommendation of the SADAC Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 
Biosafety which reflected the concerns of African countries relating both to possible 
adverse effect on human health and the environment, and to the fact that GM 
imports may jeopardise exports of conventional agricultural products.285    
The US wanted the Biotech dispute’s outcome to ‘serve as a warning to other WTO 
Members, particularly developing countries, not to restrict access to their markets 
banning or restricting GMOs.’286 In a similar case over beef hormones, once the US 
started a WTO trade complaint, no countries took steps to ban them.287  
US officials also believed that a challenge was necessary to discourage other 
countries, especially those in the developing world, from using the EU regulatory 
approach as the basis for their own regulations on agricultural biotechnology 
                                                 
283 Simonetta Zarrilli, National and Multilateral Legal Frameworks, (n 162) p.7. 
284 Ibid,  p.7.In July 2002, Zambia allowed the food aid into the country provided that it was milled 
immediately upon arrival to avoid any possible contamination of local varieties  
285 Ibid, p. 8-9. 
286 ‘USTR Seeks Industry Input on Possible Challenge in Biotech Dispute’, Trade Observatory, 19 
February 2002, http://www.tradeobservatory.org/headlines.cfm?refID=17257 access 12 May 2010. 
287 Neither the U.S. nor Canada has changed its domestic standards for the use of growth hormones 
in meat production, also, the international standards on growth hormones in beef have not been 
strengthened in response to the European ban, see Sebastian Princen, EU Regulation and 
Transatlantic Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2002) p.183-4. 
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products, which could result in even wider-scale disruptions to US trade. President 
Bush was concerned that stringent EU restrictions led to the refusal of several 
southern African nations to accept American food aid that included GM corn, 
further exacerbating famine. EU officials vehemently rejected that charge.288 
Palmer argues that ‘GM exporters could use the Panel’s interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement, and its reasoning on the relevance of international law, to undermine 
efforts by WTO Members to: 
• regulate GM imports; 
• implement and negotiate new commitments under the Biosafety Protocol; or 
• regulate other products that might cause harm to human health and the 
environment.’289 
‘Because plaintiffs almost always win WTO challenges, mere threats of challenges 
often result in the challenged country changing its policy. In this GMO case, the 
United States figured that if the claim is to succeed, mere threats against other 
countries might suffice to quash other similar rules.’290 The US already threatened 
to use the WTO dispute procedure against a number of small countries considering 
GMO legislation or bans, such as Bolivia, Croatia and Sri Lanka. 291 
 
Reports of WTO disputes guide Panels of future WTO disputes, which will in turn 
influence the future regulatory behaviour of WTO Members.292 In other words, the 
findings of the Reports are of importance to other WTO Members wanting to 
regulate GM imports. The lack of international consensus on how to regulate 
                                                 
288 US. vs EU: the Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 276) p. 12; Council for Responsible 
Genetics, ’Coalition of the Willing’ (n 110). 
289 Alice Palmer, ‘The WTO GMO Dispute: Implications for Developing countries and the need for 
an appeal’, GeneWatch UK, (November 2006), p.5-6, available at 
http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/WTO_Biotech_case_d
csummaryfinal_1.pdf . accessed 21 June 2010. 
290 The GMO Dispute: Bush Administration Attack on European Food Safety Policy Latest 
Challenge to WTO’s Legitimacy’, Public Citizen (n 174).  
291 Ibid.  
292 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 1 November 1996, adopted Panels Reports ‘create legitimate expectations 
among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any 
dispute.’ 
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GMOs, made it hard to conclude the Panel Reports. However, when it was finally 
published, the Report had no clear answers; instead it increased tension at the 
international level, which most probably led to fragmentation of international 
law.293 Greenpeace explained that developing countries fear WTO enforcement 
mechanisms, and losing a case could cost millions of dollars.294 
3.3 The way forward for developing countries   
Biotechnology alone will not be able to address all of the underlying causes of food 
insecurity. Low income, poor infrastructure, and lack of access to credit are all 
factors at the root of the food crisis, and can only be addressed by long term 
sustainable development.295 GMOs can help to feed the world if ‘attention is paid 
to the processes of technology development, benefit sharing, and more especially 
to alternative or low cost methods of production.’ Where there are no alternatives, 
GM technologies are likely to represent novel and effective options. 296 
Pretty indicates that sustainable agriculture is an increasingly viable option for 
developing countries’ farmers. It makes better use of knowledge and skills of 
farmers, improving their self-reliance and capacities. GMOs need to contribute to 
sustainable agriculture through increased eco-efficiency in order to benefit 
developing countries. The main aspects to determine whether it is achievable are: 
increase in yield; reduction in insecticide; reduction in herbicide; and the extent of 
secondary problems arising from monocultures of GMOs.297 
If research is produced by public interest bodies, such as universities or NGOs 
whose concern is to produce public goods, then biotechnology could result in the 
spread of technologies that have immense benefits.298 Increasingly, countries like 
China, India, and Brazil are intensifying agricultural research, including research 
on GM crops. In 2009, a GM version of an Indian cotton variety, developed by the 
                                                 
293 See Chapter 4, Section 3.  
294 ‘World Trade Organisation dispute on genetically engineered organisms’, Greenpeace, Briefing, 
May 2006 http://www.greenpeace.org accessed 9 May 2010  
295 ‘WTO case on GMOs’ Times Higher Education, (Brussels 18 June 2003), 
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=177451&sectioncode=26. Accessed 
6 February 2008. 
296 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p.257-8. 
297 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 255. 
298 Ibid, p. 258. 
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public sector, came to market, and a variety engineered by private Indian firm was 
approved for commercialisation.299 
The divergent policies toward GMOs in rich countries have now created a 
complicated problem of policy choice in the developing world. Developing 
countries need to find ways to increase regulatory and scientific capacity in order 
to assess the effects of modern agricultural technology on their environments. This 
may be costly and lengthy process.300 
Many developing countries still lack, or are in the process of developing, 
comprehensive regulatory systems to deal with GMOs.301 We see most developing 
countries doing so even under harder circumstances. Many developing countries 
are not able to deal with the scientific aspects of GMOs, or ‘the main concern seems 
to be finding the appropriate balance between pursuing their development 
objectives and at the same time complying with their mutually agreed 
obligations.’302 
As larger sets of developing countries make regulatory choices, some similar to the 
US, such as in Argentina and Brazil, others similar to EU’s such as the African 
Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology,303 it imposes further burdens and 
complications for international trade, which are already reflected in the current 
Biotech dispute.  
Some commentators see this dispute as a signal from the US to warn other countries 
not restrict or ban the GMOs.304 Therefore, it may be wise for developing countries 
to avoid copying the GMO policies of developed countries, whether its intensive 
cultivation of GM crops as in the US, or  full rejection as encouraged by some EU 
countries and NGOs.305 Indeed, ‘[i]t might be wiser to take a ‘wait and see’ 
                                                 
299 ‘Genetically Modified Foods: Attack of the Really Quite Likeable Tomatoes’ (25 Feb 2010) The 
Economist http://www.economist.com/node/15579956. Accessed 2 August 2011. 
300 Jules Pretty ’contested risks and benefits’ (n 59) p. 259. 
301 Simonetta Zarrilli, National and Multilateral Legal Frameworks, (n 162) p. 6. 
302 Ibid, p.6-7. 
303 Available at http://www.nepadst.org. Accessed 3 July 2009. 
304 Grant E Isaac and William A Kerr, ‘A Harvest of Trouble’ (n 223) p 1083-4. 
305 Ernestine Meijer and Richard Stewert, ‘The GM Cold War ‘(n 267) p 247.   
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approach, and to resist the temptation to join forces with GMO exporting 
countries.’306 
 
4 Conclusion 
The expansion in the development and commercial cultivation of many GM crops 
has been extraordinary rapid. This chapter demonstrated the increasingly important 
role of GMOs in global food production. They have the potential to influence and 
change agriculture as we know it. The science behind GMOs is new and very 
complex, and despite the promise, there are many concerns (scientific, social, 
ethical, and political), relating mainly to human health and the environment.  
The entire debate regarding GMOs, and GM technology, is a minefield, with 
polarized opinions, considerable frustration, and a growing sense of concern 
globally. The outcome of the dispute did not ease any of these aspects; it only added 
more challenges to regulation. Arguably, the debate over potential benefits versus 
potential adverse effects of GMOs over the long term is due to insufficiencies in 
available scientific evidence. However, subsequent development in the science 
could reduce the potential risks of GMOs, or highlight their more positive aspects,  
The gaps and lack of consensus scientific knowledge allowed both the US and the 
EU to rely on scientific statements and studies to support their approaches towards 
GMOs. The US emphasises the promises of biotechnology and the potential 
benefits that may be achieved, while the EU highlights the possible risks and 
dangers of GMOs.307  
In recent years, ‘sound science’ and ‘precautionary principle’ have emerged as 
competing paradigms for assessment and management of environmental health and 
environmental risk; whereas proponents of ‘sound science’ emphasise the 
importance of empirical studies as prerequisite for risk regulation, ‘precautionary 
                                                 
306 Mathew Stilwell, ‘Implications for Developing Countries of Proposals to Consider Trade in 
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) at the WTO’. (CIEL Discussion Paper, undated), 
available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/ciel-cn.htm. Accessed 08 January 2008. The Author 
believes that the Biosafety Protocol provides the appropriate forum for dealing with GMO. 
307 See Chapter 1, sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
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approach’ advocate for action to address where potential risks are not well 
established in scientific evidence. 
Science clearly cannot provide all of the information and judgements needed to 
make decisions on agricultural technology.308 The difficulty remains in determining 
how to assess the potential benefits and risks, and whether regulation can 
adequately manage the risks in the face of rapidly developing technical 
application.309 One should also question the commercial direction of the 
biotechnology industry, address who carries the risk and gets the benefits, and 
consider the possible longer-term effects and implications. In the absence of 
scientific certainty, it is not surprising that GMOs have spawned controversy.  
 
With a large number of GM crops available, and a large number under development, 
developing countries are caught in the middle of the dispute. They are expected to 
choose between supporting the United States or the European Union on the question 
of GMOs. They are also faced with two main approaches to the regulation of 
GMOs. The first, assumes that GMOs are safe after limited testing. The second 
assumes that more extensive testing on a broader scale is required to prove its 
safety. The next chapter elaborates on these competing approaches to regulation, 
which underline the different positions in Biotech dispute.  
 
 
                                                 
308 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 132) p. 41. 
309 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethical and Social Issues (n 140).  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE US v. THE EU: CLASHING ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS 
 
…Europe’s consumers want food that it is safe and wholesome. The concern 
of European Union is to make sure that the food we eat is of the same high 
standard for all its citizens, whether the food is home-grown or comes from 
another country, inside or outside the EU.1 
 
1 Introduction  
 
In the Biotech dispute, the complaining countries challenged the 'suspension' and 
'failure' by the EU to consider applications for approval of GM products. It also 
challenged national bans in six EU Member States on some GM products, which 
had been approved in European Union before October 1998, arguing that they 
adversely affected imports of agricultural and food products from the US, Argentina, 
and Canada.2  
 
The Complainants specifically maintained that they were arguing against the 
application of the old legislation, and did not want the Panel to take into account 
recent developments in EU law and its application.3 Yet, the fact that two GMOs 
had been authorised under the new legislation and placed on the market in the EU 
during the months preceding the formal initiation of the complaint at the WTO did 
not change the Complainants’ position; they maintained their challenge against the 
                                                 
1 From the Farm to the Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers, (Europe on the move, European 
Commission, 2004), p.1, http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/46/index_en.htm. 
Accessed 15 August 2009. 
2  Panel Reports, European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, AND WT/DS293/R (29 September 2006) 
[hereinafter EC- Biotech or Biotech] paras. 4.160-4.359 claims mainly under GATT, TBT, and SPS 
agreement. 
3 For example, Executive Summary of the First Written Submission of the United States, Biotech, 
para.16 
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EU’s measures despite resumption of  authorising of new GMOs.4 Indeed, many 
US government representatives confirmed that the main issue at stake was the way 
the EU applied its GMO authorisation regulation rather than the scheme itself.5 
 
Substantial variation in the regulation of GMOs in the US and EU produced 
different conditions of access to international markets, and ultimately led to the 
dispute. On the one hand is the ‘permissive’ approach favoured by the 
Complainants, the US in particular. This approach allows restrictions on the 
production, sale, and use of foodstuffs (including GMOs), but only where justified 
by scientifically proven risks for human health, the environment, or other important 
goods. On the other hand is the ‘precautionary’ approach, largely favoured by the 
EU. This approach allows policy makers to make discretionary decisions in 
situations where there is evidence of potential harm in the absence of complete 
scientific proof.6  
 
This chapter shows that while both the United States and the European Union share 
a common desire to provide a safe food supply complimented by credible regulatory 
systems, they have adopted two very different regulatory approaches to deal with 
the increasing numbers of GM food and feed products coming to market. 7   
Consequently, the transatlantic relationship has become fraught with conflict over 
the issue of GM foods. The main points of difference between the EU and the US 
relates to uncertainties over the nature and extent of risks associated with GMOs, 
and the potential socio-economic implications of GMOs. 
                                                 
4 The EU Approved Bt-11 sweet maize and, NK603 maize, see Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.1669. 
5 USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ (March 2013) USTR 
3-4 http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20SPS.pdf. Accessed 2 April 13; Thomas 
Bernauer, Genes, Trade, and Regulation: The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology (Princeton 
University Press 2003). 
6 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ (COM (2000)1 final, 
Brussels, 02 February, 2000); see Speech by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson 
‘Biotechnology and the EU’ (SPEECH/07/397, Brussels, 14 June 2007), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/397&format=HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. Accessed 21August 2009. On the precautionary principle in 
the EU, see section 4; and Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.53-7.55. 
7 Patterson, Lee Ann and Josling, Tim (2002) ‘Regulating biotechnology: comparing EU and US 
approaches’. Issue 8 European Policy Papers, European Union 
Centre. http://aei.pitt.edu/28/1/TransatlanticBiotech.pdf accessed 3 January 2011. 
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This chapter explores the nature of the two regulatory systems and the underlying 
social, political, and institutional factors that contributed to the development of 
these systems. It focuses on how and why the EU and the US have taken starkly 
different approaches to the regulation of GMOs. It outlines European and American 
regulation of GMOs, highlighting the attitudes underlining the differences in 
regulation. However, it is not theintention to provide a full analysis of EU or US 
law concerning GMOs, which extends over variety of topics such as labelling, 
traceability and co-existence. Rather, this chapter will focus on the authorisation 
framework and of national attitudes towards GMO’s risks and benefits 
This chapter analyses the conceptual framework with respect to national regulation, 
as well as its justification. This is a crucial step in assessing whether the ruling in 
Biotech weakens the EU’s ability to maintain its existing authorisation framework, 
which employs a precautionary approach in regulating GMOs, to meet public health 
and protect the environment.  
It begins with an examination of the EU’s regulation of GMOs, and underscores 
recent legislative changes that led to the dispute. It is not the intention of this section 
to thoroughly discuss and analyse all relevant regulatory frameworks covering 
GMOs. Instead, it will provide a sketch of the EU regulatory framework, based on 
its chronological development in parallel to the Biotech dispute.  
The focal points of this chapter are the challenged measures, the authorisation of 
GMOs, and their placement on the market. The chapter also examines aspects of 
specific provisions on the labelling of GMOs in food and feed products. It does not 
cover the full range of issues in EU law relating to GMOs. For instance 
consideration of intellectual property rights and tort liability, the coexistence of 
GMOs with conventional and organic crops, and liability for environmental damage 
from GMOs are omitted.8 
Furthermore, this chapter will delineate the divergent attitude of the United States 
towards GMOs. This contrast allows for drawing distinctions between and 
                                                 
8 For more on these issues see Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for 
a New Technology (Biotechnology Regulation Series, Edward Elgar, 2008), Chapters 4 and 5; Maria 
Lee, ‘The Governance of Coexistence’ between GMOs and Other Forms of Agriculture: A Purely 
Economic Issue? (2008) 20(2) Journal of Environmental Law 193. 
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investigating the motives behind European and American approaches towards 
GMOs. It will also examine how and why consumer preferences in the EU and US 
differ, explaining how these differences impact policy formulation. 
The chapter then examines the main legal differences arising from the dispute, 
specifically as regards the role of the precautionary principle in EU regulation of 
GMOs. The impact of biotechnology on international trade relations between the 
US and the EU will also be examined, as will public trust and acceptance of GMOs, 
and their ability to affect the ongoing GMO debate. Whether the GMO debate will 
shift will be accorded consideration as well. Finally, this chapter will appraise the 
EU’s ongoing implementation of the Panel’s Ruling. 
2 The EU regulatory framework9 
At the time the complaint was brought against the EU, its approval regime consisted 
of Directive 2001/18/EC, replacing Directive 90/220/EEC governing the deliberate 
release into the environment of GMOs (the ‘Deliberate Release Directive’)10 and 
Regulation 285/97/EC regulating novel foods and novel food ingredients (the 
‘Novel Foods Regulation’).11 These three pieces of legislation were the provisions 
that dealt with before the Panel. 
The EU’s regime for approval of biotech products was an elaborate premarket 
approval system, in which GMOs could only be placed on the market after having 
undergone a stringent science-based risk assessment on a case-by-case basis. The 
                                                 
9  For detailed and comprehensive description and analysis see Theofanis Christoforou, ‘The 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: The interplay of science, 
law and politics’, (2004) 41 CMLR, pp.637-709; Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8); and 
legislation summary http://europa.eu.int accessed 12 May 2012.  
10 Council Directive 2001/18/EC of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment 
of Genetically Modified Organisms, OJ 2001 L 106/1 thereby replacing Council Directive 
90/220/EEC, OJ 1990 L 117/15, as amended by Council directive 94/15/EC, OJ 1994 L 103/20 and 
Directive 97/35/EC, OJ 1997 L169 [hereinafter ‘Deliberate Release Directive’ or ‘Directive 
2002/18/EC’]. 
11 Regulation (EC) No 258/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 1997 
Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients [1997] OJ L 043/1 [hereinafter: ‘Novel foods 
Regulation’ or ‘Regulation (EC) No 258/97’] Regulation 258/97/EC has been substantially modified 
and reduced in scope by Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 of September 2003 on genetically modified food and feed, OJ 2003, L268/1. 
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process also had to observe the precautionary principle when assessing the 
products.12 
The general objective of the legislation is to avoid adverse effects on human health 
and the environment arising from the deliberate release into the environment, or the 
placing on the market of GMOs.13 The Complainants specifically maintained that 
they were arguing against the application of the old legislation, and did not want 
the Panel to take into account subsequent legislative developments in the EU and 
their application.14 Despite the fact that more GMOs have been placed on the EU’s 
market since 2003, the Complainants’ position did not change. Therefore, the EU 
regulatory framework continued to be a problem for the Complainants. 
This section starts by describing the EU’s GMO approval legislation prior to and 
during the Biotech dispute. It then explores the factors leading to the halt of 
authorisation of GMOs, known as a de facto moratorium, which was the process in 
which the EU revised its regulatory framework as it related to releasing GMOs into 
the environment and in food and food products. This backdrop is essential to 
understanding the challenged measures, and why they were opposed by the US. 
 
2.1 Authorisation of GMOs challenged in ‘Biotech’  
Council Directive 90/220/EEC on the ‘Deliberate Release into the Environment of 
Genetically Modified Organisms’ is the first binding piece of legislation regarding 
GMOs. It was approved in 1990. 15  After substantial revisions, Directive 
90/220/EEC was replaced in 2001 by Directive 2001/18/EC. The aim of the new 
Directive was to ensure a high and uniform level of protection of human health and 
the environment from the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment, or their 
                                                 
12  See section 4 below for more on the precautionary principle. 
13 Novel Food Regulation, Article 3.1.  
14  Executive Summary of the First Submission of the United States, Biotech, 30 April 2004, 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WT
O/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file737_5542.pdf, para. 16. 
15 Council Directive 90/220/EEC  
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placement on the market throughout the EU while maintaining the efficient 
functioning of the internal market.16 
Directive 90/220/EEC established a process for assessing and approving all GMOs 
(including GM crops and seeds) before they were deliberately released into the 
environment, including through field trials or commercial cultivation which 
extended to the marketing of GMOs.17  
Directive 2002/18/EC added a procedural stage for placing GMOs on the market, 
which was ‘tightly controlled, with precautionary measures…and highest degree of 
public participation’ in order to accommodate public concerns. 18  Directive 
2001/18/EC set up complex approval procedures and criteria requiring case-by-case 
evaluation involving both competent national authorities and EU bodies. It sought 
to balance the need for individual EU Member States to retain some decision-
making control over matters of domestic concern, with the principle of harmonizing 
regulations throughout the EU to ensure the free movement of goods.19 
Under the Deliberate Release Directive, a company wishing to market a GMO must 
first submit a notification to the competent authority of the EU Member State where 
the GM product to be marketed was first placed on the market.20 This application 
must contain a full environmental risk assessment.21 The competent authority then 
prepares an initial assessment of the product on the basis of a scientific risk 
                                                 
16 Deliberate Release Directive 2001/18/EC.  
17 This not to be confused with Council Directive 90/219/EEC of the 23 April 1990 on the contained 
use of genetically modified micro-organisms [1990] OJ L 117/1, which was replaced with Directive 
2009/41 of the European Parliament and the Council on contained use of genetically modified micro-
organisms [2009] OJ L117/15. After the contained use and before placing on the market, the 
Deliberate Release Directive applies. It has given rise to far more political controversies. This is 
linked to the scope of the latter Directive that relates to teaching, research, development, and the 
contained non-commercial uses of GMOs. 
18  Marine Friant-Perrot, ‘The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified 
Organisms and its Integration intro Community Food Law and Policy’ in Luc Bodiguel and Michael 
Cardwell, the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative approaches (OUP, 
2010), p. 84. 
19 For analysis of the complexity of EU’s multi level governance see Maria Lee, ‘Multi-Level 
Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union: Ambiguity and Hierarchy’ 
in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative approaches (OUP, 2010) 101   
20 Article 9 of Directive 2001/18/EC: Member State authorities must make their decision-making 
processes more transparent, holding consultations and making information on all releases and 
reports publicly available. 
21 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 13. Also, it is for the applicant to submit technical information 
indicated in Annex II.  
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assessment by a national food assessment body, which will take into account direct 
and indirect effects on human health and the environment which may arise from 
deliberate release or marketing of GMOs. The assessment must also consider 
whether these effects might be manifested immediately, cumulatively, or on a long-
term basis.22 The risk assessments and information to be considered therein were 
substantially changed from its predecessor, Directive 90/220/EC, as is 
demonstrated by the inclusion of indirect, long term effects, and even potential 
threats. For instance, the environmental risk assessments were to take into account 
scientific uncertainty, in light of the precautionary principle.23 Within 90 days of 
notification, the competent authority had to prepare an assessment report in 
conformity with the precautionary principle as set out in article 4.24 If the national 
authority was satisfied with the application, the authority informed the other EU 
Member States through the European Commission.25 If within a specified time limit 
no objection from other Member States was received, approval was granted and the 
national authority had to give its written consent to the applicant for placement on 
the market for a maximum duration of 10 years.26   
 
Any other Member State or the Commission could then present reasoned objections 
to the initial assessment. If the Member State and the Commission failed to settle 
their differences, a procedure was initiated. The Commission prepared a draft 
decision recommending approval or non-approval of the GM-product on the basis 
of an additional assessment by an EU scientific committee composed of Member 
States’ representatives.27 If the committee failed to reach a qualified majority, the 
Commission submitted the decision to the Council which then had three months to 
decide on the draft decision.28 After that period the Commission could approve the 
decision if the Council failed to reach an agreement. 29 
                                                 
22 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 1. 
23 Commission Decision 2002/623/EC Establishing Guidance Notes Supplementing Annex II to 
Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Deliberate Release into 
the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 
2002 OJ (L 200) 22.   
24 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 14(2). 
25 Directive 2001/18/EC, Articles 14(2) and 15(2). 
26 Directive 2001/18/EC, Art 15(3). The AB which was originally notified consents in writing to 
placing the product on the market and may apply conditions.  
27 Directive 2001/18/EC, Articles 18(1) and 30(2). 
28 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 30(2). 
29 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 30(2). 
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The Deliberate Release Directive laid down rules for monitoring and handling new 
information on risks. If new information emerged, the applicant had to immediately 
take the necessary protective measures to inform the competent authority, possibly 
leading to amendment of the conditions of the consent. 30  Furthermore, the 
Deliberate Release Directive required that GMOs placed on the market be labelled, 
but subject to the de minimise threshold.31   
 
Even if a product was approved by the Commission, Members could still institute 
‘safeguard measures’ to prohibit marketing of the GMO in their territories. This 
power could only be exercised by Member States on the basis of new scientific 
information suggesting the GMO posed a risk to human health or the environment, 
and was subject to review by the Commission. On the adoption of safeguard 
measures, a Member State had to inform the Commission and other Member States 
that the advice of European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) may be sought to 
evaluate the information supporting the measure. It was then for the Council to 
decide by qualified majority.32    There is no maximum duration for the entire 
procedure. 
 
It was the applicant who had to demonstrate the safety or lack of harm for each 
individual product. The product was deemed to be dangerous until the interested 
manufacturer carried out the necessary scientific work and demonstrated its 
safety.33 This authorisation procedure was in accordance with the precautionary 
principle, 34  as ‘[t]he level of appropriate health and environmental protection 
chosen in the directive is a level of “no risk”.’ This procedure conferred 
considerable powers on EU Member States.35 
                                                 
30 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 20. 
31 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 21. The threshold was subsequently fixed at 0.9 per cent under 
Regulation 1830/2003. See section 2.3 below.  
32 Directive 2001/18/EC, Article 23. 
33 Simonetta Zarrilli , International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral 
Legal Frameworks, (Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No.29, 
UNCTD, UN – New York and Geneva, 2005) p. 10. 
34 The precautionary principle is noted in Articles 1 and 4, and paragraph 8 of the preamble of 
Directive 2001/18/EC. EU treaties recognise that environmental policy is to be based on the 
precautionary principle.  See section 4 below on the precautionary principle. 
35  Marine Friant-Perrot, ‘The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified 
Organisms and its Integration intro Community Food Law and Policy’ (n 18). p.86 
151 
 
 
Deliberate Release Directive does not cover products derived from GMOs. Instead, 
Regulation 258/97/EC on ‘Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients’36 covered 
products derived from GMOs but no longer containing any genetic material, like 
tomato paste or ketchup derived from GM tomatoes, oil from GM corn, and sugar 
from sugar beet. The Regulation became the specific measure governing GMOs 
destined for food use.37 
  
The novel foods Regulation also addressed GM food safety issues, establishing an 
approval process based on risk assessment for novel foods, including those 
containing GMOs before they are placed on the market. While this process 
replicated the Deliberate Release Directive, a key difference was that a second more 
streamlined and ‘simplified procedure’ applied to GM foods and food ingredients 
that were ‘substantially equivalent’ to existing foods. The second procedure 
consisted of a notification requirement.38  
In order to receive market approval, GMOs must not ‘present a danger for the 
consumer’, must not ‘mislead the consumer’, and must ‘differ from the foods that 
they are intended to replace to such an extent’ for them to be ‘nutritionally 
disadvantageous for the consumer.’39 This was determined by an initial assessment 
made by a Member State Food Assessment Body, 40  which followed a formal 
request from an applicant to place a GM product on the market. This request had to 
provide information demonstrating the product met the three criteria above 
mentioned. The applicant was also obliged to carry out a full health and 
environmental risk assessment.41  
The Novel Foods Regulation required labelling of novel food products containing 
or consisting of GM ingredients, or had been produced from GMOs. It also created 
                                                 
36 The Novel Food Regulation remains in effect for the placing in the market of ‘novel food’ other 
than those produced from GMOs. 
37 It also covers enzymes produced from bacteria and yeasts used as processing aids. See Marine 
Friant-Perrot, ‘The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms and 
its Integration intro Community Food Law and Policy’ (n 18) p. 88. 
38  Novel Food Regulation, Articles 3(4) and 5. See also, Simonetta Zarrilli, National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks, (n 33) p. 9-10. 
39 Regulation (EC) No. 258/97, Article 3(1). 
40 Regulation (EC) No. 258/97, Article 6(2). 
41 Brian Sheridan, EU Biotechnology Law & Practice: Regulating Genetically Modified & Novel 
Food Products (Palladian Law Publishing 2001), pp. 132-141.  
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a more simplified approval procedure for food products that were ‘derived from 
GMOs’ but did not contain GMOs, such as highly refined soy oil or corn syrup. A 
food ‘derived from GMOs’ could be brought to the market as long as the developer 
had a scientific basis for determining that the product was ‘substantially equivalent’ 
to existing foods, notified the Commission, and delivered an opinion to the same 
effect from competent authorities of a Member State.42 A number of food products 
‘derived from’ GM crops, such as cooking oils, were introduced into the EU market 
as ‘substantially equivalent’ to conventionally-produced products under the Novel 
Food Regulation 258/97/EC.43  
 
Before 1998, fourteen GM plants, including eleven crops, had been approved for 
release or marketing under previous Directive 90/220/EEC. They included a 
number of crops, mainly a few varieties of maize, oilseed rape, carnation, one 
variety of chicory, one variety of soybean, and one variety of tobacco.44 These GM 
crops were approved for different uses: cultivation, import and processing, and food 
and feed.45 An additional thirteen applications for approval received favourable 
opinions from the Scientific Committee on Plants, and were pending authorization 
at the time that the new Directive 2001/18/EC took effect. These applications 
included five varieties of maize/sweet maize, three varieties of oilseed rape, two 
varieties of cotton, one variety of chicory, and one variety of potato.46  
However, shortly after implementation of the Deliberate Release Directive, EU 
Member States decided that it should be amended in light of the considerable 
advances in genetic modification in the 1990’s.  This point was clearly raised in the 
EU’s first submission during the Biotech dispute. The change in the legislation was 
                                                 
42 Brian Sheridan, EU Biotechnology Law (n 41) pp. 143-6.  
43  European Commission, ‘summary of Applications under Regulation (EC) N° 258/97 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council’ (18 April 2004). 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/novelfood/app_list_en.pdf accessed 30 March 2010.  
44 As of March 2001 the total number of GMOs approved under this Directive is eighteen. ‘GMOs 
approved under Directive 90/220/EEC As of March 2001’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/biotechnology/authorised_prod_1.htm. Accessed Nov 
2012. 
45 ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues Surrounding Genetically Modified Food’ Pew 
Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (December 2005), pp. 40-45, 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Food_and_Biotechnology/Bio
tech_USEU1205.pdf. Accessed 3 February 2009. 
46 Ibid pp. 40-45. Some of these applications were resubmitted for consideration under Directive 
2001/18/EC. 
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due to increased scientific knowledge regarding the risks of GMOs, and 
international regulatory developments, including the entry into force of the 
Cartagena Protocol.47  
The EU Regulation covering GMOs reflects debates over risk regulation.48 The 
next section provides details of the EU’s measures challenged in the Biotech dispute, 
and explains the reasons behind the challenges. 
2.2 The ‘de facto’ moratorium; ‘product specific delays’ and 
national bans  
There were two serious public health scares in the mid 1990s: the contaminated 
blood affair in France; and bovine spongiform encephalopathy, known as ‘BSE’, in 
England and latter in the rest of the EU.49 The EU experienced popular and high 
profile campaigns. In the UK and France protestors destroyed GM crops, triggering 
wide media coverage of scientific uncertainty about the effects of GMOs. A number 
of EU Member States stressed that the EU regulatory framework was inadequate, 
particularly with regard to risk assessment, labelling, post market traceability, and 
monitoring. 50  Member States also claimed that the regulatory framework was 
lacking with respect to the coexistence of GM crops with conventional and organic 
farming.51 
                                                 
47 First Written Submission o the European Communities, pp 7-20. 
48 It also experienced similar debates over nuclear energy, salmonella in egg, and mad cow disease 
see Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change and Decision – Making (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005), p. 79. 
49 See section 2.4 below. 
50 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 on Genetically Modified Food and Feed. [2003] Official Journal L 268/1;  Regulation (EC) 
No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically Modified Organisms and the 
Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms and 
amending Directive 2001/18/EC. [2003] Official Journal L 268/24. [hereinafter ‘Traceability and 
Labelling Regultion’]; Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1). 
51 Coexistence refers to the choice of consumers and farmers between conventional, organic and GM 
crop production, in compliance with the legal obligations for labelling defined in Community 
legislation. The possibility of adventitious presence of GM crops in non-GM crops cannot be 
excluded. Therefore, suitable measures are needed during cultivation, harvest, transport, storage, 
and processing to ensure coexistence. See European Commission ‘Coexistence of genetically 
modified crops with conventional and organic agriculture’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/coexistence/index_en.htm accessed 25 July 2011.  
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This contributed to make EU politicians and regulators extremely cautious with 
regard to GMOs.52 The European Commission published ‘White Paper on Food 
Safety’, which called for the adoption of legislation to cover assessment, 
authorisation, and labelling in the case of novel food for animals. It also proposed 
improvements to the authorisation procedure under the Novel Food Regulation, 
suggesting adoption of a single assessment for all ingredients in food stuff and 
harmonisation of measures governing the labelling of food, additives, and 
flavourings containing GMOs or derived from GMOs.53     
As a result of those concerns, as well as in reaction to rapid developments in the 
scientific and regulatory fronts, and to the negotiations on the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety between October 1998 and 19 July 2004, no new GMOs were 
authorised for planting or use in the EU.54 This situation has been referred to as a 
‘de facto’ moratorium. It was made ‘official’ at an EU Environment Ministers 
Council meeting in June 1999 when five Member States - Denmark, France, Greece, 
Italy, and Luxembourg - declared that they were opposed to further authorisations, 
and invoked the ‘safeguard clause’ of Directive 90/220/EEC in 1998.55 The clause 
allowed Member States to rely on the precautionary principle to provisionally 
restrict or prohibit the use of a GM-product on its territory if, ‘as a result of new 
information’, or a ‘reassessment of existing information on the basis of new or 
additional scientific knowledge’, it had grounds to believe that the GM-product 
endangered human health or the environment.56 This stalled evaluations of further 
applications.  
                                                 
52 David Vogel and Olivier Cadot, ‘France, the United States, and the Biotechnology Dispute’ 
Brookings (4 June 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2001/01/01france-cadot. 
Accessed 9 June 2009. 
53 European Commission, White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719. 
54 First Written Submission of the European Communities, pp 24 -51. 
55 2194th Council Meeting 24/25 June 1999: Declaration by the Danish, Greek French, Italian, and 
Luxemburg Delegations concerning the suspension of New GMO Authorisation. This declaration 
was followed by another similar declaration with a similar emphasis. 2194th Council Meeting 24/25 
June 1999: Declaration by Austrian, Belgian, finish, German, Netherlands, Spanish and Swedish 
Delegations. This secured a majority in the council. 
56 Article 16 states ‘where a Member State has justifiable reasons to consider that a product which 
has been properly notified and has received written consent under this Directive constitutes a risk to 
human health or the environment, it may provisionally restrict or prohibit the use and/or sale of that 
product on its territory. It shall immediately inform the European Commission and the other Member 
States of such action and give reasons for its decision’.   
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Following the revision of the Deliberate Release Directive regulating the release of 
GMOs into the environment (Directive 2001/18/EC), these five countries, 
subsequently joined by Austria, again declared that they would not lift the 
moratorium until issues like ‘traceability’ and ‘labelling’, and rules on coexistence 
to protect conventional and organic farming from GM contamination were 
resolved.57 Again, they maintained that Article 12 of Regulation 258/97 and Article 
23 of Directive 2001/18 allowed Member States to invoke ‘safeguard’ measures to 
justify national bans on some GM crops that have received European-level 
approval.58  
Additionally, supermarket chains responded to low consumer acceptance of GMOs 
by announcing their own policies for labelling their own products to avoid the sale 
of meat from animals fed GM cereals or oilseed products. This was an attempt to 
maintain consumer trust, even if it compromised their access to low cost supply 
sources.59   
The de facto moratorium on GM approvals was not lifted until the conclusion of 
the political process that produced the new Directive 2001/18/EC which took effect 
in 2001, and with the later entry into force in April 2004 of Regulation 
1829/2003/EC on Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 60  and by Regulation 
1830/2003/EC on labelling and traceability of genetically modified organisms.61  
The Complainants in the Biotech dispute maintained that the de facto moratorium 
led to delays in the final approval of specific notifications. They also argued that 
this ‘product specific moratorium’ existed with regard to 27 GM products notified 
                                                 
57 Article 12 of Regulation (EC) 258/97 and Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC authorize a Member 
State, See ‘Protecting People’s Health and the Environment: Is the EU Guilty?’, 
http://www.citizen.org/trade/wto/agriculture/gmo/articles.cfm?ID=11052; and ‘US vs EU: An 
Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 45 ) p.10. 
58 Under Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC. There is a distinction between the types of safeguard 
measures used. Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg use safeguard measures to prohibit the 
marketing of particular GM corn products, while the French and Greek measures prohibit the 
marketing and import of canola. See generally EU First Submission, pp. 339–361. 
59 Supermarkets’ anti GMOs marketing increased calls for labelling. See Tim Josling et al., Food 
Regulation and Trade: Towards a Safe and pen Global System (Institute for International Economics 
Washington DC, 2004), p. 163; and Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) p. 8. 
60 Food and Feed Regulation  
61 Traceability and Labelling Regulation; Also see section 2.4 below for discussion regards the 
moratorium.  
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for approval.62 In this period, the Commission stopped pushing GMOs through the 
authorisation process. 
The EU never denied these delays in approvals, although it asserted that they were 
all due to legitimate reasons. According to the EU, requests for additional 
information from the applicants, or the drafting of new legislation constituted 
legitimate reasons for WTO Members to prolong approval procedures. 63  The 
Commission worked with the Member States and others to renegotiate the 
regulatory framework that applied to GMOs, completely replacing and 
strengthening the EU’s legislative framework.64  
In Biotech, the Panel found that EU ‘product specific moratorium’ violated Article 
8 and Annex C (a) of the SPS Agreement by allowing unnecessary delays in the 
approval of two of the twenty seven products specified by the complaining 
parties.65 The Biotech Panel’s recommendations requested that the EU bring the 
relevant ‘product specific measures’ into conformity with its obligations under the 
SPS Agreement, and that it bring the safeguard measures into conformity with its 
SPS obligations under the SPS Agreement. In other words, the Panel wanted the 
EU to complete the approval process for the outstanding applications, and to either 
revoke the safeguard measures or justify them on scientific grounds under the SPS 
treaty.  
Following the implementation of the new Regulations the moratorium on 
authorisation of GMOs and GM food was lifted. A year after the initiation of the 
WTO Biotech dispute, on 28 of January 2004, the European Commission approved 
a proposal to authorise import of Syngenta’s GM canned sweet corn (Bt-11) for use 
in food under the newly adopted legislation.66 A number of additional GMOs have 
                                                 
62 The US alleges that 18 notifications for placing GM products on the market have been delayed 
under Directive 90/220/EEC (and then resubmitted under Directive 2001/18/EC), and that nine 
applications under Regulation 258/97 have been delayed: First Written Submission of the US, pp. 
48–55. Canada alleges four such delays: First Written Submission of the Canadian, pp. 68–94. 
63 First Written Submission of the European Communities, pp. 147-150. 
64 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) p. 3. 
65 Panel Reportss, Biotech, p. 845. The Panel recommended the EU bring it into conformity with its 
obligations under the SPS Agreement.pp.1072-1078. 
66 First Written Submission of the European Communities, p. 100;  See ‘Europe Takes First Step 
Towards Removing De Facto Ban’ 8(3) Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 28 January 2004, 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6975/. Accessed 3 June 2006.  
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been authorised by the Commission since the lifting of the moratorium. A few 
months later, in July 2004, the Commission also approved a Monsanto GM 
Roundup Ready maize variety (NK 603) for human and animal consumption, but 
not for planting. In August 2005, the Commission approved the import of Monsanto 
GM maize (MON 863) for animal feed, but not for cultivation or food use in 
accordance with Directive 2001/18//EC.67 The EU therefore argued in Biotech that 
the de facto moratorium ceased to exist, citing theses authorisations as evidence.  
The European Commission has been a strong supporter of GM crops despite a lack 
of popular support from EU citizens. It has also pushed for the approval of several 
GM crops despite disagreement between the between EU Member States. In each 
of these cases, the Commission acted to approve the applications after the Council 
failed to approve or reject the Commission’s proposed action by a qualified 
majority vote.68   
The Biotech Panel condemned not only the de facto moratorium, extensive delays, 
but also national bans, rejecting the EU’s defence of the precautionary principle, 
as it found a satisfactory risk assessment could be carried out and deemed the 
measures were not justified, even under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.69  
The Commission and the EFSA reviewed the information provided by Member 
States to justify their bans. In April, 2005, it informed France, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Germany, and Greece that they lacked scientific justification for those bans, and 
would therefore face legal action by the Commission. In June 2005, however, the 
Commission recommendation to force the lifting of the national bans was rejected 
by a qualified majority of the Environment Ministers Council, leaving the national 
bans in place.70  
                                                 
67 To date, nine GMOs have been placed on the market in accordance with the Deliberate Release 
Directive see ‘Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Organisms’, Summaries of EU legislation 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/agriculture/food/l28130_en.htm.  
68 Knowing that if the Member States cannot reach agreement on Authorisation in 90 days, the 
European Commission allowed granting the authorisation on its own initiative.  
69 The EU’s obligations under the WTO not to negatively discriminate or impose trade restrictions 
on imports, except under certain circumstances. 
70 FoE International, ‘Looking behind the US spin: WTO ruling does not prevent countries from 
restricting or banning GMOs’ FoE International, Briefing Paper, February 2006  
www.foeeurope.org/publications/2005/alternatives-wto.pdf accessed November 2006 accessed 12 
June 2010. 
158 
 
The European Commission then sent ten Member States a letter of formal notice 
‘mise en demeure’ because it was believed they had not implemented Directive 
2001/18/EC in time.  Pursuant to Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU), it brought enforcement proceedings against some 
Member States in the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) for breaching of 
treaty obligations.71 On 9 December 2008, the EUCJ in Commission v France, 
ordered France to pay a lump sum as a penalty for the delay in complying with a 
previous judgment, which established France’s failure to fulfil obligations relating 
to the transposition of the Directive on genetically modified organisms.72 Another 
case was in 2009 which was brought by the Commission against Poland for 
imposing a general ban on placing GMOs on the market based on ethical and 
religious reasons. 73  Another case which is worth mentioning was the case 
concerning unsuccessful challenge by Austria of the Commission’s decision to 
disallow the Austrian province’s ban on GMOs in order to protect nature as well as 
organic farming interests.74 
Despite the new EU legislation, GMOs remain unpopular in many parts of Europe, 
and national politicians have acted to assert independence and autonomy over GM 
crops and foods. Six countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungry, Greece, and 
Luxembourg) are currently blocking or temporarily restricting the use and/or sale 
of five GMO varieties (three modified maize varieties and two types of oilseed rape) 
that were previously approved by the Commission by invoking the ‘safeguard 
clause’ on their territory.75 
 
2.3 The single authorisation procedure 
During the moratorium, EU GMO regulation was complemented by two more 
instruments: Regulation 1829/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
                                                 
71 (ex Article 228 EC) 
72 In Case C-121/07, Commission of the European Communities v. France 2008 E.C.R. I‐ 
9159, the Court imposed a fine upon France for failure to implement Directive 2001/18/EC 
73 Case C-165/08 Commission of the European Communities v Republic of Poland OJ C 183, 19 
July 2008. 
74 Joined cases C-439/05P and C-454/05P, Land Oberösterreich and Republic of Austria  v.  
Commission of the European Communities  [2007] ECR I-7441, 64 
75  Under Art. 23 Dir. 2001/18/EC. See a list of Safeguards, 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/safeguards/index_en.htm accessed 15 June 2010. 
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Council on Genetically Modified Food and Feed (hereinafter ‘Food and Feed 
Regulation’),76 and by Regulation 1830/2003/EC European Parliament and of the 
Council concerning traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms 
and the traceability of food and feed products produced from genetically modified 
organisms (hereinafter ‘Traceability and Labelling Regulation’).77 The European 
Commission explained that the aim of the new regulations was to ‘develop 
proactive policies to exploit them in a responsible manner, consistent with 
European values and standards’,78 to protect human and animal health through 
stringent safety assessment of GM food and feed before it can be sold, to ensure 
common procedures for risk assessment and authorisation are efficient, transparent 
and do not take too long, and to ensure clear labelling that responds to the concerns 
of consumers (including farmers buying feed) and enables them to make informed 
choices.79 
 
The Food and Feed Regulation replaced the authorisation for GM foods and food 
ingredients previously covered by the Novel Food Regulation (Reg. 258/97/EC). 
Its objective is to provide a high level of protection to human life and health, the 
environment, and the interests of consumer in relation to GM food and feed, whilst 
ensuring the effective working of the internal market.80 
The new Regulation introduced a single centralised authorisation procedure for 
placing GMOs used as food or animal feed, or products containing or consisting of 
GMOs on the market.81 The applicant may file single notification for the GMO food 
and feed consisting of, containing, or produced from GMOs.  All intended uses 
(cultivation, importation, and processing) are covered under the Regulation, in 
                                                 
76 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 on genetically modified food and feed. [2003] OJ L268/1. It came into force on 18 April 2004. 
77 Regulation (EC) No 1830/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 September 
2003 concerning the traceability and labelling of genetically modified organisms and the traceability 
of food and feed products produced from genetically modified organisms [2003] OJ L268/24.  
78 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Life Science and 
Biotechnology- a Strategy for Europe’ COM (2002)27 [2002] OJ C55/3, para. 1.  
79  European Commission, ‘Existing rules on GM food and animal feed’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/legislation/gm_food_animal_feed_en.htm. Accessed 7 
November 2012.  
80 Article 1. Another two objectives are listed: to establish Community procedures for assessment, 
authorisation, and supervision of GM food and feed; and to establish provisions for the labelling of 
GM food and feed.  
81 See European Commission ‘Questions and Answers on the regulation of GMOs in the EU’, 
(MEMO/06/58, 22 June 2006) http://europa.eu.int/ accessed 1 October 2009. 
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accordance with the ‘one door, one key’ principle.82 This means that those wishing 
to market GM crops in the EU need not request separate authorisations for the use 
of the crop as food or feed; in the EU a crop is either authorised for both uses, or 
for neither.83 This single authorisation also applies to GMOs that fall under the 
scope of the deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation.84    
An application first goes to the Member State where the marketing of the product 
is sought. A scientific risk assessment is then carried out by a single agency, the 
European Food Safety Authority.85 Its opinion will be made available to the public, 
and the public will have the opportunity to make comments.86 On the basis of risk 
assessment by EFSA and other legitimate factors relevant to the matter under 
consideration, 87  the Commission drafts a proposal for granting or denying the 
authorization.88 If it disagrees with the EFSA opinion, it must justify its position.  
The Commission’s draft proposal is submitted for approval by a qualified majority 
of the 27 representatives of Member States within the Committee on the Food Chain 
and Animal Health. If the Committee approves it, the Commission then adopts the 
decision. If not, the draft decision is submitted to the Council of Ministers for 
adoption or rejection by qualified majority. If the Council fails to act, or fails to 
muster a qualified majority to accept or reject the proposal, the Commission then 
adopts the decision. The authorisation should be granted for a period of 10 years, 
subject, where appropriate, to a post-market monitoring plan.89 
                                                 
82European Commission ‘European legislative framework for GMOs is now in place’ (Press Release, 
IP/03/1056, 22 July 2003) http://europa.eu.int/ accessed 1 October 2009 
83 Article 5. One of the reasons for this approach is to prevent controversies such as those caused by 
the Bt maize variety StarLinkTM. StarLinkTM, produced by the company Aventis, received 
regulatory approval from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be used as animal feed 
only. However, in 2000, traces of StarLinkTM were found in taco shells which were sold in 
American supermarkets. 
84  Subject to environmental risk assessment under the Deliberate Release Directive. Or, 
alternatively, two separate applications filed under the two regulations. Maria Lee, EU Regulation 
of GMOs (n 8) p. 65. 
85 Food and Feed Regulation Articles 5(3) and 17(3). The Food and Feed Regulation centralized 
authorization of GMOs in the Food Safety Authority (EFSA), which is responsible for the scientific 
assessment of genetically modified food and feed. 
86 Food and Feed Regulation, Articles 5(2) and 17(2) (b). 
87 Articles 7(1) and 19(1). 
88 Article 6. As well as a single management process. 
89 Food and Feed Regulation Articles 7(5) and 19(5). Authorisations are renewable for 10-year 
periods. See ‘European legislative framework for GMOs is now in place’ IP/03/1056 (n 82). 
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The Regulation expanded the scope of product coverage. First, in addition to food 
for human consumption, the Regulation’s authorization and labelling requirements 
extended to GM animal feed for the first time. Second, the regulation covered food 
and feed that do not contain or consist of GMOs, but nonetheless are derived, in 
whole or in part, from GMOs’ or contain ingredients that are ‘derived, in whole or 
in part, from GMOs.’ 90  The process or production method of GM food or feed 
became a relevant factor that justifies labelling. The Regulation abandoned the 
notification procedure for novel foods considered ‘substantially equivalent’ to 
existing foods91 on the basis that ‘whilst substantial equivalence is a key step in the 
procedure for assessment for the procedure for assessment of the safety of 
genetically modified foods, it is not safety assessment itself’.92         
The Food and Feed Regulation includes specific provisions for their labelling.93 
Labelling is required for foods that are delivered as such to the final consumer or 
mass caterers in the Community, and which contain or consist of GMOs, or are 
produced from or contain ingredients produced from GMOs. The labelling 
requirements are applied irrespective of the deducibility of DNA or protein 
resulting from the genetic modification in the final product. In effect, the Food and 
Feed Regulation allows consumers to exercise their freedom of choice. The label 
must include language such as ‘This product contains genetically modified 
organisms’ or ‘... produced from genetically modified (name of organism)’. 94 
However, no labelling is required for foods or feed with ingredients containing less 
than 0.9% GM material, provided the presence of GM material is adventitious or 
technically unavoidable. 95  The Regulation does not cover all food or food 
ingredients. Excluded products include highly refined soya or maize oil, milk and 
meat obtained from animals fed with GM crops, and food and animal feed made 
                                                 
90 See Articles 2.10 and 3.1 (defining the scope of coverage). See also Marine Friant-Perrot, ‘The 
European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms and its Integration intro 
Community Food Law and Policy’ (n 18), p. 89. 
91 Ibid, p. 89. 
92 Food and Feed Regulation, Recital 6 
93 Food and Feed Regulation, Articles 12 and 24. 
94 Food and Feed Regulation, Article 13; and also required under the Traceability and Labelling 
Regulation, Article 4(6). 
95 Food and Feed Regulation, Articles 12(2) and 24(2); Traceability and Labelling Regulation, 
Article 4(7). See also Simonetta Zarrilli , National and Multilateral Legal Frameworks, (n 33) p. 12. 
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‘with’ a GMO, for example GM enzymes used in cheese production. 96  The 
regulations also required animal feed to be labelled along the same principles as for 
GM food.97 The use of GMOs in animal feed did not previously require a specific 
authorisation procedure. The Regulation will thus impact imported GM crops, 
which are predominantly used as feed for animals.  
Under Regulation 1830/2003/EC, the Traceability and Labelling Regulation, which 
entered into force on 18 April 2004, products containing GMOs could be traced and 
recalled if necessary.  Labelling required by the Regulation ensured consumers 
would know when they were buying a GM product. 98  The Traceability and 
Labelling Regulation applied to products placed on the market under EU legislation 
that consisted of or contained GMOs, or food or feed produced from GMOs.99 The 
Regulation’s key objective was to guarantee reliable information to consumers.100  
Traceability is defined as ‘the ability to trace GMOs and products produced from 
GMOs at all stages of their placing on the market.’101 Producers, processors and 
distributors using or handling GM products were required to transmit and retain, 
for five years, information at each stage of placing products on the market. GMOs 
were assigned a code, which was to be passed in writing to operators involved.102 
Similarly, farmers who buy GM seed were required to transmit relevant information 
to those who buy their harvest, and to keep a register of recipients. In the case of 
food and feed produced from GM crops, the process was repeated throughout the 
production and distribution chain in accordance with the precautionary principle.103 
Traceability is regarded as a safety net in case of unforeseen effects on human health, 
animal health or the environment. Traceability ensures all foodstuff, feed and feed 
ingredients can be traced through the food chain from the ‘farm to the fork’ in order 
                                                 
96 Article 3(1)(c); Lissa Carson & Robert Lee ‘Consumer Sovereignty  and the regulatory History of 
the European market for Genetically Modified Foods’ (2005) Enviro LR  7(3), p. 181-82. 
97 In accordance with Articles 24 and 25 of the Food and Feed Regulation.  
98 Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1).p 5 
99 Which have been authorized under the Deliberate Release Directive (section C) or under the Food 
and Feed Regulation. See Traceability and Labelling Regulation, Article 2. 
100 Traceability and Labelling Regulation, Preambular paragraph 11. 
101 Traceability and Labelling Regulation, Article 3. 
102 Traceability and Labelling Regulation, Articles 4 and 5. 
103 Traceability and Labelling Regulation, Preambular paragraph 3. 
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to facilitate a withdrawal of food and feed from the market if any unexpected 
adverse effects were to arise.104  
Linking access to information with the precautionary approach to the enactment of 
legislation, demonstrates the importance of ensuring freedom of choice for 
consumers where science is uncertain.105  For this reason, some NGOs are still 
critical of the Regulation as it does not require labelling of products, such as medical 
products for human or veterinary use, animal products such as meat, milk and eggs 
that come from animals fed GMOs, non-food derivatives like cotton and tobacco, 
and food produced with the help of a GM enzyme, such as bakery products 
involving use of amylase.106 
The Regulation expanded labelling requirements significantly while also mandating 
traceability, or the ability to track a GM product from the farm through all phases 
of distribution in accordance with Regulation 178/2002/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down the general principles and requirements 
of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority, and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety [2002] OJ L31/1 (Hereinafter ‘Food Law 
Regulation’). This Regulation provides for an integrated approach towards food 
policy in the EU, and clearly applies to GM food production.107 
According to the European Commission, the central goal of food safety policy is 
‘to ensure a high level of protection of human health and consumers' interests in 
relation to food, taking into account diversity, including traditional products, whilst 
ensuring the effective functioning of the internal market.’108 The Commission's 
guiding principle, primarily set out in its White Paper on food safety, is the 
application of an integrated approach from farm to table, covering all sectors of the 
                                                 
104 Articles 3(3)-3(5). Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1) pp. 5, and 11. 
105  Marine Friant-Perrot, ‘The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified 
Organisms and its Integration intro Community Food Law and Policy’(n 18) pp. 97 and 99. 
106  See GMO Compass ‘GMO labelling guidelines: these products do not require labelling’ 
http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/regulation/labelling/88.gmo_labelling_these_products_require.html accessed 4 
September 2010.    
107 For more on the subject see Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) Chapter 4. 
108  DG Health Commission ‘Genetically Modified Food and Feed’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/index_en.htm. Accessed 15 November 2012.   
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food chain, including feed production, primary production, food processing, storage, 
transport, and retail sale.109 
 
The European Commission used the controversy surrounding the science of GMOs 
to justify their regulations. They acknowledge both the benefits and risks of 
biotechnology. However, it emphasised that risks must be properly assessed and 
managed: ‘EU legislation on the approval of biotech products requires all new 
products to be thoroughly tested to. So we have developed the precautionary 
principle which is now incorporated in most EU policy on environmental and health 
protection (is not about purely hypothetical hazards).’110 
 
Article 7 of the Food Safety Regulation expressly refers to the precautionary 
principle.  Additionally, the Commission may adopt emergency measures under 
Article 34 of the Food and Feed Regulation where it is evident that products which 
have been authorised are likely to constitute a serious risk to human health, animal 
health, or the environment. A Member State may adopt an interim protective 
measure, if it has informed the Commission subsequent to its failure to act.111 
 
 
In sum, the current EU rules stem from the Deliberate Release Directive, the GM 
Food and Feed Regulation, and the Labelling and Traceability Regulation.112  They 
aim to protect not only the environment, but also public health and consumer 
considerations. 113  The rules are grounded in the precautionary principle and 
centralised authorisation procedure, which is based on the protection of the 
environment and public health. They allow evaluation, tracing, and monitoring of 
GM production from ‘farm to fork’. Once a GM food is placed on the market, it 
must be labelled and traceable at all times in order to keep consumers informed 
about their choices.114 
                                                 
109 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Food Safety, COM (1999) 719 final 
(12 Jan 2000). [hereinafter White Paper]. 
110 Speech by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson: ‘Biotechnology and the EU’ (n 6 ). 
111 Food Law Regulation, Articles 53 and 54. 
112 See European Commission, ‘Existing rules on GM food and animal feed’ (n 79).  
113  Marine Friant-Perrot, ‘The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified 
Organisms and its Integration intro Community Food Law and Policy’ (n 18) p. 100. 
114 Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1).  
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The European Commission stressed that ‘because new foods and new production 
methods are emerging all the time, the EU constantly evaluates and re-evaluates the 
risks posed by new food-stuff.’115 The creation of the EFSA as an independent 
agency in 2002 sought to provide EU decision-makers with scientific advice in a 
more efficient and transparent way than previous efforts. 116  The EFSA’s 
constitution emphasises scientific excellence and the independence of science from 
political and industry influence. It also aims to increase consumers’ confidence in 
GMOs.117 Meeting public concerns in such a manner can also contribute to the 
political legitimacy and popular relevance of the EU.118  
 
The single authorisation procedure subjects EFSA to multiple obligations of 
consultation, networking, and dialogue with national authorities. This is due to the 
inherent complexity of decision making and hierarchy within the EU, and complex 
interaction between central and national experts, where the EU remains far from 
speaking with one voice on agricultural technology. The authorisation of GMOs 
thus attempts ‘to tread a delicate path between National and central authorisation 
and between reaping the benefits and protecting public interests, as well as between 
scientific and political understanding.’ 119 
 
Since the US did not challenge all of the EU’s legal framework in the Biotech 
dispute, the EU remains confident that its current regulatory regime over GMOs 
and GM food and feed is fully compatible with its international commitments 
including those under the WTO.120 
  
                                                 
115 Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1). 
116  EFSA is responsible for all scientific aspects of food and feed production, processing and 
marketing its work not only covers GMOs but also a wide field including nutrition, animal health, 
animal welfare and plant health. see Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1). 
117 Alessandro Nucara, Precautionary Principle and GMOs: Protection or Protechtionism, 9(2) Int. 
T. L.R. 2003, 48.  
118 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) p. 62. 
119 Ibid, pp. 68 and 102. See also Maria Lee, ’Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified 
Organisms in the European Union: ambiguity and hierarchy’  (n 19) p. 101. 
120  See European Commission ‘Europe’s rules on GMOs and the WTO’ Press Release, 
MEMO/06/61 (Brussels 07 Feb 2006), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-06-61_en.htm. 
Accessed 12 September 2008. Speech by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson: 
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2.4 Behind the scene: motives of EU - US clash  
The EU legislation on GMOs has been in place since the early 1990s. At the time, 
it had two main objectives: to protect human health and the environment, and to 
ensure the free movement of safe genetically modified products in the EU.121 When 
EU standards for the commercial authorization and approval of agricultural 
biotechnology were first issued in 1990, they did not differ substantially from those 
of the United States.122 
Several regulatory failures and food crises led to increased public and political 
support for more stringent protective regulation of GM crops. Food has also been 
strongly influenced as these failures and crises increased ‘the political salience of 
regulatory issues and undermined public confidence in the ability of national or EU 
regulatory official to adequately protect their health, safety and environment.’123 As 
‘[w]idespread media coverage of anti-GM activists helped move the issue of GM 
foods quickly to the forefront of political debate in Europe,’ many consumers in the 
EU lost trust in science, and demanded higher levels of protection in the form of 
product bans or labelling.124 Almost overnight political opposition to GM seeds and 
products began to surface, and in 1996 European regulatory policy transformed.125 
The most important EU failure involved Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
(BSE), a disease spread among cattle through their consumption of contaminated 
feed. Also known as ‘mad cow disease’, BSE is a lethal disease, which if 
transmitted through meat consumption may cause a related disease in humans. 
When the first BSE cases were discovered, the British government denied the 
                                                 
121 See European Commission ‘Questions and Answers on the regulation of GMOs in the EU’ 
MEMO/06/58 (n 81). 
122 David Vogel, ‘The New Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe’ (2001) CARR Discussion paper 
no 3, LSE London, pp. 3-4, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35984/1/Disspaper3.pdf . Accessed June 2008; 
and David Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States’, manuscript for 
publication in (2003) 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law. pp.15-23 
123 David Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States’ (n 122) pp.24-
34 
124 Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘From the USA with Love: Sharing Home-Grown Hormones, GMOs, and 
Clones with reluctant Europe’ (30 April 2007) 37(2) Environmental Law 305. 
125 Increased representation of the Green Party in Member State parliaments and cabinets, as well as 
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politics, ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology 
(n 45 ) p. 10.   
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connection between the disease and risks to human health. 126  The initial risk 
assessments of BSE were based on scientific information incorrectly thought to be 
sufficient at the time. This failure to recognise the health hazards of eating meat 
from BSE diagnosed cattle had a severe negative impact on the public.127 The 
failure undermined public trust in EU food safety regulation, as well as the scientific 
expertise on which it was based. It has also significantly affected the attitude of the 
European public towards the potential threat caused by artificial hormones in 
American beef, and latter in GM food.128  
A second major food scandal occurred when the public discovered that Belgian 
farm animals had been fed dioxin-contaminated feed. This resulted in the removal 
of Belgian chicken, eggs, pork, and beef from the EU market, and led to the fall of 
the Christian Democratic government of Jean-Luc Dehaene.129 Other food safety 
scares arose, including the possible contamination of Coca-Cola products in 
northern Europe, and a French admission that sewage sludge containing human and 
animal wastes was found in feed destined for pigs and chickens.130  
According to Vogel, BSE failure had two important political consequences. First, 
it increased sensitivity to new technologies in the food supply industry and shifted 
attention from the safety of end product to a focus on the entire process of food 
production. Second, it highlighted the inability of EU institutions to assure the 
safety of food and products produced and sold anywhere within the single 
market.131 This increased pressure on the EU to adopt stricter and more extensive 
rules and regulation since a regulatory failure in any Member State endangers the 
single market as a whole. 
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EU legislation, therefore, established a distinctive and complex set of new 
regulatory requirements that apply only to this new agricultural technology, while 
the US has chosen to regulate both GM foods and seeds under existing laws.132 EU 
policy in this area is predominantly regulatory in character, creating an increasingly 
detailed regulatory framework within which genetically modified foods and crops 
may be developed, introduced into the environment, and work their way into the 
food supply.133 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the absence of major regulatory failures explains 
the degree of public acceptance of GMO’s. Americans are more trusting of their 
government to adequately protect public health and the environment. In addition, 
businesses became more politically effective, which played a role in shaping 
American opposition to some multilateral environmental agreements such the 
Biosafety Protocol. Since 1994, American NGO’s have fought to prevent rolling 
back existing statues and to maintain the regulatory status quo, rather than to expand 
the scope of consumer or environmental protection.134         
In reality, few farmers in the EU grow approved GM crop varieties. Within the EU, 
Spain is effectively the only Member State that is growing significant amounts of 
GM crops. Spain accounts for 85% of all GM crops grown in the EU.135 In 2011, 
Spanish farmers planted 0.1 million hectares of Bt maize. Other EU countries 
Portugal, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Romania planted 114,490 hectares 
of biotech Bt maize. In 2011, EU Member States combined together cultivate less 
than 0.2 million hectares of GM crops, compared to 69 million hectares in the US.136 
European attitudes towards GM crops and food have been shaped by a variety of 
factors, including the experience of major food safety crises, lack of confidence in 
food regulators, different cultural attitudes toward food, and involvement of 
                                                 
132 Now it is the EU in the leadership in addressing global environmental problems. See David Vogel, 
‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States’(n 122) pp.19-22 
133 For more on the EU’ regulation of GMOs See Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8). 
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NGOs.137 This pressure led to the moratorium (as discusses above in section 2.2) 
on new authorisations made under Directive 90/220, its successor Directive 
2001/18, and Regulation 258/97. In response, the EU modified its regulatory 
procedures to meet public pressure as described in section 2.2 above.138 
The EU’s regulation of genetically modified foods and crops can impact the flow 
of genetically modified foods and crops from third countries, such as the United 
States, and hence falls under the jurisdiction of the WTO. The EU claims that its 
regulatory framework for GMOs takes account of the EUs international trade 
commitments and the requirements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
specifically as regards the obligations of EU importers, and exporters of products 
to third countries. Regulation of the European parliament and of the Council on the 
Transboundary Movement of Genetically modified organisms139 implemented the 
provisions of the Protocol into Community law.140   The EU maintains that its 
regulatory system is in line with WTO rules: it is clear, transparent and non-
discriminatory.141 
 
The US, which is the world largest producer and exporter of GM crops and GM 
products, 142 has long expressed its dissatisfaction with the de facto moratorium in 
the EU and the Member States’ safeguard measures.143 This dissatisfaction is easy 
to understand as the EU is the fourth largest market for US agricultural exports 
(nearly 12% of all agricultural exports from the US are destined the EU).144  In 2002, 
the US State Department of Agriculture (USDA) claimed at least $300 million in 
                                                 
137 On food attitudes see section 4.4 below. 
138 See Farm to Fork: Safe Food for Europe’s Consumers (n 1). 
139 Regulation (EC) No 1946/2003, OJ L287 of 05/11/2003. The Protocol was incorporated into EU 
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144 ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 
45 ) p 11  
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lost sales of genetically modified corn and soy products as a result of EU policies.145 
Isaac and others contend that at the heart of the dispute is market access barriers 
that arise ‘not because of border measures but because of differences in domestic 
regulatory approaches.’146 US biotech corporations have invested heavily in GM 
applications in agriculture. These corporations have seen their access to the EU 
market severely restricted by the EU regulatory regime. Although at the time of 
filing the complaint, regulation had a limited impact on soybean and corn exports 
to the EU, American corporations worried about future growth opportunities.147  
 
Shortly after taking office in 2009, President Obama reaffirmed America’s 
commitment to ensuring the effective implementation and enforcement of the WTO 
system of multilateral trading rules, and confirmed that US exports of biotech corn 
and soybeans, as well as other agricultural products that contain, or may contain 
biotech-derived ingredients, continue to face a multitude of trade barriers.148 The 
President’s 2009 Trade Policy Agenda outlined an ‘aggressive and transparent 
program recognized that ‘behind the border’ measures and other non-tariff barriers 
have grown in significance for US exporters seeking access to foreign markets.’149 
 
NGOs were quick to point the finger at intense lobbying by US agribusiness and 
biotech corporations. 150 American farmers and industry trade bodies have pushed 
the US government to take further steps against the moratorium, resulting in the 
initiation of the WTO Biotech dispute. Furthermore, many agriculture and agri-
business groups in the US are calling for a second case at the WTO, challenging 
new European legislation on GMO traceability and labelling in an effort to prevent 
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further disruption of transatlantic trade, and to ensure that other countries do not 
adopt similar legislation.151   
 
Developing countries are caught in the middle of this dispute between the US and 
EU. For example, an unresolved problem for a developing country is whether it can 
import corn or soybean from the US for human consumption, or approve GMOs for 
domestic production, yet still seek to export crops to the EU. Solving this problem 
alone would have an important beneficial impact on the operation of addressing 
world food insecurity.152 This issue arose when three African countries declined 
shipment of US corn as food aid. 153  The underlying problem was that these 
countries were mainly agricultural producers exporting to the EU. They did not 
want to compromise their trade with the EU in case farmers were going to save and 
plant the GM corn. The solution was to require that the corn be ground before 
distribution in the recipient country.154 
 
A similar dilemma can occur if a country imports soybeans or oil from the US and 
exports processed foods, as happened in the Thailand-Egypt dispute. Thailand 
formally challenged Egypt’s decision to restrict food imports containing GMOs. 
Moreover, Thailand claimed it was not possible to identify the origin of soybean oil 
because the final stages of processing destroyed genetic material. Thailand 
therefore found restrictions on its canned tuna discriminatory, and asked the 
Egyptian government to lift them.155  
 
The EU denies that the challenged measures in Biotech and latter legislation are 
protectionist. Instead, it maintains that it made a political choice not to compromise 
                                                 
151 In November 2003, the 22 members of the Agriculture Biotech Planning Committee wrote to the 
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over food safety rules because they apply as much to its own Member States as it 
does to other countries wanting to export to the EU.156  
 
The next section describes, in general, US federal policy and the regulatory 
framework applying to GMOs. This provides necessary background for assessing 
how they differ on assessing the risks.  
 
3 The ‘permissive’ approach of the USA 
The US has chosen to regulate both GM foods and seeds under current statutes and 
existing agencies responsible for the safety of food, drugs and other products.157 
American regulatory policy is governed by the ‘Coordinated Framework for 
Regulation of Biotechnology’. 158  The Coordinated Framework concluded that 
biotechnology products are not fundamentally different from conventional products. 
It also decided that the products, rather than the process, should be regulated based 
on their use, which suggests that GMOs would not pose regulatory and scientific 
issues substantially different from those posed by traditional products.159 Therefore, 
biotechnology products would be regulated much like traditional products. The 
Coordinated Framework described the federal system for evaluating products 
developed using modern biotechnology as ensuring ‘new biotechnology products 
are safe for the environment and human and animal health.’160  This regulation was 
drafted, in conjunction with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), 
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with the identified goals of enabling industry to proceed safely and efficiently, and 
reducing barriers to trade in biotechnology.161 
Three federal agencies are responsible for regulating most production and 
marketing of genetically modified foods: the Department of Agriculture  (USDA) 
oversees growing practices (e.g. whether something is safe to grow); the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ensures safety of the environment; and 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates food products on the market as 
opposed to plants (e.g. whether something is safe to consume, for example, it 
controls the use of Bt proteins and other pesticides).162 For example, before a Bt 
crop is approved for commercial use, its developer must demonstrate that it 
conforms with the standards set by federal law in order to demonstrate to the USDA 
that the crop will not threaten agriculture, to satisfy the EPA that it is safe for the 
environment, and to establish to the FDA that the resulting product will be as safe 
as other foods.   
Oversight by these agencies is based on a mixture of pre-existing statutes. The 
‘Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology’ relies on several federal 
health and safety laws developed to address specific product classes. These laws 
are statutes the agencies review when determining the safety of a particular GM 
food.163 
3.1 US Department of Agriculture  
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The USDA was created in 1862. The Department has many functions related to the 
advancement and regulation of agriculture, including regulating plant pests, plants, 
and veterinary biologics in agriculture under the Federal Plant Protection Act.164   
 
Because most GM plants are potentially invasive, they are treated as plant pests or 
‘regulated articles’, and regulated by the by the ‘Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service’ (APHIS) under the requirements of the Federal Plant Protection Act. The 
USDA also regulates interstate movement, import, field testing, and eventual 
release GM plants. GM plants that are ‘regulated articles’ must be evaluated and 
determined to be ‘unregulated’ before they can be sold.165 The APHIS is the branch 
of the USDA which provides permits for developing and field testing genetically 
engineered plants. If an experimental organism poses a potential threat to pre-
existing agriculture, the Service makes certain that safeguards are in place.166  
 
The APHIS governs field trials of GMOs, which take place while new crop is still 
a ‘regulated article’ under the Plant Protection Act, through either a notification or 
permit process. Under the notification process, the APHIS Investigative process is 
initiated by a petition to the APHIS for deregulated status (GM plants are monitored 
in the same way as traditional plants). The APHIS reviews field test reports, 
scientific literature, and any other pertinent records before it determines whether 
the GM plant is as safe to grow as traditional varieties. The APHIS uses a ‘scientific 
– based regulatory framework that allows for the safe development and use of GM 
plants.’167 
 
The APHIS considers three broad areas while evaluating the petition for 
deregulation, Specifically, the biology of the plant is scrutinized to evaluate the 
possible threat to other plants, the risks to other wildlife and other organisms, and 
the possibility of the plant will be unwelcome and invasive (weed consequences).168 
                                                 
164 A biologic is broadly defined as any medical preparation made from living organisms or their 
products. See T William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino , Introduction to Biotechnology (n 157) 
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165 Margaret Rosso Grossman ‘Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The 
Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort’ (n 159) pp. 301-2. 
166 T William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino , Introduction to Biotechnology (n 157) p. 308. 
167 Margaret Rosso Grossman ‘Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The 
Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort’ (n 159) p. 301. 
168 T William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino, Introduction to Biotechnology (n 157) pp. 308-9. 
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During field testing, a GM plant is still a ‘regulated article’. After the safety of the 
new plant is determined, the grower can petition for its classification under non-
regulated status. The application includes information and data necessary to satisfy 
that the GM plant is unlikely to pose greater plant pest risk than the unmodified 
organism from which it was derived. If the petition is granted, the grower can 
cultivate, test, or use the plant for crossbreeding purposes without monitoring or 
approval by the APHIS.169 Because non-regulated status means the GM plant poses 
no environmental or agricultural risks, the APHIS lacks authority to impose 
conditions on the use of biotech crops, or to require biotech developers to monitor 
the impact of the crop on the environment.170   
 
The permit procedure applies to experimental release of GM plants that may carry 
higher risks, such as plants with industrial compounds, or plants with human or 
animal genetic material. The applicant includes detailed technical information 
about experiment design, location, plans to prevent escape, and final disposal. The 
APHIS prepares an environmental assessment, and after review of the application, 
it either denies or grants the permit. The permit includes conditions for the 
introduction of the GM plants.  The permit holder must notify the APHIS of the 
result of the field tests, accidental or unauthorised releases, and any other unusual 
occurrence.171       
 
3.2 The Environmental Protection Agency  
The EPA was established in 1970. Its responsibilities range from protecting 
endangered species to establishing emission standards for cars. A major duty is 
setting standards to manage the environmental impact of pesticides and 
                                                 
169  As of February 2009, APHIS had granted 75 petitions. See Margaret Rosso Grossman 
‘Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, 
State Measures, and Liability in Tort’ (n 159) pp. 303-5. 
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‘Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, 
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herbicides.172 In 1992, it agreed that GM plants expressing pesticide substances are 
pesticides, new uses of existing pesticides, and novel microorganisms. This 
understanding includes any plant that is genetically engineered to express proteins 
that provide pest control, such as Bt crops. A permit is generally required for testing 
any unregistered pesticides in accordance with the Federal Insecticides, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act. An applicant must provide data on safety and efficiency, 
which the EPA evaluates for potential effects on the environment and on animals 
or insects that also inhibit the farmers’ fields.173 The EPA has also determined that, 
when used in accordance with normal practice, such plants must not ‘cause 
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.’ Tests in laboratories and 
greenhouses are exempt. A small scale field test does not require a permit. The EPA 
encourages those conducting field trials to consult with it.174    
 
The EPA issues Experimental Use Permits to plant developers to conduct field 
experiments involving 10 acres or more of land. The EPA reviews data collected 
during the experiments. This review concentrates on four areas of concern: the 
source of the gene, how it is expressed, and the nature of the pesticide- protein 
produced; the health effects of the plants; the ‘environmental fate’ of the effect at 
large; and the effect on non-target species. The EPA review balances risks and 
benefits. 175 Like the USDA, the EPA can grant deregulated status to any plant that 
meets the requirements of all these tests, which then allows the plant to be sold or 
distributed like any other plant. The EPA has the power to amend or revoke existing 
regulation whenever required.176 
 
In 2001, the EPA adopted a regulatory framework for ‘plant-incorporated protectant’ 
to regulate food safety issues associated with pesticides. The FDA is responsible 
other food safety issues.177 The EPA also sets pesticides tolerances for foods. On a 
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173 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (Elsevier 2009), p. 409. 
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case-by-case basis, it grants temporary or permanent exemptions for tolerance 
requirements if there is a ‘reasonable certainty that no harm will result’.178 
 
3.3 The Food and Drug Administration  
The FDA is charged with ensuring food, feed, food additives, veterinary drugs, 
human drugs, and medical devices are safe. 179 The FDA regulates GMOs under the 
same act that regulates other food products. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, premarket approval is required only for unsafe food additives. 
Premarket approval of a transgenic crop is only required if the novel protein, or 
other new substance expressed in the crop by the inserted gene, is considered an 
unsafe ‘food additive’. The potential toxicity of the transgenic crop, and nutritional 
quality of the product are also tested.180  
 
In 1992, the FDA issued a policy statement indicating that it would focus on the 
food product, rather than the process by which the food was produced. It stated that 
GM foods were not ‘materially’ different from conventional food, limiting 
regulation to changes that could be tasted, smelled, detected, through the other 
human senses.181 Because GM foods cannot be ‘sensed‘ in this way, the FDA 
declared them ‘substantially equivalent’ to conventionally produced foods, GM 
varieties and their food products ‘are as safe as safe and as nutritious as their 
traditional counterparts, and would be regulated by the same through standards that 
applied to regular food, nothing more, nothing less.’ 182  
 
There is no mandatory risk assessment requirement in the USA. ‘Substantial 
equivalence’ is not part of a safety assessment, but is rather a starting point for the 
                                                 
178 Margaret Rosso Grossman ‘Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The 
Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort’ (n 159) p. 310. 
179 This done mainly under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC S 348 (2000). See T 
William J. Thieman & Michael A. Palladino , Introduction to Biotechnology, (n 157) p. 311; and 
Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘From the USA With Love’(n 124) 317. 
180 David P. Clark & Nanette J. Pazdernik, Applying the Genetic Revolution (n 173) p. 409. 
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safety assessment for GM foods by the US Food and Drug Administration.183 
‘Substantial equivalence’ measures whether a biotech food or crop shares similar 
health and nutritional characteristics with its conventional counterpart. Biotech 
foods that are ‘substantially equivalent’ have been determined to be as safe as their 
conventional counterparts. Products that are not substantially equivalent may still 
be safe, but must undergo a broader range of tests before they can be marketed. 184 
 
‘Substantial equivalence’ evaluations are conducted to assess whether the key 
nutrients or anti-nutrients in the plant components used for feed or food have been 
changed. If a biotechnology product is found not to have any differences in the 
composition of nutritional or anti-nutritional components from its conventional 
counterpart, it is considered substantially equivalent. However, a product that is 
determined to not be substantially equivalent would be subject to a broader analysis 
on a case-by-case basis, with the safety assessment focusing on established 
differences between the product and its conventional counterpart. 185 
 
Only foods with characteristics that carry higher risks, and therefore lack 
‘substantial equivalence’, are subjected to FDA premarket review.186 Substances 
that are ‘generally- recognised- as - safe’ (GRAS) by scientists are excluded from 
this requirement.187 The FDA can grant (GRAS) status to food products or additives 
that pose no foreseeable threat, like food additives used prior to 1958 which can be 
included under the GRAS exception because of their common use in food. If the 
food product or additive proves to be unsafe, the FDA has the responsibility and the 
power to remove it from the market. In 1992, the FDA indicated that most GM 
foods will be considered GRAS because most new plant foods had been accepted 
widely as safe. 188 
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 The FDA serves as a consultant to biotechnology developers and advises them on 
testing practices. The 1992 Policy statement urged industry to consult with the FDA 
before commercial distribution of food and feed from new plant varieties using new 
technologies. Even though they were not bound by law, food companies voluntarily 
consulted with the FDA before marketing any product. The FDA now uses the 
notification procedure outlined in its 1997 regulatory proposal, which has not yet 
been promulgated.189 
 
1992 policy statement does not require labels for most GM foods. The US does not 
have a traceability or labelling requirement.  Instead, GM products are treated in 
the same manner as unmodified foods on the basis that they are ‘substantially 
equivalent’ to conventional products. The United States only requires labelling if 
the composition of a food developed through genetic engineering, or any other 
method, differs significantly from its conventional counterpart. 190  
 
The FDA requires special labelling of foods and food products that present known 
safety or usage issues. If a biotechnology food product includes a protein that is not 
usually found in the food and is a known allergen, mandatory GMO labelling is 
required only where there have been significant nutritional changes, the product is 
considered to be a different product, or to alert consumers of possible safety 
concerns, such as the presence of food allergens. This standard is also applied to 
traditional food products. 191  
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Post-market oversight of GMOs has limited resources and is given relatively low 
priority in the US.192 The FDA takes regulatory action when it determines that a 
food already on the market is ‘misbranded’ or ‘adulterated’.193 Over half a dozen 
unauthorised releases of GM crops have occurred in the US.194  In October 2000, 
GM corn ‘StarLink’, which is not approved for human consumption, was found to 
have entered large amounts the US food supply chain.  
 
‘StarLink’ corn was developed and introduced commercially by Aventis 
CropScience to contain insecticidal protein derived from Bt, and herbicide tolerant 
trait. It was approved by the EPA for commercial use as animal feed only. After 
processing and cooking, ‘StarLink’ corn had a higher concentration of protein than 
expected, which can cause allergic reaction if consumed by the public.195 It was 
also found to have infiltrated the seed supply for other corn varieties. The lack of 
labelling and segregation in the US allowed the ‘StarLink’ corn to mix with all other 
corn in that region and be shipped together to processing centres.196 More than 300 
product brands had to be recalled from supermarkets by US authorities. The 
incident prompted a review of the potential effects on health of the gene inserted in 
the corn, resulting in a finding that the gene was likely to be a potential allergen. At 
the strong urging of American authorities, ‘StarLink’ corn was also withdrawn from 
non-food agricultural uses.197 The EPA revoked its approval of ‘StarLink’ corn, and 
to withdraw the product from the market. The company offered to buy back all the 
remaining ‘Starlink’ corn so that no more food would be contaminated. In addition, 
all ‘Starlink’ corn seed was pulled from the market to prevent its future use. 
‘Starlink’ corn is no longer grown anywhere in the world.198 
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In response to this episode in 2001, the Agency suggested a stricter, more formal 
approach to deal with premarket notification and labelling issues. Under the 
proposed rules, companies must notify the FDA at least 120 days before genetically 
altered food reaches the market. The manufacturer must also provide evidence that 
the new product is no more dangerous than food it replaces.199 The FDA also 
published draft guidance for industry for voluntary labelling.200 
     
3.4 Regulatory reform  
In 2002, the Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed federal measures 
to update field testing requirements for plants derived from biotechnology as a 
means of establishing early food safety assessments for food and feed proteins from 
these new plants. The aim of these measures was to reduce the risk of cross 
pollination and commingling until safety standards had been met, and thus protect 
public health and the environment, and increase public confidence in the regulatory 
oversight of GM food.201  
This policy outlined the lead agencies’ plans for enhanced regulatory measures.  
The USDA intended to amend its GM regulations by considering new criteria for 
defining the acceptable low level of regulated materials in seeds and grain.202 The 
EPA planned to publish guidelines on safety review of low level residues and 
containment in field testing on plant incorporated pesticides, and to review its 
requirements for experimental use permits to minimise gene flow from field 
trials.203 The FDA planned to publish guidelines encouraging early evaluations of 
crops so that new crops would not raise food safety issues.204 
In 2007, the USDA issued a list of nine lessons learned from its experience in 
regulating biotechnology. It highlighted issues such as ‘quality and completeness 
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of records’, the ‘availability of samples’, and maintaining identity and control of 
regulated materials’.205 In 2008, the APHIS published its proposed regulations, 
which suggested expanding regulatory oversight beyond ‘plant pests’ to include 
‘noxious weed and biological control organisms’. It proposed to revise its permit 
system, establishing four permit categories for environmental release of GM plants, 
as well as outlining permit conditions and obligations. This proposal would 
eliminate the notification procedure. The APHIS also proposed procedure to revoke 
approval of non-regulated status and new measures to strengthen compliance and 
enforcement.206     
In 2007, the EPA proposed a new guidance document focused on small scale field 
studies and low level presence of ‘plant- incorporated protectant’ in food. It also 
elaborated on the policies described in the OSTP’s 2002 policy. The EPA’s aim 
was to meet ‘current scientific advances and improve the agency’s ability to make 
regulatory decisions’ about human health and environmental effects of ‘plant- 
incorporated protectant’ pesticides to better protect wildlife, the environment, and 
people.207 
 
In June 2006, the FDA issued new guidance for industry in its ‘Recommendation 
for the Early Food Safety Evaluation of New Non- Pesticidal Proteins Produced By 
New Plant Varieties Intended For Food Use’. It encourages developers to submit 
information about new proteins, as it relates to food safety, early in the development 
process, in order to address the possibility of the inadvertent, intermittent, low level 
presence in the food supply of proteins that have not been evaluated through FDA’s 
voluntary consultation process. Developers can use the data from the food safety 
evaluation in later consultations. 208  
Overall, regulation of GMOs by the FDA and the USDA primarily relies on 
notification and informal consultation. The United States has widely authorised 
most GM products for cultivation, production and consumption.   
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4 Precaution or protectionism? 
Biotech dispute between the EU and the US over GMOs is putting the precautionary 
principle onto the political agenda of both parties. While the EU has a GMO 
regulatory framework based on the precautionary principle, the US places little 
restriction on the approval and sale of GMOs. This divergence was clearly reflected 
in Biotech. The American submissions alleged that the EU de facto moratorium and 
‘product specific Moratoria’ were   ‘arbitrary’ or unjustified distinctions on the level 
of protection against risk that have resulted in discrimination or disguised restriction 
on the international trade. It also asserted that all three challenged measures were 
not based on ‘scientific principles’, and were maintained without ‘sufficient 
scientific evidence’, in violation of several provisions under the SPS Agreement.209  
The EU, in defence, stressed that states have the right to adopt a precautionary 
approach when dealing with GMOs. The EU invoked the Biosafety Protocol as 
evidence of a strong international consensus on this point.210 The EU latter added 
that the US was not seeking settlement in Biotech; rather one of the United States’ 
main objectives was to get a dispute panel ruling confirming that there is no basis 
under WTO law to support the EU’s regulations based on the precautionary 
principle.211  
 
In order to assess the EU’s ability to maintain and develop a regulatory system for 
GMOs that allows for the use of precautionary measures to protect in the face of 
‘insufficient scientific evidence’, we have understand how it is applied in the EU, 
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as well as the extent of its application the US. The next section reflects on the origin 
of the precautionary principle, and delineates its meaning.  
 
     
4.1 The origins of the precautionary principle  
The EU’s attitude towards food safety is characteristic of Europe’s broader concern 
with risk and safety issues as expressed in the precautionary principle. This section 
provides closer examination and understanding of what the principle stands for. 
Historically, the precautionary principle has its roots in what is described in German 
environmental law as the ‘Vorsorgeprinzip’, which was first enunciated and 
described by the German Federal Government in 1976 as follows: ‘Environmental 
policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and elimination 
of damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires 
furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands of on them made with 
care.’212 
The German notion of vorsorge was initially perceived to connote more than the 
English translation of ‘foresight planning’. The principle encompassed the notions 
of risk preservation, cost effectiveness, ethical responsibilities towards maintaining 
the integrity of natural systems, and the fallibility of human understanding. This 
notion is ‘an interventionist measure, a justification for state involvement in the day 
to day lives of the citizen in the name of good government.’ 213  
Thus, social planning in the design and take up of technology, in the management 
of the economy, especially through the introduction of environmental lives, and in 
social initiatives in the practice of democracy were all introduced and justified in 
the name of precaution.214 This means that if there is a strong suspicion that a certain 
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activity may have environmentally harmful consequences, it is better to act before 
it is too late rather than wait until scientific evidence is available. At the same time, 
Germany wanted to promote preventative environmental technologies, for example 
efficient waste reduction strategies and devices for removing CO2 emissions.215  
At the core of the precautionary principle is the notion that ‘once a risk has been 
identified the lack of scientific proof of cause and effect shall not be used as a reason 
for not taking action to protect the environment’ or human health. It embodies the 
sayings of ‘better safe than sorry’ and ‘stitch in time saves nine’.216  Accordingly, 
policy makers and governments use it to impose restrictions on otherwise legitimate 
commercial activities for the purpose of protecting the environment. The distinctive 
feature of the precautionary concept is, therefore, not that it dictates specific 
regulatory measures, but rather allows many different types of measures to be used 
to implement it.  As the scale of possible damage increases, so does the need to act 
with precaution. Where the potential damage is less obvious (i.e. GMOs), it is 
common to expect controversy over precautionary action, as affected stakeholders 
seek to protect their interests. 
During the 1980’s, the precautionary principle was employed in an international 
context in response to trans-border environmental concerns, notably acid rain, 
global warming, pollution of the North Sea, and biological diversity. 217  The 
precautionary principle first appeared in international law in the 1980s, with the 
Ministerial Declarations of International Conference on the Protection of the North 
Sea 1984, and was later affirmed by European countries in the 1990 Bergen 
Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development.218 
It found further expression internationally in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development (1992): 
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by states according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.219 
As articulated in the Rio Declaration, the precautionary approach provides that 
while science is the starting point, the lack of conclusive scientific evidence or 
uncertainty does not justify inaction, particularly when the consequences of inaction 
may be devastating or when the costs of action are negligible.220 
The principle is now embodied in many multilateral environmental agreements, and 
provides the basis for a number domestic measures in both developed and 
developing countries, representing the major legal systems and regions of the 
world.221  The widespread adoption of the precautionary principle in international 
law reflects the appeal of caution as a prudent regulatory response to scientific 
uncertainty, and possibilities of serious health or environmental damage. 
While recognising that the complexity of many environmental and health threats 
may preclude clear science from emerging in time to take policy action, the 
precautionary principle advocates against deferring action in the face of potential 
consequences. However, the interpretation and application of the precautionary 
principle is disputed.222  
4.2 Precautionary principle in EU Law 
 
Within the EU legal order, the Single European Act implied the precautionary 
principle by requiring that harmonised standards take, as a matter of principle, a 
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‘high level of protection’.223 Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty (1993)224 made 
precaution an official guiding principle of EU environmental policy. This was 
subsequently reiterated in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997),225 and subsequently in 
Article 191(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union:  
 
Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection 
taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the 
Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles 
that preventive action should be taken…and that the polluter should pay.226  
 
Article 191(3) states further that ‘In preparing its policy on the environment, the 
Union shall take account of available scientific and technical data, environmental 
conditions in the various regions of the Union’. Despite this reference to the 
precautionary principle neither the Treaty nor early case law contained a definition 
of the precautionary principle.227 
In 2000, the European Commission issued a ’Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle’. 228 Central to the Commission’s Communication is the proposition that 
the precautionary principle is a risk management tool applied as part of a risk 
analysis framework.  The Communication broadened the scope of the precautionary 
principle to encompass human, animal, and plant health as well as environmental 
protection. It provided that the precautionary principle would be applied whenever 
decision makers identify ‘potentially negative effects resulting from a phenomenon, 
product or process’, and when ‘a scientific evaluation of the risk which because of 
insufficiency of the data, their inconclusive imprecise nature makes it impossible to 
determine with sufficient certainty the risk in question of the insufficiency of the 
data, their inconclusiveness or imprecise nature.’229  The Commission set out a 
                                                 
223 (1987) OJ L 169.  
224 Treaty on European Union [1992] OJ c191/1. 
225Article 174(2) of Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities [1997] OJ c340/1.  
226 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/133. 
227 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (International Economic Law Series, OUP, 
Oxford 2008), p. 410. 
228 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ (n 6) 
229 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ (n 6) p. 15. 
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structured approach to risk analysis that comprises three different stages of ‘risk 
assessment’, ‘risk management’, and ‘risk communication’.230  
 
 
However, the Commission acknowledged the danger that the precautionary 
principle could potentially be used to justify unwarranted restrictions on trade that 
could in certain ‘cases serve as a justification for disguised protectionism.’ 
Consequently, where action is deemed necessary, measures based on the 
precautionary principle should be proportional to the chosen level of protection, 
non-discriminatory in their application, and consistent with similar measures 
already taken based on an examination of the potential benefits and costs of action 
or inaction, and subject to review in the light of new scientific data.’231  
Latter in December 2000 the Nice Summit issued a Resolution on the precautionary 
principle which reaffirmed the ‘insufficiency’ of data while conducting risk 
assessment and the need for functional separation between risk assessors and risk 
management decision making. However it provided that risk assessment should be 
undertaken in ‘multi-disciplinary, independent and transparent manner that all 
views are heard’.232  Vogel observed that the precautionary principle explicitly 
acknowledges the inherently political nature of regulatory decision making by 
‘enabling policy makers to take into account a wide variety of non-scientific factors, 
including public opinion and social values.’ In effect, it reduces the scientific 
threshold for regulatory policy making.233     
Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the precautionary 
principle is recognised as an important basis for the adoption of a wide range of 
risk-adverse policies applicable in the EU, including the regulation of 
environmental protection, human health and safety, consumer protection, and 
                                                 
230 ‘Risk assessment’ is a technical process, and ‘risk management’ is a political decision. See 
European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ (n 6) p. 17.   
231European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’ (n 6), p10  
232 Council Resolution on the Precautionary Principle, Nice summit, 7-10 December 2000, p 9-10, 
11. 
233 David Vogel, ‘The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited’ (n 134 ) 556-7. See section 4.3 and 4.4 below 
for more on how public opinion helped shape EU law.  
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promotion of measures at the international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, such as restrictions on GM foods and seeds.234 
 
In relation to GMOs, the precautionary principle is incorporated into the Deliberate 
Release Directive. The preamble refers to the need for the precautionary principle 
to be taken into account in implementing the Directive. Moreover, the objective of 
the Directive is to protect human health and the environment when GMOs are 
deliberately released to the environment in accordance with the precautionary 
principle (Article1). Additionally, there is a ‘general obligation’, requiring all 
appropriate measures be taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the 
environment which might arise when GMOs are released (Article 4). 235  
Furthermore, Article 23 which allowed the EU national bans, can be understood as 
a precautionary feature of the Directive.  
 
  
In a speech on biotechnology and the EU, EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson defended the EU’s regulatory framework on the approval of GMOs as 
a regime that is open to new technologies, but one that requires all new products be 
thoroughly tested to the most rigorous scientific standards, with protection of public 
safety and health being paramount. Mandelson noted ‘so long as we apply the same 
rules and standards across the board the protectionist label doesn't stick.’236  
 
For some, in light of GMOs ‘profound technological changes that contribute to the 
appearance of new risks that may appear unmanageable‘, the precautionary 
principle in EU law offers reassurance for civil society that policy makers act 
responsibly (the precautionary principle may be applied to justify measures to 
prevent damage in some cases even though the casual link cannot be clearly 
                                                 
234 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 115/133, 
Articles 191(1) and 169. TFEU explicitly defined consumer policy and health protection as ‘rights’, 
and extended the precautionary principle to consumer protection.  
235  Deliberate Release Directive , Preamble: ‘in accordance with the precautionary principle’, 
Member States ‘ensure that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effect on human 
health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the 
market of GMOs.’; see section 2 above.  
236 He justified it because ‘[L]ike any new science, biotechnology carries risks and those risks must 
be properly assessed and managed’.  Speech by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson: 
‘Biotechnology and the EU’ (n 6 ). 
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established on the basis of available scientific evidence). 237  This creates an 
interesting problem of what is the threshold of scientific evidence to be considered 
safe by the EU. 
 
Both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the EU General Court 
have delivered rulings relevant to the application of the precautionary principle. It 
is not possible to provide a comprehensive analysis and judicial interpretation of 
the precautionary principle under EU law. However, some tenets will now be 
briefly reviewed.  
 
As a general definition the Court held that:238  
Where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to human 
health, protective measures may be taken without having to wait until 
the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent. 
 
The General Court in Pfizer reaffirmed to a large extent the principles stated by the 
Commission in its 2000’s Communication on the precautionary principle. Pfizer 
concerned a challenge related to the risk of transferring the resistance of antibiotics 
from animals to humans. The General Court rejected ‘hypothetical’ risk as a basis 
for regulation, and stated that the degree of risk cannot be set at ‘zero risk’.239 
Acceptance of the precautionary principle further acknowledged the fragility of 
scientific information as the sole provider of legitimacy for a decision.240  
The precautionary principle was also brought up in enforcement actions by the 
Commission against Member States. In the case of Commission v France, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union held that a correct application of the precautionary 
                                                 
237 Helen Trudeau and Celine Negre, ‘Precaution in the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and 
its Impact on the World Trading System’ in Marcus W. Gehring and Marie Clair Cordonier Segger 
(eds), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (Kluwer Law International, the Hague 2005), 
p. 628. 
238 Case C-236/01 Monsanto Agricoltura Italia [2003] ECR I-8105, 111 
239 Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] ECR II-3305, para.139. The court 
considered proportionality as ground for judicial review, as well as risk assessment and risk 
management. The court concluded that the principle of proportionality required the measures 
adopted by institutions not to exceed the limits of what necessary to obtain the legitimate objectives 
of the legislation in question. Where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, 
recourse must head to the least onerous, in addition, the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims perused.  
240 European courts placed strong emphasis on scientific evidence, see Maria Lee, EU Regulation of 
GMOs (n 8) p. 243. 
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principle presupposes identification of the potentially negative consequences for 
health of the proposed use of the substance at issue, and a comprehensive 
assessment of the risk to health based on the most reliable scientific data available 
and the most recent results of international research.241 Furthermore, where the 
likelihood of real harm to public health persists should the risk materialise, but it 
proves to be impossible to unequivocally determine the existence or extent of the 
alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness, or imprecision of the 
results in scientific studies, the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of 
restrictive measures, provided they are non-discriminatory and objective.242  
 
In the recent case of Gowan, the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed 
the decision in Commission v France. The Court ruled on the scope of the 
precautionary principle, the conditions triggering its invocation, and when it 
applies. The Court concluded that ‘some scientific uncertainty regarding the 
assessment’ allows application of the precautionary principle.243  
 
In the case of Austria v Commission the Court’s interpretation seems more 
restrictive. This case concerned an Austrian province’s ban on GMOs aimed 
atprotectecting the environment as well as organic farming interests under the 
Deliberate Release Directive (discussed above). The Commission disallowed the 
Austrian’s ban based on EFSA’s report which was dismissive of Austria’s scientific 
report. The General Court upheld the commission’s decision. On appeal the CJEU 
ruled that the General Court did not seem to have ‘erred in law by stating that 
EFSA’s findings concerning the absence of scientific evidence demonstrating the 
existence of a specific problem had been taken into consideration by the 
Commission’.244 
 
Biotech generated disagreements between the Commission and individual Member 
States over the application and scope of the precautionary principle, fuelling further 
                                                 
241 Case C-333/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 92. 
242 Ibid, para. 93. 
243 C-77/09 Gowan Comércio Internacional e Serviços Lda Ministero della Salute ECR 2010 I 
13533, paras. 75-78. 
244 Joint Cases C-349/05P and C-454/05/P Land Oberosterreich and Republic of Austria v 
Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-7441, 64. 
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the inconsistency of its application. This has created an interesting problem in 
identifying what counts as a sufficient proof of safety, and under what 
circumstances. 
 
4.3 Precaution in the EU and the US 
 
Risk regulation frequently requires regulators to act in the face of uncertainty 
regarding the nature and extent of the risks posed by new products and processes, 
raising the fundamental political question of how governments should regulate risk. 
Frequently, regulators take precautionary measures, regulating or even banning 
certain products or activities, including in the absence of complete information 
about the potential risks. For example, from the 1960s until the 1980s, the US 
developed an elaborate environmental regime with major statutes and regulations 
covering air and water pollution, chemical exposures, solid and hazardous waste 
management, the clean-up of abandoned toxic waste sites, and a number of other 
issues.245 
 
Vogel argued that the EU’s approach to risk regulation evolved quite differently 
than in the US. Whereas the US began with highly precautionary legislation in areas 
like the environment, consumer protection, and worker health and safety, only to 
adopt scientific risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis more recently, regulators 
in the EU arguably became more precautionary and more ‘risk-averse’ over time.246 
In effect, Vogel writes, US and EU risk regulation resemble ‘ships passing in the 
night,’ with the EU becoming more precautionary, and the US less precautionary 
                                                 
245 David Vogel, ‘Ships Passing in the Night: GMOs and the Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe 
and the United States’ (European University Institute Working Paper, No 2001/16). 
246 Between the 1960s and the 1990s, Vogel writes, ‘a number of US regulations were more stringent, 
innovating and comprehensive than those adopted by European countries and the EU.  However, 
since the mid 1980s, this pattern has changed.  Now in a number of significant areas of regulatory 
policy, EU regulations are more stringent, innovative, and comprehensive than those adopted by the 
US.  Prior to the mid 1980s, US policy-makers identified more products and processes as posing 
unacceptable risks to public health or the environment than did regulatory authorities in Europe.  
Now the latter regard a number of products and processes as posing unacceptable risks to consumers 
and the environment that US policy-makers do not.  Since the mid 1980s, the political influence of 
constituencies favouring more risk averse regulatory policies have strengthened in Europe while 
since the early 1990s it has declined in the US.  Likewise, since the mid 1980s regulatory politics 
and issues have become more politically salient in Europe, while since the early 1990s, they have 
declined in the US.’ See David Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United 
States’ (n 122) pp. 7-16  
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over time. A central cause of this increasingly precautionary approach has been the 
long series of European regulatory failures and crises over the past several decades, 
including most notably the BSE or “mad cow” crisis discussed above in section 2.4. 
As we shall see, these crises have weakened public trust in EU regulators and 
scientific risk assessments, while increasing support for highly precautionary 
regulations. Responding to this crisis, EU institutions adopted strict new regulations 
for GM foods and crops, elevating the ‘precautionary principle’ to the status of 
doctrine in EU regulation.247 
 
Other authors dispute Vogel’s ‘ships passing in the night’ description of American 
and European risk regulation, noting that the purported ‘flip-flop’ in US and EU 
approaches to risk regulation draws disproportionately from a few controversial 
issue areas, such as the use of growth hormones in beef cattle and the regulation of 
GMOs.  In a wide-ranging survey of US and European risk regulation, Wiener and 
Rogers 248  find a more complex set of outcomes in which the US is more 
precautionary in some areas (e.g. nuclear energy, particulate air pollution) while the 
EU demonstrates greater precaution in others (GMOs, hormone-treated beef).  They 
note that ‘[t]his broader analysis indicates that neither the US nor the EU is a more 
precautionary actor across the board, today or in the past. Relative precaution 
appears to depend more on the particular risk than on the country or the era.’249  
 
Europeans have been willing to accept the safety of traditional foods, such as raw 
milk, cheeses and cured meats, while challenging the adoption of new technologies 
for food production and preservation such as irradiation and genetic modification. 
                                                 
247 The literature on the precautionary principle in risk regulation has mushroomed in recent years. 
For a range of supportive and critical views, see e.g. Bodansky, Daniel (1991).  ‘Scientific 
Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle,’ (1991) 33 Environment, pp. 4-5, 43-44.; Cameron, 
and  Abouchar;  ‘The Precautionary Principle:  A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the 
Protection of the Global Environment’ (1991) 14 Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review pp. 1-27; European Commission (2000),  Commission Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle, (n 6) 1; Majone Giandomenico, ‘Foundations of Risk Regulation:  Science, Decision-
Making, Policy Learning and Institutional Reform’ in Giandomenico Majone, (ed), Risk Regulation 
in the European Union:  Between Enlargement and Internationalization (Florence:  European 
University Institute, 2003); and Jonathan B. Wiener, and Michael D. Rogers ‘Comparing Precaution 
in the United States and Europe’  (2002) 5(4) Journal of Risk Research, pp. 317-349. 
248 Jonathan B. Wiener, and Michael D. Rogers ‘Comparing Precaution in the United States and 
Europe’ 5(4) Journal of Risk Research, 317 pp. 317-349 
249 Ibid, pp. 317-349. 
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Americans, in contrast, have generally been sceptical of traditional European 
methods, while remaining more open to the use of new technologies in food 
production and preservation.250 On the international level, in some cases the US has 
explicitly endorsed the precautionary principle. It signed the 1985 Vienna 
Convention on Ozone Depleting Substances, which recognized the importance of 
taking precautionary measures to address the gangers of ozone depletion. The US 
also signed the 1992 Rio Declaration, which emerged from the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development. The Declaration is regarded as the most influential 
international statement of the precautionary principle. In addition, the US signed 
the CTIES, which endorses precautionary principle as regards ocean dumping of 
radio active waste.251  
 
As the widely divergent attitudes toward GMO food demonstrate, the American 
public generally sees promise in technological change while Europeans tend to be 
more sceptical. This translates into a tendency in Europe to favour a strong version 
of the ‘precautionary principle’.252 Accordingly, the US utilizes the precautionary 
principle as a ‘risk assessment’ tool. The precautionary principle can be invoked in 
the absence of scientific literature, or when sufficient scientific literature exists to 
establish a causal link of risk likelihood. 253  The EU, however, utilizes the 
precautionary principle as ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management tool. Therefore, 
the principle can be used to ensure precaution in light of non-scientific perceptions 
and concerns.254 In both the US and EU the use of precautionary principle revolves 
around scientific risk assessment, but in the EU the principle also mediates between 
scientific and lay perspectives on risk.255  
In sum, the precautionary principle has emerged as a critical component of the new 
European approach to risk regulation, as well as an important focus of disagreement 
                                                 
250  Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, ’Regulating Between National Fears and Global 
Disciplines: Agricultural Biotechnology in the EU’ (n 128) p. 13. 
251 Robert V. Percival, ‘The North American Symposium On The Judiciary And Environmental Law: 
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252  Daniel C. Esty, Strengthening the International Environmental Regime: A Transatlantic 
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The EU, the US, and the WTO (International Economic Law, OUP, 2003), p. 373. 
253 Grant E. Isaac and William A. Kerr, ‘A Harvest of Trouble’ (n 146) p. 1088. 
254 Grant E Isaac and William A Kerr, ‘A Harvest of Trouble’ (n 146) p. 1083. 
255 See Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law (n 48), p. 105. 
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between the US and Europe regards GMOs. Based on this comparison we can 
conclude that the EU seeks to widen the grounds upon which a country may exclude 
products that pose either unknown or unacceptable risks. Conversely, the US seeks 
to strengthen the role of risk assessment in order to limit the ability of its trading 
partners to seek regulations, and invokes international law as evidence of and 
support for its position.256 The next section analyses various factors explaining the 
extent of opposition to GMOs in the EU.  
 
4.4 Public acceptance of GMO: EU v US 
Concerns about food safety are not the only factors influencing European public 
opinion about GM crops and foods. Europeans also seem to have a deeper cultural 
connection to their food. Supermarkets have not entirely replaced the local, food 
producers such as local markets, bakers, and butchers. In contrast, most urban 
American consumers have little connection with the food production process, and 
most products are marketed and shipped nationwide, often with an emphasis on 
novelty, consistency and convenience.257 
 ‘Europeans and biotechnology’ is a series of Eurobarometer surveys, 258 which 
demonstrate that for the EU’s general public, GM foods are perceived above all as 
hardly useful, non-natural, and risky, accompanied with limited trust in the 
institutions and corporations concerned, from the fear of putting financial gain 
ahead of public welfare. A Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2002 indicated that 
54% of European consumers think GM foods are dangerous.259 The Eurobarometer 
2005 survey showed general opposition to agricultural biotechnologies, despite 
widespread support for medical and industrial biotechnologies. The majority of 
Europeans saw GM foods as not useful, as morally unacceptable, and as a risk for 
                                                 
256 This point will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
257 ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 
45 ) p.7. 
258 The ‘Europeans and biotechnology’ is a series of Eurobarometer surveys measuring the attitudes 
and perceptions of a representative sample of the adult population of each Member State. Previous 
surveys are not considered. They are: 1991 (Eurobarometer 35.1); 1993 (Eurobarometer 39.1); 1996 
(Eurobarometer 46.1); 1999 (Eurobarometer 52.1). 
259  Europeans and Biotechnology in 2002, Eurobarometer 58.0, 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_177_en.pdf accessed 13 march 2012. 
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society. A majority (58%) also believed that the development of GM foods should 
not be encouraged.260 
The latest Eurobarometer survey, conducted in 2010, maintained that Europeans 
generally do not see benefits of genetically modified food, regard it as probably 
being unsafe or even harmful, and are not in favour of developing genetically 
modified food. 261 When asked about attitudes towards genetically modified foods, 
a high proportion, 70%, agreed that GM food is fundamentally unnatural. Sixty one 
percent of Europeans agreed that GM food makes them feel uneasy. In addition, 61% 
of Europeans disagreed that the development of GM food should be encouraged, 
59% regarded GM food as unsafe for their health and that of their family, and 58% 
viewed GM food as unsafe for future generations.262 As regards attitudes towards 
those responsible for biotechnology, Europeans trusted and were most positive 
about medical professionals (81%). Views of university scientists (77%), consumer 
organisations (73%), and environmental groups who campaign about 
biotechnology products (66%) were also broadly positive.263 
 
The survey also showed that Europeans are divided in their optimism about 
biotechnology and genetic engineering as a science. A slim majority of 53% saw it 
as being a positive influence on their way of life over the next 20 years. The country 
results, however, highlight wide differences in opinion or knowledge about the 
subject between the Member States. The survey showed that Iceland has the highest 
proportion of respondents who see biotechnology and genetic engineering as 
positive (79%). At the other end of the scale, only 38% of respondents in Bulgaria 
see biotechnology and genetic engineering as positive, whereas 22% see the science 
as negative.264  
                                                 
260 However, it's not top of most people's environmental worries. Eurobarometer poll published in 
2005 indicated that ‘GMOs in farming’ came 11th on a list of 15 environmental concerns. Europeans 
and Biotechnology in 2005: Patterns and Trends, Eurobarometer 64.3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2006/pdf/pr1906_eb_64_3_final_report-may2006_en.pdf.  
261 TNS Opinion & Social, ‘Biotechnology’ Special Eurobarometer 341 /Wave 73.1, Report for the 
European Commission (October 2010), p.7. This Eurobarometer survey measures the overall 
attitudes and awareness of Europeans in the 27 EU Member States, the two candidate countries, and 
the EFTA countries towards biotechnology, including genetic engineering. 
262 Ibid, p.18-31. 
263 Ibid, p.153. 
264Ibidp.1-7. In addition, for some countries, there are many respondents who do not know. In Malta, 
46% of respondents are positive, but 43% do not know. Similarly, in Bulgaria, 38% of respondents 
are positive, and 36% do not know.  
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Looking at the overall control and influence of biotechnology, Europeans firmly 
believe that governments should take responsibility to ensure benefits for all, but 
they are not convinced that governments will act accordingly. The survey showed 
that three quarters of respondents (76%) are of the view that government should 
take responsibility to ensure that new technologies benefit everyone. Only 16% felt 
that it is up to people to seek out the benefits from new technologies themselves.265 
The European Commission found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, it 
defended its regulation as prioritising strict science-based health and safety 
testing. 266  On the other, it was responsible for fulfilling its WTO obligations, 
including compliance with the ruling in order to avoid trade sanctions. 267  The 
Commission was accused by some NGOs for taking a proactive position on GMOs, 
using its legal powers to end the six year long moratorium, and promoting GM 
foods despite massive objections from its citizens and a lack of sufficient support 
from EU Member States.268  
Vogel and others warned that a WTO ruling against the EU could increase this 
popular opposition, which was already strong.269 It is not surprising that over 740 
organizations with a combined membership of 60 million people have supported a 
campaign called Bite Back – Hands off our food! The campaign demands that the 
WTO does not force GM foods onto people against their wishes. It also asserts that 
the WTO is an illegitimate forum in which to deal with GMOs.270 
Moreover, the ‘GM-free’ regions movement is growing in the EU. More than 4,700 
elected local governments and 169 regions have declared themselves ‘GM free’.271 
                                                 
265 Ibid, p.182. 
266 Speech by EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson, ‘Biotechnology and the EU’ (n 6 ), noting 
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267 See the next section compliance with the Panel ruling.  
268 FoEE, ‘Trying to Force Feed the World: The Transatlantic Trade Dispute Over Genetically 
Modified Foods.’ (Briefing, FoEE, Brussels, Belgium), www.foeeurope.org. Accessed 7 July 2008. 
269 David Vogel and Olivier Cadot, ‘France, the United States, and the Biotechnology Dispute’ (n 
52); ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 
45 ) p.11; Robert L Paarlberg et al., ‘Regulation of GM Crops: Shaping an International Regime’ in 
Robert E. Evenson and Vittorio Santaniello (eds) The Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology 
(CABI Publishing 2004), p.7. 
270 FoEE, ‘Trying to Force Feed the World’ www.bite-back.org  (n 268). 
271 ‘List of GMO- Free Regions’, (September 2010) http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/gmo-free-
regions/list.html. Accessed January 2013. 
198 
 
An increasing number of EU Member States have made statements committing 
themselves to remaining ‘GM free’.272 
Most European supermarkets choose not to stock products containing GM products 
on the grounds that many clients would decide to shop elsewhere. 273  Food 
companies are also unlikely to start using GM ingredients in the face of consumer 
rejection of GM food. Even if such companies did use GM ingredients, EU labelling 
laws allow people to choose the non-GM option.274 
The desire of the Europeans to know what they are eating and their willingness to 
appropriately exercise their right to choose has also led, not only to the changes in 
the authorisation procedures relating GMOs based on the precautionary principle, 
but to the adoption of regulations imposing a mandatory system for the traceability 
and labelling of GMOs and GM products. 275  The EU’s policy and legislative 
provisions formally create spaces in which citizens can engage in and influence 
decision processes and outcomes. Public opinion is necessary, but should not be 
followed in all cases.276 The Commission acknowledged that public fears may be 
misplaced, but they cannot and should not be dismissed: ‘[w]e and by that I mean 
you the industry and we, public authorities and governments need to do a better job 
of setting out the issues.’277  
 
Opposition of the public supported the EUs authorization system, and in some EU 
Member States maintained the bans despite the recommendations of the Panel in 
                                                 
272 For example, Hungary, Luxemburg, Poland, and Romania impose either general bans or specific 
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Biotech, some argue that the Panel failed to account for the cultural significance of 
food, and therefore, the dispute did not end with the panels’ ruling.278  
 
In contrast to the EU, GMOs have entered the food and feed system in the US 
without widespread public concern or even noticeable public awareness.279 In the 
US, GMOs are largely treated in the same fashion as traditional food items. That is, 
food products produced with or containing GMOs are not required to carry any 
special labeling, making it impossible for consumers to express their preferences 
for or against GMOs through their purchasing power.280  
 
However, an increasing number of Americans are concerned with protecting the 
consumer’s right to information in order to facilitate making informed choices 
about what they eat. They have joined together in support of the FDA petition 
demanding the mandatory labelling of genetically engineered foods.281 The ‘Just 
label it’ campaign claims that 90% of Americans are in favour of and support 
mandatory labelling of GM food, citing political and independent surveys.282   
The recent judicial development in the US has demonstrated that the legal 
framework relating to the cultivation of GMOs has started to be influenced by 
concerns that are similar to those in the EU. Most notably by private persons’ 
challenge of APHIS decisions to grant non-regulated status to round up ready 
alfalfa crops.283 
 
In November 2011, the Center for Food Safety filed a ground breaking ‘legal 
petition’ with the US Food and Drug Administration demanding the agency require 
labelling for GMOs.  The ‘legal petition’ was prepared on behalf of the ‘Just label 
it’ campaign and a number of organizations representing the healthcare community, 
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282  Frequently Asked Questions, Just label it, available at http://justlabelit.org/faqs/ . Accessed 
January 2012. Currently, over 1 million people have joined the petition. See also Colin O’neil 
‘Consumers Call on FDA to Label Foods’ Genewatch, 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=393. 
Accessed 24 October 2012. 
283 See a comment Alberto Alemanno, ‘The First GMO Case in Front of the US Supreme court: To 
Lift or Not to Lift the Alfalfa Planting Ban’ (2010) 2(1) EJRR 152-153. 
200 
 
consumer advocates, farmers, concerned parents, environmentalists, food and 
farming organizations, businesses, the faith-based community, and more.284 The 
Center for Food Safety, maintains that twenty states have considered bills requiring 
labelling for or prohibiting GM foods over the past three years. In November 2012, 
California’s legislature turned down legislation on labelling. 
 
The Center for Food Safety issued an updated report on Monsanto’s unprecedented 
use of patents and restrictive licensing agreements to investigate and sue farmers 
for suspected seed saving.  Monsanto and its hired investigators continue to harass, 
intimidate and prosecute American farmers, primarily in cases involving alleged 
saving and replanting of the company’s Roundup Ready soybeans.285 As of 13 
January 2010, Monsanto had filed 136 lawsuits against farmers for alleged 
violations of its Technology Agreement and/or its patents on genetically engineered 
seeds. Monsanto has sued farmers and small farm businesses in at least 27 different 
states. These cases have involved 400 farmers and 53 small farm businesses. Sums 
awarded to Monsanto in 70 recorded judgments against farmers total 
$23,345,820.99.286 
 
The Center for Food Safety seeks to ‘halt the approval, commercialization or release 
of any new genetically engineered crops until they have been thoroughly tested and 
found safe for human health and the environment. CFS maintains that any foods 
that already contain genetically engineered ingredients must be clearly labelled. 
Additionally, Center for Food Safety advocates the containment and reduction of 
existing genetically engineered crops.’287 This effort does not go as far to demand 
full revision for authorisation. Rather it is mainly driven by consumers demanding 
labelling (right to know what they are eating), although it does not reflect the same 
                                                 
284  Center for Food Safety, ‘Groups File Legal Petition with FDA Demanding Labelling of 
Genetically Modified Foods’, Press Release, Washington DC (4 November 2011), 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/2011/10/04/groups-file-legal-petition-with-fda-demanding-
labeling-of-genetically-engineered-foods/. Accessed 30 September 2012 
285  Center for Food Safety, ‘Monsanto v US Farmers: 2010 Update’, 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Monsanto-v-US-Farmer-2010-
Update-v.-2.pdf. Accessed 30 September 2012 
286 Ibid.  
287  See Center for Food safety on ‘Genetically Engineered Crops’, 
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/campaign/genetically-engineered-food/crops/. Accessed 30 
September 2012.  
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hostile attitude of EU citizens. This trend may be linked to the few cases of food 
supply contamination with GM products or seeds.288   
 
Theoretically, according to Vogel, if in the near future there is an increase in public 
hostility in the US, combined with ‘internationalisation’ where industry and farmers 
adjusting to meet EU market demands, it may result in the ‘California effect’, a 
strengthening standards in the US.289 The phrase ‘California effect’ refers to the 
American state that has often been a frontrunner in raising regulatory standards in 
the United States. California, for instance, has had America’s strictest automotive 
pollution-control standards for more than three decades, making American mobile 
emissions standards steadily stronger. Car producers had strong incentive to 
produce vehicles that comply with California’s stricter standards so they could 
continue to market their cars in its large market.290  
 
A ‘California effect’ takes place when a country (or coalition of countries) exports 
it own more stringent standards to, or imposes them upon, one or more of its trading 
partners through the use of market access. For example, a country may ban or 
threaten to ban imports of products that do not conform to certain standards. If, in 
reaction, that country’s trading partners raise their regulatory standards in order to 
export their products a ‘California effect’ will have taken place.291 The ‘California 
effect’ holds not only for product standards, but also for production standards. It 
takes place when a country uses restrictions, or the threat of restrictions, on access 
to its markets to force trading partners to change their production standards despite 
the fact that such practices violates WTO rules.292   
 
                                                 
288 US authorities have few initiatives and proposals to reduce such future incidents. See section 3 
above. 
289 Vogel provides two mechanisms by which the standards of ‘greener’ countries can be ‘exported’ 
to other, less green ones: one has to do with the term market access, the other with international 
agreements. See David Vogel, ‘Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational Governance and 
Environmental Protection’, (1997) 4(4) Journal of European Public Policy, p. 561. 
290 Ibid, p. 561. The term ‘California effect’ is used as a synonym to ‘trading up’. See Thomas 
Bernauer, ‘Causes and Consequences of International Trade Conflict over Agricultural 
Biotechnology’ (2005) 7(1/2/3) Int J Biotechnology p.15. 
291 Sebastian Princen, EU Regulation and Transatlantic Trade (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 
pp.5-7. 
292 David Vogel, ‘Trading Up and Governing Across’ (n 289) p. 563. 
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Vogel admits that the ‘California effect’ has a limited impact. Its use has been 
limited to a small number of highly visible and largely symbolic products usually 
associated with natural resources.293 Factor in the wide ranging debate on the safety 
of GMOs as discussed in chapter 2 and the lack of international consensus on safety 
and trade in GMOs (as will be covered in Chapter 4), and we can rule out its 
influence for the time being. Arguably, the European measures led to a limited 
degree of strengthening in American and Canadian standards, although only in an 
indirect sense, and more so in the US than in Canada. Only US exporters have made 
efforts to accommodate changes in the EU’ regulations and consumer preferences. 
For example, soybean producers have restricted cultivation of GM soybean 
varieties not approved by the EU, and corn processors set up systems that keeps 
GM corn not approved in the EU out of the export production chain.294 
Without the consent of society at large, GM crops will fail in the market place. The 
actual future of GM crops is therefore likely to depend primarily on social, political, 
and legislative developments.295 
  
5 Post Panel’s Ruling  
The EU informed the DSB that it intended to comply with the recommendations of 
the rulings of the Panel, but needed a reasonable period of time to do so.296  Canada, 
Argentina, and the US have been meeting regularly with the EU to discuss biotech-
related issues since the adoption of the WTO panel report in 2006. This resulted in 
a partial settlement to the long-running dispute. Discussions with Canada and 
Argentina have been fruitful, resulting in settlement and providing annual bilateral 
dialogue aimed at exchange of information that contributes to avoiding unnecessary 
obstacles to trade. 297  
 
                                                 
293 Also, the WTO rules have played a role in discouraging rich countries from using production 
standards to restrict imports from less developed ones on environmental grounds. See David Vogel 
‘Trading Up and Governing Across’ (n 289) p. 564-5. 
294 Other voluntary action relate to halting commercialisation of GM wheat for fears of losing export 
markets. See Thomas Bernauer, ‘Conflict Over Agricultural Biotechnology’ (n 290). 
295 Jan-Peter Nap et al., ‘The Release of Genetically Modified Crops into the Environment, part I. 
Overview of Current Status and Regulation’ (2003) GM Special Issue 33 The plant Journal, p. 2, 8. 
296 Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, Biotech, WT/DS291/35 (26 June 2007). 
297 Dispute Summary, Biotech, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm. 
Accessed August 2012. 
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Canada and the EU established a bilateral dialogue on agricultural biotech market 
access issues of mutual interest.298  Meetings will be held bi-annually, generally in 
person, alternating between Brussels and Ottawa. Both sides will ensure the 
participation in the meetings of the competent services of their respective 
administrations depending on the specific subject matter discussed. The dialogue 
covers issues such as ‘GM product approvals’ in the territory of Canada and the EU, 
‘any biotech-related measures’ that may affect trade between Canada and the EU, 
including measures of EU Member States, and ‘any new legislation in the field of 
agriculture biotechnology’.299 
 
Argentina reached a similar settlement with the EU. This settlement also established 
annual bilateral dialogue on ‘issues related to the application of biotechnology to 
agriculture’. EU authorities meet with their Argentinean counterparts to discuss 
agricultural biotechnology and trade issues of mutual interest, such as the 
‘authorization processes of GM products’ of mutual interest, ‘measures related to 
biotechnology’ which may affect trade, ‘evaluating the economic and trade outlook 
of future GM product approvals’, and the ‘renewal of GM product authorizations.300 
 
The EU maintained that it was not expected to modify its current regulatory regime 
on biotech products, which was not subject to the Biotech dispute.301 The de facto 
moratorium, arguably, ceased to exist after the approval of several applications as 
described in section 2.3 above. Similarly, the matter of product specific measures 
was resolved either by undertaking and completing the approval procedure, or 
withdrawal by applicant.  By the end of 2012, the EU had approved only six GM 
products for the year, with an average processing time of 40 months. In addition, 
the EU has not approved for cultivation a single GM product of commercial 
significance to the United States in over 12 years.302 The US continues to stress its 
concerns regarding the EU’s regulatory framework. European delays in GM 
                                                 
298 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS292/40 (17 July 2009). 
299 Ibid.  
300 Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, WT/DS293/41 (23 March 2010). 
301 ‘EU and Canada settle WTO case on Genetically Modified Organisms’, press release IP/09/1142 
(Brussels, 15 Jul 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1142_en.htm. Accessed 2 March 
2010. 
302 72 GM product applications (for import, renewal, and cultivation) were pending approval in the 
EU system. See USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ (n 5) 
p42-43. 
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product approvals can block trade not only for the products subject to the delays, 
but also for approved varieties. Traceability and labelling pose another threat. 
Under the EU’s implementation of its biotechnology legislation, ‘the presence in 
US grain or oilseed shipments of trace amounts of GM crops that are legally grown 
in the United States, but not yet approved in the EU, can make US crops 
unmarketable in the EU’.303 In 2008, the US requested authorisation from the DSB 
to suspend concessions and other obligations with the EU.304 In July 2011, the EU 
implemented a ‘technical solution’ to address the presence of trace amounts of 
unapproved GM products in imported animal feed, but this did not satisfy the US 
as it excluded food for human consumption.305 The United States has maintained 
its suspended concessions. 
 
The Biotech dispute shares many similarities with the Hormones dispute because 
the latter not only focused on scientific and technical aspects of the hormone ban 
and its validity under terms of the SPS, but also because the disagreement on 
implementation was a long battle. The Hormones dispute was a prolonged battle 
between the EU and the US over the safety of the use of synthetic and natural 
growth promoting hormones in cattle. The EU banned the use of hormones, and 
banned the importation of all beef and beef products containing any of six banned 
hormones.306 
 
In Hormones, the Panels ruled against the EU, and the AB confirmed the ruling.307 
The European Commission, failed to supply the requisite scientific evidence to 
                                                 
303Since 2006, European rice importers and retailers have largely refused to purchase U.S. rice out 
of fear of the legal and commercial consequences should a detection of Liberty Link 601 (LL601) 
trait, which had to be withdrawn from the US market. This is an example of the effect of traceability 
and labelling.  See USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ (n 
5) p.44-45. 
304 At the time of writing this chapter, the suspension of concessions was still an open question. See 
Recourse to Article 22.2 of DSU by the United States, Biotech, WT/DS291/39 (21 March 2008).  
305 USTR, ‘2013 Report on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Barriers to Trade’ (March 2013) (n 5) 
p 44; and ‘EU, Argentina End Seven-Year WTO Biotech Row’, 10(5) Bridges Trade BioRes (19th 
March 2010)  http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/72588/, Accessed March 2011. 
306 Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘From the USA with Love’ (n 124) p. 305. 
307 The Appellate Body decision and the consequent countermeasures did not bring an end to the 
United States-Canada-EU hormone dispute. Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 
1998, modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699; 
and Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998. 
205 
 
establish danger within the set period of time. The EU also refused to bring its 
measure into compliance with the WTO ruling. As a consequence, the United States 
and Canada suspended concessions on EU items, including Roquefort cheese, foie 
gras, and Perrier water. In total, the compensation amounted to approximately US 
$117 million in concessions for the United States, and approximately US $8 million 
for Canada. 308  
 
On November 2004, the EU requested consultations with respect to the United 
States’ continued suspension of concessions and other obligations under the 
covered agreements in the Hormones dispute. The Appellate Body issued its 
Reports in October 2008.309 The AB was unable to complete the analysis as to 
whether Directive 2003/74/EC brought the EU into substantive compliance within 
the meaning of Article 22.8 of the DSU. Therefore, the AB found that the 
recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB in Hormones remain operative. 
 
Finally, on December 2008, the EU requested consultations with the US pursuant 
to Articles 4 and 21.5 of the DSU, regarding the EU’s implementation of the DSB’s 
recommendations and rulings in the Hormones dispute. Discussions between the 
EU and US resulted in the Conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding the importation of beef from animals not treated with certain growth-
promoting hormones. It also resulted in increased duties applied by the United 
States to certain products of the European Communities as agreed by the United 
States and the European Communities on 13 May 2009.310 
 
With regard to the Biotech dispute, the United States and European Commission 
renewed a consultative Task Force on Biotechnology Research. The Task Force on 
Biotechnology Research aims ‘to promote information exchange and coordination 
between biotechnology research programs funded by the European Commission 
and the United States government.’ The Task Force opens dialog between 
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American and European agencies that conduct biotechnology research. Its stated 
mission is ‘to anticipate the needs of tomorrow’s science, today’.311 However, it is 
unlikely that the dialog will lead to a settlement on the Biotech dispute because the 
Task Force does not include the agricultural applications of biotechnology/GMOs. 
Instead, it covers other applications of biotechnology and promotes research in the 
field of ‘neuroinformatics, nanobiotechnology, environmental biotechnology, 
application of biotechnology to fuels and other products and synthetic genomics’.312   
 
The Commission has indirectly favoured the cultivation of GM crops by fulfilling 
its task of enforcing EU legislation, it also bought successful enforcement actions 
before the CJEU against some EU Member States.  Despite the Commission’s 
commitment, compliance has proved to be complicated, and not fully resolved with 
all parties, in particular with regard to the recommendations on national safeguards 
measures.313  Biotech demonstrates that EU GMO policies are so important that the 
EU is willing to remain in contravention of full implementation of the ruling. The 
next section tackles recent revision of the EU regulatory framework and the 
improvement in its implementation, which may potentially widen the gap between 
the US and the EU.  
5.1 Beyond authorisation 
GMO regulatory framework reflects the complexity of decision making and the 
value basis of decision making in the EU.314 It is not only a ‘process of authorisation 
new technology’. It is also about what happens afterward as ‘rules on labelling, 
coexistence, liability and intellectual property rights are a crucial part of regulatory 
settlement of GMOs, influencing the relationship between the biotechnology 
industry and those it affects.’315 
                                                 
311 Agreement signed 8 June 2006 by John Marburger, Director of the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, and Janez Potocnik, Commissioner for Science and Research for 
the European Commission. For more information about the Task Force, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/biotechnology/ec-us/index_en.html; ‘United States, European 
Commission Renew Biotech Task Force’, USINFO, 12 June 2006 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english. See also http://usmission.gov. 
312 ‘United States, European Commission Renew Biotech Task Force’ USPOLICY, Embassy of the 
United States, Belgium 12 June 2006. 
313 See Sara Poli, ‘The EC’s Implementation of the WTO Ruling in the Biotech Dispute’ 32 E L Rev, 
p. 719. 
314 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) p. 243. 
315 For discussion regards labelling, coexistence, liability and intellectual property rights see Maria 
Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) Chapters 4 and 5. 
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In Biotech, violations found in connection with the approval process related to the 
procedural requirement not to cause ‘undue delay’. The Panel did not find other 
violations of the SPS Agreement in this context. In fact, the Panel specifically stated 
that it did not address the question of whether the EU product-by product ‘approval 
procedures’ were consistent with EU obligations under the WTO agreements.316 If 
the ‘approval procedure’ as such was to be challenged, it should be done by filing 
a new complaint. 
 
The EU and the US also disagree on how to regulate ‘around and after authorisation’ 
of GMOs.317 This section focuses on two urgent points that may lead to the next 
significant trans-Atlantic trade tension: the EU’s recent regulatory proposal, giving 
more flexibility for EU Member States to restrict the cultivation of GMOs; and 
traceability and labelling requirements, which is attracting increasing attention as 
possible restriction on international trade.    
5.1.1 Traceability and labelling 
 
Under the EU’s GM labelling regime, any GM product must, under defined 
conditions, carry a label. By contrast, the US finds no basis to treat GM food and 
feed any differently from food or feed produced through conventional breeding. It 
regards such labelling and segregation requirements as based on politics, not 
science. In the US, labels that identify foods as derived from biotechnology are 
likely to be seen by consumers as ‘warning labels’, which would be misleading and 
decrease the demand for these products. The US has only issued guidelines for the 
private sector on the use of voluntary claims for GM-free products.318  
 
While labelling requirements apply to food and feed that are intended to be 
marketed as non-GM in the EU, products derived from animals fed with GM feed, 
such as meat, milk and eggs, are not required to be labelled. As a result, some US 
exports, such as soy and corn gluten intended for feed uses, do not need to be 
                                                 
316 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 8.3. 
317 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) pp. 243-5. 
318 ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 
45 ) p.17. 
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segregated since there continues to be an active EU market for GM-labelled feed.319  
Broadly speaking, ‘[l]abelling GM food is both popular with consumers in both 
countries and an apparently reasonable way of allowing the market to decide on the 
premiums for desired attributes.’ However, labels are by no means a simple solution, 
and merely move the debate to discussing how to label and how to enforce labelling 
requirements.320 
 
The US commodity grain system routinely mixes GM varieties with conventional 
varieties of corn and soybeans. To avoid the EU threshold for labelling, US farmers, 
food manufacturers, and food and grain exporters must segregate GM crops and 
foods derived from such crops at every step of the production process, ‘a costly 
requirement’. Additionally, ‘[m]eeting the EU threshold of no more than 0.9 
percent GM content is also difficult to achieve and equally difficult to test with 
consistency, creating uncertainty about liability despite efforts to comply.’321 The 
US may argue that it is unnecessary and very costly to keep GMOs separate. It also 
considers labelling requirements or import bans unnecessary trade barriers.  
In line with this position, many agriculture and agri-business groups in the US have 
called their government to initiate another challenge of EU GMO legislation on 
traceability and labelling before the WTO. This additional threat of dispute 
resolution is aimed at preventing further disruption of transatlantic trade, and at 
ensuring other countries do not adopt similar legislation.322  
 
The EU regulatory system on authorisation, labelling and traceability are likely to 
raise further questions about compliance with WTO law. It is not clear which part 
of which WTO agreement is likely to apply to the EU legislation. Discussion of the 
                                                 
319 ‘US vs EU: An Examination of the Trade Issues’ Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology (n 
45 )  p.16 
320 Tim Josling, et al, Food Regulation and Trade (n 59) p. 164. Labelling implies some form of 
legal liability, and food sellers cannot ignore this liability. For more, see Philip Katz et al., ‘The 
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compliance of these legislation with the covered agreements goes beyond the scope 
of this thesis. There is, however, extensive academic literature on the topic.323 
5.1.2   Compliance with WTO law 
If the US or other WTO Member chooses to challenge current EU’s authorisation 
framework, Biotech ruling will be of key importance. In particular, it is worth 
recalling the Panel’s reasoning regards the applicable law which gave a broad 
reading to the definition of an SPS measure, it adopted an expansive understanding 
of the concept of an SPS measure, seeming to bring an unexpectedly wide range of 
EU’s legislation concerning authorisation procedure. (For full analysis see chapter 
1, section 3.2) Following the detailed analysis of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, 
the Panel held that many of the potential effects at which the EU measures were 
aimed fell within the scope of the SPS Agreement. The Panel held that Directives 
90/220 and 2001/18 as well as Regulation 258/97 were, for the most part, SPS 
measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade within the 
meaning of the SPS Agreement.324 Overall, the Panel’s interpretations of key terms 
of EU’s authorisation framework, and of the national bans, qualified as purposes 
covered by the SPS Agreement.    
 
The Panel somewhat restricted the ability of Members to impose SPS measures 
based on a perceived inadequacy of the scientific evidence available, thus limiting 
the precautionary principle to cases where the scientific evidence in a particular risk 
assessment is internally inconsistent, or where there is insufficient evidence to even 
conduct a risk assessment as defined in Annex A(4) (see chapter 1, sections 5.3-5).  
Panel’s reasoning implies a broad applicability to the scientific justification 
requirements of the SPS agreement. 325 (Chapter 4 covers the implications of 
expansion of the scope of the SPS Agreement) which is used to cover 
environmentally related measures rather than the TBT and/or the GATT agreements, 
                                                 
323 Mark Mansour and Sarah Key, ‘From Farm to Fork: The impact on Global Commerce of New 
European Union Biotechnology Regulatory Scheme’ (2004) 38 Int’l Law 55; and Joanne Scott, The 
WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 2007), 
pp. 230-241.  
324 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.432-7.437.  The panel noted that Regulation (No) 258/97 was 
not an SPS measure to the extent it applied  to ensure either that novel foods do not mislead the 
consumer or that they are not nutritionally disadvantageous.  
325 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech dispute and the Applicability of SPS Agreement’ 
(2007) 6(2) World Trade Review. 243. 
210 
 
unless the Panel or Appellate Body choose to overturn these holdings in the 
future.326 
 
another fundamental and contested question in relation to EU’s authorisation 
framework is whether GMOs are substantially different from non-GMOs and pose 
greater risks to human health and the environment.  A future dispute may also raise 
the issue of ‘like product’ by arguing that various features of EU regulations and 
policies violate the national-treatment obligation in the GATT (Article III:4) 
because they provide ‘less favourable treatment’ to imported GMO products than 
to domestic non- GMO products.327 For guidance on the issue we can turn to older 
disputes, such as EC-Asbestos328in which the AB provided guidance on assessing 
whether one product is ‘like’ another. The AB stressed, the determination of 
whether a measure violates Article III:4 entails a two-step test. The first step is to 
ascertain whether the imported products are ‘like’ the domestic products in relation 
to which the complainant is claiming that the imports are being treated less 
favourably. The second step, in turn, is to ascertain whether the measure in fact 
causes less favourable treatment of the ‘group’ of like imported products versus the 
group of domestic products.329 Four general criteria apply in analysing ‘likeness’: 
(i) the properties, nature and quality of the products; (ii) the end uses of the products; 
(iii) consumers’ tastes and habits in respect of the product; and (iv) the tariff 
classification of the products.330 
 
EC-Asbestos involved a challenge under the TBT Agreement and the GATT to a 
French ban on imports of asbestos fibres, and products containing them. The AB 
acknowledged the value of the traditional test, but noted that its general criteria are 
neither treaty mandated, nor composed of a closed list. Use of the criteria ‘does not 
                                                 
326 This also means that very few measures will fall under the TBT Agreement. See discussion in 
section 3.2 below. 
327 Biotech Panel’s ruling did not consider a breach under Article III:4 because it established a 
breach under the SPS Agreement, following the reasoning in Hormones. See chapter 1, section 5.2 
328 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
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329 EC- Asbestos, para. 100 
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GMOs (n 8) pp. 238-240. 
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dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all, of the pertinent evidence.’ 
The AB stated:   
 …the kind of evidence to be examined in assessing the 
“likeness” of products will, necessarily, depend upon 
particular products and the legal provision at issue. When all 
the relevant evidence has been examined, panels must 
determine whether that evidence, as a whole, indicates that the 
products in question are “like” in terms of the legal provision 
at issue.331  
The AB adopted the view that different production methods cannot render two 
otherwise identical products. Consequently, differential treatment of such like 
products based on their production methods was found to violate the GATT non-
discrimination obligation (Article III’s national treatment obligation). The French 
measure was found to be justified as a necessary measure for the protection of 
human life or health (Article XX(b)). 
In Biotech, the Panel did not follow this order, it started with assessing the ‘no less 
favourable treatment’ obligation contained in Article III:4, rather than on the ‘like 
product’ element. The Panel held that Argentina is not alleging that the treatment 
of products has differed depending on their origin. It held that in these 
circumstances: 332 
‘it is not self-evident that the alleged less favourable treatment of imported 
biotech is explained by the foreign origin of these products rather than, for 
instance, a perceived difference between biotech products and non-biotech 
products in terms of their safety, etc…’ 
 
The panel explained is that Argentina has not provided specific factual information 
about the treatment accorded by the EU to the non-GMOs which Argentina 
considers to be like the GMOs at issue.333 Therefore the Panel managed to avoid 
tackling the issue. 
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Similarly, in United States — Poultry (China), 334  the Panel supported a 
‘hypothetical’ ‘like product’ analysis where a difference in treatment between 
domestic and imported products is based exclusively on the products’ origin it also 
reaffirmed that ‘like product’ analysis must always be done on a case-by-case basis 
in determining ‘likeness’ of products:335 
 A different approach used by panels and the Appellate Body to determine 
the likeness of the products has been to assume — hypothetically — that two 
like products exist in the market place when one of two situations arises: first 
cases concerning origin-based discrimination, and second, cases where it was 
not possible to make the like product comparison because of — for example 
— a ban on imports. 
  
The Panel in In United States — Poultry (China) noted that the United States has 
argued that the differing safety levels of poultry from China vis-à-vis other WTO 
Members may have an impact on the like products analysis. However, the United 
States did not provide specific evidence relating to different safety levels between 
poultry products From China and other WTO Members. Therefore, it did not see 
no reason not to proceed with the ‘hypothetical’ like products analysis and base our 
determination on whether the products alleged to be ‘like’ are distinguished solely 
because of their origin. 336  Noting that the funding restriction in question was 
‘origin-based in respect of the products it affects’, that Panel followed a 
hypothetical like products analysis.337 
In the recent dispute United States- Cigarettes,338 the Appellate Body disagreed 
with the Panel that ‘like products’ in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement should be 
interpreted based on the regulatory purpose of the technical regulation at issue.  The 
Appellate Body considered that the determination of whether products are ‘like’ 
within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement is a determination about 
the competitive relationship between the products, based on an analysis of the 
                                                 
334 Panel Report, United States –Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China 
WT/DS392/R adopted 25 October 2010 [hereinafter United States-Poultry (China)] 
335 United States-Poultry (China), para. 7.424 
336 Panel Report, US Poultry (china) paras. 7.424–7.427, 7.429 
337 Panel Report, US Poultry (china) paras. 7.430–7.432 
338 Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of clove 
Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R adopted 13 August 2013 [hereinafter United States- Cigarettes] 
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traditional ‘likeness’ criteria, namely, physical characteristics, end-uses, consumer 
tastes and habits, and tariff classification.  The Appellate Body considered that the 
regulatory concerns underlying a measure, such as the health risks associated with 
a product, may be relevant to the determination of ‘likeness’ to the extent they have 
an impact on the competitive relationship between the products.  Based on this 
interpretation of the concept of ‘like products’, the Appellate Body agreed with the 
Panel that clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are ‘like products’ within the 
meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. 339 
Yet, a full analysis of ‘likeness’ under Article III:4 based on the approach used 
in EC-Asbestos, would seek to determine what a hypothetical ‘reasonable’ 
consumer would infer about the risks of the two types of products. It remains 
unclear whether the consumers make a sharp distinction between GMO products 
and non GMO products. (see section 4.4 above). Moreover, given the significance 
of physical characteristics in EC-Asbestos, including any differential health risks 
that might follow from different physical characteristics, the Panel would have had 
to consider the implications of the physical differences between GMO and non-
GMO products: conceptually, differences that flow from genetic dissimilarity are 
‘physical’. This also a contested mater (see chapter 2). 
 
If in a future dispute involving EU authorisation framework to be in violation of 
WTO, the EU can try to justify such breaches under Article XX similar to the earlier 
decisions of Shrimp/Turtle 340  and US-Shrimp 341  suggest that process-based 
measures may, under certain circumstances, be permissible under Article XX. In 
those cases, the United States’ measures effectively required exporting countries to 
use a production method involving ‘turtle excluder devices’ as a precondition to 
market entry for their shrimp products. The outcome of the Appellate Body decision 
in US-Shrimp was to permit the US to retain its process-based measure as long as 
it continued to satisfy the requirements set out by the Appellate Body, including the 
requirement to seek a negotiated solution. Reference to these cases does not provide 
                                                 
339 Appellate Body Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of clove 
Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R adopted 13 August 2013 [hereinafter United States- Cigarettes] 
340 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998. [hereinafter ‘US-Shrimp’]  
341 US-Shrimp. 
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a precise meaning of the notion ‘like products’ or the conditions of justification.342 
The ruling in Shrimp dispute can be applied to justify violations under GATT, but 
it does not apply to violations under the SPS agreement. In future disputes, the EU 
is likely to argue again that the existing evidence is not sufficient, inconclusive or 
uncertain when conducting risk assessment.343 
 
Following the Biotech dispute the Commission launched re-evaluation of its newly 
adopted authorisation framework which also took into consideration its compliance 
with WTO commitments. 
 
   
5.1.3 Re-evaluation of EU’s authorisation framework for GMOs 
In mid 2010, as part of continuous process of reviewing the existing legislation on 
GMOs and the improvement of its implementation between 2009 and early 2011,   
the European Commission proposed conferring on Member States the freedom to 
allow, restrict, or ban the cultivation of GMOs on part or all of their territory, while 
keeping the EU's science-based GM authorisation system unchanged. 344  The 
adopted ‘package on GMO cultivation’ consists of a Communication, a new 
Recommendation on co-existence of GM crops with conventional and/or organic 
crops,345 and a draft Regulation proposing a change to the GMO legislation.346 The 
new Recommendation on co-existence allows more flexibility to Member States, 
taking into account their local, regional, and national conditions when adopting co-
existence measures. The proposed Regulation amends Directive 2001/18/EC, 
allowing Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their 
territory. The Recommendation on co-existence took immediate effect.347 
                                                 
342 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech dispute and the Applicability of SPS Agreement’ 
(2007) 6(2) World Trade Review, p. 243. 
343 See chapter 4, section 3.1.3 and 4.3 covers application of Article 5.7 to justify a contested 
measure. 
344 European Commission ‘GMOs: Member States to be Given Full Responsibility on Cultivation 
in Their Territories’, (Press Release, IP/10/921, Brussels, 13 Jul 2010). 
345 Commission Recommendation on Guidelines for the Development of National Co-existence 
Measures to Avoid the Unintended Presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic Crops, 2010 
OJ (C 200) 1. 
346 Proposal for a Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the Possibility for the 
Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory, COM (2010) 375 
final (July 13, 2010). 
347 European Commission ‘GMOs: Member States to be Given Full Responsibility on Cultivation 
in Their Territories’, (n 344). 
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In addition, the Commission proposes to include Article 26b, which would be 
applicable to all GMOs authorized for cultivation in the EU, under either Directive 
2001/18/EC or under Regulation (EC) N°1829/2003. Member States will be able to 
exclude or prohibit GMO cultivation in part or all of their territory without recourse 
to the safeguard clause. Their decisions will not need to be authorized by the 
Commission, although Member States will have to inform other Member States and 
the Commission one month before the adoption of their measures. Member States 
will also have to respect the general principles of the Treaties and the Single Market, 
and their measures must be consistent with the international obligations of the 
EU.348 
EU countries will be able to restrict or ban GMO cultivation on their territory 
without making a judgment on the safety of authorised GMOs but on the basis of 
their local, regional and national conditions when preparing their relevant 
legislation. The EU risk assessment procedure remains unchanged. However, two 
limitations apply: the measures may not be based on human health or environmental 
reasons due to the presumption that the authorisation procedure and safeguard 
clause suffice. The measures must also comply with the EU Treaties.  This new 
approach can be considered an attempt to overcome some of the implementation 
problems arising from the Panel’s recommendation because it can be considered a 
risk management measure. This proposal presents other problems and 
inconsistencies with respect to application of several principles of EU law, but such 
discussion is beyond the scope of this study.349 
 
The Commission is aware of legal consequences and implications of proposed 
Article 26b of Directive 2001/18/EC. Reviewing the WTO compliance of trade 
restrictive measures under GATT agreement in cases such Shrimp/Turtle and 
Asbestos allow countries more autonomy in reaching decisions about acceptable 
types and levels of risk. The Commission considers that national measures 
                                                 
348 European Commission ‘GMOs: Member States to be given full responsibility on cultivation in 
their territories’, (n 344). Proposal for a Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as Regards the 
Possibility for the Member States to Restrict or Prohibit the Cultivation of GMOs in Their Territory 
(n 346). 
349 In particular, this may be inconsistent with free movement in the single market, such as Article 
34 and 36TFEU, and non-discrimination principle. 
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(restrictions) adopted by a Member State based on this provision as defensible 
within the WTO system by utilising Article III:4 and Article XX of the GATT. the 
rational is that Article 26b allows EU Member States to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of GMOs in all or parts of their territory on grounds other than health 
and environment considerations, which does not trigger the application of SPS 
Agreement 350    However, considering the impact of the Biotech dispute, the 
Commission’s approach to national measures may well alter depending on whether 
Article 26b and national measures are found to be in compliance with, or breach of, 
the WTO legal instruments. 
 
the Commission' services provided, inter alia, general considerations concerning 
the compatibility with WTO of possible national measures adopted by Member 
States on the basis of Article 26b of Directive 2001/18/EC 
 
In effect, the European Commission has made the post authorisation regime more 
flexible.351 This has been confirmed by two independent evaluation reports carried 
out by independent consultants on the European Commissions’ behalf. The first 
focused on the legislative framework in the area of GMO cultivation.352 The second 
evaluated the EU’s legislative framework in the field of GM food and feed.353 The 
evaluations assessed the effectiveness and efficiency of legislative process, and 
formulated options for the system’s improvement and adjustment. They were 
carried out as part of the continuing process of reviewing the existing legislation 
and improving its implementation.354 In the field of GMO cultivation, the report 
concluded that under the Deliberate Release Directive and the Novel Food 
                                                 
350 For an analysis of how the reform of the CMOs cultivation could be defended under the WTO 
provisions, see Commission Staff Working Paper n.9648/11, 5 May 2011. 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%209648%20
2011%20INIT accessed 12 April 2014. It also added that that the SPS Agreement is unlikely to be 
an issue. 
351 Commission Communication on the Freedom for Member States to Decide on the Cultivation of 
Genetically Modified Crops, COM (2010) 380 final (Jul. 13, 2010); and Recital 7 of the Commission 
Recommendation on Guidelines for the Development of National Co-existence Measures (n 345). 
352 Evaluation Of The EU Legislative Framework In The Field Of Cultivation Of GMOs Under 
Directive 2001/18/EC And Regulation (EC) NO 1829/2003, And The Placing On The Market Of 
GMOs As Or In Products Under Directive 2001/18/EC, Final Report, March 2011 EPEC.  
353 Evaluation of the EU legislative framework in the field of GM food and feed, Final Report, FCEC 
12 July 2010.   
354  Questions and answers on the evaluation of the European Union’s GMO legislation 
MEMO/11/742 Brussels, 28 October 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-
742_en.htm. Accessed 14 Oct 2012. 
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Regulation ‘the system is not working as envisaged and is not, in aggregate meeting 
its objective.’355  
The European Parliament supported the Commission’s initiative but introduced a 
number of changes to the proposal designed to detail grounds that could justify 
restrictions on the cultivation of GMOs and to better reflect the Member States’ 
concerns; for example  emphasis was placed on the need to evaluate the long term 
environmental effects of GMOs,  the precautionary principle, and the liability 
requirements in case unintended effects or damage that might occur due to the 
deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs.356  
The Council of the European Union held a public exchange of views on the draft 
Regulation amending Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for Member 
States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation, in all or part of their territory, of GMOs 
that have been authorised at EU level. The exchange of views confirmed the 
Member States' willingness to re-open discussions on this legislative proposal on 
the basis of the presidency compromise text. The Hellenic presidency aims to reach 
a political agreement and prepare the adoption of this important legislation by the 
end of 2014. 357 
EU Member States welcomed the proposal because it gives greater choice to 
farmers and consumers, including the presumably the choice to reject GMOs. The 
proposal also found approval from some commentators who criticised the 
Commission's previous narrow approach to coexistence as treating GMOs as a 
mainly economic issue since it underestimated the importance of public goods, such 
as sustainable development of rural areas and the environment.358 This goes along 
with the view that regulation of risks must reflect what is socially acceptable in term 
of risk and benefit trade-offs. These trade-offs must be effectively communicated 
                                                 
355 Ibid. 
356 See, European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2001/18/EC as 
regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in 
their territory COM(2010)03 7 5 - C7-0178/2010 - 2010/0208(COD),  5 July 2011. 
357 Council of the European Union, 3297th Council meeting on Environment,  Press Release 
7094/24, 3 March 2014, p.8 A first working party meet to examine the proposal on 13 March 2014 
358 Lee considered rules on coexistence as defined by the Commission as very burdensome for those 
who grow non-GM crops.  Maria Lee, ‘The Governance of Coexistence’ (n 8) p 199-205. See also 
Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs (n 8) pp. 118-126. 
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to the public since avoiding the risk altogether may increase exposure to other 
risks.359 
 
Critics of the EU argue against this proposal, accusing the EU regulatory process 
of being highly politicized and contentious, with both the public and non-
governmental organizations enjoying considerable access and influence.360  
 
American biotech corporations, GM farmers, and food industry, all of which make 
extensive use of GMOs, will find this proposal adds obstacles. It is an additional 
burden that may impact on trade in GMOs, and may lead food manufacturers to 
avoid the use of some plants despite any scientific evidence that they are harmful.  
 
 
6 Conclusion 
With regard to the regulation of GMOs, the US led the way with a permissive 
approach, assessing GM seeds and GM food products for release using essentially 
the same methods employed for conventional crops and foods. It also allows private 
markets for GM crops to operate without any new labelling or segregation 
restrictions. The EU initially took the same approach, but then quickly became more 
cautious as opposition grew among domestic consumers and environmental 
organizations in response to events such as the 1996 ‘mad cow disease’ crisis. Once 
the European media became sensitized to food safety issues, the GM crop 
revolution encountered strong social resistance.361 The regulatory systems in place 
in the EU and US are still responding to this new form of technology. This chapter 
reviewed the regulatory changes, and considered the relationship between these 
changes. 
The EU maintains that its current system for authorising GM products on a case-
by-case basis is designed to ensure they are safe for the environment, as well as 
human and animal health. The EU’s GMO regulation is based on the precautionary 
                                                 
359 Sweta Chakraborty, ‘The Role of Communication in Promoting a European Wide Approach to 
risk based Regulation (2012) 3(1) EJRR, 112  
360 David Vogel, ‘The New Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe’ (n 122) 
361 Robert L. Paarlberg, The Politics of Precaution: Genetically Modified Crops in Developing 
Countries (International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington D.C., U.S.A, 2006), pp. 3-8. 
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principle and on authorisation procedure, which follows an environmental and 
health risk assessment. Once a GM product is placed on the market, it must be 
labelled and traceable at all times. Under various authorities, a number of GM crops 
and foods derived from GM crops have been approved for food use and marketing 
in the EU. 
This chapter demonstrates that at the heart of the dispute lie fundamentally different 
regulatory approaches to the assessment and management of possible risks posed 
by the most controversial GMOs. The United States  has chosen to  bring the issue 
before the WTO, addressing it  only in terms  of  trade  agreements  based  on  
scientific  risk  analysis.   The European Union, however, sees the issue as one 
encompassing social and environmental concerns in addition to trade concerns.362  
 
The Ruling did not reverse European consumer distaste for GMOs, or its growing 
preference for organic products. Kerr explains that ‘food policy may not be 
established on purely rational basis’ he based his opinion on Adam Smith’s theory 
that laws concerning food may be compared to the laws concerning religion. 363 In 
line with public support, under the revised EU legislation, the authorisation process 
remains complicated, long, and slow, in particular those authorisations made under 
the Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation. Therefore, the 
Biotech ruling did not weaken the EU’s ability to use a precautionary approach in 
regulating to meet public health, safety and environmental objectives. However, it 
may influence some developing countries, in particular those that have not 
established regulatory regimes for GMO crops. Biotech will very likely be used as 
a guide by future WTO panels on food safety, public health and environmental 
health measures applied to international traded goods and services. 
The US and EU have not only adopted different approaches towards GM crops, but 
also have to sought to see their approaches reflected on the international level, 
which in turn seek to provide legitimacy for the increasing transfer of decisions on 
risk issues from national to international level. Since EU regulations continue to 
have an impact on the flow of genetically modified foods and crops from other 
                                                 
362 See Chapter1, sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  
363 William Kerr, ‘International Trade in Transgenic Food Products: A new Focus for Agricultural 
Trade Disputes’ (1999) 22(2) World Economy, 254. 
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countries, mainly the United States, they fall under the jurisdiction of the WTO. 
The next chapter will examine the main international instruments applying to the 
dispute, and highlight the interface and involvement of the EU and US at the 
international level, with a specific focus on the WTO Agreements and the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GMOs, THE WTO, AND NON-SCIENTIFIC FACTORS:  
MOVING TOWARDS COHERENCE 
 
 
 
If the WTO is to become a vehicle for global governance one thing has to be clear: 
this vehicle ought not to travel without a road map, and should be mindful of other 
traffic.1   
 
  
1 Introduction 
Biotech raises questions about the degree of risk judged to be acceptable to society, 
as well as about how to regulate specific products or processes in the face of 
continuing uncertainty about the risks they may pose to human health and the 
environment. The US argument focused on ‘risk assessment’ based on sound 
science in compliance with the WTO’s SPS agreements. On the other hand, the EU 
argued that it should be able to establish its own level of protection from the risks 
of GMOs. It maintained that its regulatory regime needed to be assessed in light of 
the precautionary principle, which has arguably gained the status of customary 
international law, as incorporated in WTO treaties, with additional reference to 
Cartagena Protocol commitments, which take a precautionary approach to 
regulating GMOs.2 The Panel in Biotech rejected the EUs defence, and applied the 
far reaching discipline of the SPS Agreement by providing very a broad 
                                                 
1 Footnote omitted, Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law 
Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003). 
2 The EU obligation under the Cartagena Protocol were incorporated into their regulatory framework 
by Council Regulation (EC) 1946/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms [2003] OJ L287/1. 
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interpretation of ‘SPS measure’.3 It also ruled against applying sources external to 
the WTO covered agreements.4  
 
This chapter argues that extending the scope of the SPS Agreement is problematic 
and will continue to place the onus on the EU to demonstrate that its regulatory 
framework pertaining to GM products is based on scientific risk assessments and 
not otherwise disguised restrictions on trade. In Scott’s words, the SPS Agreement 
‘is said to look to science based truth where there is only disagreement, uncertainty, 
and ignorance about potentially catastrophic risks.’ It does so because it operates in 
‘institutional framework which lacks epitomic and moral authority.’ In doing so it 
has been charged with ignoring the cultural dimension of risk and the democratic 
underpinning of regulation.5 
 
In addition, the chapter emphasizes the multi-level nature of the process, which 
involves overlapping and sometimes conflicting regulations promulgated at the EU 
and international levels. It argues that some of the Panel’s findings were unduly 
dismissive of relevant sources of international law outside the WTO framework by 
declining to consider their relevance in interpreting substantive provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, and failing to show an appropriate degree of deference towards 
EU’s regulatory autonomy.  
 
Many scholars fear that situations like this likely to lead to fragmentation in 
international law.6 They find it impossible to ascertain that one rule is more special 
than another. Consequently, potential conflicts between WTO law and national, 
                                                 
3 It found that having disposed the claims under SPS Agreement, it was not required to assess the 
complaints under the TBT Agreement or the GATT. 
4 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.3407-7.3430; for analysis of the panels application Article 
31(1)(c ) see Margaret A Young, ‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An 
Analysis of the Biotech Case’ (2007) 56(4) ICLQ 909. 
5 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary 
(OUP, Oxford, 2007) p. 3; Amicus brief Group of Academics,  Biotech, WT/DS/291,292, and 293 
(30 April 2004)also submitted that risk assessment of GMOs is characterised by low certainty and 
low consensus, pp. 5-6, 8; see section 4 below.    
6 Philip Katz and others, ‘The evolving GMO Food and Trade Policy Debate: Towards a Global 
Regulatory Regime?’ in Robert E. Evenson and Vittorio Santaniello (eds) The Regulation of 
Agricultural Biotechnology (CABI Publishing 2004) p. 33; Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’, ILC, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). 
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regional, and other international treaties persist. In line with this, the European 
Commission acknowledges that ‘trade disruptions could become more frequent and 
severe and affect more products and as more GMOs are more approved outside 
Europe.’7 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on important issues regarding the interpretation and 
application of the SPS Agreement in relation to regulatory measures aimed at 
GMOs, in particular the concept of measure and how to base risk assessment. It also 
raises questions over the relationship between WTO agreements and other rules and 
principles of international law related to human and environment protection. It aims 
to find interpretative approaches that can work not just for the US or EU, but rather 
ones that make GMOs beneficial on a global scale, in particular for developing 
countries.  
This chapter starts with assessment of the choice of applicable law by the Panel in 
Biotech. It then provides  an understanding  of  how the  dispute  should be viewed   
as  part  of  a  broader  debate. Finally, this chapter addresses the ability of the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body and applicable agreements to accommodate this 
broader debate. It concludes that future panels and appellate bodies will have 
judicial residual discretion in this area to clarify contested interpretations. Increased 
sensitivity of WTO law to environmental and non-scientific factors will allow it to 
show an appropriate degree of deference towards EU’s regulatory autonomy, to 
coexist with other international treaties. 
 
2 WTO jurisprudence 
The WTO is based on voluntary submission of a dispute by Members to the dispute 
settlement body. The submission initiates court-like proceedings, incorporating 
short timetables, a right of appeal, and strict implementation and enforcement 
procedures.8 If a WTO Member finds that another WTO Member’s trade measure 
                                                 
7 Questions and answers on the evaluation of the European Union’s GMO legislation MEMO/11/742 
Brussels, 28 October 2011. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-742_en.htm accessed 
14 Oct 2012. 
8 The WTO, by default became the frequent forum of choice for trade disputes with key health and 
environmental component. See, Frieder Roessler, ‘The Institutional Balance Between the Judicial 
and Political Organs of the WTO’ in Marco Bronckers & Rienhard Quick eds., New Direction in 
International Economic Law, Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson 324-45 (Kluwer International , 
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is inconsistent with the substantive obligations under a WTO agreement, it can 
submit it for review under the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM), in 
accordance with the rules laid down in Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).9  
 
WTO dispute settlement is intended to preserve the rights and obligations of 
Members under the covered agreements. This means that if a dispute is brought to 
the WTO, the Panel can only judge compliance with WTO Agreements.10 The DSM 
of the WTO does not have the authority to change the legislation of any Member, 
but the Member may be subject to trade sanctions if it does not bring its measures 
into conformity with its WTO obligations.11 The issue of applicable law is 
controversial. Scholars hold opposing views. Some affirm that rules of customary 
international law and international agreements which bind the disputing parties 
could be invoked in defence against WTO claims, and would be part of the 
applicable law before the WTO Panel.12 Others hold the views that WTO covered 
agreements are the only law applicable in WTO dispute resolution. Any other 
solution would go against the fact that the Panels are prohibited from reaching any 
conclusion that would constitute an amendment to the WTO, or would add to or 
diminish rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements.13 
Trade barriers arising out of environmental, human health, or public morals can be 
analysed under three different WTO Agreements: The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT),14 the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement),15 and the Agreement on technical 
                                                 
2000).  
9 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, 
WTO Agreement Annex 2, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 
(1994) [hereinafter DSU]. Article 23 of DSU states that ‘any WTO Member can initiate a case in 
the WTO if it considers that its market access rights have been violated’. 
10 Article 3(2) and 19(2) of the DSU; WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (Current 
issues in SPS Agreement Training Module) 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s1p1_e.htm accessed 3 April 
2012. 
11 See DSU Article 22. 
12 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 1) Chapter 8. 
13 Gabrielli Marceau’ ‘Conflict of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdiction: the relationship between the 
WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties’ (2001) 35(6) Journal of World Trade 1081.  
14 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (15 Apr 1994) 33 I.L.M 1125 [hereinafter GATT]. 
GATT 1994 incorporates GATT 1947, and GATT 1994 did not alter the articles in issue; when 
GATT is mentioned, it is thus done without specifying that it is GATT 1947 as incorporated into 
GATT 1994.   
15 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanity Measures, (15 April1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1125 [hereafter the ‘SPS Agreement’]. 
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Barriers to Trade (the TBT Agreement).16 It is important to stress that GATT applies 
to all measures affecting any product in international trade, including GMOs.17 
In Biotech, the US and the other Complainants argued that all of the challenged 
measures taken by the EU in administering its regulatory framework constituted 
non-tariff trade barriers, violating its obligations under the above WTO 
Agreements.18  
2.1 Choice of law 
In order to determine which of the WTO Agreements apply to particular trade-
related measures involving GMOs taken under national law, the analysis should 
start with the understanding of the policy objective behind the measure (i.e. what is 
the risk the measure is designed to protect against). Without knowing the nature of 
the risk in advance, or the kind of trade-related measure that chosen to regulate that 
risk, it is not possible to determine in advance which WTO Agreement will apply 
to trade-related measures taken under the Protocol.19  
On the question of what constitutes an SPS measure, the SPS Agreement's 
relationship with the GATT and with the TBT Agreement, and the central 
importance in the SPS Agreement of WTO Members' autonomy are key in setting 
their own levels of protection against risks as they consider appropriate.  Had the 
Panel rejected the applicability of the SPS agreement, it would have resorted to the 
claims under GATT and TBT Agreement, which are less intrusive from the EU 
perspective because they are broadly focused, and permit the adoption of non-
discriminatory, trade restrictive measures necessary to protect public moral, human 
animal, plant health, or relating to the conservation of natural resources. Some 
                                                 
16 See Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade, (15 April 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereafter the 
‘TBT Agreement’]. 
17 See also Matthew Stilwell and Jan Bohanes ‘Trade and environment’ in Patrick F. J. Macrory, 
and others, eds The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (Springer 
2005) 551. 
18 In addition to these agreements, WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (15 April 1994) LT/UR/A-
1A/2 art 2 may also be relevant to trade in agricultural products, including GMOs.  Also, WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights may also have a bearing on 
international trade in GMOs. The challenged measures in biotech do not raise issues under these 
agreements, will not be considered. 
19 Appendix. ‘The Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization in Ruth Mackenzie, et. al.  
‘An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, IUCN Environmental Policy and 
Law Paper no. 46 (2003) can be found at http://www.iucn.org last visited 11/07/07, p.231.  
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commentators have also highlighted that the SPS Agreement may become a 
significant constraint on a wide range of domestic environmental regulatory 
activity.20 Scott raised concerns over SPS ‘imperialism’ in which the SPS 
Agreement trumps otherwise applicable WTO law.21 She added that ‘the WTO 
opened itself to charges of epistemological imperialism, and positivistic simple 
mindedness’, and in doing so it has been charged with ignoring the cultural 
dimension of risk and the democratic underpinning of regulation.22 Therefore, 
claims under GATT and TBT would be less intrusive for the EU.  
 
There is some awareness within the WTO as to complexity and importance of 
GMOs. In preparations for the Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, several 
Members proposed the establishment of a WTO working group to examine GMOs 
and their relationship with the different WTO Agreements, and evaluate the need 
for further action. However, since then, the issue has not been discussed, and no 
such working group has been established.23 
 
In terms of what is relevant to the present thesis, the WTO has interfered with the 
ability of Members to enact trade measures affecting trade in GMOs, which are 
designed to protect human health and the environment, because these measures are 
most likely to be inconsistent with the substantive obligation under SPS, TBT and 
GATT Agreements. Trade measures may, however, be justified under the 
exceptions as will be discussed in the next section.24 
The following section does not provide a full detailed analysis of the application of 
the above agreements, rather it analyses the application of the different provisions 
relating the contested measures of Biotech dispute.  
                                                 
20 Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any Other Name’ …Might be an SPS Risk! : Implications of 
Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement’ (2007) 17 EJIL 
1009; Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ and the Applicability of SPS 
Agreement’ (2007) 6(2) World Trade Review. 
21 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) pp. 4-6. 
22 Ibid, p. 3. 
23 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 10). 
24 Article XX, GATT.  
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2.2 Relationship between the SPS and GATT/TBT 
 
GATT’s aimed to establish a free multilateral trading system and liberalise 
international trade through the removal of discrimination in international trade and 
a reduction in trade barriers.25 GATT adopted principles forbidding unfair trade 
practices, and set a code of conduct for the Members of particular relevance is the 
principle of ‘national treatment’, which stipulates Members must not discriminate 
between imported and domestically produced goods where they are ‘like 
products’.26  In principle, GATT applies to trade in goods, including GMOs and 
GM products, to the extent that it does not conflict with other WTO covered 
agreements, except where a more specialized WTO agreement applies. 
Biotech raised the issue of national treatment, which was an issue in connection 
with approval procedures of products. This issue was raised not only under article 
III:4 of the GATT Agreement but also under Annex C1(a) of the SPS Agreement, 
which prohibits Members from discriminating against imported products compared 
with like domestic products, by unduly delaying the procedures  of testing, and the 
approval  of GMOs.. 
Once a violation of one of the substantive obligations is found, a defending party 
may invoke one of the General Exceptions in Article XX to justify trade/import 
restrictions. Article XX can be invoked to protect public morals, human, animal, or 
plant life or health, and to conserve exhaustible natural resources (environment) 
listed in Article XX(b), (d), or (g), providing that they do not constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination resulting in a disguised restriction on international 
trade. 27 This Article can be invoked broadly to protect health or the environment, 
and applies to ordinary products and services. A country would have to show that 
it is necessary to violate the GATT to achieve the desired health or environmental 
                                                 
25 First concluded in 1948, forming an integral part of the Uruguay Round results as GATT 1994 It 
is composed of 37 articles and a number of explanatory understandings and agenda, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), Annex 1A: General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade’ 
1867 UNTS 190 (‘GATT 1994’ or ‘GATT’); draws freely from WTO Legal Texts. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
26 GATT, Art II and Art III.4. 
27 Patricia Birneie and others, International law and the environment (3rd ed OUP. Oxford, 2009), p. 
779. 
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protection.28 In US-Shrimp 21.5, American measures were found to be justified 
under Article XX(g), subject to certain requirements, including that the US continue 
to seek a negotiated solution to protect sea turtles.29 Accordingly, if the Panel in 
Biotech had applied Article III.4 of GATT, the EU would have had recourse to 
defence under Article XX to justify its measure. 
Following the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, GATT provisions were 
supplemented by detailed rules on particular kinds of non-tariff trade barriers under 
the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement30 to ‘further the objectives’ and to 
elaborate rules for the application of the GATT exceptions provided in Article 
XX.31 According to the general Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO, in the event of a conflict between the SPS or 
TBT Agreements and the GATT, the specific agreement prevails over GATT.32  
The TBT Agreement33 applies to all WTO Members adopting technical 
regulations, standards, ‘including packaging, labeling and marketing requirements, 
and conformity assessment procedures’ with the potential to impact trade.34 The 
TBT Agreement applies to both industrial and agricultural goods, except for those 
falling within the scope of the SPS Agreement.35  
Under the TBT Agreement, Members pledge that technical regulation will not be 
allowed to create an ‘unnecessary obstacle to international trade’.36 The level of 
                                                 
28 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 10). 
29 This dispute involved unsuccessful challenge to US measures to implement the decision in US-
Shrimp. The US measures were found to be justified under Article XX, subject to certain 
requirements, including that the US continue to seek negotiated solution to protect sea turtles. See 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998, DSR 1998. [hereinafter ‘US-Shrimp’].  
30 The Marrakech Agreement Establishing the WTO brought together a number of agreements 
negotiated in the Uruguay Round, as well as GATT, to form a body of WTO law covering many 
aspects of trade in goods and services. in light of concerns that its rules were not adequate to prevent 
the adoption of non-tariff trade barriers for the purpose of protecting human health, safety and the 
environment, but which in practice served to exclude or significantly disadvantage competing 
imported products. 
31 TBT Agreement, preamble, 2nd recital; SPS Agreement, preamble, 8th recital. 
32 On this topic see also Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(n 5) pp. 27-30. 
33 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 1868 UNTS 120 ([hereinafter ‘TBT Agreement’]. 
Draws freely from WTO Legal Texts, see http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm. 
See also Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27), pp. 756-763. 
34 TBT Agreement, Preamble and arts 2–8. See also, Appellate Body Report, European Communities 
– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 
5 April 2001, para. 66.   
35 See TBT Agreement, Article 1.3, 1.5. 
36 See TBT Agreement, Annex 1.2, including voluntary standards. 
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protection is up to the Member. A high level of protection can be chosen. 
Furthermore, the Member is free to accept or reject international standards, 
provided that this is ‘necessary’ to fulfil a ‘legitimate objective’.37 Therefore, if a 
Member chooses a strict level of environmental protection, it can employ stricter 
standards than international technical requirements.38 TBT provides grounds for 
state regulatory intervention. Where Members decide to adopt their own technical 
regulations, they must ensure that such standards treat imported products ‘no less 
favourable’ than domestic ‘like products’,39 and that they satisfy time and 
notification requirements directed to facilitating transparency and reducing delays 
in trade.40 
The GATT and TBT Agreement impose obligations that can apply to the same 
measure; complying with one does not preclude the application of the other. The 
SPS Agreement applies independently of any breach of GATT, although 
conformity with SPS Agreement implies conformity with GATT.41 For example, in 
Hormones, the Panels turned first to this agreement, making it clear that its 
application is not dependent upon there being any prior breach of GATT.42 
In the event that the SPS Agreement does not apply to GMO regulations, the TBT 
Agreement may still apply. The TBT Agreement allows governments to take 
measures if they have a legitimate objective, such as protecting health or the 
environment. Such measures should not be trade-restrictive more than what is 
deemed to be necessary,43 but where the SPS Agreement is deemed to be more 
specific in relation to the contested measure, it will apply to the exclusion of the 
TBT.44 This also means that even if no violation of the SPS Agreement is found, a 
measure cannot alternatively be considered under the TBT Agreement if it had been 
decided that it falls within the scope of the SPS Agreement.45 
                                                 
37 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2. 
38 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2. 
39 TBT Agreement Articles 2.4–2.5. Whether products are alike has not yet been considered under 
the TBT Agreement, but is much debated under the GATT. 
40 TBT Agreement art 2.1. 
41 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) p. 27-30. 
42 Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the 
United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998, para. 8.41-8.42. 
43 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 10).  
44 See SPS Agreement, Article 1.4; similarly, see TBT Agreement, Article 1.5 
45 See Panel Reports Biotech, para. 7.2527, Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the 
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The SPS Agreement is part of ‘an innovative system for managing trade’.  It is an 
‘evolving and novel regulatory mechanism that is dealing with contemporary trade 
issues of great complexity and political salience.’46 According to the Panel in 
Hormones, the SPS Agreement imposes specific obligations, different in nature to 
those under the GATT and its exceptions, to be met in order for a Member to enact 
or maintain specific types of measures, namely sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures.47 
The SPS Agreement is science-based and more restrictive of the two agreements. 
Therefore, the application of the SPS Agreement is often disputed.48 It covers 
‘necessary’ measures applied to protect against specific risks to humans, animals, 
and plants from certain hazards associated with the movement of plants, animals 
and food-stuffs, beverages, and feed-stuffs in international trade.49 According to the 
Preamble, it is conceived as an elaboration of GATT’s exception under Article 
XX(b).50   
The SPS Agreement is science-based, and applies to ‘all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures taken by Members which may, directly or indirectly, affect international 
trade.’51 The measures must be no more trade restrictive than required to achieve 
an appropriate level of protection. They are to be applied only to the extent 
‘necessary for the protection of human and animal health’, and must be 
scientifically justifiable in the sense that they must be ‘based on scientific principles 
and … not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.’52 In particular, they 
must be ‘based on’ a scientific risk assessment.53  However, if ‘relevant scientific 
evidence’ is insufficient, then provisional SPS measures may be based on ‘available 
pertinent information’ while the Member seeks more information to allow a full 
                                                 
environment (n 27) pp. 778-783. 
46 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5). 
47 Panel Reports, Hormones, (n 41) para. 839.  
48 Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by Any Other Name’ (n 20) p. 1009; and Patricia Birneie et al, 
International law and the environment (n 27), p. 779. 
49 The SPS Agreement. Draws freely from WTO Legal Texts, see 
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legale.htm. 
50 SPS Agreement, Recital 8; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (International 
Economic Law Series, OUP, Oxford 2008), p. 399. 
51 SPS Agreement, Article 1.1. 
52 SPS Agreement Article 2.2. The SPS Agreement is an expansion of subsection (b) of GATT 
Article XX. Article 2 repeats the language in GATT Article XX(b)  
53 SPS Agreement Article 5.1. 
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risk assessment and reviews the measure ‘within a reasonable period of time’. 54 In 
addition to being scientifically justified, that the measure must not be ‘arbitrary or 
unjustifiably discriminate between [m]embers’ and must not be a ‘disguised 
restriction on international trade’.55  
Furthermore, SPS measures must not require different levels of protection in 
situations of comparable risk,56 and must not ‘be more trade restrictive than required 
to achieve the appropriate level of SPS protection’ chosen by the Member.57 SPS 
measures must also satisfy publication and notification requirements to ensure 
transparency. 58  In addition, related approval procedures must comply with timeline 
requirements. 59 
The following section examines the Biotech finding on the applicable law. It does 
not dispute the applicability of SPS Agreement; rather it criticises the 
interpretations of key terms by the Panel, and assesses the consequences of 
broadening the scope of the SPS Agreement. 
 
2.3 The concept of an SPS measure 
Article 1.1 of SPS Agreement applies to all SPS measures that may, directly or 
indirectly, affect international trade. Defining SPS measures is the starting point. In 
Biotech, the Panel adopted an expansive understanding of the concept of ‘SPS 
measure’ available under Annex A(1).60 The Panel considered that Article 31(1) 
allowed for the use of rules of international law that were not binding on the parties, 
regarding them as informative where those rules provided evidence of the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ of the treaty terms.61 The Panel considered this would not ‘mandate’ a 
consideration of relevant rules of international law, but only ‘shed light on the 
meaning and scope of treaty term to be interpreted.’ The Panel did not require the 
consent of the WTO membership or non-WTO Members for use of non-WTO 
                                                 
54 SPS Agreement Article 5.7. 
55 SPS Agreement Article 2.3. Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement repeats the requirements of the 
exceptions under Article XX. 
56 SPS Agreement, Article 5.5. 
57 SPS Agreement, Article 5.6. 
58 SPS Agreement, Article 7 and Annex B. 
59 SPS Agreement, Article 8 and Annex C. 
60 SPS Agreement, Annex A(1) defines the harm to which an SPS measure is to be addressed. See 
also Chapter 1, Section 3.2.  
61 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.92. 
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sources in interpreting the terms of SPS Agreement.62 The Panel left itself free to 
consider international rules ‘if it deems such rules to be informative’.63 The Panel 
did not find it ‘necessary or appropriate’ to rely on CBD or the Cartagena Protocol 
in interpreting the SPS agreement.64 The Panel referred to US-Shrimp, in which the 
AB’s use of relevant rules of international law were not binding on all parties.65 
Similarly, the Panel in Biotech looked both to dictionary definitions and the other 
textual sources in clarifying the scope of the concepts deployed.66 For example, the 
Panel’s analysis of the phrase ‘animal or plant life or health’ in the SPS Agreement 
was meant to be comprehensive in coverage. Therefore it found that risks to animal 
and plant life or health encompassed concerns relating to the effects of GMO crops 
on micro-flora and micro fauna, such as soil organisms, as well as non-target 
organisms such as insects affected by the cultivation of an insecticide producing 
GMO crops. Similarly, it held that the phrase ‘risks arising from’ was ‘broad and 
unqualiﬁed’,  allowing its application to both actual and  potential  risks, as well as 
those risks ‘that arise  indirectly  or  in the longer term  from pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms’. 67 
Such reference allowed the Panel to ‘stretch the terms’, and repeated recourse to 
the concept of ‘rational relationship’ enabled it to justify inclusion of effects which 
are only indirectly attributable to the GM product subject to the restriction.68 In 
Biotech, the Panel did not reflect the considerable differences between EU 
regulations and SPS measures in previous cases, in particular with respect to the 
nature of the risks addressed with the challenged measures. These findings 
suggested that the SPS Agreement is not conﬁned simply to risk situations for which 
there are ‘direct and immediate’ links between a product and potential harms to 
human, animal or plant life or health associated with pests and diseases.  In, 
comparison, Conrad makes reference to previous cases like Australia- Salmon, 
                                                 
62 Margaret A Young, ‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law’ (n 4) pp. 918-925. 
63 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.93. 
64 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.94. Materials that did assist the Panel in interpreting certain terms 
of Annex A of the SPS Agreement were Codex, FAO, IPPC Secretariat, WHO, OIE, the CBD 
Secretariat and UNEP. 
65 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.95.  
66 Panel Reports, Biotech, for example paras. 7.222, 7.241. 7.253, 7.269, 7.272, 7.279, and 7.300; 
See also Chapter 1 section 3.2. 
67 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.219. 
68 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ (n 20) p. 237.     
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Japan Apples, and Japan-Agricultural Products in which the SPS Agreement 
applicability was not questioned because of the direct link between well-known 
risks and the well-defined values or objects.69  
The Panel’s assessment of objectives pursued by EU legislation, especially on the 
protection of the ‘environment’ and ‘diversity’, was also based on limited textual 
approach, ignoring international agreements and documents which the EU has 
ratified, such as CBD and Cartagena Protocol.70 Conrad notes that such use would 
have been important as a tool to interpret WTO Members’ national law in light of 
its international commitments. This would have allowed for more comprehensive 
interpretation and better understanding of the EU Measures, which is crucial to 
determining whether measures fall under the SPS Agreement. 71 Next, the Biotech 
Panel examined the types of risks covered by EU legislation. According to the 
Panel, they pursued a wide range of environmental and health objectives falling 
within the scope of SPS Agreement. The Panel found that EU approval procedures, 
relating to environmental release of GMOs, under Directive 90/200 and the 
Deliberate Release Directive fell within the scope of SPS Agreement.72 It found that 
substantial parts of the Novel Food Regulation fell within the definition of SPS 
measure. Only the labelling requirement was deemed to fall outside the scope of 
the SPS Agreement because it prevents consumers being misled, or protects them 
from nutritional disadvantage.73 Although the Panel did not rule on the safety of 
GMOs, or their likeness to non-GMOs,74 its interpretation of SPS Agreement will 
be of primary relevance.  
 
Scott notes that the Panel's expansive interpretation of the concept of an SPS 
measure is likely to be ‘of the utmost significance’ in the future, involving ‘SPS 
‘imperialism’ of a kind which is by no means neutral from the point of view of 
                                                 
69 Ibid, p 245. 
70 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.247, and 7.372; Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech 
Dispute’ (n 20) p. 243. 
71 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ (n 20) p. 243. 
72 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.212-395. 
73 The only risk was found to be potentially outside the SPS Agreement was one referenced by the 
Novel Food Regulation directing the labelling to prevent consumers being misled. See, Panel 
Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.415-6, and 8.3. 
74 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 8.3 
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regulating Member States.75 It would bring a wider range of measures within the 
scope of SPS Agreement beyond food safety and quarantine risks to wide range of 
environmental and biodiversity related risks.76 Further, based on the relevant 
negotiating history of the SPS Agreement, Peel explains that the SPS Agreement is 
fairly narrow in scope for it does not specifically address GMOs; hence the 
inclusion of stringent science-based requirement for SPS measures. She expressed 
concerns that ‘its requirement could be brought to bear on broadly framed 
environmental regulations with adverse trade impacts might seem far-fetched, even 
a little surreal.’77  
 
The Panel’s reasoning in Biotech will have implications for other areas of domestic 
environmental regulation.78 This could expose a broader array of national 
‘environmental measures’ and ‘consumer protection’ to the science-based 
discipline of the SPS Agreement.79 This wide reach has the potential to cover not 
only adoption of precautionary and harm prevention approaches in regulations 
targeting GMOs, but also a wide array of environmental regulations in many 
countries, as well as biodiversity or chemical pollution risks that could affect 
international trade, directly or indirectly.80 
 
The Panel’s determination that the SPS Agreement applies to measures regulating 
GMOs remains questionable as it allows for the possibility of situation in which a 
measure pursuing a different objective is in breach of the SPS Agreement, yet 
consistent with TBT or GATT. Such measures are of great interest to third parties 
to the Biotech dispute and will require attention and clarification by future panels.81  
                                                 
75 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) p. 17. 
76 See Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ (n 20) p. 239.        
77 SPS Agreement traditional subject matter, arguably, are concerns that are more applicable to 
quarantine and food safety measures, which generally used to impose restrictions or other 
requirements on imported agricultural products, rather than environmental regulation. See 
Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any Other Name’ (n 20) pp.1016-1018.     
78 Expansive interpretation of the concept of an SPS measure will also have implications on 
international environmental agreements that overlap with trade regimes. See section 3 below. 
79 Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any Other Name’ (n 20) p. 1025. 
80 This also will affect environmental regulatory choices of the US, such as those covered in chapter 
3 section 4.3; see Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any Other Name’(n 20) p. 1027. 
81 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ (n 20) p. 246-7; Joseph McMahon, ‘The 
EC Biotech Decision: Another Missed Opportunity’ in Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, the 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: Comparative approaches (OUP, 2010), p. 341; and 
Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) p. 19. 
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Overall, the Panel relied heavily on a range of international sources and dictionary 
definitions in its interpretation of the terms and definitions in the SPS Agreement, 
disregarding both extensive scientific evidence assembled in the case. Its 
unconstraint selection of sources can easily lead to ‘decontextualised and arbitrary 
reasoning’.82 Conrad argued that in order to promote respect for and confidence in 
the WTO, ‘the adjudicatory bodies need to make sure that their decisions are based 
on solid legal grounds…future panels should consider supplementing a thorough 
interpretation of crucial terms with more comprehensive legal analysis without 
refraining from normative and foresighted consideration.’83  
 
   
3 SPS and other international law   
Issues of protection of human health, the environment, and trade in GMOs cut 
across a number of WTO agreements, as well as those between the WTO and other 
international agreements and processes administered by other institutions.84 In 
Biotech, the parties utilized the available international law in ways which supported 
their causes and opinions. The US focused on the SPS Agreement, while the EU 
argued that the precautionary principle, the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and, the Cartagena Protocol should be used by the Panel as interpretive tools 
according to customary norms of treaty interpretation.85  
Some scholars view this as an attack on environmental regulation. Issac and Kerr   
write86 ‘while the EU is the explicit target, an implicit target is the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety’. Steve Suppan, senior policy analyst at IATP, said: ‘…the 
                                                 
82 Maria Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision Making for a New Technology 
(Biotechnology Regulation Series, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), p. 23. 
83 Christiane R Conrad, ‘PPMs, the EC Biotech Dispute’ (n 20) pp. 246-7. 
84 ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS Agreement) would 
normally not be invoked in a conflict regarding market access for GMOs, but it might be invoked in 
a dispute on intellectual property protection related to GMOs. ‘The Agreement on Agriculture’ 
applies to trade in agricultural products (non-discrimination and non-trade concerns), including 
genetically modified ones, Uruguay Round Agreement, Agreement on Agriculture.  
85 The EU also included reference to treaties and soft law instruments that formed the legal 
framework of international health and safety protection, such as Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
OECD, and FAO. The relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol will be considered in detail in 
the next sections. See sections 3.1.1, and 3.1.2. 
86 Isaac E Grant and William A Kerr, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms at the World Trade 
Organisation: A Harvest of Trouble’ (2003) 37(6) Journal of World Trade 1083.  
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panel legal reasoning really undercuts the Biosafety Protocol’, adding that ‘many 
countries who are signatories to the Protocol, particularly poor countries, have not 
set up their regulatory framework for genetically engineered crops. This ruling is a 
warning to Protocol Members that if they regulate biotech products according to 
their Protocol commitments, a Protocol based defence of those regulations cannot 
prevail at the WTO if the plaintiffs are not Protocol Members.’87 Therefore, the 
Biotech ruling might be used by the US in negotiating a trade agreement to deter 
developing countries from ‘emulating’ EU’s regulations.88  
Both parties seek to reflect their regulatory views in active in international treaty 
negotiation. The Cartagena Protocol is clear example, the US had indeed argued 
that there was no need for a protocol, further asserting that an international one size 
fits all regime could not be crafted to effectively address environment-specific 
issues without unduly restricting trade.89 The EU negotiators felt deep satisfaction, 
considering that they had contributed substantially to the result and that the EU’s 
negotiation strategy had been successful.90 
 
Some commentators argue that the expansion in the scope of the SPS Agreement 
encourages international disagreements, and facilitates fragmentation of trade and 
environmental regimes.91 This section examines the impact extending the scope of 
the SPS Agreement will have on the broader international relationships between 
trade and other areas of international law, with a focus on the SPS Agreement and 
Cartagena Protocol. First, it provides detailed account of the treaty interpretation 
tools. International instruments regulating different aspects of GMOs are then 
considered and employed to inform key the complex regulatory problems arising 
from interdependence created through international trade, ‘risk assessment’, 
‘scientific uncertainty’, and ‘precaution’.  
                                                 
87 ‘WTO Biotech Ruling Threatens Precautionary Approach’, IATP, September 29, 2006, 
http://www.iatp.org/documents/wto-biotech-ruling-threatens-precautionary-approach 
88 Thomas Bernauer, ‘Causes and Consequences of International Trade Conflict Over Agricultural 
Biotechnology’ (2005) 7(1/2/3) Int J Biotechnology 24. 
89 Cathleen A. Enright, ‘United States’ in Christoph Bail, et al, (eds) The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development? (Earthscan 
Publications 2002), p. 98. 
90 Christoph Bail et al., ‘European Union’ in Christoph Bail, et al (eds), The Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development? (Earthscan 
Publications 2002), p. 185. 
91 Jacqueline Peel, ‘A GMO by any Other Name’ (n 20) p. 1028. 
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3.1 Relationship between WTO and other international law 
The relationship between trade and other areas of international law is highly 
contested.92 Some advocate that treaty interpretation plays a ‘strong role in 
providing a “bridge” between potentially competing norms.’93 Article 3(2) of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding expressly provides that the existing 
provisions of the ‘covered agreements’ are to be clarified ‘in accordance with 
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.’  
The Panel in Biotech considered Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (VCLT),94 particularly Article 31(3)(c) under which 
interpretation should take into account ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.’95 It also noted that the reference to 
rules of international law should be understood expansively not only to include 
treaty and rules of customary international law, but also general principles of law 
as included Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice (ICJ).96 
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute is generally accepted statement of the sources of 
international law. It enumerates the sources of international law, providing that 
international law has its basis in international custom, international conventions or 
treaties, and general principles of law. A rule must derive from one of these three 
sources in order to be considered international law.97 
 Article 38(1)(a) refers to ‘international conventions’, which includes conventions, 
treaties, pacts, protocols or covenants, and international agreements that establish 
                                                 
92 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 1); Margaret A Young, ‘The 
WTO use of relevant rules of international law’ (n 4) p 907; Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 6). 
93 Duncan French, ‘The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms and International Law’ in 
Luc Bodiguel and Michael Cardwell, the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms: 
Comparative approaches (OUP, 2010), p. 361. Pauwelyn also examined treaty interpretation as a 
conflict-avoidance tool, among others. It is not always the most effective one. See Joost Pauwelyn, 
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 1) p. 250. 
94 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) 1155 UNTS 331. [hereinafter ‘VCLT’] 
95 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 6) p. 
88. 
96 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.67. 
97 Statute of International Court of Justice, Article 38(1). See also Patricia Birneie et al, International 
law and the environment (n 27), p. 15. 
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rules expressly recognized by consenting states.98 Only states that are parties to a 
treaty are bound by it. However, a very large number of states voluntarily adhere to 
treaties and accept their provisions as law without becoming parties to them.99 The 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is important as it codifies rules 
applicable to written treaties concluded after its entry to force in 1980.100  
Customary international law is defined as a general ‘practice of law’ under Article 
38(1)(b) of the ICJ. States follow a practice out of a sense of legal obligation. Rules 
or principles must be accepted by the states as legally binding in order to be 
considered a rule of customary international law. Thus, the mere fact that a custom 
is widely followed does not make it a rule of international law. States also must 
view the practice as obligatory, and they must not believe that they are free to depart 
from it whenever they choose, or to observe it only as a matter of courtesy or moral 
responsibility. This latter requirement is referred to as opinio juris.101 
General principles of law refer to ‘elements of the domestic legal order of 
“civilized” states’. General principles include the principle of estoppel, neutrality 
of decision-makers, methodologies of legal interpretation, and equity. Sustainable 
development and precaution have attracted discussion as to whether they constitute 
general principles of law.102     
Treaties, custom, and general principles of law as identified in Article 38(1) of the 
ICJ Statute are made with the consent of states, and become binding upon them.103 
Therefore, WTO law and international environmental law are both sub-systems of 
public international law. It is important to note that both are part of international 
law as whole, not separate, self-contained disciplines.104 Consequently, the legal 
                                                 
98 Article 38(a)(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. See,  Mark A Drumbl, ‘Actors 
and law making in international environmental law’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice,  David M. Ong, Panos 
Merkouris (eds) Research Handbook on International Environmental Law ( Research Handbooks 
in International Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010), p. 14.    
99 Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27).    
100 Ibid, p. 16. 
101 Ibid, pp. 22-25. 
102 Mark A Drumbl, ‘Actors and law making in international environmental law’ (n 98). 
103 Ibid p. 14. 
104 Birnie makes clear that ‘the resolution of international environmental problems, however 
categorized, entails the application of international law as a whole, in an integrated manner.’ See 
Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) pp. 3-4. 
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analyses of both sub-systems are not detached from the system it belongs to.105 A 
study by the International Law Commission argued that treaty interpretation rules 
provide a ‘professional toolbox’ for managing global legal fragmentation by 
requiring decision-makers considering claims under one treaty regime to situate 
those claims in the wider ‘normative environment’ of international law.106 Since 
WTO law cannot claim primacy over other international or national law, we should 
regard them as complementary, and recognize that they stand in a non-hierarchical 
relationship.107 In Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body recognised that 
GATT is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law. The 
famous AB report in Shrimp/Turtle applied the same reasoning.  
US-Shrimp/Turtle (1998) involved a successful GATT challenge to American 
measures banning the import of shrimp caught with fishing methods that threatened 
endangered species of sea turtles. Latter in 2001, the AB revoked it and found the 
US measures to be justified under Article XX(g), subject to certain requirements, 
including that the US continue to seek a negotiated solution to protect sea turtles.108 
In this case, the AB applied international treaties such as the Convention on 
Biodiversity, which brought external environmental values into trading system. The 
AB commented: 109 
The preamble of the WTO Agreement – which informs not only the GATT 
1994, but also the other covered agreements – explicitly acknowledges ‘the 
objective of sustainable development’ … From the perspective embodied in 
the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term ‘natural 
resources’ in Article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but is 
rather ‘by deﬁnition,   evolutionary’ 
The next section provides an explanation of instruments referred to by the EU, 
namely CBD, the Cartagena Protocol, and the precautionary principle. It also 
considers in detail the relationship between international agreements, specifically 
                                                 
105 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (n 1) pp. 38-45.  
106 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 6) 
p. 47. 
107 Ibid, p. 116. 
108  US- Shrimp (n 29 ). 
109. US- Shrimp (n 29 ), 129-130.  
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between the SPS Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol.  
 
3.1.1 The Convention on Biological Diversity 
The UN Convention on Biological Diversity110 is one of the most widely ratified 
environmental conventions.111 The Convention’s objective is to conserve biological 
diversity, while ensuring the sustainable use of its components, the fair and 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources, and 
access to technology, including biotechnology.112 The CBD recognises that 
biological diversity is more than plants, animals, microorganisms, and their 
ecosystems. It broadens the term to include issues such as the need for food security, 
medicines, fresh air and water, and healthy environment.113   
Article 8(g) of the CBD requires parties to establish and maintain means to regulate 
risks arising from biotechnology associated with use and release of living modified 
organisms (LMOs) which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that 
could affect conservation and sustainable use of biotechnology, taking into account 
also the risks to human health.114 Article 19(3) requires parties to consider the need 
for a protocol setting out procedures on safe transfer, handling, and use of LMOs 
that may have adverse effect on conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, 
including, in particular, provision for advanced informed agreement.115  
 
The convention seeks to extend a greater and more equitable share of the fruit of 
commercial genetic research and development to the developing countries from 
which the original genetic resources so often originate.116 The Convention has 
resulted in national biodiversity strategies and action plans in over 100 countries, 
                                                 
110 The text of the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity may be found at 
http://www.biodiv.org.  
111 The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1760 UNTS 79. 31 ILM (1992) 818; B&B Docs, 390. 
Adopted on June 1992 at Rio de Janero Earth Summit, entered into force 29 December 1993. 
[hereinafter ‘CBD’] 
112 CBD, Article 1; See also UNEP, ‘About the CBD’, UNEP at 
http://biodiv.org/convention/default.shtml  (accessed  23 June 2007) ; Patricia Birneie et al, 
International law and the environment (n 27), pp. 612-639. 
113 UNEP, ‘About the CBD’ (n 112). 
114 Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) p. 628. 
115 Ibid, p. 629. 
116 Biodiversity Convention, Article 15(7). 
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and has produced the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which is discussed below. 
It also plays a major role in highlighting the importance of biodiversity issues 
globally through research and public education.117 
In interpreting the WTO agreements the AB, in previous disputes, followed the 
general rule codified in Article 31(3) of the VCLT. Accordingly, account may be 
taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.’118 In the Shrimp-Turtle, the AB referred, inter alia, to the 1992 Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development and the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity. Instead of interpreting the GATT exceptions under Article 
XX(g) in accordance with whatever might have been the intention of the drafters in 
1947, the AB took account of these much latter and directly relevant agreements. 
 
3.1.2 Cartagena protocol  
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (2000)  is an international agreement which aims to ensure the safe 
handling, transport, and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern 
biotechnology that may have adverse effects on biological diversity, taking also 
into account risks to human health.119 The Protocol can be seen primarily as an 
‘environmental instrument’ concerned with the conservation and sustainable use of 
‘biological diversity’.120 
 
The SPS Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol clearly overlap. Both contain rules 
that govern the international trade in LMOs, but the relationship between them 
                                                 
117 UNEP, ‘About the CBD’ (n 112). The success of the CBD and the Cartagena Protocol relies on 
individual countries, peer pressure from other countries, and public opinion. To facilitate 
communication and implementation of the CBD, governments, non-governmental organisations, 
academics, members of the private sector, and other interested groups or individuals congregate in 
meetings fashioned as global forum to share ideas and strategies for applying the CBD.  
118 Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) p. 764. 
119 The Cartagena Protocol entered into force on 11 September 2003. The Protocol was signed by 
103 countries and as of 4 January 2012, 166 countries including the EU have ratified the protocol; 
Cartagena Protocol Available: http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/default.aspx.  Accessed 04 Jan 
2007.  
120 Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) pp. 612-620, 640-648. See 
also UNEP, ‘Trade-related Measures and Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ UNEP 2007 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/areas/pdf/MEA%20Papers/TradeRelated_MeasuresPaper.pdf accessed 11 
March 2013 
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remains murky.121 The WTO’s essential purpose is to liberalize markets by 
removing unnecessary, discriminatory, and protectionist barriers to trade, while the 
Cartagena Protocol contains trade related provisions which affect international 
trade in LMOs. It is important to note that during the negotiations of the Cartagena 
Protocol, developing countries pushed for trade related measures to be included, 
viewing them as the ‘teeth’ that would guarantee a strong instrument to meet their 
needs and concerns.122 During the negotiation, the EU and many third world 
countries also insisted on positions that have constantly been rejected within the 
WTO context, such as those based on the ‘precautionary principle’.123  
The flexibility of the rules under the Protocol has led to suggestions that it 
‘represents a form of “treaty-based environmental unilateralism” and that it is a 
“prototype of minimal harmonisation legislation”. It establishes principles and 
procedures to guide national decision-making based on risk assessment and risk 
management without mandating particular outcome.’124 Yet, the Cartagena 
Protocol goes well beyond the minimalist position that the US, Canada, and 
Argentina, as GM exporting countries, would have preferred. 125   
The Protocol promotes biosafety by establishing rules and procedures for the safe 
transfer, handling, and use of GMOs, with a specific focus on regulating movements 
of these organisms across borders. 126 Parties may restrict the import of some LMOs 
as part of a carefully specified risk management procedure. Therefore, procedures 
are designed to ensure that recipient counties are provided with the information they 
need to make informed decisions about whether to accept LMO imports.127 The 
Protocol applies to the transboundary movement, transit, handling, and use of all 
living modified organisms. The protocol provides two main sets of procedures 
covering LMOs intended for release into the environment (e.g. seeds for 
cultivation), and those intended for use in food or feed, or for processing (e.g. soy, 
                                                 
121 For analysis see section 3.2 below. 
122 UNEP, ‘Trade-Related Measures and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (n 120). 
123 Cartagena Protocol, Article 1; see Cathleen A. Enright ‘United States’ (n 89) pp. 96-98; and 
Simonetta  Zarrilli , International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral 
Legal Frameworks, (Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities Study Series No.29, 
UNCTD, UN – New York and Geneva, 2005) pp. 24-25. 
124Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) p. 641, footnotes omitted.    
125 Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products (n 123) p. 30.  
126 See Cartagena Protocol, Articles 1 and 4. 
127 Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Cartagena Protocol  
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corn, and cotton).  
An Advanced Informed Agreement procedure (AIA)128 applies to GMOs that are 
to be intentionally released to the environment (e.g. seeds for cultivation) from the 
importing country before the first shipment takes place. These include seeds for 
planting and other organisms that are destined to grow, and that have the potential 
to pass their modified genes on to succeeding generations. The AIA procedure not 
only reconfirms the rights of signatory countries to set their own domestic 
regulation, but also ensures that recipient countries have the opportunity to assess 
any risks that may be associated with a GMO before agreeing to its import. 
Therefore, the recipient country must be notified. The notification must include a 
detailed description of the LMO, including reference to existing risk assessment 
reports. Only upon consent of the recipient country may the export take place.129 
The AIA procedure applies only to the first international transboundary movement 
of any particular GMO intended for introduction to the environment. It does not 
apply to pharmaceuticals,130 GMOs in transit through a country,131 GMOs destined 
for contained use,132 or GMOs to be directly used as food or animal feed or for 
processing.133  
  
Second, a simplified procedure exists for GMOs that are to be used directly as food 
or feed, or for processing, such as GM maize and soybean. Parties to the Protocol 
who approve these commodities for domestic use have to communicate this 
decision to the world community via the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH).134 In 
addition, parties may decide on whether to import these commodities on the basis 
                                                 
128 The AIA procedure set forth in Article 7 of the Cartagena Protocol  
129 Cartagena Protocol Articles 7-10. 
130 The Protocol does not cover products derived from GMOs, such as cooking oils from GM corn 
or pharmaceuticals for humans addressed by other international agreements. (Articles 4-5 of the 
Cartagena Protocol); Biosafety and the environment, an introduction to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, (CBD, UNEP, June 2003) p.6   http://www.biodiv.org/doc/press/presskits/bs/cpbs-unep-
cbd-en.pdf accessed 11 March 2013 
131 Cartagena Protocol, Article 6. 
132 Cartagena Protocol, Article 3(b). 
133 Cartagena Protocol, Article 7(1)- 7(2). 
134 Cartagena Protocol, Article 20. Parties to the Protocol exchange information through a ‘Biosafety 
Clearing-House’ which contains information on national laws, regulations, and guidelines for 
implementing the Protocol. 
244 
 
of their domestic law, and must then declare these decisions through the BCH.135 
The protocol does not cover consumer products derived from GMOs, such as 
cornflakes, tomato paste, and cooking oils from GM corn.136 Thus it is narrower in 
scope than the SPS Agreement, which applies to all GM products.  
The protocol provides for decisions to be based on risk assessment. Parties to the 
protocol decide whether or not to accept LMOs primarily on the basis of scientific 
risk assessment procedures.137 However, lack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient scientific evidence can be resolved in banning importation following 
the precautionary principle provisions introduced in the Protocol.138 In addition, 
import decisions can be revisited should new scientific information on adverse 
effects come to light.139 Under certain circumstances, importers can ask the exporter 
to carry out the risk assessment. 
Parties may also take into account socio-economic implications likely to result from 
the import of LMOs, especially in relation to the ‘value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities’.140 A party must adopt measures for managing 
any risks identified by risk assessment. It can also require the exporter to carry out 
a risk assessment, and charge the exporting country the full cost of regulatory 
approval.141   
Governments must adopt measures for managing any risk identified by risk 
assessment. Additionally, they must continue to monitor and control any future 
risks that may emerge affecting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in 
the receiving environment. This applies to traded as well as domestically produced 
GMOs. Based on Article 27, Members concluded the Protocol on Liability and 
Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety142 which aims to contribute to the 
                                                 
135 Cartagena Protocol, Article 11. 
136 Cartagena Protocol, Article 4. 
137 Cartagena Protocol, Article 15. 
138 Cartagena Protocol, Article 10.6. 
139 Cartagena Protocol, Article 12. 
140 Cartagena Protocol, Article 26. 
141 Cartagena Protocol, Article 15.  Biosafety and the environment, an introduction to the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, (n 130) p. 8. 
142 The new treaty opened for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 7 
March 2011 to 6 March 2012 and will enter into force 90 days after being ratified by at least 40 
Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. See Protocol on Liability and Redress to the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol) Nagoya, 
16.10.2010.  http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/supplementary/ accessed 10 Nov 2012 
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conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account 
risks to human health, by providing international rules and procedures in the field 
of liability and redress relating to living modified organisms.143 In light of the 
arguments made in this thesis , managing risks of GMOs will benefit from 
recognition that it is intimately linked to some of the key principle of ‘polluter pays’ 
since the new Protocol provides international rules and procedure on liability and 
redress for damage to biodiversity resulting from living modified organisms 
(LMO).144  
Furthermore, the Protocol contains provisions related to identification of LMOs in 
international trade.145 When a party decides to allow the import of a GMO, the 
exporter must ensure that all shipments are accompanied by appropriate 
documentation. The Protocol requires that GMOs intended for international 
introduction into the environment, or for contained use, must be clearly identified 
as ‘living modified organisms’, but modified organisms intended for direct use as 
food or feed, or for further processing, just require a label stating that product ‘may 
contain’ such organisms. No labelling requirements for processed foods, such as 
cooking oil, were established.146     
To ensure its own long term effectiveness, the Protocol contains a number of 
‘enabling’ provisions relating to capacity-building, public awareness and 
participation, and financial mechanism.147    
3.1.3 The precautionary Principle  
While the precautionary principle appears to be a well-accepted tool in the field of 
environmental law,148 its application to issues relating to food safety has proven 
                                                 
143 Article 27 of the Cartagena Protocol provides elaboration of rules and procedures on liability 
and redress; Article 34 the conclusion of a compliance mechanism. 
144 Press release, ‘The Nagoya – Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’ (Nagoya, 16 October 2010).  
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/NKL_pressrelease.shtml accessed 10 Nov 2012 
145 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 10). 
146 Cartagena Protocol, Article 18. 
147 Cartagena Protocol, Articles 22-23. 
148 See discussion in chapter 3, section 4; see also David Freestone and Ellen Hey, ‘Origins and 
Development of the Precautionary Principle’ in David Freestone and Ellen Hey, eds, ‘The 
Precautionary Principle and International Law (Kluwer Law International 1996).   
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more controversial due, generally, to its potential implications for trade in 
GMOs.149  
Previously, in Hormones the EU argued that the precautionary principle has fully 
crystallised as a principle of customary international law, and therefore constitutes 
a relevant ‘rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
that must be used to interpret WTO agreements.150 The US and Canada rejected this 
argument, contending that precautionary approach could be characterized, at most, 
as an emerging principle that may in the future crystallise into one of the ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’.  The AB ruled: 
   The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to 
be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators 
and judges. The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having 
crystallised into general principle of customary international 
environmental law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as 
principle of general or customary international law appears less than 
clear. We consider...that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the 
Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important but 
abstract question. We note that the panel itself did not make any definitive 
finding with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in 
international law and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the 
field of international environmental law, still awaits  authoritative 
formulation.151  
In other words, the AB declined to take a position on the EU’s claim for customary 
status for the precautionary principle. The Appellate Body noted in EC-Hormones 
that ‘the precautionary principle has been incorporated in, inter alia, Article 5.7 of 
the SPS Agreement’, which addresses the right to take a provisional measure where 
relevant scientific information is insufficient, and ‘in the sixth paragraph of the 
preamble and in Article 3.3’. At the same time the Appellate Body noted that the 
                                                 
149 See also Matthew Stilwell and Jan Bohanes ‘Trade and environment’ (n 17 ) p. 544. 
150 See Chapter 3 section 4. 
151  Footnotes omitted, emphasis in original, see Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning 
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, 
DSR 1998, para. 123, and, Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.87.  
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principle ‘does not, by itself, and without a clear textual directive to that effect, 
relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. customary international 
law) principles of treaty interpretation’ in reading the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement.152 The AB held that the precautionary principle, as reflected in Article 
5.7, could not override the explicit requirements of Articles 5.1 and 5.2, which 
require measures under the SPS Agreement be based on evidence from a risk 
assessment.153 The EU ban on beef hormones was successfully challenged by the 
United Stated and Canada under the terms of Sanitary and PhytoSanitary 
Agreement. 
 
In Biotech, the precautionary principle was raised again by the EU, which 
maintained that it had become a ‘fully fledged and general principle of international 
law’.  The EU argued that references to precaution in the Protocol should contribute 
consolidation of the status and relevance of the precautionary principle in both 
international and national law.154 Others also argue that the fact that the Protocol 
reflects the need for precautionary measures provides an additional support for 
precaution as a principle of international law. It is also clear that the insertion of 
precaution contributes to the reinforcement of the principle’s status, and helps to 
clarify its meaning and the way it should come into operation.155 
The Cartagena Protocol gives importers unchallengeable rights to ban imports of 
living products which are genetically modified, for example grains, seeds, fruit, and 
vegetables. Importers are entitled to justify such bans by invoking the version of 
the Precautionary Principle laid down in the Cartagena Protocol.156 The Protocol 
contains four references to precaution, ranging from two references to Principle 15 
of the Rio Convention in the preamble and in Article 1, which develop its own 
interpretation of the precautionary approach,157 to more precise and operational 
                                                 
152 Hormones, para. 124. 
153 Hormones, paras. 124-5. 
154  Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.77-7.78 See Chapter 1, section 5.1.5. 
155 Laurence Graffe, ‘The Precautionary Princeple’ in, Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & Helen 
Margot, eds, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with 
Environment & Development? (Earthscan Publications, 2002), p. 419. 
156 Annex III states: ‘Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be 
interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk’. 
157  Article 1 of the Cartagena Protocol states that the objective of the Protocol ‘is to contribute to 
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provisions in the decision-making provisions under Articles 10.6 and 11.8 when 
facing scientific uncertainty.158 A technical Annex relating to risk assessment also 
contains a contrary interpretation of lack of scientific knowledge or scientific 
consensus, which has implications for the precautionary principle and the ways it 
might be applied.159 In other words, importing countries can ban imports because 
of ‘lack of scientific certainty’. A trade restrictive measure may be in force without 
time limits since the importing country is not obliged to seek information necessary 
to reach scientific certainty.160 
The Biotech Panel rejected this view, relying on the reasoning of EC- Hormones. 
The Panel stated that the precise definition and content of the precautionary 
principle is not clear, and the ‘legal debate of whether the precautionary principle 
constitutes a recognized principle of general or customary international law is still 
ongoing’, and therefore it ‘need not take a position on whether or not the 
precautionary principle is recognized principle of general or customary 
international law.’161  
Biotech’s ruling stated four aspects of the relationship between the SPS Agreement 
and the precautionary principle. First, the precautionary principle does not justify 
measures otherwise inconsistent with the SPS. Secondly, while the precautionary 
principle is reflected in Article 5.7, it does not mean that Article 5.7 exhausts the 
application of the precautionary principle to the SPS. This must be the case since 
Article 3.3 allows Members to establish their own level of sanitary protection. 
Thirdly, a panel that has been asked to consider whether or not there was ‘sufficient 
scientific evidence’ for a measure should ‘bear in mind that responsible, 
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and 
                                                 
ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of safe transfer, handling and use of living 
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human 
health and specifically focusing on transboudary movement.’  
158 Articles 10.6 and 11.8 of the Cartagena Protocol- ‘lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects 
of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the 
party of import, taking also into account risks to human health, shall not prevent the party from 
taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism…, in 
order to avoid and minimize such potential adverse effects.’ 
159 Annex III states: ‘Lack of scientific knowledge or scientific consensus should not necessarily be 
interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk.’ 
160 Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products (n 123) p. 27. 
161 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras.7.88- 7.89. 
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precaution where risks of irreversible damage to human health are concerned.’ 
Lastly, the precautionary principle does not replace ordinary principles of treaty 
interpretation.162 
 
3.2 Overlap and linkage (The EU, the US, and international law) 
Both the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol are signed 
and ratified by the EU. Argentina and Canada have signed, but not ratified, the 
Biosafety Protocol.163 The US is not party to the CBD, and therefore has not signed 
the Biosafety protocol. However, the US did attend the Convention with a 
delegation, and worked with-like minded countries (making up the Miami Group, 
which included Canada, Chile, Argentina, Australia, and Uruguay).164 The Panel 
noted that the Protocol became legally effective two weeks after the establishment 
of the Panel. The Panel added that the fact that the US participates in the Protocol’s 
Clearing House Mechanism does not mean the rules of the Biosafety Protocol can 
be deemed to apply to the US. Consequently, the Panel is not obliged to take into 
account an obligation created under the Protocol, or a defence argued by reference 
to the Protocol.165 The Protocol is legally binding only on countries that have 
ratified it.  
The Biotech Panel confirmed, in line with previous jurisprudence, that it had to 
interpret WTO agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law as reflected in Article 31(1)(c) of the VCLT. The Panel’s 
analysis of Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna convention rejected the EU’s defence. 
Having first determined that the two instruments indeed establish ‘rules of 
international law’, the Panel then considered whether they were also ‘applicable in 
the relations between the parties’. The Panel focused on the notion of ‘parties’ in 
this context, the panel took the view that ‘the rules of international law to be taken 
into account in interpreting the WTO agreements at issue in this dispute are those 
which are applicable in relations between WTO [M]embers.’ It added that Article 
31(3)(c) should be interpreted ‘as requiring considerations of those rules of 
                                                 
162 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.87; Repeated the AB in Hormones para. 124. 
163  Last checked on 11 July 2007. 
164 Cathleen A. Enright ‘United States’ (n 89) pp. 95-100. 
165 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.75, p 302, 
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international law which are applicable in the relations between all parties to the 
treaty which is being interpreted’, because this ‘ensures or enhances the consistency 
of the rules of international law applicable to these states and thus contributes to 
avoiding conflicts between the relevant rules.’166   
In Biotech, the Panel determined that ‘the parties’ meant all the parties to the WTO, 
rather than the ‘disputing parties’ or ‘one or more parties’. Therefore, it could not 
take account of ‘relevant of rules of law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ in its interpretation of the relevant WTO agreements unless they had 
identical membership to the WTO. 167  Then, the Panel pointed out that the CBD 
and Cartagena Protocol did not have the same coverage of Members as the WTO 
covered agreements, noting, in particular, that the US had not ratified either 
instrument.168 Furthermore, the Panel decided not to rule on whether the 
precautionary principle could constitute a relevant rule of international law 
according to Article 31(3)(c). The Panel based its decision on a review of recent 
commentaries and cases regarding the precautionary principle. The Panel also 
stressed that a treaty interpreter could rely on any relevant international law only if 
it found such recourse useful, but was under no obligation to do so. Therefore, it 
simply stated ‘We do not consider that in interpreting the relevant WTO 
agreements, we are required to take into account other rules of international law.’169 
If all parties to the disputes were parties to the Cartagena Protocol, the EU could 
have invoked two principles of international law, lex posterrior derogat legi priori 
and lex specialis derogate legi generali, which may apply when two conflicting 
treaties relate to the same subject matter and involve the same parties. The 
Cartagena Protocol could be said to reflect a more recent and more specific 
expression of state consent than WTO Agreements.170 
The Panel’s finding leaves the relationship of the Protocol with the SPS Agreement 
and other international agreements in a grey area.171 As a result, the EU will be left 
                                                 
166 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras. 7.68-70. 
167 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.68. 
168 Panel Reports, Biotech, paras.7.47-7.75. 
169 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.95. 
170 Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products (n 123) 16. 
171 WTO, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs)’ (n 10); Alexia Herwig, ‘Whither Science in 
WTO Dispute Settlement?’ (2008) 21(8) LJIL 838. 
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with conflicting obligations without interpretive means, complicating its 
observance of international obligations. Ultimately, the Panel’s ruling contributes 
to increase the fragmentation of international law.172 The Panel noted:173 
Other relevant rules of international law may in some cases aid treaty interpreter in 
establishing, or conforming, the ordinary meaning of treaty terms…Such rules 
would not be considered because they are legal rules, but rather they may provide 
evidence of the ordinary meaning …they would be considered for their informative 
character. 
Criticism of the Panel’s ruling on this point is based on the fact that the Panel went 
too far in interpreting Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention to apply only if all 
WTO Members are parties to a treaty. ‘Given the number and diversity of WTO 
Members, this would be requirement impossible to fulfil. It is also unfortunate that 
the panel seems to have rejected any interpretive value of non-WTO treaties, an 
approach in stark contrast to that adopted by the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp.’174 
The implications of this position are important for future WTO disputes involving 
conflicting norms.175 Margaret Young argued further that these non-WTO sources 
were crucial also to the Panel’s analysis of the applicability of the relevant covered 
agreements.176  
The next section considers the relationship and the overlap between the Cartagena 
Protocol and the SPS Agreements in light of EU and US involvement in negotiation 
of international law. 
                                                 
172 Study Group of the International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’ (n 6) 
pp. 12-14. 
173 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.92 
174 Joanna Gomula, ‘Environmental disputes in the WTO’, in Malgosia Fitzmaurice (eds) and David 
M. Ong, and Panos Merkouris (eds) Research Handbook on International Environmental Law 
( Research Handbooks in International Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010). 
175 Margaret A. Young, ‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of 
the Biotech Case’ (2007) 56(4) ICLQ 913. Young also calls into question the Panel’s approach of 
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176 CBD and Cartagena Protocol should have been used to clarify the concept ‘SPS Measure’ in 
section 2.3 above. See Margaret A Young, ‘The WTO use of relevant rules of international law’ (n 
4) p.  908. 
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3.2.1 SPS v Cartagena Protocol  
The drafters of the Protocol, most of which were also WTO Members, were aware 
of the overlap between the Protocol and the WTO Agreements. They made every 
effort to ensure that its provisions and other trade agreements would be mutually 
supportive and complementary.177 The Preamble of the Protocol emphasizes that 
the ‘Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations of a party under any existing international agreement’, whilst claiming 
that this statement is ‘not intended to subordinate the Protocol to other international 
agreements’. 178 Therefore, the Protocol’s preamble contains a saving clause, which 
attempts to regulate the relationship between the Protocol and other international 
agreements.179 
The second additional phrase captures the political sentiment expressed during the 
Cartagena Protocol negotiations that environmental agreements are not of a lower 
status, class, significance, or importance than trade agreements, and that inclusion 
of a saving clause in the Protocol should not be understood to lower or lessen it.180 
The EU favoured a ‘Cartagena Protocol that would support and be supported by 
other international agreements and apply simultaneously with them.’181 The EU’s 
view on inclusion of the ‘no subordination’ preambular language in the Protocol 
text reaffirms the application of the rule of Article 30(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention. 182 
In spite of this attempt, the relationship of WTO agreements and the Cartagena 
Protocol is unclear and open to various interpretations. The reason is that WTO 
agreements do not include a conflict clause, nor do they clarify their relationship 
                                                 
177 Appendix. ‘The Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization, in, Ruth Mackenzie, et. 
al.  , ‘An Explanatory Guide to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’, IUCN Environmental Policy 
and Law Paper no. 46 (2003) can be found http://www.iucn.org last visited11/07/07, p. 226. 
178 Biosafety and the environment, an introduction to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, (n 130) 
p.12.  
179 Sabrina Safrin, ‘The relationship with other agreements’ in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & 
Helen Margot, eds, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with 
Environment & Development? (Earthscan Publications 2002) pp. 445-446. 
180 Ibid p. 446. 
181 Margarida Afonso, ‘The relationship with other international agreements: an EU perspective’ in 
Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & Helen Margot, eds, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: 
Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment & Development? (Earthscan Publications 
2002), p.  424. 
182 Ibid, p. 434. 
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with pre-existing or future treaties.183 The Preamble to the Agreement establishing 
the WTO recognises that ‘trade should protect and preserve the environment’ in a 
manner consistent with Members different levels of economic development.184  
The EU and US regulatory rivalry played a role in shaping international law since 
both of them attempted to influence the international legal framework within which 
WTO rules operate. Both are active within the SPS Committee185 and other 
standards setting institutions, such as Codex Alimentarius, with rivalling focuses 
on definition of science and the use of precaution in trade.186 Negotiations of the 
Cartagena Protocol witnessed this rivalry. The EU advocated the incorporation of 
the precautionary principle into the Cartagena Protocol,187 while the US actively 
led the Miami Group in expressly opposing its inclusion.188 Some commentators, 
and many NGOs, argued that the US timed its complaint with the entry into force 
of the Protocol. In Biotech, the US wanted to maintain the legal supremacy of the 
SPS Agreement, whose more demanding scientific standards for trade-restrictive 
regulatory policies enabled the US to prevail in its dispute over the EU’s 
precautionary measures on GMOs.189 
 
Overlap and interaction of the Protocol and the SPS Agreement adds challenges to 
an already complex scenario, and will continue to give rise to further conflicts 
                                                 
183 It should also be noted that the Protocol governs some transboundary movements of LMOs that 
are unrelated to international trade, and would thus fall outside the scope of the WTO. The 
unintentional transboundary movements of LMOs through, for example, the spread of pollen, is 
covered by the Protocol, but would not be covered by the WTO.  
184 Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trading Organisation, 15 April 1994.  
185 The committee, among other things, is seen to operate as contextualizing regime, whereby 
Members arrive at settled understanding of the standards laid down in the agreement, and of their 
implications for the boundaries of legitimate regulation by the Members States. See Joanne Scott, 
The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) pp. 41-75. 
186 The EU sought actively to export its precautionary approach to the international trade, 
environmental, and food safety regimes, and thus help shield the EU from a WTO legal challenge., 
see Gregory C Shaffer & Mark A Pollack, Regulating Between National Fears and Global 
Disciplines: Agricultural Biotechnology in the EU, (Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/04, NYU 
School of Law, New York, 2004) 43; Scott, Joanne, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (n 5) p. .274.  
187 Christoph Bail et al., ‘European Union’ (n 90) p. 185; David Vogel, ‘The Politics of Risk 
Regulation in Europe and the United States’, manuscript for publication in (2003) 3 Yearbook of 
European Environmental Law. pp. 61-62  
188 Cathleen A. Enright ‘United States’ (n 89) pp. 95-98. 
189 Steve Suppan, ‘US Vs EC Biotech Products Case: WTO Dispute Backgrounder’, (2005) ITAP 
p. 15, available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refid=76644%20. 
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between GMO exporting countries and potential importers.190 Potential tension 
arises from the following of issues. 
Risk assessment 
The SPS Agreement and the Protocol have different understandings of risk 
assessment. Under the SPS Agreement, measures must be based upon a risk 
assessment process ‘taking into account available scientific evidence and economic 
factors, including the objective of minimizing negative trade effects.’191 The 
Protocol, on the other hand, endorses a more open-ended approach, drawing on the 
precautionary approach. Article 15 of the Protocol states that ‘risk assessment 
should be carried out in a scientifically sound manner in order to identify and 
evaluate the possible adverse effects of LMOs on the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, taking into account risks to human health.’192 The import 
of LMOs may be approved by the designated national authority with or without 
conditions. It may also be prohibited, or subject to requests for additional 
information. Silence from the party of import in response to an initial notification 
does not imply consent to transboundary movement.193 There are also provisions 
for review of decisions in light of new scientific information regarding the potential 
adverse effect of the LMO.194 States are permitted to take action more protective of 
biodiversity than provided for in the Protocol, such actions must be consistent with 
both the Protocol and with that state’s other obligation under international law, e.g. 
WTO trade related obligations.195  
The requirement that risk assessment ‘shall be carried out in a scientifically sound 
manner’ entails taking account not only the provisions of the Protocol but also of 
‘recognised risk assessment techniques’. The Biosafety Protocol also permits 
importing countries to take into account socio-economic concerns. Article 26 
enables the parties to take into account, when deciding whether and under which 
                                                 
190 Helen Trudeau and Celine Negre, ‘Precaution in the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and 
its Impact on the World Trading System’ in Marcus W Gehring and Marie Clair Cordonier Segger 
(eds), Sustainable Development in World Trade Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2005), 
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191 Article 5. 
192  See also, Nuffield Council on bioethics, The Use of Genetically Modified Crops in Developing 
Countries-a Follow up Discussion Paper (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, December 2003), p. 69. 
193 Cartagena Protocol, Article 9(4). 
194 Cartagena Protocol, Article 12. 
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conditions to allow the import of LMOs, ‘socio-economic considerations arising 
from the impact of LMOs on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to indigenous 
and local communities.’ It allows trade restrictive measures justified by the fact that 
imports will lead to loss of cultural tradition, knowledge, and practices, stressing 
the special value that biological diversity has to indigenous communities, and its 
effect on their socio-economic environment.196 It is clear that decision making 
regarding LMOs must be grounded in ‘sound science’ and those non-scientific 
factors will not provide unchallengeable grounds for refusal to import LMOs under 
the Protocol. For example, a general consumer concern regarding genetically 
modified foodstuffs will not provide unchallengeable grounds for refusal to import 
LMOs under the Protocol.197 
Neither Article 5(2), nor 5(3) of the SPS Agreement retains socio-economic 
considerations in its risk assessment. Nevertheless, the list of factors that a party 
may take into account in its decision making is not exhaustive. Consequently, socio-
economic considerations may play a role in a government’s decision to be more or 
less risk averse. However, no trade restrictive measures will be allowed based solely 
on socio-economic considerations.198 
Precaution 
The Protocol and the WTO SPS Agreement include differing language on how 
governments should make decisions under conditions of scientific uncertainty. The 
Protocol explicitly embodies a precautionary approach (preamble, and Articles 10.6 
and 11.8), and explicitly permits countries to prohibit the import of certain LMOs 
(Article 10.3) to protect from risks to biodiversity and human health.199 The SPS 
Agreement, by contrast, merely ‘reflects’ the precautionary principle in Article 5.7, 
which  allows Members to adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on a temporary 
or provisional basis to be reviewed ‘within reasonable period of time’. 
Even without sufficient scientific evidence, the SPS Agreement includes 
‘precautionary language’ that permits standards to be adopted provisionally.200  
                                                 
196 Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products (n 123) p. 29. 
197 Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the environment (n 27) p. 645. 
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Article 5.7 of the SPS allows for situations in which there is insufficient information 
available to the import country to make a scientific determination, in particular to 
take into account available scientific evidence in risk assessment in order to justify 
trade barriers, which can only be made on a temporary or provisional basis. This 
does not permit a measure to be justified on the basis of the precautionary principle 
if it is contrary to the explicit requirements of the SPS Agreement.201 The Protocol 
on the other hand, endorses a more open-ended approach, drawing on the 
precautionary approach.202 It explicitly adopts the precautionary principle for the 
regulation of food, feed, and processed LMOs, allowing import regulation even in 
the face of ‘lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient scientific information’.203 
This major overlap between the Protocol and The WTO raises many questions, for 
example, regarding the relation between the terms ‘insufficient scientific evidence’ 
and ‘scientific uncertainties’. The influence of uncertainty in determining whether 
scientific evidence is insufficient in a given situation. It also raises questions about 
the status of the principle in international environmental law, and whether it has any 
contribution towards sustainable development.  The Panel in the EC-Biotech case 
did not rule on this conflict as it did not apply the Cartagena Protocol to its analysis 
of precaution under the SPS agreement, thus raising high the hurdle for the 
interpretation of WTO agreements in the light of other instruments. 
The next section questions whether the science-based obligations of the SPS 
Agreement are capable of accommodating legitimate regulatory diversity. It 
focuses on how science, risk assessment, and precaution, as defined and interpreted 
by the Panels, can be read in light of the wider understanding of science and risk as 
explained in Chapter 2, section 2.7. It is important because the definition of these 
concepts determines what is considered a legitimate barrier to trade, a legitimate 
risk, and essentially, how states set the level of protection. 
 
                                                 
201 Beef Hormones (AB) paras 124-5; See also Patricia Birneie et al, International law and the 
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4 Science and SPS Agreement  
The question of how the WTO Panel can strike an appropriate balance between 
maintaining domestic regulatory space to respond to scientific uncertainty, on the 
one hand, and the need for predictable trading relations, on the other, will thus 
depend on the interpretation of particular WTO obligations and their application on 
a case by case basis to particular domestic measures.204 All SPS measures require a 
scientific basis. The SPS reliance on science serves to verify WTO Members’ ‘risk 
regulatory policies’ to curb disguised protectionism.205 Therefore, science and risk 
assessment lies at the heart of the SPS Agreement’s strategy of reviewing and 
exercising oversight of national regulations.206  
While science is the primary mechanism underpinning risk assessment, in recent 
years the ‘strength of hold science on society has waned considerably’ in some 
countries. This is due to two main reasons. The first is the low level of public faith 
in the ability of science to deliver solutions to manifest risks by ‘experience’.207 
Chapter 3 explained how public opposition in Europe is notable and shaped the 
regulatory choices.208 The second reason is the increasing and complex problems 
of uncertainty within science itself, making the reliance on science difficult to frame 
risk. Risk assessment is always interwoven with uncertainty because it must ‘rely 
on the interfaces and extrapolations whose correctness cannot be proven by 
scientific method’.209 Chapter 2 demonstrated that the high level of uncertainty 
surrounding GMOs/biotechnology poses a challenge to the law. 
The Amicus Curie Brief by the ‘Group of Academics’ recognised that risk 
assessment is neither a single methodology, nor a 'science': 
Rather, 'risk' situations lie within a matrix defined by two 
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variables: certainty and consensus. At one extreme are cases characterized 
by high certainty with respect to the knowledge base to be relied upon, 
and high consensus with respect to the parameters of the scientific issues to 
be addressed, the analytic methods to be applied, and the values to be 
protected. At the other extreme are low certainty and low consensus on such 
matters. The nature and adequacy of any risk assessment will depend on the 
position of an issue within this matrix - and GMO technologies fall squarely 
in the low certainty, low consensus range.210  
The Group of Academics compared Biotech to previous WTO dispute cases, such 
as Importation of Salmon (1998) and Prohibition of Asbestos and Asbestos 
Products (2001), which were characterized by high certainty and high consensus 
with respect to the basic parameters, scientific knowledge, analytic methods, and 
values relied upon in risk assessment. 211  
The Group of Academics and others suggest that the SPS Agreement represents a 
suitable response to attempts by WTO Members to restrict imports for traditional 
products. It is arguable that for innovative products, such as the GMOs, where 
challenges are more complex, the SPS may be inadequate.212 As a result, ‘the status 
of science as a co-traveller with law has become ever more strained and new 
paradigm for interdisciplinary interaction is urgently required.’213 
The next two sections analyse the SPS Agreement’s science based obligations 
allowing WTO Members to adopt measures, as laid out in its substantive provisions 
in Articles 2.2, 3.3, 5.1, and 5.7. These contrast with Biotech’s perspective, and 
consider the extent to which the EU can define its own ‘appropriate level of 
protection’. This is done by questioning the interpretation of elements of protective 
measures, which must be based on a ‘risk assessment’ and not maintained without 
‘sufficient scientific evidence’ because there is space for judicial discretion to be 
exercised by future panels and appellate bodies.  
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4.1 SPS and International Standards 
The SPS Agreements stipulate the need to take into account other existing 
international agreements and other relevant State practice.214 Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement provides that SPS measures to be based ‘on as wide basis as possible’ 
on international standards, guidelines or recommendations where they exist. An 
SPS measure that conforms to international standards is presumed to be necessary 
to protect health or life.215 Article 3.3 allows Members to apply higher standards ‘if 
there is scientific justification, or as consequence of the level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection a member determines to be appropriate’.216  
The SPS Agreement explicitly recognises ‘three sister organisations’ for setting 
standards, guidelines, and recommendations relating to food safety issues,217 and 
for the harmonization of food safety measures affecting trade.218 The standard 
setting organisations are the Codex Alimentarius for food safety, the International 
Office of Epizootics for animal health, and the Plant Protection Convention for 
plant health. Neither the CBD, nor the Protocol, is currently recognized as a 
standard setting body under the SPS Agreement. The SPS Committee 
also monitors the use of these international standards.219 WTO Members are 
required to base their food safety measures on their standards, otherwise they must 
be based on risk assessment.  
The Office International des Epizooties (OIE) is the world organisation for animal 
health. The OIE develops standards and guidelines designed to prevent the 
introduction of infectious agents and diseases into the importing country during 
international trade of animals, animal genetic material, and animal products. Some 
                                                 
214 SPS Agreement, Article 3.1, Annex A, Article 3. International standards, guidelines and 
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of the standards developed by the OIE deal with diseases that have human health 
and biosafety significance. The OIE has had a working group on biotechnology 
since 1996.220 
The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) is a multilateral treaty for 
international cooperation in plant protection. The IPPC protects plant health by 
assessing and managing the risks of plant pests and invasive species. It is in the 
process of setting standards to address the plant pest risk associated with GMOs 
and ‘invasive species’. Any GMO that could be considered a plant pest falls within 
the scope of this treaty. The IPPC allows governments to take action to prevent the 
introduction and spread of such pests.221 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission is responsible for compiling global 
standards, codes of practice, guidelines and recommendations that address food 
safety and consumer health.222 The Codex has established an ‘ad hoc task force on 
foods derived from biotechnology’ to develop standards guidelines or 
recommendations, as appropriate, for genetically modified organisms.223 
 In 2003, the Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted a set of ‘Principles and 
Guidelines on foods derived from biotechnology’ to help countries coordinate and 
standardise regulation of GM food to help ensure public safety and facilitate 
international trade.224 The guidelines call for safety assessment of all GM foods 
prior to their approval for commercial use. The Commission sets standards 
regarding risk analysis, and international guidelines for assessing and managing any 
health risk for foods derived from biotechnology. Both traceability and food 
labelling were named as risk management tools. The SPS Agreement grants the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission a prominent role, with its standards enjoying a 
considerable weight in determining whether national measures are in conformity 
with the Agreement. States can establish more exacting conditions than those 
contained in the Codex standards, but only if justified based upon a scientific risk 
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assessment of the products in question.225 
Member may only depart from international standards when the scientific evidence 
provides due reason. In Hormones the Panel found that the EU violated Article 3.1, 
determining the import ban was not based on international standards and was 
imposed without scientific justification. In the Biotech dispute over GMOs, the 
Panel referred to the Codex.226 The incorporation of the international standards 
provide a degree of deference to non-WTO rules through the presumption of 
consistency with certain WTO rules in case international standards are complied 
with.227 Scott notes that while ‘international standards in particular were regarded 
as aids to interpretation; they were not treated as dispositive with the panel 
exhibiting a willingness to depart from them in favour of a more expansive 
understanding’.228 Lee also finds ‘[g]ranting special status to standards is especially 
strange when considered alongside the irrelevance of Cartagena Protocol.’229  
 
4.2  Risk assessment to be based on scientific evidence  
 
Member have an ‘autonomous right’ to establish their own level of sanitary 
protection,230 but it must be based on proper risk assessment and subject to the 
various requirements of Article 5. In Biotech, the Panel suggested that adequate risk 
assessment had to be based on evidence ‘gathered through scientific method’ with  
‘a complete, self-contained, scientific evaluation’, result only admissible231     
 
In spite of this, the definition in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement specifies that 
risk assessment must first ‘Identify’, then  ‘Evaluate the likelihood’ of entry, 
establishment or spread of these diseases, as well as the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences, ‘according to the SPS measures that might 
                                                 
225 See Joanna Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (n 5), Chapter 
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229 Despite the remark, Lee considers the wording of the Cartagena Protocol very ambiguous, and it 
is not clear whether it would have been helpful for the EU's defense. See Maria Lee, EU Regulation 
of GMOs (n 82) p. 232. 
230 Hormones 1998, 172. 
231 Panel Reports, Biotech, para 7.3188 
262 
 
be applied’.232 Risk assessment must be ‘specific’ to the case at hand, and must take 
into account ‘risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organisations’.233 ‘Risk is a complex concept, however, entailing judgments not 
only about the probability and scale of harm, but about causes of harm, the effects 
of the activities, substances or processes in question, and their interaction over 
time.’234 
 
According to Article 5.2, risk assessment will take into account available scientific 
evidence. The importance of such evidence is reinforced by Article 2.2, which 
requires SPS measures to be ‘based on scientific principles’, and not ‘maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence’. In Japan-Apples, the Panel indicated that 
any evidence presented should be gathered through scientific methods.235 Non-
demonstrable hypotheses and purely circumstantial evidence are considered non-
scientific.236 In the EC-Hormones case, the Appellate Body determined that 
sufficient evidence cannot be based on theoretical science, whilst in the same 
paragraph indicating that science is never absolute and embodies a degree of 
theoretical uncertainty.237 This is a narrow risk assessment procedure, in which 
hypothetical and long term risks are difficult to incorporate, leaving aside the 
application of the precautionary principle. Furthermore, the tight connection 
between the SPS measures and the scientific evidence does not allow room for 
consideration of other legitimate unscientific factors. 
 
In Hormones, the EU was found to have violated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement 
because its ban was not based on risk assessment (i.e. an evaluation of potential for 
adverse effects on human health arising from the presence of certain hormones in 
meat). The Appellate Body clarified that risk is not exclusively scientific, 
providing: 
It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a risk 
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assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science 
laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in 
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential 
for adverse effect on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die. 238   
The approach in Hormones shows some acknowledgment of the limitation of 
science as arbiter of SPS risk. It suggests a broader understanding of risk assessment 
by accommodating the divergent opinions and real world risks. The result is a less 
intrusive standard of review applicable in the scrutiny of Members’ risk 
assessments. This echoes Appellate Body’s reasoning under GATT violations, 
which allows countries more autonomy in reaching decisions about acceptable 
types and levels of risk. The Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle did not rely 
exclusively on examining the sufficiency of the scientific basis of the measures, and 
turned to various process based alternatives to evaluate whether risk claims were 
genuine and legitimate. Similarly in Asbestos the Appellate Body undertook an 
explicit weighing of value concerns in determining the necessity for trade restrictive 
measures to implement.239 
 
 Yet, in the Biotech dispute, the Panel ruled that all nine national safeguard 
measures, which were imposed by EU Member States against GMOs and had been 
approved at the EU level, were not based on risk assessment consistent with Article 
5.1. The Panel therefore concluded that the safeguard measures violated WTO 
rules. Simply by enacting measures that trumped EU risk assessment protocols. It 
did not need any further investigation.240 The Panel made no mention of the 
extensive expert advice it received at any stage in its analysis of the scientific basis 
of the safeguard measures.  
Herwig, criticized the Panel in Biotech for not engaging in scientific evidence to 
determine the sufficiency or otherwise  relevant scientific evidence as a basis for 
provisional restrictions on the marketing of some GMOs. She added that ‘had it 
done so it might have discovered that scientific assessment and regulation of GMOs 
has to cope with uncertainties and incomplete background knowledge 
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notwithstanding the fact that some scientists consider risk assessment of GMOs to 
be possible.241     
 
Again, the criticism of the Panel’s finding has revolved around the role of science 
in the SPS Agreement. The Panel attributed a broad scope to risk assessment under 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel also read the Article 5.1 exception as 
placing the burden of proof on the EU to prove GMOs are unsafe.  
 
Herwig noted that the concept of risk assessment as defined in Annex A(4) is 
sufficiently open to include forms of scientific evidence with different degrees 
corroboration ‘since nothing is said about specificity, conclusiveness, or real world 
circumstances’. 242 Even though it is clear that the competence of WTO bodies is 
limited to consideration of claims under covered agreements, when elucidating the 
content of the relevant rights and obligations WTO bodies must situate those rights 
and obligations within the overall context of general international law.243 
 
Drawing on social scientific findings regarding the limitations of science-based risk 
assessment in diverse risk settings, Peel contends that a more coherent and 
principled approach to application of the process based standard of review would 
allow for its adjustment according to the nature of the risk situation under 
consideration, WTO should undertake a review of the processes by which a decision 
on such measure are reached, rather than their technical accuracy.244 
 
4.3 ‘Uncertainty’ and precautionary measures 
WTO Members could argue that relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, and 
adopt a provisional measure according to Article 5.7 of the SPS based on the 
available pertinent information. A number of WTO panels have recognized the right 
of a Member State to take a precautionary measure under the SPS. In EC Asbestos, 
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the AB held that ‘it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine 
the level of protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given 
situation.’245 
 
 
 Nevertheless, they listed strict conditions that must be met for these measures to 
be compatible with WTO rules.246 The Biotech Panel, following the AB’s findings 
in Japan- Agricultural products II,247 determined that Article 5.7 sets out four 
cumulative requirements that must be met for adopting and maintaining provisional 
SPS measures:  
 
1. An Article 5.7 SPS measure may be imposed only in a situation where 
relevant scientific information is insufficient; 
2. The provisional measure must be adopted on the basis of available 
pertinent information; 
3. The Member adopting the measure must seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk; and 
4. The Member must review the SPS measure within a reasonable period of 
time.248 
 
Members are obliged to actively seek the needed additional information, which 
must be ‘germane’ for conducting a more objective risk assessment, and must do 
so within a ‘reasonable period of time’ to be determined on a case-by-case basis.249 
 
In the Japan-Apples case, the AB confirmed the need for the cumulative 
requirements to be met in order for WTO Members to adopt and maintain 
provisional SPS measures. The AB clarified that ‘the application of Article 5.7 is 
triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but rather by the 
                                                 
245 Asbestos, para,168. 
246 See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 
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247 The case was about a complaint by the US relating to requirement imposed by Japan (invoking 
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each certain agricultural product. Japan-Agricultural products II  
248 Panel Reports, Biotech, para. 7.2973; and Japan-Agricultural products II, para. 89. 
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‘insufficiency’ of ‘relevant scientific evidence'. It stated that ‘relevant scientific 
evidence’ will be ‘insufficient’ within the meaning of Article 5.7 if the body of 
available scientific evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the 
performance of an adequate assessments of risks as required under Article 5.1, and 
as defined in Annex A to the SPS Agreement. The text of Article 5.7 is clear: it 
refers to “cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”, not to “scientific 
uncertainty”. The two concepts are not interchangeable.’250  
 
Having rejected the EU’s argument that Article 5.7 contains specific rules for the 
assessment of provisional measures, the Biotech Panel also recalled that Article 5.7 
could be characterised as a ‘qualified right’ rather than an ‘exception’ from the 
general obligation under Article 2.2. This means that if a challenged SPS measure 
was adopted, and is maintained consistently with the requirements of Article 5.7, 
the obligations in Article 2.2 would not be applicable. 251 
Broude criticized the Panel’s finding on the relationship between Articles 2.2, 5.1, 
and 5.7. He found it an obscure textual interpretation that distorts the way they 
interact. He regarded the Panel’s discussion of a ‘qualified right’ under Article 5.7 
unnecessarily confusing. He advocated for a ‘substantive, contextual interpretation’ 
in which Articles 5.1 and 5.7 are applications of the general SPS Agreement 
obligations under Article 2.2 to ‘two distinct situations- one, where there exists 
scientific evidence sufficient to establish an SPS measure on risk assessment; the 
second where scientific evidence insufficient for such a purpose.’252 
 
 
The Panel went on to interpret Article 5.7 with reference to Article 5.1. The Panel 
concluded that ‘if an SPS measure challenged under Article 5.1 was adopted and is 
maintained consistently with the cumulative requirements of Article 5.7, the 
obligations in Article 5.1 to base SPS measures on risk assessment is not applicable 
to the challenged measure.’253 The Panel applied this understanding to assess the 
                                                 
250 Japan- Apples para. 184. 
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consistency of the different safeguard measures taken by some EU Member States. 
First, it examined whether risk assessment within the meaning of Annex A(4) and 
Article 5.1 had been conducted. The Panel seemed to be searching for ‘a complete, 
self-contained, scientific evaluation’ of particular GMO risks.254 To the extent that 
risk assessment was found to exist, the Panel then considered whether each measure 
was ‘based on’ the relevant risk assessment. 255  
 
Various studies and reports used by EU Member States to support their safeguard 
measures were framed by the Panel as incomplete risk evaluation. It assumed that 
the suggestions of uncertainties, the lack of field data and the inability to reach 
definitive conclusions about risk were failing of the studies as risk assessments and 
not indications of the unsettled state of the underlying science.  Peel noted that the 
Panel in Biotech did not question current state of the underlying science on GMOs 
to provide the basis for more comprehensive, case by case assessments of the likely 
health and environmental effects of different GM crops. This failing of the studies 
could have been ‘a reflection of the insufficiency of this body of evidence as a basis 
for an adequate risk assessment of risks satisfying the requirements of Article 5.1’. 
256 
In Biotech, the Panel also stated that ‘if there are factors which affect scientists’ 
level of confidence in a risk assessment they have carried out, a WTO Member may 
in principle take this into account.’257 The Panel added that ‘there may conceivably 
be cases where Member which follows a precautionary approach, and which 
confronts a risk assessment that identifies uncertainties or constraints, would be 
justified’ in adopting a stricter SPS measure than another Member responding to 
the same risk assessment.258 Yet, the Panel took the view that the conclusion of a 
favourable risk assessment by EFSA indicated the sufficiency of the underlying 
scientific evidence. It did not question why and how EU Member States assessed 
risk differently, particularly in cases where alternative assessments turned on 
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‘possible uncertainties or constraints in the risk assessments in question’.259 The 
Panel later wrote a letter to the parties, annexed to the decision, seeking to reinforce 
the capacity of Members to adopt protective measures on the basis of new additional 
information: 
The panel’s findings relating to Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement preserve 
the freedom of Members to take prompt protective action in the event that 
new or additional scientific evidence becomes available which affects their 
risk assessments. Particularly if the new or additional scientific evidence 
provides grounds for considering that the use or consumption of a product 
might constitute a risk to human health and/or the environment, a Member 
might need expeditiously to re-assess the risks of human health and/or the 
environment. 260 
This letter can be understood as seeking to reinforce the capacity of Members to 
adopt protective measures on the basis of new additional information, or reverse of 
its position in the ruling.   
Reading the Biotech’s Panel’s finding together, we find that the broad scope 
attributed to ‘risk assessment’ under Article 5.1 combined with the high threshold 
for precautionary measures adopted on the basis of Article 5.7 of the SPS, made 
recourse to Article 5.7 difficult on account of its narrow interpretation. The Panel’s 
ruling is restrictive despite its commitment to the ‘domestic autonomy’ of Member 
States to choose the appropriate level of protection.261 In relation to EU Member 
States’ bans, the Panel held that because the studies conducted at the EU level 
constituted risk assessment, the measures fell outside the scope of Article 5.7, which 
only applies where there is insufficient evidence to conduct such risk assessment.  
 
An amicus curia by the Group of Academics concluded that ‘[a]n overly rigid 
conception of risk assessment and regulation in this area…could undermine the 
legitimacy of the SPS Agreement and the WTO more generally.’ The brief 
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recognised the appropriate role of the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel as that of an 
administrative tribunal reviewing the adequacy of executive decision-making 
processes not that of an adjudicatory body reviewing the substantive merits of the 
parties' risk assessments.262 Therefore, judicial review of decisions about hazards 
need to take into account the non-scientific qualities of hazards that can be 
anticipated on the basis of reasonable scientific evidence when determining whether 
there is sufficient scientific basis for regulatory purposes.263 
 
A legal understanding of GMOs concentrating solely on the regulatory details and 
ignoring the broader context provides less than the whole story. It also has the 
potential to both mislead and misrepresent the true nature of how GMOs are 
governed at the international level.264 On the one hand, there is an interest in 
deference towards the approach a given Member takes to the management of risks 
such as, health safety, or the environment. On the other hand, there is also an interest 
in preventing new protectionist barriers arising under the guise of precaution. 
 
The EU maintained its extensive regulatory framework, covering a number of 
issues ranging from release into the environment, to food and feed, to allowing 
Member States to have more options and choices in deciding whether to cultivate 
GMOs. The EU exercised regulatory autonomy with higher standard as a matter of 
preference, a long there is no consensus  as to the scientific uncertainty it has not 
been possible to establish a clear and consistent line whether it is legitimate or in 
breach of Articles 2.2, and 5.5 of SPS Agreement.   The inconsistency between 
trade on the one side, and human and environmental protection on the other will 
continue to give rise to conflicts between GMO exporting countries and potential 
importers.  
 
However, further escalation of trade disputes is counterproductive because 
‘potential plaintiffs may conclude that winning a domestic political support from 
crucial constituencies by escalating a trade dispute is more important than actually 
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winning the case.’265 The EU and US are ‘repeat players’ at the WTO DSU system, 
and ‘are able to pursue strategic litigation’, looking not only for success in a specific 
case but also for a trade framework interpreted in a way that best reflects their 
interests.266 
 
Political constraints and consumer attitudes may limit the utility of WTO dispute 
settlement rulings; therefore the outcome of a dispute may be considered a ‘negative 
conflict’ whose political costs may be higher than the gains from the legal 
victories.267 The Biotech dispute has occasionally been criticized for endangering 
the WTO dispute settlement system as it entailed questions of democracy and the 
role of government in the WTO system in addition to conflicting and sometimes 
hidden views on technological development and corporate power.268  
  
The key for achieving a balance lies in the preamble to the 1994 Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. It provides that the 
expansion of production and trade must allow for the ‘optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking 
both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing 
so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels 
of economic development.’ 269  
The preamble has influenced the interpretation of the WTO covered agreements, 
including the GATT in the Shrimp-Turtle and Asbestos cases.270 The Appellate 
Body’s use of internationally principled interpretation have helped it move away 
from the free trade focus of earlier GATT panel awards, such as in the Tuna Dolphin 
case. This has allowed the AB to ‘begin the task of developing a new and more 
environmentally nuanced jurisprudence, in a manner which appears to justify the 
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decision taken at Marrakesh in 1994 to create a more formally judicial dispute- 
Settlement machinery.’271  
French points to the following extract from US-Shrimp to point that legally there is 
no distinction between GATT and the SPS Agreement as annexed agreement to the 
WTO Agreement to justify the diverse approaches:272 
The preamble of the WTO Agreement- which informs not only GATT 1994, 
but also other covered agreements –explicitly acknowledges ‘the objective 
of sustainable development’. 
This concept has been generally accepted as integrating economic and social 
development and environmental protection. 
We note once more that this language demonstrates recognition by WTO 
negotiators that optimal use of the world’s resources should be made in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development’. 
 
The increase of mutual trust and cooperation between the EU and US is also 
required to prevent future disputes. Both must be willing to change their own 
policies, and provide less affluent countries with sufficient incentives to modify 
their policies as well.273 It also necessitates efficient systems of identity 
preservation and labelling.274  
Furthermore, it is better for the EU and the US to negotiate the differences over 
risks within the SPS Committee or within the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
which can be accommodating of risk judgements at the domestic level.  Scott 
describes the SPS Committee as sitting amongst the non-judicial accountability 
mechanisms of the WTO, as part of its ‘largely invisible infrastructure’.275 The SPS 
Committee provides Members a participatory and cooperative framework outside 
of dispute settlement in which proposed regulatory measures can be discussed with 
reference to the Agreement's provisions, and adjusted to reflect others' trade 
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concerns.276 The SPS Committee can hypothetically adopt ‘precautionary principle’ 
similar to that provided in the Cartagena Protocol. This can be used in future 
disputes as a change to the interpretation of Article 5.7 of SPS Agreement, which 
would consequently change the rights and obligations of WTO Members in respect 
to the SPS Agreement.  
5 Conclusion 
The Panel expanded the scope of the SPS Agreement beyond the traditional sanitary 
and phytosanitary realm to include a wider range of health and environmental 
protection measures. At the same time, it disposed of complaining parties’ claims 
on technical grounds to avoid a decision on the validly of the measures under WTO 
jurisprudence.  This has been seen by some as means of sidestepping divisive issues 
over GMO safety.277 
The Biotech case is a good example of a dispute arising from the intersection of the 
need for establishing international harmonisation and the need for Members to 
maintain their sovereign right to acknowledge public policy goals within their 
health and environment protection measures.  It is important for WTO Member 
States to diminish arbitrary and unjustified trade barriers. However, the WTO must 
not do so at the expense of a Member’s right to consider more than just hard 
scientific evidence when developing health and safety measures to protect their 
citizens. 
The last section of this chapter offered means for responding to many of the 
limitations posed by an over-reliance on science and science based risk assessment 
in complex and uncertain risk situations. In order to avoid conflicts, a country’s 
obligations should be read together and considered cumulatively. The Panel in the 
Biotech dispute limited its analysis to a primarily jurisdictional framework, giving 
wide scope to the SPS Agreement. It also failed to rule on the nature of GMOs or 
the relationship between WTO law and the Cartagena Protocol. In doing so, the 
Panel reinforced the schism between the WTO and Cartagena Protocol.278 
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We should aim for a system that is able to accommodate and minimise these 
concerns. The gaps and lack of consensus scientific knowledge, as well as the 
application of the precautionary principal are fundamental issues. They can be 
better understood by using international agreements to interpret WTO Agreements 
and to clarify the meaning of national measures or laws adopted by a WTO Member 
unilaterally.  
Biotech was not appealed, therefore it remains unclear to what extent the Appellate 
Body might follow the same reasoning on the interpretation of the scope of SPS 
measure, and insufficiency of scientific evidence for the purpose of Article 5.7. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
GMOs have become one of the most relevant topics today, and it will continue for 
years to come. GMOs promise significant potential to improve efficiency of 
agricultural production, environmental management, and ultimately to help feed the 
world’s growing population. The previous chapters demonstrate that GM crops are 
fast joining agriculture throughout many parts of the world, and are playing an 
increasingly important role in global food production. More and more of the foods 
we eat are being produced by genetically altered organisms.  
 
However, GMOs raise concerns over uncertain benefits and risks that are hard to 
assess due to lack of full scientific knowledge; much concern stems from unknown 
risks associated with GMOs and their impact on human health and surrounding 
environment. Moreover, GMOs know no geographical barriers, once they are 
released to the environment; there are no borders for cross pollination.1 
 
 We have also seen that the scope of the debate over GMOs is far reaching. There 
are concerns that have implications in economics, law, science, human rights, 
technology, international relations and ethics, to name but a few fields of 
knowledge.  
 
European Communities - Measures affecting the Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products Biotech highlights the divide in regulatory and cultural attitudes 
between the European Union and the United States over authorisation and access 
of GMOs. 2  The competing views of the US and the EU offer very different 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 2, Section 2; Clive James, ‘Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops’ 
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assessments of risk, and advance conflicting visions of the proper role for 
government regulation of this technology.  
 
On the one hand, the right of the EU to set its own standards and regulatory 
framework to protect human health and the environment according to the specific 
alleged preferences of European consumers, and on the other, the market access 
right of the US products in the EU market. Biotech highlights that the conflict about 
GMO is not limited to the WTO; it also extends to other international agreements, 
in particular to the Cartagena Protocol which raises a range of overlaps over how 
to conduct risk assessment and precautionary measures. 
 
This thesis highlights the significant implications of the Panel’s Ruling in Biotech. 
In particular, it affects the EU or other WTO Member ability to develop and 
maintain a regulatory system for GMOs that allows for the use of precautionary 
measures to protect human and/or environment when there is insufficient scientific 
evidence to assess the risks of a biotech product presented to governments for 
commercialization approval? 
 
The Panel in the Biotech dispute based its ruling on the narrowest finding against 
the EU. The Panel found the EU guilty of ‘undue delay’ in its regulatory approvals 
or commercial use. It also found the EU at fault for national ‘safeguard bans’ on 
EU-approved GMOs, ruling that these national bans were not based, as required, 
on scientific assessment of the risks.3  The failure to reach full settlement and the 
retaliation measures by the US have confirmed that the US-EU dispute over GMOs 
is far from being over. At first glance, in Biotech  dispute,  the EU again faces a 
long, drawn out trade dispute with the United States - ie, the United States won 
victory in the first stage but the battle between ‘sound science’ and ‘precaution’ 
rages on. 
 
                                                 
3 The requirement for a scientifically based risk assessment on which to base a trade-related SPS 
‘measure’ under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. Also, the application of provisional SPS 
measures when there is inadequate scientific information about a specific product on which to base 
a risk assessment Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. See Chapter 1, section 3.5  
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A number of broad conclusions that are thematic to the biotech dispute emerge out 
of this research: 
First, there is a division among scientists over the safety of GMOs; clearly, the 
scientific community is not unanimous in its opinion on GMOs. While some praise 
the potential, others caution against their use. Since science cannot provide all 
answers or certainties, it raises concerns among the general public about the effects, 
and whether or not GMOs are safe. The long term consequences of GMO 
technology is still unknown, it will be matter of time to judge which way is better. 
It is worthwhile noting that GMOs produced to date may be valuable to US farmers 
and multinational seed companies, but has no direct consumer benefit, such as 
added nutritional value or improved taste.4  
Second, Biotech ruling did not reverse European consumers distaste for GMOs. In 
line with public support, under the revised EU legislation, the authorisation process 
remains complicated, long, and slow, in particular those authorisations made under 
the Deliberate Release Directive and the Food and Feed Regulation. Therefore, the 
ruling did not weaken the EU’s ability to use a precautionary approach in order to 
meet public health, safety and environmental objectives.  
Evidently, the EU’s regulations imposing restrictions on genetically modified foods 
and seeds remain an ongoing source of trade tension with the US.  
Third, this thesis highlights that decisions regarding the development, planting and 
regulation of different aspects of GMOs takes place at many levels and are 
influenced by international regimes and national policies. Currently, there are 
multi-sources of international instruments that address various aspects of biosafety 
in general and, GMOs in particular. This reality came to be as a result of having 
several international organisations that are involved in developing rules applying to 
GMOs.  
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Fourth, the rules which are included in various legal instruments may not be fully 
consistent with each other and probably continue to give rise to future conflicts 
between GMO exporting countries and potential importers. Therefore, until these 
conflicts between precautionary and more permissive approaches are reconciled, 
the international regime surrounding GMOs could not be an effective instrument 
for its members. Clearly, there is a tension between the trade regime, which seeks 
to limit discretion that might be unfairly used for protectionism, and a principle that 
grants great deal of discretion to national level regulator. International legal 
developments illuminate the question of whether it is appropriate for science to play 
such central role in international legal systems dealing with regulation of health and 
environmental risk. The challenge is to find a way to limit a potential for 
protectionism without being so heavy handed as to impede legitimate rule making 
that accommodate other concerns. 
Fifth, some of the Panel’s findings were unduly dismissive of relevant sources of 
international law outside the WTO framework, by declining to consider their 
relevance in interpreting substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement and failing 
to show an appropriate degree of deference towards EU’s regulatory autonomy.  
Finally, The EU did not change its authorisation regulatory framework, the Biotech 
Ruling did not weaken the EU’s ability to employ precautionary approach in its 
regulation to protect public health, safety, and the environment. However, 
extending the scope of the SPS Agreement is problematic and will continue to place 
the onus on the EU to demonstrate that its regulatory framework pertaining to GM 
products is based on scientific risk assessments and not otherwise disguised 
restrictions on trade. Biotech ruling may influence other WTO members, in 
particular developing countries that have not established regulatory regimes for 
GMO crops.  
The world could use all the benefits GMOs have to offer, but the contested question 
is how much risk is too much risk? Arguably the EU’s regulatory framework takes 
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into account, while designing their domestic regulatory framework, its obligations 
under WTO and other international law.5  
Disappointment from the outcome of the biotech was widely expressed by the EU, 
many of EU Member States, and numerous civil society groups. The EU believes 
that ‘the legal ambiguity surrounding the possibilities of such a challenge causes 
uncertainty and doubt over the effectiveness and legal status of such measures and 
thus weakens the Cartagena Protocol’.6 Moreover, the EU wanted legal recognition 
to the precautionary principle by the WTO, and further clarification of the 
relationship in order to harmonise the EU and the WTO approaches to regulatory 
policy formation in the face of scientific uncertainty. 
Central to this research is the Panel’s application and interpretation of SPS 
Agreement to determine its applicability to the EU measures which brought about 
the dispute. The Panel found that relevant legal instruments constituting EU 
regulatory framework at the time of the establishment of the Panel constituted SPS 
measures within the meaning of Annex A of the SPS Agreement.7 In addition, the 
Panel found that EU Member State’ bans on GMOS fell within the definition of 
SPS measure in Annex A of the SPS Agreement; the Panel reasoned that the EU 
failed to conduct appropriate risk assessment before the imposition of the contested 
measures and thus violating the SPS Agreement.8 This expansive application of the 
SPS Agreement makes current EU regulatory framework vulnerable to future 
challenge through WTO dispute resolution.     
Therefore, despite having the right to determine the level of protection of health 
that they consider appropriate in a given situation, the regulatory freedom of a 
Member establishing SPS measure is limited to an ‘objective and rational 
relationship’ between the scientific evidence and the SPS measure, taking into 
account that those measures should be the least trade restrictive ones (it does not 
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allow any room for the consideration of other legitimate factors that can be far from 
science).  
The problem with SPS Agreement is that it presumes that science can give 
determinate answer to whether the regulatory mechanism is justified in view its 
stated objective and whether a less restrictive measure can be found. Notions of risk 
assessment and scientific justification play a central role in this normative 
framework. Science holds a key role in turning the distinction between protectionist 
and legitimate regulations. Therefore, GMOs continue to pose a challenge to the 
WTO in terms of its capacity to resolve the problem of uncertainty underlying 
dispute about risks of GMOs. 
Proposed solution 
The reasoning in Biotech will very likely be used as a guide by future WTO panels, 
convened to resolve disputes relating to food safety, public health and 
environmental health measures. However, Biotech was not appealed and therefore 
the impact of its legal conclusions is arguably limited.9 Therefore, future panels 
entrusted with disputes raising similar issues still have the opportunity to situate its 
decision within the broader realm of public international law, and to demonstrate 
an awareness of the interconnectedness of international instruments. 
 
In the Short term, future panels should utilise the preamble to the WTO Agreement 
to ensure that appropriate interpretation sensitive to socio economic considerations 
will be followed when interpreting the SPS Agreement. Increased sensitivity of 
WTO law to environmental and non scientific factors will allow the WTO to coexist 
with other international treaties. This change requires an open minded approach to 
different types of knowledge claims, willingness the risk assessment process to a 
single discursive universe. 
In the long term, most important changes will come from increased dialogue across 
the Atlantic that builds on agreement among scientists and includes a broader mix 
                                                 
9 Joanna Gomula, ‘Environmental disputes in the WTO’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, David M Ong, 
Panos Merkourris, Research Hand book on International Environmental Law (Research 
handbooks in international Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010) 
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of representatives from both sides within the WTO and other international fora.10 
A special emphasis should be placed on the needs of developing countries 
Therefore, we need ‘– above all - political will: a desire to make our rules and 
regulations compatible…’11 Furthermore, A positive outcome requires appropriate 
supporting economic and environmental policies at national and international 
levels.12 
Addressing GMOs responsibly may help us learn how to address the broad array of 
risks to human and environmental health and safety on our fast changing planet. It 
is important to do so because trade liberalization can have a positive impact on 
the environment by improving the efficient allocation of resources, promoting 
economic growth, and generating revenues that can be utilized for environmental 
improvement. However, in the absence of effective environmental policies and 
regulations, or when distortive domestic policies exist, increased economic activity 
generated by trade liberalization can contribute to environmental problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
                                                 
10 Patrice Laget and Mark Cantley, ‘European Responses to Biotechnology: Research, Regulation, 
and Dialogue’, Issues in S. and T. Summer 2001 http://bob.nap.edu/issues/17.4/p_laget.htm 
11 Statement by President Barroso on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Press 
Release, (13 Feb2013) SPEECH/13/121 
12 ‘Environment and Trade’ A Hand Book(second edition)2005 IISD,UNEP, p.117 
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